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The South Australian Civil Service began in I836 as a 
'formed' bureaucracy. It was, for example, classified in a 
rudimentary fashion, duties were defined and pluralities 
were few. In the period before responsible government 
(1836), though not remarkably inefficient, the Service 
came under strong attack from colonial politicians as it 
grew in size and cost, for it was regarded as a creature 
of the Governor. Colonists asserted their right to be 
informed about the work of the government departments, and 
regulating Acts of 1832 and 183^- arose directly from this 
situation. Most colonists knew little of the workings of 
the Service, and were suspicious of it, but the self­
esteem of officials grew throughout the early years as 
they emphasized the importance of their contribution to 
the young colony.
In the period 1837-7^ a close relationship grew up 
between the heads of departments and a small Ministerial 
'elite' owing to the conservative and cautious instincts 
of both groups, their feeling of mutual dependence and the 
developing ideas of 'service' and 'duty' at the top of the 
Service. The heads were mostly young men who had risen 
quickly to the top through a combination of fortuitous 
circumstances and the gap separating them from their 
subordinates, in terms of salary and social status, was 
wide. They were eager to conserve the status quo and the 
development of the colony in these years was steady rather 
than spectacular. Ministers also, having made some early 
financial reforms and having brought a number of boards 
into the departmental structure, were intent on running a 
going concern. Barring scandal or corruption, the heads
Vhad absolute control over the personnel practices of their 
departments, and the Service was small enough to permit 
informal consultation between them on related matters.
They were not restricted by staff organizations and so 
those in a position formally to regulate the Service were 
not interested in doing so. A Civil Service Act of 187^- 
was no more than an unenthusiastic attempt to alleviate 
discontent in the lower ranks of the Service, mixed with a 
feeling of obligation towards subordinate officers and a 
realization that the Act could be ignored at any time (as 
it soon was).
After 187^ fresh economic pressures, the arrival of 
new men at the top of politics and administration and a 
rapid expansion of governmental functions (especially in 
railways and public works) after twenty years of 
consolidation broke down the comfortable relationship 
between Ministers and senior officials. The Civil Service 
was in a less privileged position, certain of its 
financial rights were revoked, it had to adapt itself to 
new tasks and the status of its members in the community 
declined. Partly because of this the Civil Service 
Association, consisting almost exclusively of senior 
officials, was formed (l884) to gain from governments 
concessions that had previously been granted informally 
and as a matter of course. Economic troubles and 
dissension within the Service itself, however, ensured 
that legislative and public attention was directed towards 
cutting the cost of the Service, and politicians proposed a 
Civil Service Board to effect this. The proposal drew 
support from the early notions that the Service should be 
open to public inspection, although initially the Board
vi
was seen as playing only a narrow financial role. Senior 
officials feared that a Board would trench upon their own 
powers if instituted and their fears were confirmed when a 
Royal Commission (l888-9l), set up to advise on 
retrenchment, instead recommended a Board of wide powers.
However, this went too far for the legislators, whose 
flagging interest rendered the too-energetic Reports of 
the Commission ineffective for more than twenty years, a 
situation which the Association did its best to make 
permanent. But it could not raise the declining financial 
and social position of officers and, having failed to 
restore the old administrative ethos, was forced gradually 
to widen its membership to remain in existence. During 
the 1890s a number of internal battles were fought between 
the old guard and lower grade employees dissatisfied with 
their lot, with piecemeal reforms, and with the efforts of 
the Association. This latter group turned to the 
discarded idea of an independent Board to manage the 
Service and urged its adoption after gaining control of 
the Association. Neither press, Parliament nor public 
displayed interest in the matter - partly because the 
Service itself had for too long been divided about it - 
but the example of other states and the need to integrate 
servicemen into government employment eventually 
precipitated acceptance of the proposal for an independent 
personnel authority in the Public Service Act of 1916.
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INTRODUCTION
2Aims of the Thesis
The development of the South Australian Civil Service 
from I836 to 1916 was one instance of the process of 
administrative reform that took place in Britain and 
Australia during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The first period of administrative reform in 
Britain, in the fifty or so years before the Reform Act of 
1832, was concerned with clearing away the archaic 
practices of preceding centuries. Demands for economy in 
administration, aroused by the American War of 
Independence and the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars, were 
supported by the growing industrial classes, whose 
opposition to extravagance, secrecy and corruption Bentham 
reflected. Political parties, more clearly defined, used 
the cry of reform to berate their opponents, and increased 
Cabinet unity made it possible to treat the Civil Service 
as one entity. The broadening of the political franchise 
and the ever growing functions of government increased 
demands for efficiency as well as economy, and the second 
period of reform, especially after the Northcote-Trevelyan 
Report of 1835? was concerned particularly with improving 
the quality of civil servants. Reform in Britain was 
characterized by the emergence of an Executive responsible 
financially to Parliament, and by the division of politics 
and administration. Civil servants were given security of 
tenure and the Ministerial department was favoured as a 
means of ensuring the political responsibility of the 
administration to Parliament. The staffing and financial 
procedures of the Service were standardized and
3centralized, as subsequently were the means of 
implementing technical efficiency.
The institutions which embodied these reforms were, 
in addition to those mentioned, the independent Civil 
Service Commission for centralized, non-political 
recruitment; the Administrative Class to separate 'the 
intellectual from the routine work of the Service'; the 
powerful machinery of 'Treasury control'; and the 
financial oversight by Parliament through the Comptroller 
and Auditor General and the Committee of Public Accounts.
None of these institutions developed in the 
Australian colonies of the same period, although a number 
of writers have observed that these colonies were in a 
position to benefit from periods of administrative reform 
in Great Britain. R.S. Parker, for example, has pointed 
out that the financial reforms made in Britain between
1780 and 1815 were 'perfectly reflected in the Colonial
1Blue Books for New South Wales'. He and others have
suggested a connection between the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report of 183^~35 and the Victorian Commission of Inquiry
under Professor Hearn (1862), and between the British
Superannuation Act of 1859 and similar measures enacted
2soon afterwards in Australia, Few have ventured into the
1
R.S. Parker, 'Public Administration as the Study of 
Bureaucracy', Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. XV,
No. 1 (March, 1956) , p.32.
2
See, e.g., F.A. Bland (ed.), Government in Australia; 
Selected Readings (2nd ed.; Sydney: Government Printer,
1 9 4 4 ) , p .xiii; Gerald E. Caiden, Career Service: An 
Introduction to the History of Personnel Administration in 
the Commonwealth Public Service of A u s t r a l i a (Melbourne: 
MelbourneUniversity P r e s s , 1965) , p .36; T .H . Kewley,
(cont. p .k )
4period between the early 1860s and Federation, but R.L. 
Wettenhall has noted that 'a movement was developing in 
the Australian colonies for the establishment of a career
civil service removed from political patronage, after the
1British style' and C.J. Hayes has referred to 'the
beginnings of reform... which followed the Northcote-
Trevelyan Report in England in denouncing political
patronage...during the next thirty years various attempts
2were made to remove i t '.
The fact is that while the earlier measures of 
administrative reform in Britain were rapidly transmitted 
to the colonial administrations in Australia by mid­
century, this process practically ceased after self- 
government came to most of the Australian colonies in the 
1850s. From this time on the British influence on 
Australian administrative development was diluted almost 
to nothing, and explanations for the shape of that 
development must be sought in the social, economic and 
political history of the colonies themselves. As S. Encel 
has said in a similar context, the traditional approach
1 ( continued from p.3)
'Recruitment in the Public Service, with Special Reference 
to the New South Wales Public Service', Public 
Administration (London), Vol. XVI, No. 4 (October, 1938),
pp.445-46; Robert S. Parker, Public Service Recruitment in 
Australia (Australian Council for Educational Research; 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press in Association with
Oxford University Press, 1942), p.22.
1
R.L. Wettenhall, 'Public Corporations under the 
Commonwealth Government of Australia' (unpub. M.A. 
dissertation, Dept, of Political Science, University of 
Tasmania, 1958), pp.26-27*
2C.J. Hayes, 'The Administration of State Public Services', 
Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. XV, No. 2 (June, 1956),
p. 1 1 6 .
5takes the British pattern for granted, as a norm 
from which Australia deviates in observable 
ways....A more adequate understanding is likely 
to emerge if British institutions are taken not 
for granted, but as the outgrowth of a unique 
social configuration. If Australia is similarly 
treated, the reasons for the adoption of what is, 
superficially, the same form of government will 
become clearer, as will the true nature of both
the differences and the similarities to the1original model.
What the Australian colonies inherited from British 
administrative reform were, so to speak, the ’external' or 
'sociological' aspects of Weberian 'bureaucracy' - the 
separation of official from private life; the canons of 
impersonality, impartiality, probity and rationality; the 
ending of sinecures, pluralities, performance of duties by 
deputy, and proprietorial rights to public office. But 
the 'internal' or 'organizational' aspects of Weber's 
ideal type, like the above-mentioned British institutions 
of the second half of the century, did not transplant 
readily to Australian soil. The first settlers in South 
Australia, for example, were aware of the British 
administrative reforms prior to I836, and were determined 
that their Civil Service should be rational, bound by 
known rules, efficient, cheap and free from the evils of 
nepotism and improper influence. Nevertheless, the early 
Service was characterized by uneven working conditions, 
vague occupational and functional divisions, inconsistent 
accounting practices and, even before self-government, a 
diffusion of control. Like the other Australian Services,
1
S. Encel, Cabinet Government in Australia (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1962), p.2 .
6it developed gradually into a modern career service 
characterized by standardization of conditions of 
employment, recruitment by examination, promotion by merit, 
position classification and administration by an 
independent personnel authority. Even then it remained 
different in important respects from the parent Civil 
Service in Great Britain, and much more so from the 
Continental bureaucracies that were most familiar to Max 
Weber.
The first major question posed, then, by a study of 
Australian administrative history is: what were the
important differences in the Australian development and 
how can they be explained? Some of the answers to this 
question might throw light on the more general problem of 
the relations between social development and administrative 
styles.
A closer investigation of this problem would be 
facilitated by comparing the patterns of administrative 
development in the different Australian colonial Services 
themselves. Australian political historians have been 
unduly tempted to generalize from the little administrative
history that has been written, most of it about the public
1services of New South Wales and Victoria. The present 
thesis is an attempt to redress this imbalance by 
examining the formative period of the South Australian 
Civil Service up to the passing of its first modern Public
1
Cf. G.E. Caiden, The Study of Australian Administrative 
History, Paper presented to the Australasian Political 
Studies Association (Melbourne, 1963), pp.1-3*
7Service Act in 1916, It is hoped in this way to broaden 
the foundations for the comparative studies that will be 
necessary in the future.
South Australia has been chosen for this purpose on a 
number of grounds. Not least were the facts that the 
writer knew the State at first hand, and had already made
a preliminary exploration of its administrative history
1for his Bachelor's thesis. But there are more objective 
reasons for the choice. South Australia was (and still 
is) in many ways unique among the Australian settlements. 
It was never a convict colony. It never experienced 
military rule, and existed for only twenty years before 
the advent of responsible government. It never 
experienced a gold rush and the associated social, 
economic, demographic or political upheavals. Its one 
experience of foreign immigration was quite smoothly 
assimilated. It never had the substantial Irish and 
Catholic minorities of other colonies. Its economy 
remained remarkably homogeneous, with negligible mining 
and industrial development until comparatively recent 
times. Its economic development was not punctuated by the 
sharp controversies and bitter competition characteristic 
of the eastern colonies, over land, the pattern of 
communications, trade policy, or industrial relations, nor 
by such severe fluctuations of boom and depression.
1
'Movements for Civil Service Reform in South Australia: A 
Brief History of the Years I836-I916, with Special 
Reference to the Civil Service Commission of 1888' (unpub. 
Bachelor's dissertation, Dept, of History, University of 
Adelaide, 1.963)* The present thesis is complementary, in 
content and treatment, to the earlier one.
8Geography was important here. Adelaide always contained a 
high proportion of the population of the colony and 
settlement spread out from it in an orderly manner, for 
much of the colony was desert, and areas of pastoral and 
agricultural expansion, for example, were clearly apparent; 
the methodical founding of new settlements in an order 
ordained by geography similarly reduced arguments about 
where railway lines should go . 1 Its political history was, 
as a result, comparatively placid and harmonious.
This contrasting historical background invited 
examination in any attempt to enlarge and enrich the 
existing picture of Australian administrative development. 
And even at first glance there appeared to be some obvious 
contrasts between public administration in South Australia 
and that of the eastern colonies previously studied.
South Australia was by a substantial margin the last of 
all the colonies to pass a Public Service Act on modern 
lines. Its Civil Service, though one of the smallest in 
the continent, has always exhibited, at least on the 
surface, one of the most complex and diffuse patterns of 
departmental and extra-departmental organization. And 
compared to those of Victoria and New South Wales, at 
least, it seemed during the nineteenth century to have 
aroused remarkably little interest or concern among 
politicians and publicists on the score of patronage,
1
Cf. E.M. Bjorklund, Focus on Adelaide: Functional 
Organization of the Adelaide Region, Australia, Department 
of Geography Research Paper No. 4 l , University of Chicago 
(Chicago: By the author, 1955)» pp.13-23* and Griffith 
Taylor, Australia: A Study of Warm Environments and their 
Effect on British Settlement [4th ed.; London: Methuen,
1947), p.273.
9corruption, overstaffing, extravagance, inefficiency, or 
industrial discontent.
These superficial contrasts raised obvious questions. 
Was the South Australian Civil Service really different 
from those in other colonies? Did the laggard appearance 
of its first comprehensive Statute betoken a triumphant 
surmounting of the normal problems of organization and 
staffing encountered elsewhere, or a complacent 
conservatism protecting outworn methods and outdated 
privileges to the last ditch? Were South Australian civil 
servants themselves unusually favoured or unusually 
obsequious in their comparative indifference to militancy 
and employee organization up to the first world war? How 
far and in what ways were these differences related to the 
peculiar background of South Australian society and 
history? In particular, was there any evidence to link 
these characteristics with South Australians' estimate of 
the contributions their Civil Service had made to the 
development of the State? Were these contributions 
important or negligible? Were they thought to have been 
rendered imaginatively and efficiently, or with bumbling 
indifference, or with self-serving cynicism?
Scope of the Thesis
Questions
This thesis does not attempt to deal fully with all 
of these questions. In particular, it does not examine in 
any detail the substantive role of public administration 
in South Australian development. F.K. Crowley has pointed
10
out that ’the historical role of the "State” in South 
Australian development awaits attention, especially in 
relation to public works, railway policies, state 
socialism, and public utilities'.^ This need is not met 
here. Emphasis below is on the problems of staffing the 
Service (economic rights of officers, legal, official and 
social status, motivation, esprit de corps, attempts at 
self-betterment; the evolution of a career service), and 
on the problems of organization and management (structure 
and hierarchy; coordination, control, communication and 
classification). It is clear that these matters, which 
constitute what may be termed the 'internal' Civil Service, 
are not distinct from the functional concerns of 
government, the 'external' Civil Service. A Civil Service 
develops in complex interaction with its environment but, 
since little South Australian history has been written, 
that environment is unevenly known; and the functions of 
government are an important channel between the 'internal' 
Service and its environment. On the one hand, statements 
about, for example, the effectiveness of classification or 
the morale of civil servants imply other statements about 
the effectiveness of government activity in the community. 
On the other hand, changing functions imply, over time, a 
need for internal change, such as*new organs of 
coordination, in an expanding Service.
These matters cannot be ignored, but the functional 
concerns of government are treated as briefly as possible,
1
F.K. Crowley, 'South Australian Political Bibliography', 
Politics: The Journal of the Australasian Political 
Studies Association, Vol. I , No . 1 (May, 1966) , p744.
11
and so are the formal, legislative landmarks in the 
development of the Service. Wide ranging and often 
nebulous changes in society - in the educational system, 
in political groupings, in communication with other 
colonies, for example - influenced change in these areas, 
and to such wider influences the development of the 
'internal’ Service is traced.
'What can we learn from administrative history?',
1asked Dwight Waldo. Anderson and Gaus have emphasized
the importance of administrative history 'as a complement
to economic, political, social and cultural history', for
without it 'other aspects of...history [cannot] be
2correctly presented'. And Mansfield has referred to
3'philosophical observations', which encompass 'the major
4mechanics of society as a whole': 'general observations
or conclusions which, though they do not decide concrete
5cases, "help establish a mood of understanding"'. This 
thesis is not a history of South Australia, though it is 
hoped that it will contribute to that history. But it
1
Dwight Waldo, The Study of Public Administration (4th 
printing; 'Studies in Political Science'; New York: Random,
1961), p.51.
2
William Anderson and John M. Gaus, Research in Public 
Administration (Social Science Research Council: Committee
on Public Administration; Chicago: Public Administration
Service, 19^5) > p.71*
3Quoted in Waldo, p.31*
4
Quoted in Dwight Waldo, 'Five Perspectives on the Cases 
of the Inter-University Case Program', Essays on the Case 
Method, ed. E.A. Bock et. al. (n.p.: International
Institute of Administrative Science, 1962), p .56.
5
Quoted in Waldo, Study of Public Administration, p.51-
12
does draw on aspects of history, not always considered in 
relation to administrative history, in an attempt to 
secure a better 'understanding' of administrative 
development.
'The Civil Service*
As several writers have said, it is difficult
formally to define a Civil Service and the government
1employees it contains. This thesis is concerned chiefly 
with the central government departments and with those 
employees whose work was mainly of a clerical or 
supervisory nature. Statutory corporations and their 
servants, teachers, police, labourers and the militia do 
not fall within this area. However, the term Civil Service' 
is used elastically, for different groups of government 
employees regarded themselves as civil servants at 
different times. Until 1875» for example, printing office 
employees considered themselves as civil servants, but by 
1900 they did n o t , and this development was paralleled in 
other areas of government employment, such as the Police 
and Railways Departments; the change was due partly to the 
increased size of the Service, and partly to a growing 
feeling of exclusiveness amongst white-collar workers.
When necessary, the term is taken to include employees 
whose activities influenced, or reflected, the development 
of those officers more usually considered civil servants.
_ —
See, e.g. , W.J.M. Mackenzie and J.W. Grove,. Central 
Administration in Britain (London: Longmans Green, 1957)»
pp.15-2 1 .
2
It began to give way to 'Public Service' at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, but the earlier term is here 
retained throughout.
13
The growth of the government work force (less than 30
permanent employees in 1837; almost 1,700 in 1916) alone
makes some exclusions necessary, but a different problem
is raised by the small number (in relation to total
Service numbers) of heads of departments throughout the
period (thirty-nine in i860; sixty-two in 1916).
Particular emphasis is placed on senior officials below.
This is inevitable, since they commanded more public
attention, and were themselves more publicly articulate,
than their subordinates. Any account of the development
of the Service must therefore be distorted, in so far as
the role of junior officers is understated. But analysis
supports the view of Knight and Schaffer:
In understanding small services... individual cases 
matter. They will undoubtedly, as precedents, 
have constituted one of the factors creating the 
prestige structure... .The individual, whether he 
represents an exception or the rule, is altogether 
more significant for assessing the quality, 
atmosphere, and traditions of the top of a service 
than some not particularly dominant statistical 
trend.1 2
Studies of prominent officials are therefore frequently
used, partly because of the biases of source material, but
2mainly because of their explanatory value.
1
B.B. Schaffer and K.W. Knight, Top Public Servants in Two 
States (University of Queensland Papers: Department of 
History and Political Science, Vol. I, No. 1; St Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1963), PP»35> 5*
2
Biographical information is derived from the sources 
listed in the Bibliography under Biographical Works 
(below, pp.515-6) ; these sources are cited hereafter as 
Biographies.
l4
Period
This study nominally covers the eighty years Prom the 
foundation of South Australia in I836 to the Public 
Service Act of 1916, but the years from 1857 to 1892 
receive most emphasis. Whilst the Civil Service bore the 
marks of its South Australian environment before 1857, 
self-government opened the way to new influences that the 
powers of the Governors had formerly suppressed. By 1892, 
the idea of an independent personnel authority had been 
raised, discussed and endorsed by a Royal Commission, and 
the central arguments of the debate, though opposed by 
governments and senior civil servants, remained unchanged 
until 1916. In 1857» colonial politicians assumed full 
control of the affairs of their colony and were confident 
of their ability to manage the Service; by 1892, their 
confidence was lessened and alternative means were 
proposed to manage and control the Service. These changes 
are a central element in the narrative below.
PART ONE : ORIGINS, I836-I856
16
South Australia was to be a model colony, and the 
first sqttlers recognized the importance of efficient 
government in achieving this. Official antagonisms, 
however, almost caused the colony to fail in its first 
years of existence. Governors indulged in little formal 
regulation of the Civil Service: its efficiency depended
on the character of each Governor, and on the economic 
condition of the colony. When the colonists achieved a 
limited measure of self-government in 1851, they strongly 
criticized the Governors' administration of the Service 
and passed two Acts purporting to regulate it. But few 
colonial politicians were genuinely interested in the 
problems of the Service. Their activity was meant to 
embarrass the Governor. At the same time, developments 
within the Service itself were of later importance: the
growing seclusion and pride of officers marked them for 
eighty years.
CHAPTER I
THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE GOVERNORS
18
Foundation
England and the colonies
The Britißh Empire increased in size four fold in the 
fifty years after the American War of Independence but no 
regular pattern of development was apparent apart from the 
Tory insistpnce that the Empire should be governed from 
London, a view that was increasingly opposed. The War 
convinced some that the colonies would form closer and 
more amicable bonds with the mother country if granted 
independence, while others condemned the commercial 
restrictions of the colonial system as bureaucratic, 
oppressive and unintelligent. But English ignorance about 
colonies was great and the question of colonization 
languished under widespread apathy.
1
The following account of the origins and foundation of 
the colony of South Australia is drawn mainly from:
Charles E. Carrington, The British Overseas: Exploits of a
Nation of Shopkeepers (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1950) \ secs. V, VII; Klaus E. Knorr, British
Colonial Theories, 1570-1850 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 19*44), Pt I I ; Douglas Pike, Paradise of 
Dissent: South Australia, 1829-1857 (London: Longmans 
Green, 1 9 5 7 ) » chap. II; A .Grenfell Price, ’Experiments 
in Colonization', The Cambridge History of the British 
Empire, ed. J. Holland Rose, A.P. Newton, and E.A. Benians 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933 ), Vol. VII,
Pt I, pp.213-7; Robert L. Schuyler, The Fall of the Old 
Colonial System (Oxford: Oxford University Press , 194-5) >
chap. II; Edward Gibbon Wakefield, The New British 
Province of South Australia (2nd ed.; London: Knight,
1835)j and A View of the Art of Colonization, in Letters 
between a Statesman and a C o l o n i s t (London: Parker,1849); 
Donald Winch, Classical Political Economy and Colonies 
(London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 
1965), pp.99-104, 109-11.
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The Napoleonic Wars changed this as a fast-growing 
population, the return of' soldiers, the relapse of 
marginal lands pressed into productivity during the wars, 
the increasing use of machinery and the disorganization of 
commercial conditions, an influx of Irish labour and 
frequent harvest fluctuations combined to produce 
widespread unemployment and pauperism. Poor law costs 
soared and many, influenced by Maithus* gloomy predictions, 
saw emigration as the best means of reducing poverty, 
expenditure and human misery. There seemed few other 
acceptable remedies - birth control and the wider use of 
Irish lands found few champions - and emigration further 
recommended itself as a political safety-valve. A number 
of Parliamentary attempts were thus made between 1815 and 
about 1825 to test the proposed remedy. In I8l6 war 
veterans were despatched to Canada, in 1819 , 1821, 1825 
and 1827 Parliamentary grants were made towards the 
emigration costs of paupers, Parliamentary Committees 
investigated the question in 1826 and 1827, and the 
abolition of prohibitions against skilled artisans leaving 
the country in 1824, the repeal of some of the Navigation 
Act restrictions in 1825 and the repeal of most of the 
Passenger Acts in 1827 helped to speed emigration.
Improving economic conditions in the early 1820s 
resulted in a change of emphasis. It was argued, perhaps 
most forcibly by Edward Gibbon Wakefield, that there was 
congestion in all classes of society and that Britain was 
overstocked with capital and was suffering from a lack of 
markets. Capital did not find employment immediately, and 
a glut of capital might cause over-trading and a 
consequent fall in profits and wages; and for this
20
Situation the remedies of free-traders like Parnell, Greg 
and Villiers were insufficient.
The Wakefield plan
It was Wakefield's central idea that outlets for
capital and labour might be found in the virgin lands of
the British Empire. There had been considerable capital
exported from Britain in the 1820s, no doubt hastened by
the foreseeable collapse of the East India Company, and
this had culminated in the 'bubble year' of 1825* But
Wakefield planned a less haphazard scheme than this:
emigration of capital and labour was not to be merely a
1'shovelling out of paupers' nor a means for the 
enrichment of a few, but a plan to extend British 
civilization, to provide new markets for British commerce 
and to open up opportunities for resourceful men by the 
application of certain principles of colonization. These 
were, briefly, that the prosperity of a new colony 
depended upon an abundance of labour; that the revenue 
derived from the sale of land was the best means of paying 
for their emigration from England; that land should be 
sold at a price sufficiently high to prevent labourers 
becoming land-owners too quickly; that land should 
therefore be sold at a uniform price per acre for all 
qualities and all situations, and not by auction; and that 
this system would lead to an advantageous concentration of 
population.
1
Charles Buller (op whom, see Pike, pp.90-l), quoted in 
Knorr, p.269.
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This was an eclectic plan and in Wakefield's hands it 
gained as much from the denigration of colonizing 
experiments like the Swan River settlement, which 
Wakefield rather unfairly plaimed was brought close to 
ruin by the low price of land, as from its own 
demonstrable merits. Wakefield was perhaps motivated 
mainly by a desire for power and influence, and he did not 
set foot in a colony until after 1850, but many found the 
logic of his plan compelling.
The settlers
The founders of South Australia were men of the
middle classes dissatisfied with the social and political
order of the England of the 1820s and 1830s.^ They
echoed Buller's remark that
you hear every day of the sons of gentlemen 
entering into occupations from which their pride 
in former times debarred them. Among the middle 
classes you hear the same complaints. There is 
the same intense competition among tradesmen, 
and notoriously a most severe competition 
amongst farmers.2
They decried with Wakefield 'this competition of capital 
with capital, of education with education, and of place­
hunting with place-hunting'.  ^ The Reform Bill of 1832 was 
especially unsatisfactory to them for government sinecures 
and nepotism and electoral malpractice remained, and 
Church reform was tardy, for pluralities and
-
For fjie background of the early promoters, see Pike, 
chaps. IV and V.
2
Quoted in Knorr, p.295*
Quoted in ibid., pp.95~96.
3
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discrimination against Dissenters were still evident; the 
hopes of the 1820s were not realized. They were an 
ambitious but thwarted class, anxious to claim the vaunted 
English freedoms of constitution, religion, business and 
opportunity, but unable to do so in a society that was 
still largely tied by the traditional bonds of a past age.
Government
The Wakefield plan presented some of these men with 
the means of achieving their social, political and
religious ambitions, even if they read more into the
1scheme than Wakefield had himself intended. For almost a 
decade they sought legislative permission to found a 
colony based on the Wakefield plan in which they might 
mould a secure society tailored to meet their own
2aspirations and eventually, in 1834, achieved this.
Considerable modifications were made in the early
proposals but it seemed that the essentials had been
retained. There was to be no Established Church and, most
important, freedom of government and financial
3independence seemed assured. Sale of land at a
1For the early moves, see Pike, chap. Ill, and Edwin Hodder 
(ed .), The Founding of South Australia: As recorded in the 
Journals of Mr Robert Gouger, First Colonial Secretary 
( London: Sampson Low, Mars ton , I898 ) , pp . 20-31 , 83 -4 .
2
4 & 3 William IV, c. 95» 'An Act to empower his Majesty to
erect South Australia into a British Province or Provinces, 
and to provide for the Colonization and Government thereof'.
3But the Act did, in fact, provide for the appointment of 
a Colonial Chaplain, for no clear reason; see Pike, p.115.
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'sufficient price' would provide enough labourers to work 
the land and thus quickly make the colony self-supporting, 
and there would be no need for convict labour and hence no 
obnoxious military authority. Originally the promoters 
had asked for a chartered company to take up 3,000,000 
acres of land in the southern part of Australia and for 
permission to shape their own means of government. The 
British Government vetoed this, as setting up an 
irresponsible republic, and a compromise was reached in 
the Act. Surveys, land sales, the emigration fund and the 
employment of connected officials were entrusted to a 
Board of Commissioners resident in London who were to 
raise a guarantee fund of £20,000 and be represented in 
the colony by a Resident Commissioner. The Crown was 
represented by a Governor, advised by a Council of three 
officials, who was to control the Civil Service of the 
colony, control non-territorial revenues and watch the 
interests of the Crown generally; colonial accounts were 
to be scrutinized by the Imperial Treasury. Responsible 
Government was to be granted when the population of the 
colony, if self-supporting, reached 5 0 ,000.
This was less than the colonists desired, but at 
least the lynch-pin of their independence - the land and 
emigration fund - remained byond Imperial control. The 
colony was thus, from the start, distinct from the
settlements of eastern Australia, those 'mere receptacles
1of the felonry of England'. There seemed no reason why 
this rational scheme should not nurture a transplanted
1
Anthony Forster, South Australia: Its Progress and
Prosperity (London: Sampson Low, Mars ton, 1866) , p72.
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English society in which men would advance, not by birth 
or privilege, but by ability and ambition. And, since the 
economic position of the colony seemed assured, there was 
little doubt but that Imperial political and economic 
control would soon disappear entirely.
A double government
The promoters of the colony bemoaned the political
and economic intrusion of the 'Downing Street bum
bureaucracy', ^ as represented by the Governor, but they
were not opposed to governmental activity itself. They
realized that certain government functions were
indispensable to a new colony and the Wakefield plan
demanded efficient management of the revenue and
2emigration arrangements. Also, the colonists were
influenced by the growing scope of British government
during the previous fifty years, from which they had
3expected so much. They had been disappointed, but only 
because the machinery of government was inept and corrupt.
1
George Stevenson (editor of The South Australian Gazette 
and Colonial Register, 18 3 7-42 ) , quoted in Pike, p .401.
2
'It is...impossible...to colonize well without plenty of 
government....Ample government, in a word, is the pabulum 
vitae, the unremitting sine qua non of prosperous 
colonization' (Wakefield, Art of Colonization, p.212).
3
For a short account of municipal expansion 1780-1840, and 
references, see Moses Abramovitz and Vera F. Eliasburg,
The Growth of Public Employment in Great Britain (National 
Bureau of Economic Research: General Series, No. 60:
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957)» pp.8-11.
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They were prepared to accept a Governor and Civil 
Service controlled by Downing Street as the price of 
founding the colony as long as corruption was not evident, 
appointments were made with due regard to colonial wishes 
and expenditure did not endanger the self-supporting 
position of the colony. Initially it seemed that these 
conditions would be met. In 1832 the colonists had 
protested that as they, rather than the British government,
were taking economic risks, patronage should be in their
1hands. They were mollified when the Colonial Office made
all early appointments on the recommendations of the
Commissioners and it seemed that, although the Colonial
Office controlled the Service, the officers within it were
at one with the aspirations of the colonists. In a number
of cases promoters of the colony were appointed to office.
Officials were further bound to the colony by the
provision that they should buy land and it was thought that
2land bargains would be some compensation for low salaries.
A more general optimism was engendered by those who 
energetically puffed the fertility of the proposed colony 
in their search for emigrants. Some declared that the 
produce of the colony would include 'cotton, almonds, 
aniseeds, bees’-wax and honey, barilla, cheese for India 
and China, carraway, cochineal, coriander, dried fruits,
3hops, vegetable oils, olives, citrons, oranges, and silk'.
1
Hodder, pp.109-10.
2
Pike, p .98.
3
Colonization Commissioners, quoted in William Mann, Six 
Years Residence in the Australian Provinces (London: Smith
Elder, I839), p.248.
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There was only slight supporting evidence for such a view. 
Sturt and Barker had been the only reputable explorers 
recently in the territory and their examination had been 
cursory and at the best time of year. One early promoter 
admitted that information was scant, but soil and climate 
were small points when freedom and a new venture were at 
stake. Besides, they were all reasonable and rational 
men; and through their mutual aim and effort they would 
reap their reward.
A developed Civil Service
The disposition of the Civil Service reflected the 
full range of early colonial function. The offices were: 
Colonial Secretary, Judge (sic), Advocate General, Crown 
Solicitor, Naval Officer, Harbour Master, Governor's 
Secretary, Clerk to the Council, Colonial Treasurer,* 
Collector of Revenue,* Accountant General,* Auditor 
General, Registrar of Deeds,* Commissioner of Emigration,* 
Colonial. Storekeeper,* Surgeon, Chaplain and Surveyor 
General,* and Deputy Surveyor General.* In I836 the South 
Australian Service embraced more functions than its 
counterparts in Western Australia or Tasmania at 
foundation and nearly as many as in Western Australia in 1857* 
It is significant that no provision was made for police, 
military forces or sheriff, and one potential governor had
Under the partial or complete control of the Resident 
Commissioner.
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been rejected for demanding the presence of troops.
South Australia, the new Eden, needed no coercive 
government. Nor was any particular religious view to be 
forced on unwilling spirits by the State, for the Colonial 
Chaplain was the only state-supported clergyman.
Weaknesses
However, there were potential weaknesses in the
structure of the new colony. Most of the early officials
were inexperienced administrators and some demonstrated an
early dislike for one another, though this was seldom
evident in England when they were interested in securing
their position and when the stresses of a pioneer society
were absent. Relations between Hindmarsh (Governor) and
Fisher (Resident Commissioner) were especially strained.
2Hindmarsh, a ’zealous, good-tempered... brave' sailor, 
without previous experience of civil administration, 
brought a quarter-deck approach to government which 
clashed with the wily and pettifogging attitude of Fisher, 
who spent considerable time engrossing land to himself.
1
Charles James Napier, Colonization; particularly in South 
Australia: With Some Remarks on Small Farms and Over
Population (London: Boone, 1835) » pp.ix-xxvii. If Napier
had been appointed Governor the administration of the 
colony might have been quite different, for he proposed to 
model government on the system of Frederick the Great,
(twith five principl secretaries heading justice, 
agriculture, police, public works and schools, and one 
common. (Geoffrey Dutton, Founder of a City: The Life of 
Colonel William Light, First Surveyor-General of the 
Colony of South Australia, Founder of Adelaide, 1786-1839 
[Melbourne: Cheshire, i960 ] , p .150).
2
Lord Auckland, quoted in Pike, p.103*
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These men would probably have been temperamentally 
incompatible in any situation and their struggles had a 
profound effect on the young colony.
The Act ambiguously defined the Wakefield plan and 
even before leaving England conflicting interpretations 
arose on how land was to be sold. Wakefield himself 
walked out on the scheme announcing that to sell land at 
12/- per acre made a mockery of the ’sufficient price’.
The officers controlled by the Governor were not named in 
the Act and principles for the determination of salaries 
and promotions were not listed. Later instructions and 
regulations did not dispel this vagueness.
The South Australian Company
Discord was made more likely by the institution of
the South Australian Company, which formed virtually a
third government.1 The Company had been set up to buy
land at concession prices when insufficient private buyers
were interested, and it rapidly gained a substantial
portion of the best land in the colony. Its activities
later expanded beyond land cultivation and speculation to
include banking, auctioneering, shipping and fishing, and
2for many years it maintained the colony’s only bank. To 
varying extents the Company was able to control the flow 
of credit in the colony, the use of ports and roads and 
the spread of settlement, to the detriment of the
1
See Pike, pp.120-4, 169-220 passim, and George Sutherland, 
The South Australian Company: A Study in Colonization 
(London: Longmans Green, I898), passim.
2
Mann, p.258.
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Governors' autonomy. Its numerous employees formed a sort 
of small-scale Civil Service and provided an alternative 
avenue of employment to some government officials.
Governor Hindrnarsh and Confusion
Troubles were evident even before the colony was 
officially under way. Fisher and Hindrnarsh bickered for 
the whole six months of the journey out and the new land 
was far from being a 'perfect Eden'.  ^ The settlers came 
in December 1836 to a vast territory of 'dust and hot
winds and ... the ... innumerable flies and vermin...of the
2baking season', and found Kangaroo Island, reported a 
paradise, to be stony, scrubby, waterless and fit only for 
the few whalers and their native wives that were found 
there. The port chosen in St Vincents Gulf - the only 
safe one between Port Lincoln and Portland - was ringed by 
mudbanks and accessible only at limited times. Ten miles 
of dense scrub separated it from the chosen capital site 
which had the rare, but nonetheless uncertain, advantage 
of water. But there were compensations for this 
discomfort and disappointment. The capital was placed 
near the River Murray trade route and the soil was fertile 
and needed only energy to make it productive. At any 
other location the infant colony would probably have 
failed.^
T
Ibid., p .248.
2Robert Harrison, Colonial Sketches (London: Hall. Virtue, 
1862), p.ll.
3A. Grenfell Price, South Australians and their Environment 
(5th e d . ; Adelaide: Rigby, 1927), App. II. ~ ~~
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An unsatisfactory Civil Service
Far more serious was the failure of the administrative 
machine to function efficiently. Everything depended on 
the surveys placing settlers on the land and making it 
possible for the colony at least to produce food for
itself. The competent Surveyor General, Colonel William
1Light, found this an almost impossible task. His early
instructions were time consuming and most of the survey
party arrived late. The type of survey stipulated
required experienced men, but low salaries did not attract
them and appeals in Sydney were unsuccessful; some staff
indeed left Adelaide for the eastern colonies. The survey
labourers, who were bonded at fixed rates of pay, found
themselves receiving less than most other labourers and
rapidly became discontented at being ’two-shillings a-day 
2slaves'. Light thus summed up his situation as
truding along the bank of this river carrying 
my theodolite on my own shoulders with very 
often only two men to help me who were 
employed with the chain, and to be obliged 
also to tread the same ground over and over 
again placing my flags &c ., not having enough 
men to perform this office.^
Imported food sold at high prices and the majority of
settlers were forced to remain unproductively in the city.
1
Dutton, chaps X-XX passim.
2
Ibid., p.224. Survey staff were supposed to receive food
and lodging also, and in less confused times the pay would 
have been adequate, even handsome.
Quoted in ibid., p.225« Original emphasis.
3
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Hindmarsh exacerbated the position by
misunderstanding his role as Governor in thinking that he
had despotic control. He wasted much of Light’s time by
bickering over the capital site and on one occasion opened
incoming mailbags on his own authority thus alienating
many officials, who saw their duties being usurped, and
disturbing the population in general, who saw a threat to
their personal liberties. Fisher was not above
discomfiting his rival by fomenting discontent with
Hindmarsh's ineptitude in the Service and survey party and
his large powers over land disposal doubtless influenced
officials interested in gaining select acres. Executive
Councillors were antagonized by the Governor's
disinclination to consult them and some rebelled against
him. Hindmarsh wrote of them, in bewilderment, that
they have decided that I have no powers and can 
really do nothing under my Commission as 
Governor save in Council. Which in fact amounts 
to this, that His Majesty has retained no rights 
whatever but given all to the Council...I am 
firmly convinced this is not the case.'
Much of this discord arose from the muddled Act,
though personality conflicts and the irritations of an
uncomfortable new colony were catalysts. The Governor's
Secretary thus referred to the Colonial Storekeeper who
has refused to take any orders from the 
Governor... Mr Gilbert was storekeeper to the 
Commissioners and to the Government, and it was 
only in the latter capacity that we possessed 
any authority over him....This double mastery 
will lead to sad confusion unless cautious 
proceedings are adopted. There is Brown, the 
Emigration Agent, for instance, who holds his
Quoted in Pike, p.226.
1
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orders from the Commissioners, and, in his 
appointment by the Order in Council, is 
commanded to be 'obedient in all things to the 
Governor’. Now, the Resident Commissioner and 
the Governor have no views in common, and 
squabble they must - that is the certain 
result.1 2
Effect on the colony
Confusion and inefficiency in the Service had
widespread effects on the rest of the community for the
young colony was heavily dependent on government, not only
for surveys, but for over-all security and growth. The
lack of local capital, the absence of protection from
local hazards, the necessity for exploration and the
maintenance of distant settlements and the need to support
local trade and production forced the colonial government
to assume functions that in a richer and more compact
community might have been left to private initiative.
These needs were not fulfilled in Hindmarsh's time as
disgruntled officials resigned with a consequent loss of
goodwill and potential. It was not easy to find
replacements for them. The settlers had migrated to be
landowners and labourers, not clerks, and land speculation
2was more tempting than drudgery at a desk. Hindmarsh was 
compelled to accept men who had exhausted all other means 
of earning a living. Low morale and poor salaries and
1
George Stevenson, Journal, quoted in Proceedings of the 
Royal Geographical Society of Australasia (South 
Australian Branch)“! Vol. XXX (1928-29)> p .64 .
2
Cf. J.I. Watts, Family Life in South Australia (Adelaide: 
Thomas, 1890), p.100.
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accommodation brought personal antipathies to the surface
and on one occasion the colonists were regaled with the
edifying spectacle of the Colonial Secretary and Colonial
Treasurer brawling in front of a gin-shop.^ Many must
have feared for the future of the colony when those
supposedly governing it were unable to produce even a
2semblance of unity.
Hindmarsh's recall in July 1838 was attributed by the
then Secretary for the Colonies (Glenelg) to his failure
3to make the Service perform efficiently and this 
stricture was doubtless partly due to Hindmarsh’s habit of
4writing home about the insubordination of his officers.
The brief interim administration of G.M. Stephen (formerly 
Advocate General) marked time as colonists and officials 
waited to see whether the new Governor could breathe new 
life into the government of the Colony.
1
Dutton, pp.231-2, and R.M. Hague, Sir John Jeffcott: 
Portrait of a Colonial Judge (Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press, 1963), pp.90-2.
2
Dissent between officers was condemned by many later 
writers; see, e.g., Sutherland, pp.106-7; Arthur J. 
Perkins, South Australia: An Agricultural and Pastoral 
State in The Making: First Decade, 1836-46 (Adelaide: By
the author , 1939 ) > PP .9-Hj and L . C . Wilcher , 'South 
Australia, 1836-50' (unpub. dissertation for the Tinline 
Scholarship, University of Adelaide, 1936), pp.102-3*
3
Duttpn, p .264.
4
See, e.g., the letter from Hindmarsh to Sir Pultpney 
Malcolm, 22 June 1838 (National Library, Canberra).
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Governor Gawler and Extravagance
When Lieutenant-Colonel George Gawler arrived in the 
colony in October I838 he found 3,000 unproductive people 
living in the capital on their credit. Morale was low and 
his difficulties were compounded by the Commissioners, who 
sold another 230,000 acres of land to English investors 
and sent out another 8,000 emigrants. The Civil Service 
operated 'with scarcely a pretension to system; every man 
did as he would and got on as he could. There were
scarcely any records of past proceedings of public accounts,
1or of issues of stores', and the position was worsened 
by the burning down of the reed huts that served as 
Government offices. Sufficient evidence of corruption 
remained, however, for Gawler either to suspend or dismiss 
the Colonial Treasurer, Commissioner of Police and 
Colonial Storekeeper.
Gawler was better equipped than Hindmarsh to deal
with these problems. He combined in his person the
offices of Governor and Resident Commissioner, although he
still had to report to the Commissioners in London, an Act
of 1838 made a grant in aid of £130,000 to the colony and
he was given authority to dismiss any of his executive
2officers with whom he disagreed. He quickly discerned
1
Despatch from Gawler to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 22 January 1839> Correspondence Book, Vol. I, 
p.68 (South Australian Archives; cited hereafter as S.A.A.). 
2
This last power was extended to other British colonies, 
with important effects in Canada; see J.R.M. Butler, 'Note 
on the Origin of Lord John Russell's Despatch of October 
l6, 1839» on the Tenure of Crown Offices in the Colonies', 
Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. II, No. 2 (l927)> 
pp.248-31,and O.A.Kinchen, 'The Stephen-Russell Reform 
in Official Tenure', Canadian Historical Review, Vol. XXVI, 
No. 4 (December, 1943T"> p p . 382-91 •
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the two basic causes of failure - the stoppage of the 
survey and the lack of capital in the colony. Accordingly, 
Gawler brought in competent surveyors from the other 
colonies, organized them under Charles Sturt and E„C.
Frome and set them to work in the country. By December 
1840 , 6,000 settlers had moved into country districts, 2,700 
acres were under cultivation, overlanders were bringing in 
sheep, cattle and horses, and the colony was on the way to 
self-sufficiency. The £70,000 spent on surveys and roads 
was, in general, well used. However, Gawler also spent 
£140,000 on public works and relief, mainly in Adelaide. 
Some expenditure of this sort was needed, and today such 
an amount would not seem excessive, but at the time the 
home authorities were scandalized by what seemed gross 
over-expenditure. Gawler was recalled in May I84l.
An expanding Civil Service
A considerable part of Gawler's expenditure went into
the Civil Service. For his public works programme and for
reasons of morale he considered it necessary to increase
salaries and allowances and embark upon an extensive
1building of public offices. Recognition of 'the utter
inadequacy of the salaries of public offices' and of the
'very great' volume of public business also compelled him
2to increase salaries and raise staff numbers. Gawler was
1
Cf. J.W. Bull, Early Experiences of Life in South 
Australia and an Extended Colonial History (Adelaide: Wigg,
1884), p7258.
2
Despatch from Gawler to Robert Torrens, 21 February 1840, 
quoted in 'Report of the Select Committee on South 
Australia', House of Commons Papers, I84l, Vol. IV, No. 19,
p.282.
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actuated by genuine sympathy for officers and by his
desire for 'a paternal, rather than judicial, system of 
1government', but perhaps also by the more practical 
realization that he had no chance of success if the feuds 
and bitterness of Hindmarsh's time continued. By the end 
of 1839 the number of officials had risen to 384 and 
salaries to £42,089 p.a., compared to the authorized 
establishment of only thirteen months before of 78 men at 
£ 8,322 p.a.1 2 3
Gawler urged officials to work 'for their own welfare,
for that of the community which is rising around them and
3for the credit of the Service to which they belong', but 
his pleadings, sympathy and good intentions were often in 
vain, for his administrative ability was not marked. He 
was little disposed to administrative detail and heads of 
departments assumed much of his power over appointments 
and promotions. His successor Grey, on the other hand, 
seems to have read all government correspondence and to
1
Ibid., p .303.
2
Ibid., pp.230-4 and 'South Australian Correspondence... 
I83I. • -[to I84l]' , House of Commons Papers , l84l, Vol. XVII, 
No. 129 , pp.l60-2.
3
Circular issued by the Colonial Secretary's Office [3 , 4 
or 5 ] June 1840, Letter Book D , pp.285-6 (S.A.A.). The 
Colonial Secretary's Office later became the Chief 
Secretary's Office, and both are cited hereafter as CSO. 
Until 1849, circulars were included in the Letter Books, 
after which they were bound in order of issue in distinct 
volumes. The S.A.A. holds most of the Circulars, but some 
are held (Aug., 1967) by the CSO itself (see Bibliography); 
with this exception, the S.A.A. holds all CSO material. 
Circulars of the CSO are cited hereafter as, e.g., CSO 
Circular, [3 , 4 or 5 ] June 1840.
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have drafted most replies himself, and in his 
administration the Colonial Secretary was little more than 
a highly paid copying clerk. The presence of such 
commodities as madeira cakes in some.offices suggests that, 
under Gawler, public officials had a freer time than they 
were to have again for many years.
Gawler's was an expensive regime and the dishonouring 
of his drawings on the Imperial Treasury caused much 
heart-burning but the colony would have failed if he had 
not taken the steps he did; and his expansionist policy 
regarding the Service, though not resulting in marked 
efficiency, did alleviate a great deal of discontent and 
provided a foundation upon which his successors built. 
Gawler could fairly plead that his actions were rendered 
imperative by the slowness of communications with England 
and the hesitation of the Commissioners in deciding how to 
save the colony. However, his work increased resentment 
against highly-paid, slothful officers and his readiness to 
undertake building works which would normally have been 
left to private individuals probably increased colonial 
reliance on governmental action.
Governor Grey and Retrenchment
It has been said that 'the real history of South 
Australia dates from the commencement of Captain Grey's 
administration. Since then, the progress of the colony 
has been almost uninterrupted', 1 and that under him the
Forster, p .35•
1
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Civil Service was 'converted...into an effective, smoothly
1functioning government machine'. These are exaggerations, 
but the colony did take a new direction after the arrival 
of Grey in May l84l. The grant-in-aid of I838 was written 
off, the emigration fund was partly diverted to common 
revenue and in September 1842 the Board of Commissioners 
was abolished, although land prices were maintained and an 
upset price of 20/- per acre extended to other colonies. 
With the system of double government and most of the 
Wakefield plan gone, South Australia became purely a Crown 
Colony and Grey was enjoined to remove the financial, 
burden that the colony placed on the mother country.
Reductions in expenditure
Young and inexperienced but ambitious and able, Grey
set out to reduce expenditure by some £144,000 annually.
2He 'ruled the colony alone' and curtailed capital 
expenditure, instituted a sort of means test for relief, 
lowered relief wages and, aided by the good harvest of 
1841-42, forced an increasing number of labourers into the 
country. The relief roll fell from 300 in February 1.842 
to none in December and government expenditure from 
£170,000 in 1840 to £32,000 in 1845.
~  —
'The Civil Service in the Early Days' (Research Note 108, 
S.A.A., n.d.), p .6 . For similar comments, see Francis S. 
Dutton, South Australia and its Mines; With an Historical 
Sketch of the Colony, under its Several Administrations, 
to the Period of Captain (Sir George) Grey's Departure 
(London: Boone, 1846), pT60, and George H. Pitt, 'The
Crisis of l84l: Its Causes and Consequences' (unpub. M S . ,
S.A.A., n.d.), pp.5-6 , 75-6.
2
Henry Ayers (on whom, see below, pp .139» 231-2) , quoted in 
J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey (London: Cassell, 1961), 
p . 44 .
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He retrenched vigorously in the Civil Service, by
reducing the size of all departments - the police force by
a half - until the Service was proportionately smaller
than ever before, by abolishing some departments entirely,
and by cutting salaries, allowances and contingencies
until the Executive Council protested that no further
economies were possible. Grey insinuated to heads of
departments that their own positions were in danger if
they did not find new economies and attempted to shift
some of the odium from himself by circulating Colonial
Office statements that condemned the inflated and
1inefficient Service.
A rational Civil Service
Grey made no substantive changes in the structure and 
working of the Service except in so far as it came to 
resemble more closely the Services of other British 
colonies with regard to appointments. In 1843 the 
Colonial Office codified appointments by dividing 
colonial Services into three classes: a junior group at a
salary of up to £100 p.a., an intermediate group paid from 
£101 to £200 and senior officials earning more than £200. 
The Governor could appoint men to the lowest class, 
subject only to the need to report each appointment to 
England, and in the second class sent recommendations to 
the Colonial Office which then made a decision. In the 
highest positions he had to submit a special report to
1
See, e.g., CS0 letters from Grey to the Commissioner of 
Police, 27 December 1842, and to the Colonial Treasurer,
3 March 1843, Letter Book F , pp.276-7 and 290 respectively.
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England about each vacancy, but it was unusual for the
1Governor's suggestions to be over-ruled. In South 
Australia there were two exceptions to this general scheme, 
for the Treasury Commissioners for some years nominated 
the Surveyor General, and the Judge of the Supreme Court 
(later Chief Justice) could appoint some court officials. 
Promotion was by seniority and this rule was fairly 
consistently adhered to, although there were always 
exceptions to be found. The quality of employees varied 
greatly for, although a Governor could often get competent 
men for the 'plums' of the Service, large salary 
differentials meant that the lower positions attracted men 
of little ability. For this reason, Governors used their 
powers of patronage most often in filling top positions 
and it was thus at the highest levels that promotion by 
seniority broke down; there was little to be gained by 
scrutinizing mediocre men for subordinate offices and, 
indeed, there was usually little demand for these 
positions.
Departmental structure was rudimentary and was
complicated by dividing responsibility for some departments
between the British Government and the local Governor, as
2in the case of the Customs Department. However, under 
Grey and later Governors the focal-point of the Service,
1
’Regulations relative to the Appointment to Public Offices 
in the Colonies', CSO (1843), Letter Book F , pp.336-8.
2
A description of the departments during Grey's time is 
contained in Dutton, South Australia and its Mines,
pp,170-80.
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diffused in Gawler1s time, was the Colonial Secretary’s 
Office, as it was in other colonies. All correspondence 
between Governor and officials passed through this office,
'the only recognized channel of official communication
1with the Head of the Government', as did all letters 
between the administration and the public. The Colonial 
Secretary was the Governor's chief aide and ranked in 
precedence and salary after the Chief Justice, but 
Governors usually made his subordinate position clear and 
the opening words of a letter, ’I am instructed by His 
Excellency to write...’, denoted more than a formality, 
especially under Grey.
The hierarchy of individual offices was defined with 
remarkable consistency from the start, although Grey's 
retrenchments clarified a situation that was becoming 
confused under Gawler. Infrequently an officer occupying 
an apparently low position, such as master of a steam 
dredge, would receive the salary of a chief clerk,but 
generally similar positions received similar salaries.
The largest differentials naturally occurred at the top 
level, where the work of the Surveyor General, for example, 
was clearly more onerous than that of the Keeper of the 
Gaol, and this was reflected in salary levels. However, 
within this structure changes slowly took place as 
departments increased in importance and the status of the 
head of the department rose accordingly. That these 
changes fairly accurately mirrored departmental growth is 
a measure of the rationality of the overall organization
1
The South Australian Government Gazette (cited hereafter 
as Government Gazette), No. 8 ( 21 February I850), pp.110-1.
of the Service; at least after the time of Grey, South 
Australia saw no great anomalies in salaries or work load, 
although efficiency, justice and ability were other 
matters. The position was admittedly confused by the 
practice of dual or multiple appointments, and this was 
especially common in areas outside the city where it would
have been uneconomical in small settlements not to combine
1say, the offices of postmaster and customs waiter.
However, the combination of several important positions
was rare and increasingly so as the years passed and the
Service expanded. A notorious case of pluralism occurred
in the early years but not without loud and successful 
2public protest. In general, Governors desired efficiency 
as much as the mere use of patronage for its own sake.
Moves for Political Freedom
Grey's policy was a success in so far as he restored 
the colony to solvency, though much of the credit was due 
to Gawler and good luck, but political freedom was lost in
1
An early visitor, for example, observed that one official 
at Willunga, a settlement twenty miles from Adelaide, was 
'Post Officer, Collector of Customs (sic), Postmaster 
General (sic) and Government factotum - he also attends to 
the Natural History of the country, the language of the 
Aborigines, the health of the Inhabitants and performance 
of divine worship' (Diary of Lady Franklin [National 
Library, Canberra], December 1840, p.17); cf. below, p.287
2
A. Grenfell Price, Founders and Pioneers of South 
Australia (Adelaide: Preece, 1929)» P •105•
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the process. A Committee of the House of Commons, set up
in 1841 to examine the colony's financial position,
recommended the withdrawal of the self-government clause
in the 1834 Act and the substitution of self-government at
Imperial discretion depending on the colony's ability to
pay its own way; a nominee advisory Council, consisting of
four official and four non-official members, was suggested
2as an interim substitute. These provisions were enacted
in 1842 and were badly received by the colonists who
3thought that a pledge had been broken. The institution 
of the Adelaide Council as the first municipal government 
in Australia was no substitute and many were angered, and 
made even more suspicious of Downing Street control, by
1
Opinions on the relative merits of Grey's and Gawler's 
policies have fluctuated considerably, though recent 
writings have favoured Gawler to a greater extent than 
earlier writings. For earlier writings that favoured Grey 
at the expense of Gawler, see, e.g., George C. Henderson, 
Sir George Grey: Pioneer of Empire in Southern Lands
(London: Dent, 1907)? p p .60-2 , and W . J . Boraman, 'History
of Public Finance in New Zealand from the Earliest Times 
up to the Year I89O ' (unpub. P h .D . dissertation,
University of Otago, New Zealand, 1929)? pp.30-1* For an 
early description that emphasized the merits of Gawler's 
policies, see R.J. Rudall, 'The Foundation of South 
Australia: An Essay on an Experiment in Colonization' 
(unpub. dissertation for the Tinline Scholarship, 
University of Adelaide, c. 1920), pp.237-60. For one of 
recent date, see R. Hetherington, 'Gawler, George', 
Australian Dictionary of Biography, ed. Douglas Pike 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1966-67 ) ? Vol. 1,
PP.431-3? and cf. [Douglas Pike], 'Grey, Sir George', 
ibid., Vol. 1, pp.476-80.
2
'Report of the Select Committee on South Australia', I84l. 
3
3 & 6 Viet., c. 6l, 'An Act for the Better Government of 
South Australia'.
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the discovery of Grey’s covert opposition to their dreams 
of political independence.' As prosperity returned, aided 
by mineral discoveries in 1845 and later years, colonial 
demands for a larger share in government increased; and it 
was often the Civil Service that provided a target for 
agitation.
During Grey's administration it was seldom possible 
to condemn the Service for being too expensive but many 
observed that Grey was quick to appoint officials from 
outside the colony, one of whom was his brother-in-law, in 
his drive for efficiency. Under his tight-fisted rule the 
Service withdrew into itself as officials sought to avoid 
any public charges of extravagance or inefficiency which 
would bring further action from Grey. The Service became 
an increasingly mysterious body to aspiring colonial 
politicians and charges of extravagance and nepotism, 
compounded of ignorance and suspicion, were easy to make. 
The Council of 1842 linked the Service more closely to 
Downing Street as official members voted with the Governor, 
as they were bound to d o , and against the nominal 
representatives of the people. Growing demands for 
political and economic freedom were thus reflected in 
parallel demands that the Civil Service be open to 
colonial inspection and control.
Agitation under Governor Robe
Charges were easier to make against the next Governor, 
Major F.H. Robe (October 1845-August 1848). An upright,
Pike, Paradise of Dissent, p.397*
1
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blunt and honest soldier, he was frankly out of sympathy
with the ambitions of the colonists and he ruled the
colony with an autocratic hand, but less subtly than Grey.
Convinced by the prosperity of the copper strikes, he
ended Grey's stringency and raised salaries and numbers in
the Service over cries of protest. He appointed officers
as he saw fit and would brook no interference with this
prerogative, and was consequently subjected to bitter and
sometimes offensive attacks from the colonial press,
although, in fact, few colonists were eager to fill any
but the top positions. However, the colonists saw all
exercises of gubernatorial patronage, high or low, as
deplorable incidents in a free colony, not because
patronage itself was wrong but because their own
representatives did not exercise it. As one later editor
apostrophized, 'the power of patronage, though held by the
Government, is after all held in trust for the people, and
1should be used exclusively with a view to their benefit'. 
Under Governor Young
Under Governor H.E.F. Young (August 1848-December
1854) there was less cause for complaint since he took
care to appoint as few non-colonials to office as possible,
even though Earl Grey said,
I believe that the appointment to some of the 
principal offices in the Colonies of people not 
selected from the narrow circles of their own
1
The South Australian Register, 21 March 1856. The South 
Australian Gazette and Colonial Register, founded in I836, 
became The South Australian Register in 1839 , and was 
renamed The Register in 1901; it is cited hereafter, in 
all instances, as the Register.
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inhabitants, and imbued with the peculiar 
feelings and opinions which are apt to 
prevail in such communities, but chosen from 
the well-educated gentlemen of the Mother- 
country, is calculated greatly to improve the 
tone of Colonial society.1 23
No one could cavil at Young’s swift retrenchments
following the efflux of population during the gold-rushes
and his later salary increases, necessitated by a sharp
rise in the cost of living, also went unquestioned for
they patently meant no more than justice to a group which,
as a whole, had not benefited directly from the discovery 
2of gold.~ In the early 1850s, also, Executive Councillors
tried to dissociate their executive and administrative
functions in an attempt to lessen their unpopularity and
to guarantee their administrative posts against the time
3of Responsible Government.'
Under Governor MacDonnell
But Young's successor as Governor, R.G. MacDonnell 
(June 1855-March 1862), though personally charming, 'did
1
Earl Grey, The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's 
Administration (London: Bentley, 1853)> Vo1. p p .38-9•
2
For a summary of these increases, see 'Return of 
Classified Officers', South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers, No. 137 of 1859 (cited hereafter a s , e .g . , S . A . P . P . 
137 of 1859) .
3
See, e.g., the comments of B.T. Finniss (on whom, see 
below, p p . 7^-7 ) in 'Civil List Bill', S .A .P ♦P . 44 of
1853 > Minutes of Evidence, qq. 2-9» Later, G.F. Dashwood 
(Collector of Customs, 1852-58) declined to enter politics 
because of 'a desire to remain in the Public Service'
('Civil Service Retirement Repeal Bill' , S . A . P , P . 147 of
1855-56, p.i).
47
not consider the country ripe for Responsible Government'. 
He regarded the political aspirations of the colonists 
with little favour, which inspired growing criticism. And 
the functions of government expanded rapidly in the 1830s, 
which increased already hostile reactions to the Governor 
and his administration.
The Expansion of Government
A growing colony
Changes in government activity centred around
education, communications and transport, and reflected an
increasingly complex society already far removed from that
of 1836; a new generation was growing up and new demands
were being made on old institutions. In the early 1830s
the colony entered a phase of prosperity. The Victorian
gold-rushes had drained South Australia of a high
proportion of its workforce but stern action by Young cut
the outflow of currency and reduced government expenditure 
2great'ly until the demand for food in the eastern colonies
1
Boyle Travers Finniss, The Constitutional History of 
South Australia during Twenty-one Years, from the 
Foundation of the Settlement in I836 to the Inauguration 
of Responsible Government in 1 8 3 7 (Adelaide: Rigby, 1886),
p.290. For a note on this work, see below, p.77*
2
S.J. Butlin, 'The South Australian Devaluation of 1832' , 
Business Archives and History, Vol. 3> No. 2 (1963)»
pp.136-86. Young established the Assay Office, which 
bought gold and issued the colony's own currency, under a 
scheme devised by George Tinline (temporary manager of the 
South Australian Banking Company). As Butlin indirectly 
shows, civil servants took almost no part in the plan
(cont. p .48)
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provided South Australia with fresh markets for its
agricultural produce. By the middle 1850s South
Australians referred to their colony as 'the granary of
Australia', and as grain prices rose so the amount of land
under cultivation and the total annual yield increased.
Against this background of prosperity the marriage rate
increased from 28 per 1000 in 1851 to 129 per 1000 in 
11853? where it remained until the end of the decade.
The birthrate showed a consequent increase and underlined 
the inadequacy of existing educational institutions.
Education and welfare
The old system of non-compulsory schools run by
private citizens and interested groups taught only a small
proportion of children of school age. Syllabuses differed,
conditions varied and were mostly poor, and private groups
were less and less able to provide even an elementary
education. An Act of 1847 unsuccessfully attempted to
legislate away these faults and a further Act was passed
2in 1852 setting up a Central Board of Education. This
2(cont. from p.47)
until the Office was established (see also Pike, Paradise 
of Dissent, pp.446-50); and the management of the Office 
fell to H.J. Andrews, formerly a bank teller (although he 
remained in the Service for forty years; see below, p.328. 
The Assay Office is thus a minor but interesting example 
of how the Service assumed new responsibilities, which its 
members did not seek.
2
This and similar data in following paragraphs is taken 
from the South Australian Statistical Registers (issued 
annually in S ,A .P .P .).
1See G.E. Saunders, 'Public Education in South Australia 
in the Nineteenth Century and Some Factors affecting i t ' 
(unpub. M.A. dissertation, Dept, of History, University of 
Adelaide, 1964), p p .50-53»
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Board consisted of seven members, including members of the
public, a politician and several civil servants (who had
no direct connection with education in their official
capacities), and controlled an Inspector of Schools,
joined by a second Inspector in 1854, and a Secretary,
joined by a clerk also in 1854. It was responsible for
administering the payments-by-results system, allocating
government subsidies for salaries and other expenditure
that the Act laid down, inspecting standards of teaching
and accommodation, and had some control over syllabuses.
However, much of its power lay in suggestion only and most
control remained at local level until the next important
education Act of 1875*^ Increasing numbers of young
children were important also in modifying certain health
facilities. Under a rudimentary system, dating from about
1840, government health officers in distant communities
vaccinated those who requested it. An Act of 1853
extended this system by making vaccination compulsory for
all newly-born and by designating a number of physicians
in private practice throughout the colony as part-time
2Government Vaccination Officers. The scheme was 
administered by a Board in Adelaide, consisting of the 
Colonial Surgeon, a physician and a layman, which was 
responsible for registering officers and keeping records. 
This was still a patchwork system but laid the foundation 
for later and more detailed amendment. In this period,
1
See below, p.28l.
2
1853 > No. l6, 'An Act to extend and make compulsory the 
Practice of Vaccination'.
50
also, a Child Apprenticeship Board was set up to provide
1for the welfare of neglected children.
Communications and public works
Growing population and the increased volume of South
Australian produce placed strain on transport facilities
to which railroads appeared an answer. The first aim was
to connect Adelaide with its relatively distant port and
an Act was passed in 1847, the first of its kind in
Australia, authorizing a private company to build the 
2line. The company soon went bankrupt, allegedly because 
of inadequate loan facilities, and the Government was 
forced to complete the work. The line was placed under 
the direction of a salaried Undertaker, but the position 
was later transferred to the Colonial Architect and later 
again (l855) to another private individual who had, 
however, been a nominated legislator and a member of a 
number of government Boards. In 1854 the construction of 
a line to Gawler, then the main country town, was 
authorized and this line was placed under the direction of 
a Board of three officials which initially controlled a
1
See Constance M. Davey, Children and their Lawmakers: A 
Social-historical Survey of the Growth and Development 
from I836 to 1950 of South Australian Laws relating to 
Children (Adelaide: Griffin, 1956), pp .119-20.
2
On the development of South Australian railways in this 
period, see the two works by Roger L. Wettenhall, 'Early 
Railway Management in New South Wales', Tasmanian 
University Law Review, Vol. I, No. 3 (July, i960) ,
pp.449-50, and 'Aspects of Political Control in Selected 
Public Transport Corporations' (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, 
Dept, of Political Science, Australian National University,
1961), p .4.
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permanent staff of an Engineer and a Secretary. Some 
politicians protested at the move but the line was
1completed in good time and was financially a success. 
Railway construction became a permanent government 
activity with the number of staff gradually increasing.
Technical innovation and social need combined again
in 1855 to produce the Telegraph Department. Experiments
with telegraphic communication had been made in Adelaide
as early as 1852 and in 1853 a private individual
constructed a line to Port Adelaide. Fears of private
monopoly were instrumental in leading the Government to
take responsibility in this direction and Charles Todd was
brought from England in 1855 to act as Director of 
2Telegraphs.
Because of the copper strikes and agricultural re­
settlement in the l840s, the proportion of the population 
of the colony resident in Adelaide declined from almost 58 
per cent in 1840 to 23*9 per cent in 1851? but the 
absolute figure almost doubled, from 8,480 in 1840 to 
14,577 in 1851. This increase strained the service 
facilities of the city and made unpaved footpaths and 
roads an uncomfortable hazard in winter, and, more 
important, the long, hot summer underlined the inadequacy
1
South Australian objections were chiefly financial. 
Politicians did not suggest that government intervention 
in railways would increase the Governor's powers of 
patronage; cf. R.J. Beveridge 'Victorian Railway 
Management' (unpub. M.A. dissertation, Dept, of History, 
University of Melbourne, 1952), p.86, note 68.
2
On Todd, see below, p.239*
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of the so-called River Torrens as a source of water.
Water carriers charged exorbitant prices and it was clear 
that a water supply system was necessary for the city, as 
was sewerage. A limited company to build a waterworks had 
been proposed in 1847 and although eminent persons gave 
their name to the project few would give their monpy, and 
the scheme fell through. In 1852 the Government 
authorized the raising of capital and work commenced in 
1852 though water was not supplied to Adelaide until i860. 
Differences of professional opinion beset the scheme from 
the start, although the service was gradually extended 
beyond Adelaide.1
The building of roads to meet the spread of 
population was entrusted jointly in 1849 to the Local 
Boards of Roads, consisting of land holders elected from 
the relevant districts, and a Central Board of Main Roads 
with rather vague powers over disbursements. In 1852 the 
Central Board was reconstituted with more specific powers 
over the allocation of funds and considerable power over 
planning. In the next year the Local Boards were 
transferred to the newly created District Councils wfyich 
became responsible for hiring labour, raising a proportion 
of the expenses and transmitting local grievances to 
Adelaide. The members of the Central Board were chiefly 
government officials, and this led to complaints from 
country districts that their needs were inadequately 
represented. Accordingly, members elected by land-holders 
were included on the central Board from 1854. The
1
For a short history of waterworks development until 1869, 
see the Register, 1, 9, 21 and 23 April I869.
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increased volume of shipping revealed the insufficiency of
harbour facilities and the Port Adelaide Harbour Trust was
appointed in 1849 to deepen channels and improve docks and
jetties. In 1851 a further body, the Trinity Board, was
created to operate on lines analogous to the London
Trinity House. The Harbour Master acted as ex officio
Chairman and other members were drawn from shipowners and
1insurance companies.
Government activity expanded in other directions of
less immediate importance. An Immigration and Passenger
Board was created by Executive Order in 1850 to hear
charges against disorderly passengers, and consisted of
officials normally resident at the Port. In 1855 a
Director was appointed to manage the Botanic Gardens,
which had passed through various hands since their
foundation in 1840; the move reflected the growing pride
2of Adelaide citizens in their main civic attraction. In 
1853 the Adelaide Hospital was brought more firmly under 
government control after allegations of mismanagement and 
insufficient finance had been made.
Inevitability of expansion
Although the colonial government was not always eager 
to assume responsibilities, in cases like the railways and
1
On the Central Road Board and the Trinity Board, see S.E. 
Jackson, 'A History of South Australia, 1850-1856' (unpub. 
dissertation for the Tinline Scholarship, University of 
Adelaide, I9II), pp.l49, 155-7- 
2
A part time Board was appointed in September 1855» to 
which the Director was responsible.
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waterworks it had little choice for private initiative,
even when ready to act, could not raise the necessary
finance, and in the case of telegraphs was unable to
1guarantee fair and maximum use of the facility. The 
demand for 'value-for-money’ meant also that the 
Government required some organizational control over the 
Botanic Gardens and Hospital; in these two cases, indeed, 
governmental activity was not an innovation but rather a 
tightening of a system that already existed. The 
disposition of the government to govern was crucial.
Reliance on Boards
However inevitable these new and reorganized functions 
were, it would not on the surface appear to have been so 
necessary that Boards, rather than departments or sub­
departments, should have proliferated so rapidly, and 
whilst a common set of circumstances underlay the expansion 
of government, the organizational clothing depended on 
heterogenous elements. This was reflected in the 
characteristics of the Boards, which were so called only 
to separate them from the Civil Service proper and not 
because they possessed any consistent legal similarity.
None were in any legal sense precursors to the Boards and 
public corporations created later in the nineteenth 
century. Although the functions of some were set forth in 
Acts, others were created by Executive Orders and their 
function, tenure and financial responsibility were never
1
Cf. W. Bennett Hays, Engineering in South Australia 
(London: Knott, I856), p.36.
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formally defined. It is doubtful that any had a separate
legal identity and they appear to have been vested de
facto with the usual legal rights of Crown departments.
However, employees of Boards were not regarded as civil
1servants and did not enjoy their privileges. On at least
one occasion the Chairman of a Board argued that the legal
status of his Board should be decided, but the question
2was never settled.
Types of Boards
It would have been difficult to place the Boards 
under any common rubric since their characteristics varied 
according to the immediate reasons that had prompted their 
institution. Some were off-shoots of the Civil Service 
proper, were formed for specific and limited purposes and 
could, presumably, have been reabsorbed into the Civil 
Service at any time. The Vaccination Board employed no 
one at all, and simply gave formal recognition to 
additional duties performed by certain members of the 
Service. The Trinity Board, on the other hand, contained 
private citizens and government members and on occasion 
clashed with the working of the Service itself even though 
its duties were clearly defined. The railways was an 
evolving organization spending increasing sums of money 
and employing a growing work force, none of whom, except 
for one brief period, was a civil servant. The Boards had 
a closer connection in that their membership tended to
E.g., 'Memorial of Mr Hugh Quin', S.A.P.P., 27 of 1855-56.
'Letters from Trinity Board' , S.A.P.P. jk of 185^ --
2
56
overlap; and in nearly every case Board members were 
appointed at the Governor's pleasure.
Reasons for their use
OnJ_y the more important reasons for the creation of
Boards are mentioned here. The Civil Service had few
professionally qualified officers, and their time was
usually fully occupied. To bring in qualified men as
engineers and surveyors at high levels in the Service
would have aroused discontent; but their employment on
Boards raised no such problem. Indeed, the fact that the
salaries and other costs of Boards did not appear on the
annual Estimates freed the Government from criticisms of
extravagance by elected legislators, and from possible
criticisms over appointments. Whilst it is true that the
fees paid to Board members were never large, the presence
of men holding several positions made criticism a
possibility. The allocation of these positions was the
Governor's most useful source of patronage but in general
it was cautiously used.^ Also, the employees of Boards
were not eligible for the salary scales granted to civil
2servants under an Act of 1852 and greater economy and
flexibility in hiring and firing employees was therefore 
3ensured.
1
A list of the more important members of Boards during the 
l850s is contained in the General List Book (S.A.A.).
2
See below, pp.63-7.
3
Although not corporations or statutory authorities, the 
Boards thus shared some of the characteristics that have 
been used to explain the latter-day growth of such bodies;
(cont. P.57)
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As R.L. Wettenhall has pointed out, 'it was to be 
expected that the Governors of the Australian colonies 
would use administrative forms with which they were most
familiar. Hence boards concerned with small segments of
1administration appeared...on the Australian scene'. But 
the most important reason for the creation of Boards was 
the loose nature of departmental organization.
Departments tended to report, through their heads, 
directly to the Governor on important matters. Executive 
Councillors were responsible for sections of the Service 
but their dual administrative and political responsibilities 
made extensive supervision of the departments nominally 
under their control difficult. A strong Governor in any 
case demanded an intimate knowledge of the Service. In 
this situation it was hardly a matter of organizational 
importance whether or not new functions were incorporated 
into departments, for the Governor would exercise the same 
amount of supervision, dependent on his interest, in either 
case. Indeed, the appointment to Boards of men with whom 
he had some personal contact permitted him better 
knowledge of the work of the Boardsand more freedom to
3 (cont. from p.5 6 )
c f . G. Sawer, 'The Public Corporation in Australia', The 
Public Corporation: A Comparative Symposium, ed.
W. Friedmann(University of Toronto School of Law: 
Comparative Law Series, Vol. I; Toronto: Carswell, 195^0 5
p p .12-13•1
1
R.L. Wettenhall, 'Administrative Boards in Nineteenth 
Century Australia', Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. 
XXII, No. 3 (September, 1963 ) , p .25 6 . On the use of 
boards in Britain during this period, see F.M.G. Willson, 
'Ministries and Boards: Some Aspects of Administrative
Development since 1832', Public Administration (London), 
Vol. XXXIII (Spring, 1955), pp.43-58.
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issue directives. In some departments, heads were inclined 
to assert their own authority and autonomy, a tendency 
seen even under the rule of Grey. The Executive Councillors,
too, at times attempted to assert their administrative
1independence. The growth of Boards thus depended on some 
positive advantages gained from the move but, equally 
important, from the disadvantages that would have attended 
the extension of departments. And there was no need to 
construct departments when they were not being demanded.
Summary; Colonial Reaction to the 
Expansion of Government
This type of organizational structure was well suited
to the conditions of gubernatorial rule but it was not
regarded with favour by elected politicians. Their
ignorance of the detailed workings of the Boards and of
the way in which financial appropriations were expended
increased their already critical reaction to the operation
of the machinery of government. Public business,
protested the Register, was
closely shrouded in the recesses of the Government 
sane turn. The best possible guarantee against any 
wrong-doing in the public department s ... is publicity. 
Let the public know what is going on, and they 
cannot long or to any great extent be plundered.^
Colonial politicians tried, with increasing vigour
throughout the 1850s, to achieve such publicity, despite
an unsympathetic government. That the government was
unsympathetic only spurred them on.
1At the same time, Boards also attempted, when possible, 
to assert their independence of the Governor and everyone 
else; see, e.g., Register, l4 March 1856.
2 April 1855.
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CHAPTER II
THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE COLONISTS
6 0
Representative Government, I85I
Until 1851, Governors controlled the Service closely 
and exercised almost absolute powers over it, and the 
development of the Service reflected the economic progress 
of the colony. Colonists had no signal means of 
expressing their opinions on Service management and 
organization but the institution of the Legislative 
Council in I85I gave them the means and also some reasons 
for doing so. The Council of twenty-four members, sixteen 
elected by the colonists on a wide franchise, controlled
electoral matters and the general revenue of the colony
1but not the Civil List and territorial revenue. Still 
the colony was bound by the shackles of Imperial control, 
which only approaching responsible government could 
completely remove, and the flow of Bills and the pitch of 
agitation increased as that goal was neared. The first 
move of colonial politicians after 1851 was to guarantee
1
On the Council, see Pike, Paradise of Dissent, pp.421-41 
passim, and A.C.V. Melbourne, Early Constitutional 
Development in Australia, ed. R.B. Joyce (2nd ed.; St 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1963), pp.369> 376.
Of the eight government members on the Council, four were 
'nominated non-official members'. The other four were 
'nominated official members' (Executive Councillors), and 
in 1851 were the Colonial Secretary, Advocate General, 
Registrar General and Collector of Customs. In the 
Council of 1855-56, which passed the Constitution Act, the 
Colonial Secretary became the Chief Secretary and the 
Advocate General became the Attorney-General, and the 
Surveyor General and Colonial Treasurer (later Treasurer) 
replaced the Registrar General and Collector of Customs. 
Due to transfers of office, this involved only one change 
of personnel.
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religious freedom but their attention was not long 
diverted from the Service, which presented an attractive 
target as one of the last and most important areas of 
gubernatorial privilege.
Criticism of the Service
The simple existence of non-responsible authority was 
sufficient to arouse colonial antagonism; but the
expansion of government activity in this period gave added
1force to the criticisms of Benthamite colonists, who saw
extravagance, corruption and inefficiency resulting from
the growth. They resented the life pensions granted to the
Executive Councillors in the Constitution Act of 1855-56
to compensate them for possible loss of office after self- 
2government. Colonial politicians had no control over the
salaries of officers paid from the territorial revenue and
neither could they decide any appointments. However, they
did question appointments frequently and in every session
the Governor had several times to restate his appointment
3prerogative. The Estimates of salaries paid from general
1
In one case, literally. John Bentham Neales (Member of 
the House of Assembly, 1857-60, 1862-70, and of the 
Legislative Council, 1870-73; Commissioner of Crown Lands, 
1859» 1865-66) was a nephew of Jeremy Bentham and was 
raised by him as a child (H.J. Finnis, 'Neales, John 
Bentham', Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 2,
p p .280-1).
2
1855-56, No. 2, 'The South Australian Constitution A c t ' ,
S.39.
3
See, e. g . , Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative 
Council, No. 24, 3 October 1851, S.A.P.P. 1851, p.8l.
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revenue were always subjected to close scrutiny, and so 
was the work of the government departments.
The police force was easily criticized, for personal
antagonism between senior officers was marked, as was
discontent amongst troopers at the better wages of their
1contemporaries in Victoria. Colonial politicians seized 
this opportunity, and initiated several investigations
2which deplored the Governor’s management of the force.
Their criticisms, however, ranged more widely than this.
Apart from general criticisms of the Service and
particular criticisms of items on the Estimates, which
emphasized the prevalence of extravagance and nepotism,
elected members made three major attempts to reduce the
Governors' control of the Service. An Act classifying the
Service (1852) and an Act instituting a pension scheme
(185^-) were brought into operation and a Select Committee
(1855-56) criticized the Governor's administration of the
3Service at length.
1
See Alexander Tolmer, Reminiscences of an Adventurous and 
Chequered Career at Home and at the Antipodes (London: 
Sampson and Low, I882), V o l . I I , p p .175-7• Tolmer led the 
'Gold Escort' (a group of police troopers charged with 
conveying gold safely from the Victorian goldfields to 
South Australia), which acquainted the South Australian 
troopers with conditions outside their colony.
2
'Police Force', S .A .P .P . 100 of 1853; 'Management of 
Police Force', S ,A .P .P . 145 of 1855-56; 'Report of the
Select Committee of the Legislative Council of South 
Australia, appointed to inquire into, and report upon the 
Conduct of the Police Force', S.A.P.P. 171 of 1855-56.
3Several other Committees,- of which the Select Committee 
of 1855-56 was the culmination, investigated the work of 
particular departments; see 'Reports from the Sub- 
Committee of the Legislative Council, appointed to examine
(cont. p .63)
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Classification, 1852
A Classification Act was foreshadowed when, two 
months after the opening of the Council, an elected member 
initiated a Select Committee to investigate the condition 
and working of the Service. The recommendations of the 
Committee formed the basis of a Bill which divided the 
Service into five classes, covering all officers, with set 
salary ranges and increments for each. Promotion was by 
seniority and in cases of equal seniority a Board, 
consisting of a number of officers of the relevant class, 
was to adjudicate. An unexplained Court ’for the 
correction of offences not cognizable by Courts of Law' 
and a Provident Fund were to be set up, and recruits were 
to enter the Service by non-competitive examination.^
None of the other Australian colonies at this time had 
approached such a scheme, which probably drew largely upon 
the similar system of Service organization then in force 
in India; the mover of the Bill was a retired Indian Army 
officer. But the essential point of classification 
doubtless also owed much to the classification set forth 
by the Colonial Office in 1843*^
3 (cont. from p .6 2 )
the Efficiency and Necessity of the Colonial Engineer's 
Department and such other Departments as may be referred 
to it', S .A .P .P . 1851 (there were three unnumbered reports,
dated 27 October 1851 , 24 November 1851 and 27 November 
1851, respectively).
1
Register, 23 October 1851 (until responsible government, 
Parliamentary debates were reported in the Register). The 
report of the Committee is not extant.
2
See above, pp.39-^0-
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The proposed Act clearly would have trespassed on the
Governor’s promotion prerogative, virtually abolished his
right to fix salaries and removed much of the revenue of
the Land Fund from his control. Such radical proposals
dismayed the Civil Service, and some officers petitioned
1against the Bill. Their fears were groundless. Though
believing that the Governor was constitutionally unable to
sanction such a Bill, some members were sanguine enough to
think that the Imperial authorities would 'probably
affirm' it, but the Governor disabused them of this idea
2and the measure lapsed.
In the next session a classification Act was passed
3by the Government. This Act, the first Civil Service
4legislation in Australia, divided the Service into three
'Civil Service Bill', S .A .P .P . 1851 (not numbered, dated
27 November 1851)*
2
Register, 23 October I85I. The constitutional position 
was unclear; see, e.g., Arthur Berriedale Keith,
Responsible Government in the Dominions (2nd ed.; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1928), Vol. I , pp.74, 85.
3
1852, No. 9 , 'An Act to regulate the Salaries of certain 
Clerks and Subordinate Officers of the Crown in South 
Australia, and to establish Rules for a Progressive 
Increase of the same for Length of Service'.
4
Cf. Arthur McMartin, 'Aspects of Patronage in Australia, 
I786-I836 ' , Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. XVIII, No. 
4 (December, 1 9 5 9 ) » p . 3 26,n o t e 1. The Colonial Secretary 
referred to a classification scheme operating in New South 
Kales, but this was established through regulation 
(Register, 20 October 1852). According to F.A. Bland, a 
scheme similar to the South Australian existed in Tasmania 
the previous year (Bland, Government in Australia, p.237)5 
but no reference is given for this statement and it has not 
been verified. The scheme is not mentioned by the two
(cont. p .65)
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classes with set salary ranges (£100-150; £160-210; £225- 
375 p.a.) and automatic annual increments for each. The 
offices of the Service were to be ranked in classes 
according to the salary then attaching to the office and 
new entrants to office were to commence at the bottom of 
their class. Promotion within a class was to be by 
seniority and from one class to another by merit. The Act 
did not apply to temporary employees, police officers or 
officers paid from the Land Fund. All disputes were to be 
settled by the Governor. Though not extensive, these 
provisions embodied the rudiments of a promotion structure, 
guaranteed some salaries and provided something of an 
example for other colonies. The later classification Acts 
in other colonies distinguished between professional and 
other employees, sometimes included the higher offices and
usually made some provision for entrance examinations, but
1in general outline resembled the South Australian Act.
Also in 1852 the Government stipulated, by regulation,
that no clerks would be appointed outside fhe age range
16-25 years and that entrants would be required to pass a
2non-competitive examination. A Board of two members, a 
4 (cont. from p .64)
most likely authorities, the Tasmanian Civil Service 
Commission of 1862 (for its Report, see Parliamentary 
Papers of Tasmania, 1863 , No. ll), or W.A. Townsley, The 
Struggle for Self-government in Tasmania, 1842-56 
(Tasmania: Government Printer, 1951)•
1
The early Acts of other colonies are described in Bland, 
pp.xiii, 4-9-53» 134-35» and Parker, Public Service 
Recruitment in Australia, pp.20-6.
2
Government Gazette, No. 35 (12 August I852), pp.491-2, 
and N o . 5Ö (25 November I852), pp.713-4.
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minister of religion and a senior civil servant, was
appointed to administer the examination in conjunction
with the head of the department into which the applicant
sought admission. These changes were received
apathetically, the Act exciting little comment and the
1Regulations none at all. The Governor still controlled 
the appointments, promotions and salaries of manual 
workers, those paid less than £100 p.a., Land Fund 
employees and higher officers, and the success of the 
limited Act itself depended on his good faith. It was 
also true that no Governor had any reason to desire control 
of the lower offices under the Act. No one begged his 
patronage for those appointments and the revision of 
paltry salaries was tiresome and better left to an 
automatic system. For the same reason, colonial 
politicians were not very interested in the compromise 
victory they had won, since the important officers and real 
power were beyond their grasp.
1
Nor were heads of departments enthusiastic about the 
cadet scheme, which made demands upon their time, and the 
Board received little support from them; see, e.g., CSO, 
Incoming Correspondence, Docket No. of 1.852, dated 21
September 1852. By the 1850s, the CSO filedincoming and 
outgoing correspondence in consecutively numbered annual 
series. Incoming correspondence is cited hereafter as, 
e.g., CSO In, 27^/1852 (on outgoing correspondence, see 
below, p.90, note 1.
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Governor's prerogative reduced
But the Act did involve certain changes. Because the 
top salary range extended beyond £300 the appointment 
powers of the Colonial Office, reserved for all offices 
above that figure (albeit seldom used), were reduced. And 
though only middle and lower grade officials were involved, 
in no other colony did a Governor concede even that under 
colonial pressure until constitutionally necessary; the 
apparently gratuitous regulations emphasized the unusual 
situation. Since most growth in the Service could be 
expected to occur in the ranges covered by the Act, the 
Governor was also conceding an unknown amount of future 
control. Colonial politicians thought little of these 
points, however. The Governor had conceded only part of 
what they demanded and had removed some force from their 
criticisms of his administration. Yet if the Act was 
passed by the Government it reflected colonial prejudices 
in so far as it followed the Bill of the previous year. 
These prejudices were not compatible with a lasting system 
of Service control.
Classification and pay-scales
The Act, according to its title, was intended to 
'regulate the salaries of...Clerks and Subordinate
Officers'. Later regulations purported to 'classify the...
1Offices in the Public Departments'. In fact, the Act 
dealt with offices rather than officers and was not a 
classification of offices in any clear sense. It instead 
instituted a salary plan for a limited number of offices.
CSO Circular, 23 December 1853*
1
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Each class proposed in the Act was defined by 
regulation as consisting of those offices which had 
received a salary within the range of that class on the 
Estimates of the previous year. Therefore, the Act did 
not revise the salaries attaching to offices but put 
limits upon them. Also, salaries were not awarded 
directly on the work-content of offices. The First Class, 
for example, contained the Warehouse-keeper (Customs 
Department) ancj. House Surgeon (Hospital); the Second, the 
Reader (Printing Office) and the Inspectors of Police; and 
the Third, the Master of the steam dredge and the Fifth 
Clerk (Colonial Secretary's Office). The duties of these 
officers were hardly comparable in scope and detail. But 
placing offices together in classes implied that they made 
comparable demands on the officers holding them, and this 
was a reasonable assumption. It also implied that 
officers of equivalent service were comparably skilled for 
the jobs they held; thus, a record clerk (Registrar General 
of Deeds) of three years standing in the second class 
filled his job with a skill equivalent to that of a 
paymaster (Police) also of three years standing in the 
second class. And, by extension, a record clerk of five 
years standing filled his job with more skill than a 
paymaster of one (or four) years standing filled his.
In 1855 the Register made explicit the assumptions in
such a scheme: 'useful men, with general aptitude, soon
familiarize themselves with the details of office....If
Government situations are so complex that none but the
initiated can understand them, it is time they were 
1modified'. Colonists were committed to the belief that
27 August 1855*
1
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they were capable of holding any position in the Service; 
only experience was necessary for colonial talent to shine 
in government. The good civil servant was not the 
brilliant or indispensable man, for this was but a 
euphemism describing the Governors' hangers-on, but rather 
the man who had gained practice and expertise in the lower 
ranks. Lack of common educational qualifications removed 
an objective means of distinguishing between officers, and 
very few posts in the lower ranks could be linked with 
specific educational requirements. The nature of an 
official's work accordingly changed and grew in importance 
as he gained skill through service. The office and the 
man inter-acted and it was not possible to distinguish 
sharply between the two.
The Act of 1852 therefore did not link together 
positions requiring similar skills and neither did it set 
a standard of skill for any particular position, since 
this could change from year to year, depending on the 
experience of the occupant. Instead it set salary ranges 
for positions felt to be comparable and provided financial 
incentives for capable work. The Act is thus more 
accurately regarded as a simple pay-plan than as a 
classification system for the Service.
Thus far, it is possible to agree with V. Subramaniam 
that the
egalitarian ethos...in the 1850s and 1860s... 
made it difficult to carry out the hierarchical 
idea too far even in bureaucracy. On the 
contrary, the rights of the meanest person
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assumed importance and so did those of the 
lowliest public servants.1
The Act of 1852 made it possible, in theory, for a group 
of entrants to enter the Service at the bottom level and 
rise together to senior positions by displaying nothing 
more than bare competence. But colonial politicians were 
not so naive as to discard the hierarchical principle 
entirely. They emphasized the virtues of experience, 
ability to learn, competence and fair reward; but they 
were well aware that some men were incompetent for official 
work, that some were more competent than others, that an 
effective Civil Service depended on choosing the best man 
and that choices between officers had often to be made.
The above simple interpretation of the Act of 1852 
therefore needs some additional explanation; and it needs 
to be explained why such a simple interpretation can in 
the first place be offered.
Colonial common sense
A Committee of 1851 argued that
the principle of proportioning the salary to the 
responsibility of the duties attached to the 
office should always be borne in mind...a re­
arrangement of the Clerks ' Salaries in the 
department of the Colonial Secretary, Treasurer 
and Auditor-General [should] be made, as it 
appears... that much more responsibility attaches
1
V. Subramaniam, 'Promotion in the Commonwealth Public 
Service: Its Development and Current Practice compared
with those of the New South Wales and Victorian Public 
Services' (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of Political 
Science, Australian National University, 1959) > p.473*
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to the Clerks of the latter departments than 
to those of the Colonial Secretary, whose 
duties are confined to copying letters, and 
other public documents.^
The difference noted here between types of clerical work
was reinforced in the debates of the following year in
passing references to certain types of government
employment being intrinsically more important than others.
Such observations were indeed inescapable. When the
Government passed the Act of 1852 no protests greeted the
insertion of 'gaps' between classes in the so-called '
classification scheme. Such gaps were supposedly passed
automatically by competent officers at the top of their
class when a vacancy occurred in the class above; but it
was clear that the Governor would exercise his discretion
on whom to promote into a higher class. It is true that
elected members could not expect a Governor to do
otherwise, and protests were to that extent obviously
unrealistic. But neither were protests made on the
grounds that the exercise of discretion itself was unjust.
Colonists argued that 'promotion from the lowest to the
highest office should be considered as a right, and not as 
2a favour' and that 'it is quite time that our rising 
generation should have every reasonable prospective
1
'Report from the Sub-Committee of the Legislative Council 
appointed 15th October, 1851 , to inquire into and report 
upon the Salaries of the Officers comprised in Schedule D, 
Parts 1 and 2' , 'S . A . P . P . I85I (not numbered, ordered to be 
printed 25 November 185^). This Committee was appointed 
to recommend salaries for officers on the Civil List; 
predictably, it extended its activities.
2
Register, 20 October 1852.
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encouragement [in the Civil Service]’, but they were far 
from a simple-minded endorsement of seniority and 
sufficient competence. The colonists knew that positions 
were not of equal value, that officers were not of equal 
competence, and that discretion had to be exercised by 
someone in judging merit, itself a desirable attribute.
But these were not useful views to expound when
condemning an allegedly autocratic and overbearing
Government. It was of greater utility to contrast
nepotism (the wrong use of promotional discretion) and
unequal positional remuneration (a sign of influence or
ignorance) with equality, experience and justice. Any
inconsistencies in such a distinction were believed to
result only from degrees of emphasis. Colonists'
statements reflected the political position of the elected 
\members vis-a-vis the Government. As self-government
neared, elected members gave free rein to their ideas of
how merit and the distinction between offices and officers
should be evaluated. This is not to argue that the
colonists had clear views on the organization and control
of the Service, but rather that they over-simplified their
views to achieve other purposes, chief of which was the
2embarrassment of the government.
1
Register, 23 October 1.8 51.
2
Cf. Edward Sweetman, Constitutional Development of 
Victoria, I85I-I856 (Melbourne: Whitcombe Tombs, 1920),
pp.l4l-3.
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Superannuation, 1854
The Superannuation Act also found its origins in the 
political life of the colony. A retiring allowance had 
been suggested in the Bill of 1851 and similar schemes 
were mentioned intermittently in the following three years, 
but most members opposed them on principle (that is, cost 
and the virtues of thrift). There were exceptions made on 
some counts, however. The early pioneers of the colony 
were, by the 1850s, held in wide esteem, the explorer 
Sturt especially so, and in 1851 the Council voted him a 
life pension for his services. It was carefully stated 
that this was not to be taken as a precedent and many 
members regarded with suspicion an attempt to secure a 
similar pension for the aged Harbour Master (Thomas Lipson) 
in 185*4. They sought a compromise between the undeniably 
deserving Lipson and the possibly venal applicants of 
future years; also present was the fear that Qld men like 
Lipson might squander a lump-sum grant and return, cap in 
hand.
When the goldrushes at length improved the economic 
condition of the colony, some argued that Britain had a 
comprehensive superannuation scheme, that India had one 
also, and that South Australia could surely match these 
nations, or, as one editor more grudgingly put it, 'we
1
1854, No. 21, 'An Act to provide for the Retirement of 
Officers in the Civil Service'.
2
Another pension for the ex-Colonial Storekeeper (Thomas 
Gilbert) also came under consideration, and made the 
matter the more urgent.
7 4
must be content to give our Government officers what is 
recognized as their right...in other parts of the Empire'J 
Several retired army officers in the Council drew 
attention to solvent military schemes. Others wished to 
make a generous gesture in contrast to what they could 
portray as gubernatorial short-sightedness. And most saw 
some form of retiring allowances as a safeguard against 
the arbitrary dismissal of officers by the Governor. On 
the other hand, a plan that old officers should be 
retained while younger men did the actual work for less 
remuneration found no supporters; this would simply be to 
aggrandize the Governor's powers by sanctioning him in 
retaining his nominees through their dotage. Plans for 
retiring allowances were clothed in the argument that they 
would promote efficiency by providing an inducement to 
retirement in the senior ranks and thus to advancement in 
the lower, but at all times legislators looked for a cheap 
way out. They did not intend to provide for a pampered 
class that had not the foresight to look to its own future 
The fund set up seemed to reconcile these divergent 
opinions. It was financed by a legislative grant of 
£10,000 supplemented with contributions from voluntary 
contributors at the rate of 2^ - per cent on salary or wages 
Minimum service of fifteen years gave a pension of 15/60 
of the average salary of the three years prior to 
retirement, with an increment of l/60 for each additional 
year of service to a maximum of 40/60. Temporary officers 
and wages staff were eligible to join the fund.
Register, 28 November 1854.
1
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Failure of the Acts
Contributions were voluntary and open to all because 
it was the business of officers to decide on their future 
welfare for themselves once the Council had shown the way. 
It was calculated that the contributions of 2\ per cent 
would be sufficient for calls on the fund, with the 
nucleus of £10,000 being necessary for exceptional periods 
only. Nevertheless, the fund proved to be a generous one, 
as far as some contributors were concerned, because of 
flaws in its construction. Fewer employees than 
anticipated joined the fund and the nucleus, which was not 
invested because no one directed the Treasurer to do so, 
was covered by only a thin skin of contributions. The 
right of the non-contributor Lipson to have first call on 
the fund further weakened it. Its actuarial basis was 
soon proved doubtful (having been drawn up by. three or 
four legislators in less than a week). Officers who had 
already served, say, ten years, realized that they need 
only contribute for another five before retiring on a life 
pension, and many did this. By i860 pensioners who had 
contributed £100.14. 7d were drawing £1,584 annually. But
even before 1857 it was clear that the Act was not
2functioning as it was intended to.
1
The actuarial calculations were drawn from the Irish 
Constabulary Act; see South Australian Parliamentary 
Debates(cited hereafter as S.A.P.D.)~ 20 July i860, col.
459. a
See, e.g., the correspondence between the Colonial 
Secretary, Auditor General and Surveyor General (CS0 In, 
105/1855» enclosures dated 4 January 1855 and 17 January 
1855).
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The classification Act of 1852 also was effective for 
only a few years. Rapid changes in the cost of living 
following the gold-rushes forced the Government to make 
piecemeal alterations to salaries and wages on several 
occasions. No protests followed, since it was obvious 
that the salaries of 1852 were outdated, and neither were 
attempts made to introduce an amended Act. By 1856 the 
utility of the Act had greatly declined and colonial 
interest in it had entirely disappeared.^
The Estimates Committee, 1855-56
Scope
The Select Committee on the Estimates was another 
large scale attempt to condemn, by implication, 
gubernatorial control of the Service. The Committee, 
consisting of five elected members and one official (B.T. 
Finniss, who disagreed totally with the Reports ), was
1
It was repealed in 1858*
2
Boyle Travers Finniss, one of the most prominent 
officials before self-government, was born at sea in 
August 1817. His father was a soldier, and he was 
educated at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. He 
resigned his commission to come to South Australia as a 
surveyor in September 1836. Finniss rose to hold various 
high positions in the Civil Service, including 
Commissioner of Police (1843-47), Executive Councillor 
(1847-56), Colonial Treasurer (1847-50), Registrar General 
(1847-52), and Colonial Secretary (1852-56). After self- 
government , he was a member of the House of Assembly 
(1856-62), Premier and Chief Secretary (1856-57), and 
Treasurer (I858-60) in the Hanson Ministry (on which, see 
below, pp.176-7). Later, he was Government Resident in, 
the Northern Territory (1864), a member of the Forest
(cont. P.77)
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ostensibly set up to examine the system of keeping the
public accounts, but went further than this 'to an enquiry
1into the financial condition of the colony generally'.
In addition, the Register claimed, it 'descended to the 
minutiae of official routine, and...sketched plans of
2 (cont. from p.76)
Board (on which, see below, pp.280-1) (l875-8l), and
Acting Auditor General (1876). In retirement, he became a 
religious polemicist and author. He died in 1893« See 
'Finniss, Boyle Travers', Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Vol. 1, pp-377~9> for a rather bland biography, 
which incorrectly states that he was Auditor General from 
I876-I88I. A proud, autocratic and deeply religious man, 
Finniss earned a deservedly high reputation as an 
administrator before self-government, though R.R. Torrens 
(Colonial Treasurer, 1851-56) thought otherwise; to him, 
Finniss was 'over-rated', and depended overmuch on his 
subordinates (Letter of R.R. Torrens to Anthony Forster, 
l6 May I858 [S.A.A. ]). But the correspondence of the 
Colonial Secretary's Office showed Finniss as diligent, 
precise and eager to be efficient, though perhaps lacking 
in imagination. The virtues and defects of these 
qualities, outside the office, were sharply revealed in 
his administration of the Northern Territory (below,
p p .251-3 .)
1
Finniss, p.353* Finniss wrote his Constitutional History 
when an old man (in 1886, at the age of seventy-eight).
It reveals little of the precision of mind once 
characteristic of him, and was hastily revised between 
writing and publication, if revised at all. The 
disappointments of his career show through. Given this, 
Finniss succeeded in being remarkably objective; and where 
he was not, his prejudices are plain. There is no reason 
to doubt his account of the Estimates Committee and the 
events surrounding it, since other sources support him; 
and Finniss was no champion of Governor MacDonnell (see, 
e.g., p p .409-25, passim).
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reformation for the public departments', and even so,
'excited almost as much interest as the discussion of the 
2Constitution'. The Committee indeed gave colonial 
politicians their first chance of examining and commenting 
on the work of the departments in detail. Their analysis 
of the Service rested upon three closely linked 
considerations.
Assumptions
The Civil Service should be three things: efficient,
inexpensive and just to its employees. Efficiency was
never clearly defined but was seen as a general good
flowing from the other two factors. In arguing for an
inexpensive Service, the members of the Committee found
support in the confused public accounts system which, they
believed, concealed extravagance and carelessness. They
referred to 'the reckless manner in which the public Funds
have been squandered', and with heavy irony emphasized
3'the necessity of exercising a little economy'. Detailed
1
21 March 1856. The Committee issued five reports, 
contained in 'Reports of the Select Committee of the 
Legislative Council of South Australia appointed to take 
into Consideration the Colonial Estimates', S ,A .P ♦P . 158 
of 1855-56. The inquiry took nearly six months to 
complete, and the reports, minutes of evidence and 
appendices totalled 37^ - pages. The reports are cited 
hereafter as, e.g., First Report. The minutes of evidence 
and appendices followed the Fifth Report.
2
Edwin Hodder, The History of South Australia from its 
Foundation to the Year of its Jubilee (London: Sampson Low,
Mars ton , 1893 ) > Vol. p . 2 9 8 .'
Fourth Report, p p .1, 7•
3
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criticisms of the Estimates for 1856 were made and a 
lengthy list of amendments submitted to the Governor. But 
it was not enough to reduce waste and to see clearly how 
the public money was being spent. An efficient Service 
presupposed officers interested in their jobs and willing 
to exert themselves for the public benefit. The alleged 
'practice of making Government appointments on account of 
personal favouritism rather than of known merit' was 
therefore condemned on the general grounds that it was 
unfair to officers without influence, but more importantly 
because 1 2the inducement to exertion does not consist so 
much in immediate remuneration as in the knowledge that
their efforts will be appreciated and lead to more
1important future advantages'. As long as gubernatorial
nominees obtained the most attractive posts, so long would
the quality of employees be poor. The rewards 'of
laudable ambition' should go 'to those whose talents and
energy entitle[d ] them to promotion'; at the same time,
able men were most likely to be those who had 'served
faithfully for a lengthened period' and who had therefore
2a detailed understanding of government work.
The Committee's recommendations on cutting the cost 
of government were of a piecemeal nature but their 
thoughts on promotion implied something more. It meant
1
Fifth Report, p.l.
2
Ibid., p.l. Governor MacDonnell privately described 
these recommendations as 'some very excellent but rather 
general truisms as to the natural aspirations of men for 
the highest offices of Government' (Despatch from 
MacDonnell to the Secretary of State, 6 June 1856, p.2 
[s.A.A.; cited hereafter as MacDonnell Despatch]).
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'introducing-, in fact, a system of promotion in the 
Government service'.' About the nature of such a system 
none was certain, and the Committee contented itself with 
thundering that
it cannot be too soon made known that all... 
attempts at nepotism will be discountenanced, 
and the maxim established that none will be 
appointed to a situation of public trust on 
any other ground than that of fitness'.2
Service reaction
These statements of good intention aroused little
enthusiasm in the Service. Some officers thought that
'this rare inquisition' was designed only to squeeze more
3work from men already over burdened. The Auditor General 
protested that 'indiscriminate censure' tended to 
discourage good officers; the work of his office was 
'unceasing, uninteresting, requiring close application to 
ill-written MSS [sic] wearying to Eye and Brain, - a 
thankless labour', and his officers deserved the support
kof the community. Elected politicians and the press
1
Fifth Report, Minutes of Evidence, q.4097*
2
Fourth Report, p.7*
3
Register, 31 January 1 8 5 6 , Letter from 'A Government
Clerk'; see also Register, 11 February 1 8 5 6 , Letter from 
'A Country Postmaster', and 7 March 1 8 5 6 , Letter from 
'Fiat Justitia'.
4
CSO In, 952/1836, 27 March 1 8 5 6 ; cf. MacDonnell's comment: 
'It is now somewhat difficult to realize the extent of 
irritation and distrust which pervaded almost all ranks of 
the public service on the publication of the [Committee's 
Reports]' (MacDonnell Despatch, p.3)*
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thought differently. The work of the Committee, said the 
Register,
was well begun, well carried on, and has been 
well conducted....There can be no doubt that 
if the recommendations of the Committee were 
carried out the public service would be 
conducted more efficiently and more 
economically. We believe that no person, 
unless he were an official, would deny that.
Limited value of the Committee
The Committee's recommendations did not warrant such 
2praise. Many of its conclusions were probably drawn 
before the investigation commenced, as the consistent use 
of leading questions suggests, and the Committee's claims 
were not well documented. Some suggestions for reducing 
expenditure were inconsistent and others unworkable. Only 
four cases of nepotism were found, and members were unable 
to deny the Colonial Secretary's assertion that three were 
appointed because able men could not be found in the 
colony. Nor did anyone deny the Auditor General's 
contention that the Committee had not given him an 
opportunity of explaining the workings of the financial
1
21 March 1856.
2
And in subsequent years the newspapers remembered the 
Committee with less favour; see, e.g., Register, 9 June 
i860, and cf. MacDonnell Despatch, p.6.
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system to it. However, the Committee did reveal that the 
book-keeping methods of the Government were complex, 
difficult to understand and in many cases misleading. A 
further Select Committee was appointed (June I856) to 
investigate this matter. The Reports of this Committee 
repeated the findings of the Estimates Committee 
concerning entrance and promotion in the Service, but also 
suggested some sensible book-keeping reforms, and argued
2that the Auditor General should have security of tenure.
1
CSO In, 952/1856, 27 March 1856, and 'Memorandum on the 
Estimates Committee's First, Second, Third and Fourth 
Reports', S.A.P.P. 162 of 1855-56, pp.22-^3, and 1-9 
generally. This Paper contained the Governor's reply to 
the Committee, and its rhetoric did not suffer in 
comparison with that of the Committee. When deploring 
insults levelled at officers, for example, the Governor 
said:
In these Colonies, freemen, whether their station 
be humble or exalted, will not brook to be looked 
down upon by any man, or body of men whatever.
Fairer fields for enterprise and better rewards 
for industry and character are even now being 
sought out by numbers who had chosen this Colony 
as their home, and had made her service their 
ambition. If thus an hour should yet arrive when 
South Australia...shall deplore the loss of the 
ablest and most honorable of her servants, till 
the exhausting process leave her but few who are 
not incompetent - except those who may be 
corrupt - then will be the hour of bitter 
reflection for all who may have assisted to 
scatter the seed of that distrust, whose growing 
shadow is even now spreading over the length and 
breadth of the land (p.8).
2
'Reports & c . by Public Accounts Commission', S.A.P.P. 12 
of 1856.
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But the final Report was issued only four months before 
the elections for the first Parliament and its 
recommendations were ignored.
Although the immediate results of the work of the 
Estimates Committee were slight, the importance of the 
Committee did not rest upon the merit or effectiveness of 
its recommendations. Finniss accurately said that its 
existence arose from
a feeling indicative of mistrust of the then 
Government, and of a disposition to use all 
the power which the elected members possessed 
to limit the prerogative of the Governor, and 
to decry the system under which the Government 
of the colony had been conducted.^
When the Governor replied strongly to the conclusions of
the Committee, the Council condemned his statement as 'an
irregular and improper interference with the constitutional
2action of the House and its Committee'. Members did not 
refer to charges made for and against the Service, but 
simply asserted the right of the Council to comment on the 
Service as it pleased and rejected the right of the 
Governor to interfere. In this respect, the Committee and 
Council were largely successful: the Committee opened the
Service to public inspection and challenged one of the 
last areas of gubernatorial privilege. In doing so, the 
Committee established that the public had a right to know 
what yas happening inside the government departments and 
it helped establish the three rough guideposts of
1
Finniss, p p .358-9; cf. MacDonnell Despatch, pp.9-10.
2
Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Council, No. 15, 
13 May 1836, S.A.P.P. 1833-36, p.279-
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efficiency, economy and justice as means of judging the 
performance of the Service.
Suggestions by the press
In the months following the Committee’s final Report, 
the Register embellished the notions of what the Civil 
Service should be. Officers were growing in unpopularity 
and this was largely the result of a costly and over­
manned Service which could certainly be reduced, both by 
cutting salaries and amalgamating departments and by 
abolishing offices thereby rendered superfluous. On the
other hand, 'men should be found to suit places, and not
1places to suit men', and this was best achieved by 
offering adequate salaries. Promotion should be by 
fitness, since this would attract able men and was only 
just. The newspaper relied heavily on commercial 
analogy - the government service was the business of the 
community as a whole, and the number employed should meet 
exactly the number required to maintain government 
functions. Therefore, civil servants should not have 
permanent tenure and retiring allowances should be 
condemned. Conditions in the Service should be equivalent 
to those of commercial establishments. The colonists had 
a right to know how their money was spent and inquiries 
into the Service should be made if it was thought that 
these canons were being broken.
1
Register, 8 November 1855. For newspaper comment on the 
Service generally in this period, see also Register, 9 
August 1855» 6 September 1855» 5 November 1855» 23 
February I856 , l4 March 1856, 3» 10 and l4 April I856, and 
21 November I856.
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The Register did not deal with cadet entrance, 
suggest what adequate salary levels were or decide who 
should have the power to hire and Tire, and its criticisms 
generally lacked detail. Untested were the assumptions 
that competent men to fill certain positions could be 
found within the colony and that the problem of 
superannuation required only thought to solve it. The 
press was indeed not concerned with the details of Service 
administration, as its brief notice of regulations 
affecting the Service suggested, but it made its main 
point strongly. The Service was inefficient and costly 
because of the unrepresentative nature of government.
This did not mean that government was debased. The 
nominee members, for example, continued their political 
careers after I856; the abuse levelled at them before then
was dictated more by their official circumstances than by
1the belief that they controlled a corrupt organization.
The Register suggested rather that, since the mode of 
government was responsible for a cumbrous Service, the 
advent of responsible government would lead to reform of 
the Service. Details of Service retrenchment and 
reorganization would be the prerogative of responsible 
Ministers. It was the duty of the press to emphasize that 
reforms were needed. Responsible government would provide
1
Finniss, for example, found sufficient support to enable 
him to lead the first Ministry under Responsible 
Government, unlike his counterpart in New South Wales (see 
M.E. Osborne, 'Thomson, Sir Edward Deas', Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 2, pp.525-6).
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the means of attacking the problems of the Service: intent
1and attention only were needed.
Inside the Service
Function and structure
Colonial proposals were remote to most civil servants 
and the work of the government departments proceeded with 
little reference to colonial politicians. Some important 
developments, however, occurred within the Service. By 
I856, the number of officers had increased to 900» spread 
over a wide area of the colony and engaged in a large and 
expanding variety of tqsks. The Service was relatively 
large for the population it served and embraced more 
functions than those of Western Australia or Tasmania at 
that time. Partly this resulted from the geography of the 
colony, which demanded transport and communication 
facilities not so necessary in smaller Tasmania, and 
partly to community approval of wide government action, 
possibly not so marked in the other Australian colonies,
1
Cf. the comment of an Under Secretary in the British 
Foreign Office (185^-5 5 ): ’What is vulgarly termed jobbing
...is the blot of constitutional governments. Jobbing is 
a part, though an ugly part, of the price which a free 
people pay for their constitutional liberty. So long as 
there are Parliamentary constituents they will ask favours 
of members of Parliament, and members of Parliament of 
ministers, and ministers will on their part have a 
tendency to satisfy such solicitants, if in their power'
(quoted in Edward Porritt, The Unreformed House of Commons 
Parliamentary Representation before 1 8 3 2 [Reprints of 
Economic Classics; New York: Kelley, 1963], Vol. I, p.306)
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and perhaps resulting from the failure of municipal 
government to gain a firm hold.
The status of positions in the Service, as measured 
by salary, showed some important changes. Whilst the 
Colonial Secretary maintained his pre-eminent position 
(his Chief Clerk was equally placed with the Crown 
Solicitor and Commissioner of Crown Lands) other positions 
showed a steady advance that prefigured their even greater 
importance later in the century. Most important was the 
increasing status of the Auditor General, Commissioner of 
Police and Postmaster General, and the rise of the 
Colonial Architect and Engineer signified the small 
beginnings of the later railways boom. On the other hand, 
the declining importance of the Sheriff testified to the 
allocation of some of his previous duties to the police 
and Law Officers, and the shrinking position of Harbour 
Master was adequate proof of the growing incompetence of 
the holder of the office.
The Service was patchily governed by piecemeal rules 
and regulations and the changing importance of various 
positions and the growth of staff and function clearly 
meant that further codification would be necessary, as 
legislators showed themselves to be uneasily aware of 
after I856. Nevertheless, the Services of I836 and I856 
were not basically different. Expansion of function had 
been foreshadowed by the initial designation of offices, 
some of the early officials were still in office and 
regulations were only exiguous. The most important 
changes in the Service occurred in the attitudes of the 
men who constituted it.
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Status of officials
Civil servants enjoyed short hours, pressure of work
was not high except when annual returns came in, a
mailship arrived or politicians demanded papers, and
office conditions were better than in commercial firms.
However, they were not popular as a group and were
criticized for their slothfulness, inefficiency, cost and
arrogance by nearly all sections of the community.^
Fluctuating economic conditions guaranteed them little
security of employment or salary, and the lower salaries
were 10-15 per cent below those paid by commercial firms
2for comparable work. Some claimed that they were engaged 
in work peculiar to the Service and would be at a 
disadvantage in commerce if retrenched. The dual 
responsibility of official members left some departments 
without a formal head for much of the time and subordinate 
officers had therefore to assume the responsibilities of 
departmental leadership with none of the compensating 
advantages of public status, increased salary or assurance 
that their labours would be recognized. Some higher 
officials spoke of their subordinate officers with disdain
1
See, e.g., CSO Circular, 12 June 1852, which drew attention 
to complaints from a number of commercial firms at 
officials’ inactivity, and 'Petition from the Working 
Classes' , S . A , P . P . 33 of 1854, which protested against 
interfering and highly paid officials.
2
These figures are difficult to collate because the 
salaries of private firms are largely unknown. Service 
salaries fluctuated widely and elected members often 
disputed the actual amount of salaries paid (see, e.g., the 
debate in the Register, 4 April I856). However, the 
margin would be approximately correct, on the average, and 
is consistent with later figures.
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and, whilst South Australia was not an authoritarian 
society to the extent that New South Wales or Tasmania
were, many top officers were eager to emphasize the power
1and authority that their positions gave them.
Obvious confusion existed in some departments and 
this undoubtedly covered laziness and inefficiency.
Rivalry between heads of departments, public condemnation 
of administrative acts, the incompetence of some officials 
and the mediocrity of others, the unnecessary nature of 
some of the work performed and the difficulties of 
communications between departments were all marked traits 
and contributed to a picture of a confused and 
uncooperative organization. Some advantages derived from 
a small Service which focussed upon the Governor, however. 
Promotion could be rapid for able men who caught his 
attention and there was little hesitation in transferring 
officers between departments when it seemed necessary to 
do so. Several officers, for example, moved from the 
Police Department to the Treasury and Auditor General’s 
Office, and others were experienced in half a dozen 
departments. But one man could not supervise the whole of 
the Service and the lower levels especially suffered from 
lack of coordination.
Status
Yet civil servants had a growing pride in their 
position and a cohesiveness as a group that ran counter to
_
See, e.g., letter of Robert R. Torrens to W.H. Cushkip,
3 September i860 (National Library, Canberra); cf. the 
remarks of P.E. Warburton (Commissioner of Police, 1853-67)» 
Fourth Report, Minutes of Evidence, qq.3029-35«
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much of the above description. Many lived beyond their 
means; a Board of Inquiry, appointed in 1838 to report on 
the remuneration necessary to maintain a reasonable 
standard of living for a middle-grade official, 
recommended provision for servants, laundering and
1entertainment expenses and a considerable amount of wine.
Whilst officers might claim this standard, it was often
beyond the resources of the colony to provide it, as later
salary reductions showed. Nonetheless, many managed to
keep up social appearances. Henry Holroyd, a police
inspector, was thus able to say that
Lady MacDonnell [the Governor's wife] was a very 
charming person and gave many hospitable 
entertainments. She was a great patroness of 
archery and music.... Balls, musical parties, 
archery meetings, and riding excursions were 
much in vogue.-
It is noteworthy that Holroyd was referring to I856 and 
that he was not a protege of the Governor.
However, gubernatorial nominees did set the pace 
socially. As long as their patron remained in power their 
pay and position were reasonably secure. A number were 
'gentlemen out of luck' who regarded their appointment in 
the Service as merely a passing phase, for England was 
their home: some requested leave of absence to travel back
and many never returned. They saw themselves as men free
1
See C S O , Outwards Correspondence, 11 December I838, 
Letterbook D , p .3^ » and 'Draft Report of Board on Civil 
Service Salaries' , dated 15 December 1838 (S.A.A.). 
Outwards correspondence is cited hereafter as, e.g., CSO 
Out, 11 December I838, p.3^*
2
Henry Holroyd, Henry Holroyd, South Australian Pioneer: 
His A u t o b i o g r a p h y (Adelaide: n .p . , n .d . ) , p p . 3 8 , 39•
91
to travel on as opportunity arose, and therefore separate 
from those who, by choice or fortune, were bound to the 
future of the colony.
Their influence on the non-imperial nominees, the
poorer-paid recruits and those from a lower social
position was important, for these also adopted the manners
of an influential, well-paid and widely respected group.
And by 1856, when staff turnover had considerably
decreased and the influence of these men had all but
disappeared, those characteristics remained. Partly this
resulted from the separate nature of civil servants as a
group. Because of the concentration of government offices
in the city most worked within walking distance of one
another and they tended to live in the same suburbs near 
1their offices. For years officers knew most of their 
peers by sight, if not acquaintance. This became less 
possible as the Service expanded but was partly 
compensated for by a clearer definition of structure and 
function within the Service itself. By I856 the positions 
of most of the officers were fairly clearly defined, 
though not necessarily because of extra-Service action as, 
for example, in the case of the Crown Solicitor and the 
Advocate General, who were advised that 'the division of 
duties and clerical assistance [was ] a matter of mutual 
adjustment between [themselves]'. The Service presented 
a picture of confusion to outsiders, but this was not an
1
After about 1845 post office employees were required to 
live in the South Adelaide area.
2
CSO Out, 1 February 1850, p.71*
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inconsistency, as today's abusive cliches may show. If it 
was not possible for an officer to belong to a group that 
he personally knew, he could at least feel part of a 
closely linked body,
Sense of esteem was heightened by an awareness that 
the Service was essential to the development of the new 
colony; no amount of public mutterings at official 
indolence could deny that and, unlike their brother-clerks
in New South Wales, officers did not share their duties
1with convicts. Some bolstered this claim by emphasizing
that they had peculiar qualifications for office, either
of temperament or training, and one said, 'I detest that
mawkish affectation of humility which leads some men to
talk loudly of their fears lest they should be found
incompetent to fulfil their duties...I do understand my
2duties both in theory and in practice'. Many saw their 
connections with the Service of the colony in more worldly 
terms. Until at least 1870 the majority of officials were 
English by birth but quickly became South Australians by 
necessity. The lazy, the infirm, those with dependent 
relatives or families and sometimes the ambitious found it 
difficult to leave the colony for one personal reason or 
another. With their own fortunes depending on the success 
of the colony they emphasized the importance of the 
Service.
1
Cf. Alexander Harris, The Secrets of Alexander Harris 
(Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1961) , p p .96-7•
2
Robert R. Torrens, quoted in Pike, Paradise of Dissent,
p.237.
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Politics
With some exceptions, officials considered themselves
above political strife, a few because of an idealized
conception of public service, but the more realistic
because they realized that their tenuous security depended
on keeping out of the 'firing line' of politics, Elected
members were quick to protest at any sign that the Service
was politically active and Governors were generally
careful to see that members had no grounds for complaint,
although activity in the weak District Councils was not
forbidden.^ In 185^ the following rules, 'acknowledged
2through the Public Service', were thus issued:
Public Officers are required to abstain from all 
interference in political movements adverse to 
the policy of the Government. They should 
absent themselves from all public meetings for 
the discussion of political measures, unless 
they support the policy of the Government; nor 
will they be exempt from responsibility if - at 
any public meeting or otherwise - their 
unauthorized statements, or the course they 
take, should prove embarrassing to the action of 
the Government.... They are to abstain - both
1
See, e.g., George W. Gooden and Thomas L. Moore, Fifty 
Years History of the Town of Kensington and Norwood 
(Adelaide: Webb, 1903), p p .35 > 7 9 j E . Lumbers, Centenary 
History of the City of Port Adelaide (Adelaide: Allen, 
1956 ) , p .25; H .A .F . Tay1o r , History of Brighton, South 
Australia (Adelaide: Allen, 1958 ) , p .17.
2
CSO Circular, 26 August 185^* Their acknowledgement 
throughout the Service, if true, probably derived from 
similar opinions which Gawler expressed to the Secretary 
of State in 1839 (Pike, Paradise of Dissent, p.233)> 
although Gawler did not, it seems, promulgate his views 
officially.
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orally and in writing, officially and non- 
officially - while in the service of the 
Government, from all opposition to the 
measures of the GovernmentJ
Some officers went to considerable lengths to avoid
controversy. When W.H. Maturin learned that a number of
elected members objected to his appointment as an
Inspector of Police, for example, he immediately resigned
the position, although no one had suggested that he
should.^
Much of the civil servants' self-picture was based on 
hope and aspiration, if not on imagination. In later 
years this became more evident as middle- and lower-grade 
officials lost contact with the well-paid and prestigious 
heads of departments who long symbolized the ambitions of 
an aspiring class. Their general standard of living 
undoubtedly declined as governments demonstrated 
consistent inability to guarantee salaries. The era 
before 1856 was regarded as a time of comparative well­
being:
the position of the public officials was 
surrounded by a certain amount of security as
1
Governor Young considered the matter to be ’one requiring 
very careful deliberation and very guarded language', and 
the circular as finally approved was gentler in tone than 
some of its earlier drafts (CSO In, 2466-^/1854, enclosures 
dated 22 August 1854 and 23 August 1854). A subsequent 
directive emphasized that restrictions were not intended 
to interfere with the franchise (CSO Circular, 9 November 
1854).
2
'Mr A.S. Maturin', S .A .P .P . 93 of 1853» On the other 
hand, the Estimates Committee was so disliked by civil 
servants that many took part in a public meeting which 
condemned it (Register, 21 May I856). The regulations 
implicitly supported this action, since it reflected the 
official opinion of the government.
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long as things went on smoothly....The system 
worked fairly well, for on the whole the 
Civil officers were well treated, and generally 
satisfied with their condition'.^
This was overdrawn, but it indicated the optimism of the
early years. At the same time, other attitudes were
emerging. Since both the economic and political
circumstances of those years threatened the security and
self-esteem of the Service, officers already showed a
tendency to act slowly, perhaps to cling to what they had,
and to accept reversals with at least the appearance of
equanimity.
The seeds for the continuance of these attitudes were 
sown. In I856 the Service belonged to young men: the
average age of departmental heads was little over forty 
and some remained at the top for thirty years (one until 
1903 when a retiring age was instituted). These men had 
absorbed their ideas in pre self-government years and 
their influence on their subordinates was considerable.
The influential South Australian families established 
themselves in these years, in some cases in both politics 
and administration, and their early radicalism turned into 
a defence of the positions they had won. The tone of the 
Service set in its first twenty years was a factor of 
continuing importance in later development.
1
[James Dominick Woods], The Civil Service of South 
Australia: A Review (Adelaide: B y t h e a u t h o r ,1890), p.6. 
On the origins and quality of this booklet, see below,
p.375.
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Summary: The Legacies of 1836-56
Also of later importance were the attitudes that the 
community, and especially its politicians, learned to hold 
towards the Service. When the South Australian Parliament 
came into existence on April 4th 1857, the colony had 
achieved much of the political and religious equality that 
its founders had sought, and legislators consolidated this 
by quickly passing a number of enactments, advanced for 
Australia, such as triennial parliaments, universal 
manhood suffrage, secret ballots and eventually votes for 
women. However, it had become clear to all but a few that 
South Australia was not to be a new Eden and that indeed 
the colony would be hard pressed to match its prosperity 
with that of the eastern settlements. Progress seemed 
assured but it would be steady rather than spectacular. 
Nevertheless, the early conceptions of the nature of the 
colony were still widely held, even if the early fluidity 
often congealed into conservatism, and the Civil Service 
was seen in the context of these colonial prides and 
prejudices.
South Australia was conceived as an entity quite 
separate and different from the other Australian colonies 
and its inhabitants never ceased to emphasize its unique 
nature, even when cause for such claims had disappeared. 
Partly because of this pride they opposed the appointment 
of outsiders by the Governors, believing the colonists 
capable of filling all posts, and this attitude persisted 
after I856 though it was then directed rather 
indiscriminately against any non-South Australian, which 
usually meant men from the other colonies. They were thus 
opposed to the exercise of patronage for anything but the
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good of the colony as a whole (which was never 
successfully defined). When the Governor was removed as a 
whipping boy Ministers were proud to claim that South 
Australia was free of the abuse of nepotism as it existed 
in Victoria and New South Wales, by which was meant, not 
that political influence was unimportant in securing 
appointments and promotions in Adelaide, but that such 
influence was used to appoint the 'best man'. This was 
not in the case, it was argued, in Victoria and New South 
Wales.
The colony was to have been a land of equal 
opportunity where ability and ambition alone counted.
This was never the case but the vision of South Australia 
as an egalitarian society was not lost. It found 
expression in the Service, where it was claimed that men 
should be able to rise from the bottom to the top by 
ability alone; and this again was partly a reaction 
against the freedom-usurping nepotism of the Governors. 
Little emphasis was consequently placed on educational 
standards since a high education was notoriously the 
property of classes privileged by birth and luck. Men 
were to prove themselves in practice and this reflected 
the early discovery that an administrative machine 
transferred from Britain needed to adopt radically new 
procedures in a new colony.
These vaguely expressed attitudes resulted from 
colonial ignorance of the Service and from a preoccupation 
with ends rather than means. The political struggle of 
the first two decades was concerned with winning just 
rights and few colonial politicians doubted that they 
could run the Civil Service well. But their confusion was
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profound as the Acts of 1852 and 185^-, the Committee of 
1855-6 and their willingness to accept governmental 
activity whilst denigrating its operators showed. When 
South Australia gained self-government, colonists 
harboured few specific grievances against the Service. 
Belief that it was generally inefficient, expensive and 
unjust to many employees was widespread, but few doubted 
that responsible ministers, given time, opportunity and 
experience, would remove these faults. The fine rallying 
cries of egalitarianism and freedom from nepotism, however, 
proved to be only ambiguous guides to action; and action 
became increasingly necessary after 1856 as salaries and 
allowances remained unregulated, pensions hung in the 
balance and promotions depended on the rectitude of 
individual Ministers. Lines of authority were blurred and 
an expanding government called the more urgently for 
rationalization.
Within the Service itself the position was clearer: 
but this internal structure had been initiated by the civil 
servants themselves in default of political action. The 
development of the Service in the next sixty years was to 
be concerned with the tension between these two themes.
On the one hand colonial politicians gradually defined 
what they wanted from the Service and how they expected to 
get it by modifying the early colonial ideals, and on the 
other civil servants discreetly sought the privileges 
which were a product of those ideals.
PART TWO: CONSOLIDATION, 1857-187^
100
Despite the severe criticisms of the Service made 
before 1857» this period witnessed few deliberate and 
comprehensive changes in Service structure, management and 
conditions of employment. Changes arose from specific 
grievances and were of a piecemeal nature. A Civil 
Service Act was passed in 187^, but it was not a new 
departure in administration. It was a retrospective Act, 
for it embodied the piecemeal changes and established 
practices of the previous seventeen years. Disinclination 
to remodel the Service resulted from many factors, 
including the prestige and authority of senior officials, 
who resisted change, the calibre of politicians and the 
nature of Parliamentary activity. The economic condition 
of the colony was also important.
The economy
It is convenient to divide the period into two parts, 
with the depression of 1870-71 forming the dividing line. 
Cautious economic policies characterized the first span. 
The main areas of government activity were outlined before 
1857 and were little altered in scope during the 1860s . 
Governments were concerned rather to expand and 
consolidate existing functions, and railway mileage, 
immigration, the public debt and agricultural and 
industrial production grew slowly and steadily rather than 
spectacularly.
In later years, some saw the period as one of the
1most fruitful in the history of the colony, especially
1
E.g. Geoffrey Blainey, Gold and Paper: A History of the 
National Bank of Australasia Limited (Melbourne:Georgian 
House»., 1958 ) , p . 117 .
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when placed against the depressions of the middle 1880s and
I89OS. At the time, uncertainty characterized economic
development. Unpredicted recessions in i860, I865 and
I87O, due largely to agricultural failures following poor
seasons, caused sudden retrenchments in government
expenditure and inhibited ambitious developmental
programmes. Colonial Treasurers preferred short-term
planning when finances were uncertain, though political
considerations were important also, and the ever
increasing cost of developing the Northern Territory after
1864 further disposed them to caution. However, the
depressions of the 1860s were not as severe as those of
the 1840s, I85OS or 1880s, and prices remained stable
throughout the decade. Checks to the development of the
colony were shortlived only. The recession of 1870-71 was
by far the most serious of the period, and resulted in an
unprecedented storming of the government offices by a
2body of unemployed workers, but the recovery of the
colony after 1871 was unexpectedly rapid. Governments,
however, were slow to respond to improved conditions and
dissatisfaction with Parliamentary inertia, expressed only
intermittently throughout the 1860s, grew rapidly.
Although critics had little opportunity of acting on their
criticisms until after the elections of 1875 > they were
able to force reluctant governments to legislate on some
matters. In 1874 the Blyth Ministry (July 1873-June 1875)
thus found it convenient to pass a Civil Service Act in
3order to reduce charges of inactivity. The unambitious
T~~ ~ ^
See below, pp.251-3*
2Hodder, History of South Australia, Vol. II, p.229»
1874, No. 3) 'An Act to regulate the Civil Service'.
3
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and limited Act was a reflection of the Ministry itself, 
and of the development of the Service generally throughout 
the period.
CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATION AND GROWTH
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Apart from R.L. Wettenhall's work on Tasmania/ 
little has been written concerning the structure of the 
Australian Civil Services in the nineteenth century, 
including the allocation of departments to Ministers, 
formal methods of coordination and control, the nature of 
departmental hierarchies, functional range, and 
occupational and salary divisions between employees. A 
description of the formal structure of the South Australian 
Service will provide new material eventually useful for 
comparative purposes and lay a base for an explanation of 
informal management and control.
Organization
Constitutional provisions
The South Australian Constitution Act of 1855-56^ was
unusual because it represented * the only occasion [in
Australia] where an attempt was made to entrench the
principles of responsible government in the language ofathe constitution', but only four provisions directly 
applied to the Civil Service. First, Section 33 provided 
that:
1
R.L. Wettenhall, 'Ministerial and Departmental 
Organization in Tasmania' (unpub. MS., author's possession). 
(Typescript»)
2
1855-56, No. 2, 'The South Australian Constitution A c t ’.
3
Encel, p.21; and see R.D. Lumb, The Constitutions of the 
Australian States (2nd ed.; St Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press, 1965)» p.34.
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No officer of the government shall be bound to 
obey any order of the Governor involving any 
expenditure of public money; nor shall any 
warrant for the payment of money, or 
appointment to or dismissal from office, be 
valid, except as herein provided, unless such 
order, warrant, appointment, or dismissal 
shall be signed by the Governor, and 
countersigned by the Chief Secretary.^
Second, appointments to public offices were to be made by
the Governor acting with the advice of the Executive
Council, although heads of departments could make
2appointments to 'minor1 offices. The appointments of the 
Clerks of the House of Assembly and Legislative Council 
rested with their respective Chambers (but, in practice, 
with the Speaker and President, as was 'customary'
O
elsewhere in AustraliaJ ). Third, a Civil List guaranteed 
the salaries of the Crown Solicitor, Auditor General and 
Under Secretary. Fourth, members of Parliament were to 
vacate their seats if they accepted 'any office of profit 
or pension from the Crown, during pleasure, excepting those 
offices which are... required... to be held by Members of4Parliament'. The nature of official tenure was not
1
The necessity for the Chief Secretary to countersign 
appointments was subsequently overlooked, and an Act had 
to be passed validating those appointments already made 
(1862, No. 2, 'An Act to remove Doubts as to the 
Appointments to and Dismissals from Office of Certain 
Persons'); see S . A. P . D . , l6 September 1862, cols. 85^-65, 
and the Register, 17 September 1862.
2
S.29- 'Minor' offices were subsequently defined as those 
below the Second Class under the Act of 1852 (Minutes of 
the Executive Council, Vol. 2, 16 January 1857T*
3Alpheus Todd, Parliamentary Government in the British 
Colonies (2nd ed.; London: Longmans Green, 189*4), ed. by 
his son, p.42; cf. S.A.P.D., 19 August 1873» cols. l6l-2. 
k
S.17.
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specified and doctrines associated with responsible 
government, such as Civil Service anonymity and 
Ministerial responsibility for the actions of officials, 
were not raised but evolved in later years. Thp implied 
reliance on subconstitutional means to order the Service 
testified to the belief that it was a viable machine. 
Whatever ills it harboured derived from the nature of 
gubernatorial rule, and these could be corrected by the 
elected representatives of the people. In 1856 the 
organization of the Service presented only three immediate 
problems.
Ministerial succession and departmentalization
The first and basic problem concerned Ministerial 
succession. The former Executive Councillors, who formed 
the first Ministry^ under responsible government, were 
experienced administrators and their financial position 
was secured by the Constitution Act, which provided that 
they should receive pensions if forced to retire on 
political grounds. Their successors would not be so 
experienced, and neither would they be so financially 
secure. Ministerial control over the Service might not be 
continuous, but it was considered 'undesirable...that one 
single day should be lost in placing proper responsible 
Ministers over the various departments of the public 
service'.^
_
From 1857 onwards, all South Australian Ministers have 
been members of Cabinet. The terms Ministry and Cabinet 
therefore refer to the same group of men at one point in 
time; nuance decides which term is used below.
2
Register, 15 August 1857.
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Accordingly, the second and third problems were 
concerned with distributing departments between Ministers 
and deciding how to coordinate the loosely knit structure 
of the Service. In allocating departments to Ministers, a 
task which the Governor thought to be 'of lasting Public 
importance, and n o t ...affeeting the existing Government 
only', the first Ministry followed the example set by New 
South Wales, thus:^
Chief Secretary's Office, Audit Office, 
Police, Sheriff, Goals, Convicts, Post 
Office, Education, Medical, Hospitals, 
Lunatic Asylum, Destitute Poor,
Colonial Store, Printing Office, 
Cemeteries;
Law Officers, Supreme Court, Magistrates 
and Local Courts, Commissioner of 
Insolvency, Official Assignee,
Registrar General of Deeds, Coroner; 
Treasury, Customs, Harbours, Agency in 
England;
Office of, Survey, Immigration, 
Aborigines, Sheep Inspectors;
Office of, Colonial Architect, 
Observatory and Telegraphs.
No debate accompanied this division of the Service along 
rough functional lines. To Finniss it was 'a matter of
1
Minutes of the Executive Council, Vol. 2, 28 October 1856. 
For a short statement of the main functions of each 
Minister's group of departments, see Government Gazette,
No. 42 (2 October I862), pp.8l4-5, and 'Conduct of Public 
Business', S.A.P.P. 36 of 1871.
Chief Secretary:
Attorney General:
Treasurer:
Commissioner of 
Crown Lands:
Commissioner of 
Public Works:
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simple arrangement',1 23 and lew alterations to it were made
2during the period. There was no talk of reducing the
number of departments through amalgamation; the existing
departmentalization of the Service was accepted. The
status of the Boards was consequently not immediately
considered. As in Tasmania,
the already established pattern of departmental 
division of the public service was little 
changed by responsible government: the cabinet
system was grafted on to give the top of the 
hierarchy a different appearance, but it 
scarcely affected the structure below.3
Nor did the removal of the erstwhile Executive Councillors
from the ranks of the Service necessitate substantial
alterations to the top positions. The chief assistants to
the Colonial Secretary and Treasurer became the
administrative heads of their departments, tfyeir titles
being changed from Chief Clerk to Under Secretary and from
Assistant Treasurer to Under Treasurer, and the position
of Crown Solicitor and Public Prosecutor was separated
from that of the Attorney-General and made non-political
in nature. Before self government, Public Works and Crown
1
Finniss, p.370.
2
The Treasurer controlled the Cemeteries Department 
1864-70, which then passed to the Commissioner of Crown 
Lands, and the Telegraph Department 1869-70, which was 
then amalgamated with the Post Office, under the Chief 
Secretary.
3
Wettenhall, 'Organization in Tasmania', p.17* The 
position in New South Wales was similar; see Kenneth W. 
Knight, 'The Development of the Public Service of New 
South Wales from Responsible Government (1856) to the 
Establishment of the Public Service Board’ (unpub. 
Master's dissertation, Dept, of Government, University of 
Sydney, 1958), p.24.
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Lands were not distinct sections of the Service because 
the Surveyor General, Freeling, headed both the Surveyor 
General and Public Works departments, but in I856 a new 
position, that of Colonial Architect, was created at the 
head of the latter department. One curiosity resulted 
from this division. Freeling became Commissioner of 
Public Works in October I856 but remained Surveyor General, 
in which capacity he was placed under the supervision of 
his Ministerial colleague, the Commissioner of Crown Lands 
(Bonney). No protests were heard concerning this, however, 
and Freeling's resignation from the Ministry removed the 
anomaly.^
Coordination - functions of Ministerial departments
Ministerial secretariats were instituted to coordinate 
the activities of the departments under the control of
each Minister, again following the example of New South
2Wales. The functions of these five secretariats, which 
were termed Ministerial departments and headed in three 
cases by an officer designated as 'Secretary to...' the 
relevant Minister, included transmitting correspondence 
between departments, Ministers and outside bodies, 
processing applications for employment, gathering 
information for the Minister in charge or other parties,
1
He resigned from the Ministry in March 1857» but remained 
Surveyor General until January 1861 and continued to hold 
his seat in the Legislative Council until August 1859*
2
Cf. E. Deas Thomson, 'Administrative Arrangements', 
Parliamentary Papers of New South Wales, Vol. I, 1856-57»
pp.175-82.
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collating annual and other returns relating to the 
activities of the departments and, in general, acting as 
clearing houses. The Ministerial departments thus shared
much of the former business of the Chief Secretary’s
1Office. The flow of communication was up and down the
hierarchy, although heads of departments did not report
2directly to their Ministers. No formal provisions were 
made for lateral coordination and correspondence between 
equivalent subordinate sections of departments, nor for 
the Ministerial departments to supervise the activities of 
a department at subordinate levels. The past history of 
the Service and the example of other colonies made it 
difficult for Ministers to think of an alternative to the 
simple plan of secretariats.
The Heads of Departments
Ministerial Secretaries
The Ministerial departments had no direct control 
over the personnel practices of the departments. They 
were supposed to receive applications for employment 
within the group of departments controlled by a Minister, 
but the administrative assessment of these applications 
occurred at the departmental level. Similarly, salary
1
But that Office retained some special coordinating 
functions; see below, p p .111-2.
2
Cf. B.B. Schaffer, 'The Idea of the Ministerial Department: 
Bentham, Mill and Bagehot', The Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, Vol. Ill, N o . I (November, 1957)>
p . 60 .
Ill
claims and recommendations were routed through them, but 
did not originate from them. Neither did they have any 
formal policy advising functions, although their position 
as recipients of recommendations from the departments gave 
them an important potential role in this area, in 
reconciling opposed recommendations, for example. Deas 
Thomson (Chief Secretary for New South Wales, 1837-56) had 
said of their position that, on the coming of self 
government,
public business... will be distributed amongst 
the several Ministers, instead of being 
centralized in the Office of the Colonial 
Secretary. . . . [in order to avoid inconvenience ] 
there must be attached to each Minister a 
permanent Under Secretary and Clerical Staff; 
so that on the assumption of office by any new 
Minister, the business of the Department may 
continue to be conducted with due regularity.^
A Victorian legislator later referred to their functions
differently: ’although they were called "Secretaries"
[they] were after all mere clerks or recorders... .Their
2function was, for the most part, managerial*. The 
importance of the Ministerial Secretaries is discussed 
below; here it is noted that in two cases secretariat 
functions formed part only of the business of a larger 
department.
The head of the Chief Secretary’s Office, termed ’The 
Under Secretary’, on occasion acted as clerk to the 
Cabinet. His department was responsible for the 
collection of agricultural and other statistics, the 
communication of remissions of sentence, protocol, the
1
Thomson, pp.176, 175.
Quoted in Parker, Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. XV, 
No. 1, p .3 6 .
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enforcement of regulations affecting weights and measures
and patents, government correspondence with foreign
governments and the Justices of the Supreme Court, and any
other matters not covered by an existing department,  ^ The
Treasury, headed by the Under Treasurer, was responsible
for the budgeting and financial policy of the government
and was supposed to superintend certain of the financial
affairs of the Service (estimates of expenditure and
requisitions for equipment, for example) in cooperation
with the Auditor General's Office. In addition, the Chief
Secretary's Office exercised 'a general supervision over
2all the Departments of the Service', and in this capacity 
drafted and distributed regulations concerning the Service 
and collected data relating to the Service as an 
organization (at the request of members of Parliament, for 
example). It was concerned with cadet examinations, 
classification lists when applicable, and pensions and 
superannuation. Matters dealing with the Service were 
thus meant to pass from the Chief Secretary's Office to 
the other Ministerial departments and thence to the 
remaining departments.
Since the Ministerial departments did not perform 
congruent functions, the salaries and status of the five 
Ministerial Secretaries differed. For historical reasons 
the Under Secretary was preeminent, and the Under 
Treasurer's responsibility for finance and budgeting
1
Cf. Edward Jenks, The Government of Victoria, Australia 
(London: Macmillan, 1891), p .279•
2
CSO In, 4l3i/l858, 19 March I858.
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invested his office with a status almost as high in a 
colony properly watchful of its economic position. The 
Crown Lands and Public Works Secretaries formed a third 
level equal in salary and approximately equal to each 
other in status. For some years the Secretary to the 
Attorney General occupied a less eminent and well<-paid 
position because of the importance of his professionally 
qualified official associate, the Crown Solicitor, with 
whom Attorneys General (who were themselves legally 
qualified) often had closer working contact. These 
gradings did not necessarily reflect the relative 
positions of the Ministers. By the 1860s the Treasury was 
sought more eagerly than the Chief Secretary's Office by 
some politicians, and Ministerial posts in general 
fluctuated in importance at different times. The Premier^ 
was more often Chief Secretary than not, as this 
tabulation shows:
Table 1
Premiers and their Ministerial Positions, 1857-74
Position
Number of Premiers 
who held position
Chief Secretary 15
Treasurer 4
Attorney General 4
Commissioner of Crown Lands 2
Commissioner of Public Works 1
Total 26
1The term 'Premier' had no constitutional basis but was 
used from the beginning; the term 'Prime Minister' never 
enjoyed popularity.
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The office of Chief Secretary never regained the position 
it had before I856, however. Administrative positions 
were more stable and the four levels created among the 
Ministerial Secretaries remained almost constant for the 
period.
Table 2
Ministerial Secretaries and their Salaries, 1857-74
Position
Salaries ( £ p . a .
1857
Year
I865 1870 1874
Under Secretary 600 600 600 800
Under Treasurer 500 500 600 700
Secretary Attorney General 300 400 400 550
Secretary Crown Lands 400 400 500 600
Secretary Public Works 400 400 500 600
From the lists of civil servants included, after 1866, in 
the annual Blue Books (S ♦A .P .P . 2 in each year); cited
hereafter as Civil Service Lists (on which, see App. la, 
and the Bibliography).
Other heads
The Ministerial Secretaries could be readily defined 
because of their similar nomenclature, function, 
structural position and remuneration, and further 
characteristics which distinguished them as a group are 
considered below. But to define the other senior officers 
in the Civil Service and their ranking was, as Governor 
MacDonnell found in 1859 when transmitting such a list to
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the Colonial Office, a task of 'difficulty'.^ MacDonnell 
considered the Ministerial Secretaries to be 'chief 
Assistants’, apparently meaning assistants to Ministers.
Such a term cannot usefully be applied to highly paid 
officers whose positions were structurally distinct, and 
is discarded here. His list of the 'Principal Heads of 
Departments' was not open to doubt; it included the 
Surveyor General, Auditor General, Commissioner of 
Insolvency, Registrar General of Deeds, Collector of 
Customs, Postmaster General, Commissioner of Police, 
Superintendent of Telegraphs, Colonial Architect, Colonial 
Surgeon and Sheriff. But the heads of minor departments 
could less easily be defined. MacDonnell thought that the 
'following might fairly be included': Colonial Agent,
Emigration Agent, Immigration Officer, Comptroller of 
Convicts, Clerk of the Executive Council, Private Secretary, 
Chief Inspector of Schools, Clerk of the Legislative 
Council, Clerk of the Assembly, Government Printer,
Official Assignee and the Stipendiary Magistrates. This 
list did not match that of the minor departmental heads 
who could be adduced from the departments allocated to 
Ministers in October 1856. It added the Parliamentary 
Clerks, Clerk of the Executive Council and Private 
Secretary, and excluded the Keeper of the Gaol, 
Superintendent of the Lunatic Asylum, Superintendent of 
the Destitute Poor, Colonial Storekeeper, Coroner, 
Superintendent of Cemeteries, Harbour Master, Protector of 
Aborigines, Engineer of the Railways, and Chief Inspector 
of Sheep.
1
Despatch of MacDonnell to the Secretary of State, 18 July
1859-
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But departmental heads could not be adduced simply 
from a list of departments. The listings of departments 
in the Blue Books changed from year to year and sometimes 
included, for example, the 'department* of 'Public 
Offices', which was composed entirely of office cleaners, 
none of whom earned more than £100 p.a. This group of 
employees clearly did not have a departmental head, and 
was not constituted a department. A formal definition - 
that a department was a branch of the Service under a
permanent head alone responsible to a Minister, for
1example - was applicable only to a limited extent. Some
departments that were supposed to report directly to a
Minister through the Minister's Office were in fact
informally supervised by a larger department, and such a
2relationship could change over a period of time. A head 
of a department was so because of several factors: his 
structural position, salary, relationship to subordinate 
and superior officers, and prestige in the Service and the 
community were important. Therefore, departmental heads 
could not in all cases be rigidly defined. However, some 
useful exclusions could be made: viz. the Coroner,
Superintendent of Cemeteries and Protector of Aborigines, 
who controlled no subordinates and were not highly paid; 
the Keeper of the Gaol, who was not considered a civil 
servant and was subject to the Sheriff's supervision on 
some general matters of prison administration; the
1
Salmon (Solicitor General of New Zealand, 1918), quoted in 
Wettenhall, 'Organization in Tasmania', p.40.
2
See, e.g., Keit^i R. Bowes, 'Land Settlement in South 
Australia, 1857-1890' (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of 
History, Australian National University, 1962), pp.132-6.
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Colonial Storekeeper, whose position was abolished in 
1859; the Private Secretary and Clerk of the Executive 
Council (offices often held by the same man), who were 
appointed by the Governor; and the Stipendiary Magistrates. 
Officers who should be added to MacDonnell1s list include 
the Chief Inspector of Sheep, Harbour Master,
Superintendent of the Lunatic Asylum, Chief Engineer of 
the Railways and Superintendent of the Destitute Poor, who 
controlled a number of subordinates, were paid high 
salaries and were widely regarded as departmental heads.
The Master of the Supreme Court could also be added since 
he enjoyed a salary and status higher than that of some 
other minor heads and held the senior non-judicial 
appointment in,his department. Difficulties of definition 
implied that the heads were not a homogenous group. Apart 
from such factors as status and ability, some differences 
in their career patterns may be noted, before their 
similarities as a group are considered.
Clerical and professional heads
The career patterns of the senior officials divided 
them into two groups: the 'clerical' heads (the
Ministerial Secretaries and some others), and the 
'professional' heads (most of the other heads of 
departments). The professional heads were acknowledged to 
possess some special skill or expertise seldom found 
elsewhere in the Service. In some cases this took the 
form of academic qualifications permitting entry at a very 
senior level (Colonial Surgeon, Engineer-in-Chief), and 
such officers often regarded the Service as a temporary 
mode of employment only. The difference between the
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professional and clerical heads in this respect is shown 
in the following tabulation, which indicates the number of 
years spent in Service employment by the members of each 
group from the start of their careers until the end of the 
period.
Table 3
Years in Service Employment: 
Clerical and Professional Heads, 1857-74
Length of Service 
(Years)
Number
Clerical Heads Professional Heads
Less than 5 4
5 - less than 10 2 11
10 - less than 15 2 11
15 - less than 20 4 3
20 - less than 25 6 9
25 - less than 30 3 6
30 - — 1
Total 17 45
aFrom the Civil Service Lists. Former Executive 
Councillors excluded.
Other professional heads of departments, however, 
gained expertise through long service in a particular 
department (for example, the Surveyor General and the 
Registrar General of Deeds). In either case, professional 
heads had little interdepartmental experience. Their 
promotional routes generally lay within the department 
which they ultimately headed, and they seldom moved from 
it once at the top; for the possession of a particular
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talent made it highly likely that a head should spend most 
of his Service life in the department where that talent 
was most needed.
The clerical heads, almost without exception, entered 
the Service at an early age and worked in a number of 
departments before reaching the top. Through chance or 
preference, they seldom occupied posts that might 
transform them into experts, and they had less chance of 
finding outside employment. Once at the top, the 
interdepartmental mobility of the clerical heads was high. 
Edward Hitchin, for example, headed five departments 
during his career, as did William Sheppard,^ and Samuel 
Deering and H.J. Andrews each headed three. The clerical 
heads formed a core of experienced administrators who 
could be moved from department to department as occasion 
demanded. The following tabulation summarizes some 
aspects of the careers of the clerical and professional 
heads up to the end of the period.
On Hitchin and Sheppard, see below, pp.240-l.
1
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Table 4
Clerical and Professional Heads, 1857-7^-s 
Summary of Careersa
Type of Head
Clerical Professional
Number serving during period 17 ^5
Average number of top 
positions occupied by 
each head 2.0 1.3
Average number of 
departments in 3.1 1.5
Average time in each 
department (years) 5.6 8.7
From the Civil Service Lists. Former Executive 
Councillors excluded.
It is evident that the 1 professional/clerical 1 
division depends on clear differences in career patterns, 
and exceptional cases would greatly weaken it. In this 
period, however, there were few exceptions, and none of 
significance: that is, the top positions filled by the
members of the two groups never overlapped, the 
interdepartmental mobility of the professional heads in 
only one case approached that of the clerical heads, and 
in only two cases did a clerical head hold a subordinate 
position in one department for as long as a professional 
head. But because so few men were concerned in this 
division - in some cases an officer held one top position
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throughout the period - it is also evident that the 
division had no necessary connection with the 
classification of later career patterns, since only a few 
individual cases would alter it. Thus, the division is 
chiefly of descriptive value.
However, it may be argued that the terms 
'professional' and 'clerical' are not truly descriptive. 
The only factor common to the heads termed 'professional' 
was their experience in, and specialized knowledge of, a 
particular department. Some, like the Registrar General 
of Births, Deaths and Marriages, performed work that could 
only be termed clerical in content; in which case, it 
might be argued, the clerical heads should for consistency 
be termed professional also, since they were experienced 
in the general work of administration, as has been implied 
In later years, professional officers were distinguished 
on more objective grounds, that is, on grounds not 
peculiar to the Service. Few of the heads designated 
'professional' here retained the title. But during this 
period, the definition of what constituted a 'professional 
officer was obscure and most departmental heads claimed, 
or had claimed for them, the right to be so called. In 
most cases, the use of the term was bound up with length 
of service and experience. It is therefore useful to 
retain the term because it links contemporary claims to 
professional status with one aspect of the structure of 
the Service.
Apart from the Auditor Generalship, which was a
clerical position during this period, the most highly paid
posts were occupied by professional heads and their
/superiority was emphasized by changes in remuneration over 
the period:
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But as this table shows, the distinction between 
professional and clerical heads in terms of remuneration 
was not evident below the very top salary levels. In 
other respects the two groups were closely associated, 
partly because of the coordinating work of the Ministerial 
Secretaries who had, in addition, worked with the other 
departmental heads as they made their way up the 
promotional ladder. Other factors also characterized the 
heads as a group and distinguished them from their 
subordinates.
Separation of heads from subordinates
First, salary differentials between top officers and 
subordinates were wide. During this period, about 85 per 
cent of government employees earned less than £200 p.a., 
while the salaries of departmental heads ranged from £400 
to £1000 p.a. The difference in remuneration was a real 
one, for no income taxation bridged the gap. And the 
heads were not distant figures in receipt of high 
salaries - in a small Service, their relatively affluent 
presence was felt by all. Nor were their salaries as 
likely to be reduced in times of financial stringency. 
Second, salary differentials were felt also by subordinate 
officers who earned more than £200 p.a. The pyramidal 
salary structure postulated by the Act of 1852 more 
resembled an ’hour-glass’ distribution in the 1860s, with 
the ’w aist’ in the salary range £300-400 p.a., 
corresponding to positions at the senior subordinate 
level:
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Table 6
Distribution of Salaries above £200 p.a. , 
1858, 1865, I874a
Salary 
(£ p.a.)
Number of officers receiving
1858 1865 1874
200-99 76 97 160
300-99 10 21 36
400-99 18 25 14
500- 16 23 37
Total 120 166 247
aFrom the Civil Service Lists and annual Estimates of 
expenditure.
The most marked salary gap was in the range £400-£450 
p.a., which no officer in these years filled, and the 
hour-glass distribution was more marked in individual 
departments than the above figures would suggest. 
Contiguous top salary levels (as defined above) were 
seldom found together in the same department. The senior 
subordinate of a department infrequently received more 
than 65 per cent of the salary of the head, and this 
represented a salary differential of £250 or more; and the 
differential increased during the period:
126
Table 7
Salary Differentials: Heads of Departments 
and Senior Subordinates, 1858, 1866, l874a
Number of Officers
1838 1866 1874
Subordinate's Salary 
as % of Head's Salary
- 49 6 8 12
50 - 59 3 8 9
60 - 69 5 10 7
70 - 79 5 3 1
80 - 89 l 1 -
90 - — 1 —
Difference in £ p.a. 
1 - 9 9 l 1
100 - 99 6 8 3
200 - 99 8 10 11
300 - 99 4 9 8
400 - 99 1 2 3
500 - - 1 4
Total 20 31 29
aFrom the Civil Service Lists and annual Estimates of 
expenditure.
A third factor distinguishing the heads was connected 
with the salary structure of the Service : wide salary 
differentials implied that the heads were able to 
supervise and control their staff directly, and hence no 
strict distinction was implied between policy advising and 
departmental management functions. The hierarchy of
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positions in most departments was linear in nature, 
descending from the departmental head down through single 
subordinate positions separated by small salary 
differentials. This was to a large extent a product of 
the small size of most departments, but even in the larger 
departments sections and sub-departments were not clearly 
demarcated by salary levels. Departments that were 
fragmented for geographical reasons, such as the Customs 
Department, required a head to delegate authority and 
supervision; but centralized departments, that is, the 
majority of departments, enabled a head to supervise the 
activities of his department at all levels. Although some 
refinements in departmental organization occurred over 
this period, this simple picture of departments focussed 
upon dominant heads remained generally true. Clearly, 
departmental structures cannot be explained in terms of 
salary differentials; the reverse is more likely to be 
true. The quality of staff, the ethos of particular 
departments, the aims of officers, and informal methods of 
coordination and communication are only some of the 
relevant factors to be considered in this respect. At 
this point it is noted that departmental structures - 
linear in most departments and confused in others - were 
consistent with the relatively high salaries paid to 
departmental heads. Remuneration and structure both 
testified to the central role of the departmental heads.
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Subordinate Officials
Permanent and temporary
The horizontal division between heads and their 
subordinates was clearer than were vertical divisions 
between the subordinates themselves. The distinction
1between temporary and permanent employment was tenuous. 
Positions in the Service, and the remuneration attaching 
to them, were divided into two classes on the Estimates: 
'fixed' and 'provisional and temporary'. Officers on the 
fixed list were those whose services were supposedly 
required on a permanent basis and they were paid an annual 
salary. The 'pro. and tern.' [sic] label was less precise. 
Officers on this list were paid on a daily or weekly basis 
but the positions they filled were diverse, and many 
occupied positions that were in fact permanent. The 
reason for the employment of ostensibly temporary officers 
on a permanent basis was primarily economic; as temporary 
officers, they had no claim on the government in times of 
retrenchment. However, their brother officers on the 
'fixed' list were in a position different in one respect 
only. Under the provisions of an Act of i860, fixed list 
officers were entitled to claim a retaining allowance and
governments were accordingly less inclined to dismiss
2them. But for neither group was there any direct 
legislative guarantee of tenure.
1
See App. 1 on the categories of government employees.
See belowq pp.l6l~3.
2
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Two provisions of the Civil Service Act of 187^, 
however, improved the position of a limited number of 
temporary officers. First, officers not on the 
classified list^ (i.e. on the pro. and tern, list), who 
served for five years continuously, were termed 1 2non- 
classified1 officers and became eligible for a retiring 
allowance on the same terms as classified officers.
Second, they became eligible for transfer to the
classified list at the salary level they had attained on
2the non-classified list. But such transfers were 
discretionary, and few early transfers were made under the 
Ac t .
1
Under the Act, the classified list contained, in the 
main, these officers formerly on the fixed list (see 
below, pp.13^-5*
2
Two new terms were thus used to describe officers: 
’classified' officers were formerly 'fixed list' officers 
and 'non-classified' officers were formerly 'provisional 
and temporary' officers. But the provision concerning 
five years continuous service meant that not all former 
'pro. and tern.' officers became 'non-classified' officers. 
The Act did not directly apply any term to such officers, 
and they continued to retain the old title. However, in 
popular usage 'pro. and tern.' officers came to mean all 
officers not classified, i.e. 'non-classified' officers as 
well. This usage was unfortunate, since 'non-classified' 
officers were a distinct group within the Service. For 
clarity, the following terminology has been adopted below: 
'classified' and 'non-classified' are retained in the 
senses defined by the Act; and 'unclassified', a term 
which enjoyed a brief popularity, refers to all officers 
who were not 'classified' and hence is used when there is 
no need to distinguish 'non-classified' officers as a 
group. For narrative purposes, however, 'classified' is 
occasionally rendered by its synonym, 'fixed list'; and 
'unclassified' by 'pro. and tern.'.
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Cade t s
By the 1860s the cadet scheme instituted in 1852 had 
virtually disappeared. A few youths still entered 
departments at low salary levels, but knowledge of the 
practice was not widespread. When regulations concerning 
cadets were issued in I869 the South Australian Advertiser 
thought it 'the first time that regulations have been 
issued concerning cadets'.  ^ The plan of that year fared 
no better than its precursor, because cadet salaries were
low and departmental heads were not willing to spend time
2in training young men. However, obeisance continued to
be paid to the idea of a cadet scheme as a means of3recruiting competent officers for future years, and 4regulations under the Act of 1874 renewed the scheme.
1
The South Australian Advertiser, 26 October 1869; cited 
hereafter as the Advertiser.
2
'The time of Professional Heads of Departments is too 
valuable to Government to be taken up in teaching young 
gentlemen a profession', said a committee of heads which, 
in 1873 , drew up a Civil Service Bill (CSO In, I84l/l873, 
enclosure dated 5 December 1873; on the committee, see 
below, pp.236-7 , 262).
3
See, e.g ., Advertiser, l4 January 1859, Letter from 
'C.J.C.', and 'Report of the Auditor General for the Year 
ending June 30th, I87O', S.A.P.P. 3 of 1870, p.9 . The 
Auditor General (later replaced by two Commissioners of 
Audit; see below, pp.288~90) issued annual reports, which 
are cited hereafter as Audit Report for the relevant year; 
see the Bibliography for their location.
4
Government Gazette, No. l4 (l April 1875), P-591, and 
'Examinations for Cadetships under Civil Service Act, 1874', 
S.A.P.P. 24 of 1877-
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Candidates for cadetships were required to submit
certificates of age, health and character, be between
sixteen and eighteen years of age, and sit for an
examination of a more extended nature than that proposed
in 1852.^ The examination was to be administered by a
Board consisting of eight civil servants and one private 
2citizen. Successful candidates were to be ranked in 
order of merit but could be appointed in any order, at the 
discretion of the government. Entrants were required to 
serve three months on probation without pay, and were then 
to receive £50 p.a. for the first year, £65 p.a. for the 
second year, and £80 for the third and subsequent years of 
service in the cadet ranks. Entrance to the senior ranks 
of the Service, and to a. salary of £100 p.a. , did not 
follow automatically after three years as a junior, but 
required a favourable report from the head of the 
department concerned and a vacancy in the senior ranks.
But vacancies could also be filled by non-cadets
1
See above,pp.65-6. Compulsory subjects for examination 
included reading aloud, writing from dictation, English 
grammar, English composition, arithmetic, geography and 
English history; optional subjects included modern 
languages, mathematics, classics and natural science.
Sample examination papers were published; see, e.g. , 
'Examination of Candidates for Cadetships under Civil 
Service Act, 1874', S . A . P . P . 24-8 of 1874. The standard of 
the examination was roughly that of the South Australian 
Institute Examination in General Education.
2
Viz. the Senior Inspector of Schools, Under Secretary, 
Surveyor General, Engineer-in-Chief, Postmaster General, 
Under Treasurer, Secretary to the Commissioner of Crown 
Lands and Secretary to the Minister of Education, and 
A. von Truer, J.P. The Chief Clerk of the Education Office 
was appointed as Secretary to the Board and effectively 
administered the scheme.
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'conditionally... upon probation', or by lateral
recruitment when it was considered that there was no
officer 'competent to discharge the duties of the vacant 
2office' already in the Service; and also under 'any
3special circumstances'.
Classification
Although the cadet system was moribund until 1874, 
the upper salary limit for cadets (£80 p.a.) served as the 
boundary between the junior and senior ranks of the Service 
before then: all but a few full time adult employees were
paid more than £80 p.a. Above the boundary, levels of 
position and remuneration were often obscure. The 
Classification Act of 1832 was repealed in 1838, some 
years after it had ceased to be meaningful, and was not 
replaced by a comparable scheme until 1874. In the 
interval, no formal machinery regulated salaries as the 
Act of 1832 had purported to do, although a simple 
classification was set forth in the Estimates of 1866.
The Service was divided into five classes, thus:
1st class - £300 p.a
2nd I t £260 "
3rd i t £220 "
4 th i t £180 "
3th 1 1 £l40 "
Civil Service Act, 1874, S. 19.
2
Ibid., S. 21.
Ibid., S. 22.
3
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Cadets were to be placed on the pro. and tem. list and 
receive a maximum of £100 p.a. No explanation accompanied 
this classification, which was continued in I867 and 1868, 
and its purpose and effect were not clear. No provision 
was made for salary increments or promotion from one class 
to another, although the top salary of £300 marked, in 
practice, an important salary limit; only departmental 
heads and their deputies received a higher salary in 
1866-68. But the scheme did not guarantee salaries in any 
way and could have served only as a basis for comparing 
offices and officers.
Under the Civil Service Act of 1874, the Service was 
divided into six classes. The First contained the heads 
and deputy heads, who were not affected by the 
classification or remuneration provisions of the Act. The 
other Classes were allotted salary scales and fixed annual 
increments thus:
Salary p.a. Annual
Minimum Maximum Increase
Second Class £350 £425 £15
Third Class 280 330 10
Fourth Class 220 270 10
Fifth Class l60 210 10
Sixth Class 100 150 10
Like the Act of 1852, this was a salary plan rather than a 
true classification of offices or officers, and the 
remarks that have been made on the earlier Act applied 
also to the later. Though more extensive than previous 
schemes, the classification had several weaknesses and 
made few substantive innovations.
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The lower five classes corresponded roughly to salary 
levels that already existed. The level of £425 p.a. 
constituted a de facto division between heads of 
departments and subordinate officers before 1874, as has 
been noted, and the majority of comparable positions were 
paid at similar rates before the Act came into operation. 
Also, the relative position of senior officers was 
improved by those increases that were made,as the 
following table indicates:
Table 8
Average Increases of Salary Granted to Officers 
of Each Class under the Act of l874a
Class Average Increase
First £65
Second 42
Third 33
Fourth 21
Fifth 19
Sixth 14
This and the following table are drawn from ’Return of 
Classified Officers', 1859» and from the list of 
classified officers drawn up in 1875 under the 
provisions of the Act, located in Government Gazette, 
No. 32 (29 July 1875), pp.l404-09- These lists were 
issued annually in the Government Gazette, and are 
cited hereafter as Classification List for the relevant 
year.
A number of officers were promoted to higher classes but 
promotions were balanced between the classes so that the 
relative size of classes was little altered:
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Table 9
Number of Promotions to 
Higher Classes under the Act of 187^ -
Clas s Number of Officers Promoted
From Second to First 16
i i Third to Second 15
i i Fourth to Third 21
i i Fifth to Fourth 21
i i Sixth to Fifth 25
Total 98
In general, classification under the Act reinforced the 
salary structure of the Service as it had existed 
previously.
Occupational divisions
Classification did not reflect occupational groupings, 
which the growth of the Service made of increasing 
importance. By 1857» a number of departments had begun to 
develop their own traditions and identity, most notably 
the Police, Printing Office and Legislative 
establishments. The Printing Office required experience 
seldom needed elsewhere in the Service and which was more 
a product of commercial experience than in any other 
Service occupation; to this extent, the Printing Office 
was on the fringes of the Civil Service, although its 
employees were well aware of their status as civil
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servants. The discipline of the Police Force separated 
it almost entirely from the rest of the Service, though 
this was less marked at its senior levels. The 
Legislative establishments were small and attracted men 
with scholarly interests; promotion followed after long
and quiet apprenticeship. The Police Department developed
2its own superannuation fund, and it and the Printing 
Office later instituted their own salary scales.
It has been observed above that before I856 it was 
not unusual for an officer to transfer between such 
apparently widely separated departments as Police and 
Treasury, but after I836 this was less common. The 
process of occupational grouping grew most quickly in 
those departments that had clearly defined functions, 
generally of a non-clerical nature. Departments that 
employed large numbers of clerks were less easily typified. 
The Audit Office, for example, had by the end of the 
period scarcely begun to develop a tradition of employing 
staff with long and specialized training in auditing 
procedures; its members were drawn from varied ranks of 
the Service. It was still possible for a letter-carrier, 
a draughtsman, a storekeeper or a dispenser, for example, 
to become a clerk. The nomenclature of offices (Clerk and 
Draughtsman, Clerk and Accountant, Accountant and Cashier) 
reflected this. Such transmutations of function, however,
1
See below, e.g., pp.244-5, 254.
2
In I867. The fund grew out of the police reward fund 
(into which certain fines, fees and rewards were paid for 
distribution throughout the force). It was, however, 
’practically insolvent from its very initiation' (Audit 
Report, 1889/90, p.xxv); see below, p.310, note 1.
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usually occurred within one department, although the 
holding of multiple positions involving several 
departments remained common in country districts.^
The Act of 187^ recognized the growing importance of 
specialization and professional training to a limited 
extent by dividing the Service into two Divisions, 
Professional and Clerical. Professional officers were 
awarded an additional 10 per cent on their salaries. But 
no criteria were stipulated for determining which officers 
should be allotted to which Division. And even in 1873 
the Register had wondered whether such a simple division 
could adequately deal with the growing complexity of the 
Service.^
Growth of the Service
Size and cost
The functions of government did not expand so rapidly 
in this period as to constitute a strong force for 
organizational change. Nor did increases in expenditure
1
See below, pp.153-5-
2
See, e.g., 'Plurality of Appointments1 2, S.A.P.P. 221 of
I857-58.
17 May 1873.
3
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and numbers employed. Expenditure on establishments
increased by 170 per cent between 1857 and 1874, and at
the beginning and end of the period was divided between
2the areas of government function thus:
1
I.e. the sum needed to operate the departments of 
government for one year. This included salaries, wages, 
expenses, allowances, repairs to premises and 
'contingencies’ (supposedly, unanticipated or non- 
estimatable items of a similar nature). Unless stated 
otherwise, all items of expenditure, here and below, are 
actual figures. Though apparently simple, the listing of 
expenditure on establishments (and most other statements 
concerning finance) presents some difficulties; see App. Ia.
2
The areas below are a simplified version of the scheme 
contained in The Government of Victoria: An Analysis of 
the Machinery of S t a t e (Compiled by the Department of 
Political Science, University of Melbourne; Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1958), pp.1-6. The areas here 
contain the following departments: Internal Administration
- Legislature, Chief Secretary's Office, Treasury, Audit 
Office, Agent-General, departments of the Ministerial 
Secretaries; Revenue (raising and receiving) - Customs; 
Education, Recreation - Board of Education, Botanic Gardens; 
Health, Welfare - Colonial Surgeon, Medical, Hospitals, 
Lunatic Asylums, Central Board of Health, Vaccine, 
Quarantine, Destitute Poor, Aborigines; Law and Order, 
Registry - Supreme Court, Court of Insolvency, Magistrates, 
Coroner, Police, Sheriff, Gaols, Prisons, Registrar General 
of Deeds, Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages, 
Official Assignee; Communications - Post Office, Telegraph; 
Other Development - Engineer-in-Chief, Architect, Surveyor 
General, Roads Boards, Sheep Inspectors, Valuator of Runs, 
Immigration; Railways - Railways, Tramways. Defence and 
Ecclesiastical are excluded, here and below. It might be 
objected that this is a coarse division. And it is coarser 
still later in the nineteenth century, when the scheme has 
to encompass more departments; Other Development, 
especially, may seem over b u r d e n e d ( s e e b e l o w  p .273)• But 
any division presents difficulties (see, e.g., S. Encel, 
’The Distribution of Functions between Departments', Public 
Administration [Sydney] V o l . XVII, No. 4 [December, 1958 J,
(cont. p .l4o)
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Table 10
Expenditure on Establishments by 
Functional Area, 1857 and l874-75a
Year
Area 1857 1874-75
£ $ £ %
Internal
Administration 18,092 11.5 31,336 7.4
Revenue 8,160 5.2 11,176 2.6
Education, 
Recreation 13,513 8.6 44,322 10.5
Health, Welfare 18,900 12.0 50,648 12.0
Law and Order, 
Registry 57,398 36.6 91,625 21.7
Communications 18,663 11.9 107,561 25.5
Other Development 22,218 14.2 85,816 20.3
To tal 156,944 100.0 422,064 100.0
Railways*3 74,049 30.5 165,702 28.2
Total - - 587,766 100.0
a
This and the following table are derived from ’Estimated 
and Actual Expenditure of the Government of South 
Australia' (an appendix to the Audit Report) for the 
relevant years, 
b
The figure listed under 1857 is actually that of l860/6l, 
since no prior figures for railways are complete. The 
percentages of other areas exclude railways expenditure, 
which is listed as a proportion of total expenditure on 
establishments.
l4o
As this table indicates, different areas grew at 
different speeds. Table 11 (p.l4l) shows this in more 
detail, taking expenditure in 1857 as the base year 
(=100). Expenditure on health and railways increased at 
about double the rate of expenditure on internal 
administration,^ revenue services and law and order, but 
development, education and communications, especially the 
last, were easily the fastest growing areas. Sometimes 
the growth rate slowed, or even retreated, but this was 
clearly due to minor and temporary recessions. The 
pattern of growth established in the first years -
2allowing for the substantial reductions of I86O/6I 
generally remained unchanged over the period. Only in 
the very last years did railways begin to command that 
large share of the public purse which later became such a 
prominent feature of colonial government.
2 (continued from p.138)
p.298, and G.E. Caiden, The Commonwealth Bureaucracy 
[Melbourne: Melbourne University Press , 1967 ] > p p .66-7)•
It is not, for example, possible here to separate the 
different functional responsibilities of each department 
in terms of cost. The division adopted strikes a balance: 
the areas, though blurred well before their edges, are 
not so small that meaningful fluctuations in expenditure 
are lost.
1
The declining relative cost of the central administrative 
departments might be taken as a measure of the 
consolidation and slow expansion of government; but this 
is clearly a crude measure, since it ignores the cost of 
staff in other departments who played an essential role 
in the coordination of administration.
2
Which were part of a deliberate policy of retrenchment; 
see below, pp.179-82.
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As this would suggest, the numerical growth of the 
Service varied from area to area, the largest absolute and 
proportional growth being railways (225 per cent), and the 
smallest, law and order (25 per cent). Departments also 
varied greatly in size, from Railways (194 in 1860/61; 585 
in I871), Police (177 in 1857; 187 in 1873), Post Office 
and Telegraphs (64; 184) and Customs (31; 46) to the 
Office of the Commissioner of Crown Lands (2; 5), Sheriff 
(2; 2) and Cemeteries (l; 1). The largest departments,
however, were composed mainly of labouring staff; the 
Railways, for example, had a maximum central, supervisory 
staff of nine officers.
The overall growth rate of the Service was small. In 
the intercensal decade 1861-1871, the Service increased at 
a rate only slightly greater than that of the workforce 
and population as a whole:
Table 12
Size of the Government Workforce, 1861 and 187la
1861 1871
Civil Service
Fixed 313 442
Provisional and Temporary 353 4o6
Total 666 848
Other Government
Railways 177 552
Other 183 229
Total 360 781
Grand Total 1026 1629
As % Population 0.80 O.85
As % Workforce (Male only) 2.60 2.85
a
See App. I for an explanation and monitory note on the 
categories used, and for sources.
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These figures to some extent understate the growth of the 
Service, since I87I was a year of recession and Service 
numbers were reduced. By 1875» it is probable that the 
number of full-time government employees represented more 
than 3 per cent of the workforce.
New departments *
By December 1874, the thirty-four departments of 1857 
had increased to forty, representing the abolition of two 
departments and the creation of eight, including the 
incorporation of four Boards into the departmental 
structure. The new departments - Marine Board, Railways, 
Waterworks, Vaccine, Engineer-in-Chief, Valuator of Runs, 
Births, Deaths and Marriages, and Botanic Gardens - for 
the most part arose from a relocation of the existing 
functions of government rather than the creation of new.
Between I858 and i860 the main revenue spending
Boards - Roads, Waterworks, Railways, and Trinity - were
reconstituted as departments as a result of Ministerial
dissatisfaction with their independence of action. In
I858 the expenditure, auditing, appointment, dismissal and
tendering powers of the Boards were brought, by regulation,
under the purview of the Executive, and this alteration to
2the system of management and control, discussed below, 
was reflected in organizational changes in three of the 
bodies. The Waterworks Commission was replaced in 1858 by 
a Manager who, as 'chief executive officer' of the 
department, was responsible directly to the Commissioner
1
See A p p . 2 for a graphic representation of departmental
expansion.
2
See below, pp.179» 182.
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of Public Works, and the Board of Railway Commissioners 
was similarly replaced in 1859 by a Manager of the 
Railways. Following the promotion of the Harbourmaster to 
Collector of Customs in 1858, the Harbours Department was 
absorbed by the Trinity Board, which was itself 
reconstituted in i860 as the Marine Board; though termed a 
Board, the powers of the Board members were advisory only 
and the department was headed by a Secretary, again 
responsible to the Commissioner of Public Works. Further 
changes to the Railways and Waterworks departments occurred 
in i860, when the department of the Colonial Architect 
absorbed their construction sections. The enlarged 
department was renamed the Department of the Colonial 
Engineer and Architect, the head being responsible for 
works of architectural and railways construetion and his 
deputy for those connected with the Waterworks. The 
remnants of the Railways and Waterworks departments, 
headed by the Managers, were thus concerned with 
maintenance and revenue collection. In 1866 the functions 
of the Engineer and Architect Department were further 
differentiated by the appointment of a senior officer to 
supervise architectural construction, and in the following 
year the Department was divided into two separate 
departments. The Department of the Colonial Architect was 
responsible for architectural, construction and supervision, 
and the Department of the Engineer-in-Chief assumed 
responsibility for general public works construction, 
while the head of the latter department, the Engineer-in- 
Chief, supervised railways cons truetion as ex-officio 
Engineer of Railways. From 1869 to I876 he was also 
ex-officio Engineer of Waterworks.
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A further change was made in the Board system in 1873» 
when the Vaccination Board was replaced by a single 
salaried official. He performed the same functions as the 
Board had formerly done, except that he was required to 
report annually to Parliament, thus again ensuring some 
responsibility. The creation of the Department of the 
Valuator of Runs was more arbitrary. The functions of the 
department, handled since about i860 by the Surveyor 
General's Department, were in 1871 transferred to Charles 
Bonney who initially worked alone, although by 1874 staff 
numbers had reached sixteen. Bonney was Manager of the 
Railways from June 1869 to December I87O, when this office 
was assumed by the Engineer-in-Chief, and his appointment 
as Valuator probably resulted from the need to find him a 
new position, preferably one that did not represent an 
undeserved loss of status. As Valuator he headed a 
department, though in fact the Surveyor General continued 
to supervise its functions.
The constitution of the Births, Deaths and Marriages 
section of the Registrar General of Deeds Department as a 
separate department in 1858 gave recognition to a clear 
functional division that had always existed. The 
delineation of the Botanic Gardens as a distinct 
department was also little more than a formal change of 
status. The Gardens first appeared on the Estimates of 
1868 but the Auditor General termed this an accounting 
change only, since the Gardens had previously been voted 
under 'contingencies'; in matters of day-to-day 
administration, the Director remained under the guidance 
of the Board of the Gardens.
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In I869 the Post Office and Telegraph Departments 
were amalgamated, partly in recognition of the fact that 
the offices of postmaster and telegraph operator were 
often filled by the same person in country districts. 
Amalgamation, it was claimed, would result in economy of 
supervision. Some economy was also effected at the top, 
where Charles Todd (formerly Superintendent of Telegraphs) 
became Postmaster General and Superintendent of Telegraphs. 
The former Postmaster General, J.W. Lewis, was retrenched, 
and his unpopularity with Cabinet may have speeded the 
amalgamation and his dismissal.
Piecemeal growth
Some of these organizational changes thus served to 
group together like functions, others brought departments 
under closer Ministerial control and others again served 
no obvious administrative purpose. Whilst the growth of 
government bodies between 1851 and I856 was related to a 
general expansion of government functions, the creation, 
abolition and amalgamation of departments in this period 
did not follow a similar course. If departmental 
reorganization had one common characteristic, it was that 
no major alterations were made without a coterminous 
change in the senior officers involved. New senior 
personnel might be expected to have favoured departmental 
reorganization, but it is clear that reorganization might 
also have occurred under long-serving heads. Yet in this 
period no head presided over the dismemberment of his own 
department and no departmental rearrangements were made 
without the transfer, and in some cases the dismissal, of 
the head concerned. Not only did this reflect the central
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role of the heads in the departmental structure, and 
their close identification with it; in some cases, such as 
the Post Office and Telegraph amalgamation, desire for 
changes in senior personnel seems to have provided the 
incentive for structural change. In these circumstances 
it was inevitable that no single pattern marked the 
reorganization of departments, apart from the pattern 
imposed by the abilities and reputations of the men 
involved. At the same time, some characteristics of long 
term importance were evolving in the interior structure of 
departments, though for the most part these changes were 
exiguous.
Reorganization within departments
The employment of senior clerical civil servants as 
'executive officials' in the Waterworks and Railways 
departments has been noted, and similar positions were 
created in other departments at various times. Officers 
designated as 'Secretary' were placed within the 
departments of the Agent General, Destitute Poor and 
Registrar General of Deeds, for example. The incumbents 
of these offices were the chief administrative officers 
of their departments but they did not head the department, 
and their salaries were below those of the Ministerial 
Secretaries. 'Secretary' was not an immutable term. It 
was sometimes rendered as Chief Clerk and its use arose 
partly from reasons of status. Nor did it necessarily 
mean that the secretary headed a subdivision of the 
department; for some years those in the Police and 
Destitute Poor Departments were the only officers engaged 
exclusively on clerical work. However, these offices were
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important in establishing promotional routes leading to 
the Ministerial Secretaryships, and their use showed that 
senior positions in the Service, other than those of 
departmental heads, were slowly coming to be distinguished 
from other subordinate positions. Subsections of the 
larger departments were more clearly defined at the end of 
the period than at the beginning, also, but these changes 
were not marked, nor were they Service-wide. At the end 
of the period the Service was not greatly changed from 
that of I856. Ministerial departments imposed a pattern 
of control, but departments varied greatly in size and 
importance, no overall scheme was evident in the creation 
of departments, a hierarchy of departmental offices was 
only slowly evolving and the departmental heads remained 
in a dominant position.
Summary: The Hesitancy of Organizational Change
The formal means of controlling and coordinating the 
Service through Ministerial Offices, and the Chief 
Secretary’s Office in particular, remained unchanged 
throughout the period. Lines of control were simple and 
direct, which was a product of a small Service where 
occupational divisions, for example, could be ignored if 
necessary, and where the focus of departmental control was 
reflected in large salary differentials at the senior 
levels. The system was, however, potentially fragmented. 
It has been suggested on several occasions that size, the 
propinquity of officers to one another and slow growth 
were unrecognized or unstated aids in regulating the 
Service, which might undergo change when those factors
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changed, And much of what has been termed the 'formal' 
structure of the Service did not, in fact, derive from 
legislation or written regulation. At the end of the 
period the Civil Service Act formally regulated some of 
the characteristics and customs that had grown up in 
previous years, but it made few innovations. Political 
activity, the ambition, nature and quality of civil 
servants, and interdepartmental rivalry are but some of 
the other factors not yet mentioned that influenced the 
informal structure of the Service and its development in 
other areas.
CHAPTER IV
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
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The conditions of Service employment, including 
financial reward, opportunities for advancement, 
recognition of merit, security, retiring allowances, 
office conditions, hours of work, holidays, leave of 
absence provisions and political rights, were built from 
propriety, necessity, expediency and precedent. Most 
civil servants considered financial reward to be the most 
important aspect of their conditions of employment, but it 
is useful firstly to set this against conditions of 
advancement and expectations of promotion since these 
matters largely determined the level of remuneration.
Promotion
Promotion had two connotations in this period. It 
was normally taken to mean movement up the departmental 
hierarchy to positions of greater responsibility and 
financial reward.^ But since movement up occurred most 
frequently between fixed list offices - which included 
most of the senior positions - it could also refer to the 
transfer of an officer from the pro. and tern, to the fixed 
ranks. Such transfers did not necessarily involve an 
increase in remuneration or responsibility - often the 
reverse was true - but it meant greater security and 
opportunity for future promotion to the officer concerned. 
The importance of this form of potential promotion is 
discussed below in connection with questions of security 
and tenure, and here attention is directed at the process 
of promotion in its first connotation.
1
In some cases, this might more properly be termed 
advancement; see below, pp.1 5 5 -6 *
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Opportunity
Throughout the period, opportunities for promotion to 
the top levels of the Service were limited by the youth of 
the incumbent heads and deputy heads. The average age of 
heads at appointment was a little less than thirty-eight 
years and ranged from twenty-nine to fifty— four years. 
Mid-way through the period, in I867 , the average (median) 
age of the heads of departments and their deputies was 
almost equal (forty-four and forty-three years 
respectively).  ^ Moreover, the infrequent creation of new 
departments meant that few new senior offices were created, 
and it has been noted that the evolution of senior 
’ subordinate positions in this period was slow. Vacancies 
at the top did occur, but they were few, and, as the 
following table indicates, only a little over one-third of 
top vacancies during the period were filled by promotion 
from the ranks.
Table 13
Appointees to Head of Department, I857~74a
Appointed from Subordinate Position 20
Not from Subordinate Position
Previously Head of Department 18
34Not previously in Service 16
Total 54
a
From the Civil Service Lists.
Calculated from Biographies and the Civil Service Lists.
1
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Most promotions accordingly took place within a
rather narrow salary range, up to about £300 p.a.
Promotion was supposed to be by seniority coupled with
merit, a principle enunciated by the Estimates Committee
in I856 and repeated on a number of subsequent occasions.^
Whilst there is little evidence to suggest that this
principle was deliberately set aside by promoting
2incompetent officers for political reasons, there is as 
little evidence to suggest that consistent efforts were 
made to promote the most efficient officers. Several 
factors acted against any such efforts.
Importance of experience
It has been shown that the Classification Act of 18^2 
did not distinguish between duties peculiar to positions 
but instead set up a salary equivalence between positions 
felt to be comparable on other grounds. When the Act 
broke down, therefore, positions requiring similar talents 
were not ranked together in hierarchical order, which was 
perfectly reasonable when it was believed that the average 
officer was competent to fill most positions in the 
Service. And officers did, in fact, occupy positions with 
diverse names that required diverse skills at different 
times in their careers. At the same time, transfer 
between departments was not frequent; it occurred largely 
at the junior levels, where cadets and youthful entrants 
were shuffled rapidly between departments, and at the top
1
Cf. Forster, pp.203-^-.
See below, pp.207-17.
2
level, where the Ministerial. Secretaries were largely 
concerned. The following table shows the number of 
officers whose salaries and/or positions were altered 
during i860 and I87O, including new appointments, salary 
increases within a department, amalgamations, and 
transfers between departments (which might or might not 
involve an increase in salary).
Table 14
Positional Changes, i860 and l87Qa
Number
1860 1870
Type of Change
New Entrants 42 30
Promoted within Department 12 51
Offices amalgamated - 20
Transferred 10 9
Total 64 110
Level of Transfer (£ p.a.)
To 600 1 1
500 l 1
400 4 1
350 2 -
300 - 3
240 - 1
160 - l
l4o - 1
120 2 -
Total 10 9
a
From the Civil Service Lists.
1
Cadet figures have been excluded, since they were of 
insufficient detail to be reliable.
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Transfer between departments, therefore, was rare and
was outweighed by intra-departmental promotion. This was
so partly because long experience in one department led to
the acquisition of 'expert' status, as the departmental
heads in the 1860s demonstrated. Also, the number of
departments was large and knowledge of a vacancy in one
department did not always spread to others.^ It was
easier to promote a man already in the department,
especially if he was of above average quality, than to
search for a better man outside; and heads resented the
2'poaching' of their more able subordinates. Furthermore, 
a number of departments were so small that promotion could 
not take place within them. The Sheriff's Department, for 
example, consisted of the Sheriff and one assistant who 
could not be promoted unless he transferred to another 
department or the Sheriff retired. Such assistants in a 
two-man department could and usually did receive salary 
increments as their years of service lengthened. They 
were therefore eligible to transfer to other departments 
at increasingly high levels, and they approached more 
closely to their departmental heads in terms of salary, 
thus increasing their chances of gaining the top position 
when their chief retired. This process may more 
accurately be termed 'advancement' than promotion since 
the nature of their duties changes only marginally. In
T ~
Nor to the public; see, e.g., Register, 1 November 1869, 
Letter from 'Medicus', who complained of the 'secret 
process' whereby the position of the Superintendent of the 
Lunatic Asylum was filled without advertisement.
2
See, e.g., the comments of Charles Todd (Postmaster General, 
1869-1901), 'Report of Commission into the Organization 
and Working of the Post Office Department', S ,A .P .P . 20
of 1875, Minutes of Evidence, qq. 108-15»
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most cases subordinate officers in small departments chose 
to remain in the department, partly in the hope of 
succeeding their superior officers, but also for reasons 
that applied in larger departments: since few positions
below the senior level called for defined skills, 
subordinates had little opportunity to force their 
promotional pace by seeking transfer between departments 
that required a particular skill. Occupying one position 
for a long period also gave greater claims to a permanent 
position in times of retrenchment. Inevitably, this 
process led to an emphasis on seniority at the expense of 
merit.
Seniority was endorsed by the Act of 187*4 > since 
automatic annual increments made it possible for an 
officer to advance to the top of his class by years of 
service alone. Promotion to the next class also depended 
chiefly on seniority. Merit was acknowledged, but Clause 
22 of the Act stated that:
when in the Ordinary Division any vacancy occurs, 
if it be expedient to fill up such vacancy, the 
Governor shall promote to such vacancy that 
officer, being qualified, and most deserving of 
promotion, who shall stand next in rotation on 
the classified list of that Division of the 
Service, and such promotion shall be made as far 
as possible from the Department wherein such 
vacancy has occurred.
Remuneration
Salaries and wages
The absence of regular salary increments for skill 
and service between 1858 and 187*4 bore most heavily on
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officials of middle age who had increasing family and
social responsibilities, for capricious salary increases
1could not match the growth of these responsibilities. In
a decade of stable prices young, unmarried officials were
permitted a reasonable standard of living by their
salaries. Heads of departments, also, were comparatively
well paid; they were separated from their subordinates by
large salary differentials and, though most were paid less
than bank managers or the leaders of commercial firms,
they were well off in the context of the Service. Their
homes were large, they could afford one or two servants
and their sons went to one or other of the better schools.
Cadets, on the other hand, were very poorly off, which
partly explains their small numbers. Bank cadets were in
a similar position but whilst one bank manager 'presumed
"that the young gentlemen in question had other means of
2support besides their salaries"', few Civil Service 
cadets appear to have had wealthy parents; at the same 
time, their salaries required some amount of parental 
support. Living at home provided some of this, and made 
less likely the transfer of country cadets to the city.
1
In 1858, seventy-six officers took the unusual step of 
petitioning the government in protest against the 
abrogation of the Act of 1852. They complained that they 
'were in some measure induced to enter the Civil Service 
from a knowledge that the said Act provided an annual and 
progressive increase... and have continued to serve the 
Crown, notwithstanding superior attractions offered in 
other occupations...upon the faith of the Act being 
carried out in its integrity' ( 'Petitions from Officers in 
Civil Service', S.A .P .P . 112 of I858). Attempts were made 
to find a viable alternative to annual increments, but 
without success.
2
Quoted in Blainey, p.218.
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If some sections of the Civil Service fared better
than others, no civil servant was reduced to poverty.^
The House of Assembly increased all salaries and wages in
1865-66 by distributing a vote of £ 5 0 0 0  on a pro rata
basis, and resolutions calling for salary increases to
particular officers were successful on a number of 
2occasions. Officers of the middle ranks were forced to 
live carefully, and doubtless found it difficult to 
maintain the appearance befitting a government officer, 
but the average clerical salary for the period, which 
varied between £l80-£200 p.a., was considerably above that 
of skilled tradesmen. All service salaries, apart from 
those of cadets, compared unfavourably with bank salaries 
but were superior to teachers', and there is no evidence 
to suggest that they suffered in comparison with the 
remuneration paid by commercial and trading firms. 
Labourers employed by the government were for some years
3better paid than their counterparts in private industry.
1
See, e.g., the debate on the matter by three civil 
servants in the Advertiser, Letters from 'A Hardup 
Government C l e r k ' ( 1 2 January 1859)» from 'A Subscriber'
(l8 January 1859)» and from 'Pinchgut' ( 2 5  January 1859)*
2
See, e.g., 'Bonus to Estimator of Runs', S .A .P .P . 117 of 
1861; CSO In, 1479/1865, 22 September 1865; 'Sum voted for 
Increase of Salaries' S .A,P.P . 53 of 1865-66; S .A .P .D ., l4
August 1868, cols. 155-7, and 2 6 August 1874, cols. 1447-5^- • 
3
Office of the Commissioner of Public Works, Inwards 
Correspondence, Docket No. 123 of I8 6 9 , enclosure dated 
3 February I8 6 9 (S.A.A.; cited hereafter as, e.g., CPWO
In, I2 3 /I8 6 9 ).
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'Civil servants', said the Register in I869, 'were in 
receipt of an assured income, which, in the case of the 
lower grades especially, compared most favourably with the
incomes of persons occupying similar positions out of
1doors' . In the 1860s , civil, servants of the middle ranks 
seldom complained that their salaries were insufficient to 
live on, but rather that there was no system that would, 
by rewarding diligence and skill, raise them above the 
level of adequacy. In the early 1870s, their financial 
situation declined as prices rose significantly for the 
first time in fifteen years, but the Civil Service Act 
alleviated this to some extent, albeit belatedly. Of the 
470 officers on the fixed list at the time of the passing 
of the Act, a little over two-thirds received increases in 
salary under the new classification, ranging from £5 to 
£150 p.a. (mean: £20 p.a.). As has been seen, the heads 
of departments received the largest increases. But nine- 
eight officers (some 16 per cent of the total number of 
officers previously on the fixed list) received increases 
that placed them in a class above that which they would 
have occupied had their salaries remained unchanged.
These officers had, previous to classification, received 
salaries considerably below those of other officers 
engaged in comparable work, and it was necessary to raise 
their salaries to honour the promise that no one would 
suffer from classification.
This procedure was dictated by feelings of justice 
but had no effect on the salary levels of other officers. 
More important to classified officers as a whole was the
26 June 1869.
1
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re-institution of automatic annual increments. On the 
other hand, neither the Act nor regulations following it 
attempted to deal in a thorough manner with practices 
regarding fees, allowances and other financial privileges. 
These had always been ill defined, although few benefited 
from them. Civil servants were, indeed, well aware that 
their salaries represented almost their only source of 
income.
Other income
Some had the opportunity of earning overtime payments, 
but this practice was confined almost exclusively to the 
Post Office after a circular of 1863 had informed officers 
that they were:
expected to remain at their offices a sufficient 
length of time to enable them to make up any 
arrears in their daily work....No claims for 
payment will in future be allowed for services 
performed in over-time.^
A number of payments in contravention of this rule were
subsequently made, but the sums involved were not 
2substantial. Acting as a locum tenens for an absent
senior officer was not financially rewarding since the
salary payable was limited to half that of the permanent
occupant. Fees and allowances were forbidden to all but a
handful of officers; in 1872, for example, salaried
3officials were forbidden to receive witness fees. These
1
'Public Service Regulation', S .A .P .P . 27 of 1863.
2
'Pay for Overtime to Government Officers', S .A .P .P . 222 
of 1862, 136 of 1865-66, and 126 of 1869-70.
CSO Circular, 9 December 1872.
3
l6l
bans were successfully enforced. Officers with 
professional qualifications were supposed not to engage in 
private work, but some did so. On occasion this resulted
in legislative criticism, but at other times a blind eye
1was turned to the practice. This additional source of 
income, however, was available to few officers.
Attraction of retiring allowances
Civil Service employment had one financial advantage
over bank employment, however. The Australia and New
Zealand Bank instituted a Guarantee and Provident Fund in
I86l which paid ’modest benefits' and pension funds were
2normal in banks by 1875» but the earlier provision in 
185^ for Civil Service pensions made government employees 
more willing to accept their lower salaries. The 
insolvency of the fund in the late 1850s aroused fears
1
See, e.g., 'Private Practice of Officers of Central Road 
Board', S .A ,P .P . 190 of 1867; 'Charges against Clerk of
Works, Mount Gambier', S .A .P .P . 17^ of 1869-70; Advertiser,
15 January I869. But cf. Governor MacDonnell's comment on 
officers acting as representatives for individuals in 
other countries: 'persons at a distance who perhaps do not
know any one personally in the community do practically in 
many cases select persons holding government situations 
just because their public employment and position point 
them out as suitable and reliable for the transaction of 
business, and if they should be forbidden...[it] would 
probably occasion delay and inconvenience' (Despatch of 
MacDonnell to Secretary of State, 17 August 1859)« This 
practice was not forbidden.
2
S.J. Butlin, Australia and New Zealand Bank: The Bank of 
Australasia and the Union Bank of Australia Limited, 1828- 
1951 (London: Longmans, 1961) , p p .151> 226 ; but cf.
Blainey, pp.222-3*
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that an attractive - some said essential - condition of
government employment would be lost , and a variety of
schemes were proposed to revise it.1 2 Thomas Reynolds
(Premier and Treasurer, 1860-62) finally repealed the Act
in i860 and established a new fund that most, after the
experience of the previous one, thought fair and
reasonable. The amending Act provided for the return of
all contributions with 10 per cent interest to those
subscribers still in the Service; the claims of all
pensioners were settled by paying them a lump sum equal to
2five times the annual value of their pensions. The new 
scheme provided that all fixed list officers should 
receive, upon retirement, an annuity of one month's salary 
for every year of service, calculated on the average 
salary of the three years immediately preceding retirement. 
Although less advantageous than the pension fund, the
1
See, e.g., Register, 21 September 1857> Letter to Editor 
from 'O.C. 'Report of the Select Committee of the House 
of Assembly, appointed to report on the Superannuation 
Question', S.A.P.P. 204 of 1857-58; S.A.P.D., 20 July i860, 
cols. 450-60; Arthur Kinloch, Letters from South Australia 
(London: Stanford, I86l), pp.55-8. Kinloch was Clerk of
the Executive Council, 1851-58, and initiated the petition 
of I858 (above, p.157, note l). He was the chief agitator 
of the day within the Civil Service, and he complained to 
the Colonial Office, after his retqrn to England in 1858, 
that self-government had brought him unfair treatment.
2
i860, No. 12, 'An Act to repeal an Act, No. 21 of 1854, 
intituled "An Act to provide for the Retirement of Officers 
in the Civil Service" and to provide for the Settlement of 
all Claims arising under the said Act, and for Other 
Purposes'. Lipson and Gilbert continued to receive their 
pensions, since it was considered that a binding promise 
had been made to them.
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provision of retiring allowances was some years ahead of 
commercial practice, and the scheme was continued in the 
Act of 1874.1 2
Civil servants could also hope to. receive
compensation on abolition of office, though this depended
on the generosity of the current Minister and similar
2cases were often treated quite differently. All
government employees (including labouring staff) could
more confidently expect some payment to their family if
they were killed while engaged on government business, but
again the amount of compensation varied considerably. The
Act of 1874 made it explicit that compensation was a3privilege, and not a right.
Other Conditions
Leave of absence
Non-financial conditions of Service employment 
compared favourably with those in similar occupations 
outside the Service. Recreation and sick leave were not 
formally regulated but officers on the fixed list were 
usually granted the latter for periods of up to two weeks
1At which time the fund resembled those operating in the 
Services of other colonies; see 'Report of the Royal 
Commission appointed to enquire into the State of the 
Public Service and the Working of the Civil Service Act', 
Parliamentary Papers of Victoria, Vol. II, No. 10 of 1873» 
A p p . F .
2
E.g. CPWO In, 45/1869, 14 January 1869? and 59/1869, 19 
January 1869; and CSO In, 249/1869, 15 February I869.
S. 37.3
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with full pay annually, and so-called temporary employees 
sometimes gained a similar concession. Heads of 
departments were well treated in this respect; a number 
took extensive (nine months or longer) journeys to England 
on half pay for the sake of their health. Leave for 
recreation was more uncertain and depended largely on the 
attitude of the departmental head and the state of
business in his department, but most fixed list officials
1were granted several days a year during slack periods.
The Act of 1874 provided for recreation and sick leave of
up to three weeks and three months respectively per year,
and for leave of absence after long service of up to
2twelve months on full pay. But these provisions did not 
extend to unclassified officers; and, for classified
3officers, leave remained a privilege and not a right.
Nine holidays a year were granted throughout the 
greater part of the period and a Saturday half-holiday was 
observed from the beginning. Office hours were short, 
from 9-45 a.m. to 4 p.m. until I869 , when they were 
extended to 9*30-4.30; in the following year they were 
reduced again, to 9*30-4. Time books were kept in few
1
Some heads used their discretionary powers here to their 
own advantage. O.K. Richardson (Under Secretary, I856-68; 
see below, p.24o), for example, usually took six weeks 
leave a year; but most heads were more diligent.
2
Ss. 29, 30. After ten years of continuous service
employees could be granted twelve months leave of absence 
on half salary or six months on full salary, and twelve 
months on full salary after twenty years of continuous 
service.
3
Cf. the opinion of the Crown Solicitor, CSO In, 1340/1900, 
enclosure dated 18 October 1900.
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departments and circularized injunctions that clerks 
should not leave the office until their work was done 
were infrequently acted upon.^ In addition, early closing 
of the public offices usually followed the death of an 
important official.
Work environment
Office conditions aroused few complaints. The
introduction of the letter press to most departments
during the middle and late 1860s greatly reduced the
copying drudgery of clerical work, and a number of
alterations and improvements were made to government
buildings in the same period. Trollope commented in 1876
that the main group of public offices were 'not
magnificent - but were pleasant, commodious, and 
2sufficient'. However, conditions in this respect were 
not uniform throughout the Service: though the Post Office
was 'the grandest edifice in the town...the one building
O
...on which the town most prid[ed] itself', postal 
employees worked under cramped and trying conditions.
A few departments, such as the Chief Secretary's 
Office, maintained an almost constant work-load over the 
period but the work-load of most departments and 
individual civil servants increased. In the decade
1
CSO Circular, 12 December 1862.
2
Anthony Trollope, South Australia and Western Australia 
(London: Chapman H a l l , 1 8 7 5 ) > p . 2 2 ; on theconstruction of
offpee buildings during the period, see 'Government 
Offices' (Research Note 582, S.A.A., n.d.).
Trollope, p.22.3
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1860-70, for example, the number of both letters and daily
mails handled by the Post Office increased by over 100 per
1cent whilst staff numbers rose by only 80 per cent.
However, these increases were not spectacularly large and
greater changes in work load occurred over shorter periods,
as the volume of business of departments fluctuated
considerably from year to year, often with only marginal
staff changes. The ratio of inward letters to employees
in the Office of the Commissioner of Crown Lands, for
example, declined from 258:1 in i860 to 164:1 in 1868, but
2rose sharply to 351:1 in 1871. Departmental activity
varied considerably on a day to day basis also. Activity
in the Post Office intensified greatly when an English
mail arrived, as it did in the Customs when a large ship
berthed, and officers were on such occasions expected to
3work longer hours without extra remunderation.
Diversity of conditions
Indeed, the outstanding characteristic of Service 
conditions - financial and otherwise - was their lack of 
uniformity from department to department and from year to 
year. Generalizations were subject always to a number of 
exceptions. If Service salaries were just adequate,
1Abstracted from 'Commission on the Post Office', 1875»
The Commissioners observed that the staff was too small to 
handle the work of the department (p.8).
2
From the letterbooks of the department (S.A.A.).
3For a contemporary account, see Carl Gustav Schedlich, 
Memoirs (S.A.A.), pp.40-2. Schedlich worked in the Post 
Office from 1865 to 1886. He became Senior Inland Clerk 
in 1877 and was later postmaster at North Adelaide.
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leaves of absence generally reasonable, and office
conditions usually fair, this was not because regulations
on these matters were observed. Often there were no
regulations; and those that existed were frequently
ignored. ^ Officers with financial, responsibilities, for
example, were required in 1861 to prove annually that they
2had taken out a surety bond with an insurance company,
but in 1868 the Auditor General pointed out that such
officers had not been comprehensively defined and that no
3one had been appointed to receive such proof; and even by
1876 some officers required to be bonded were not.^
Honesty was as much a product of individual officers as of
5the effectiveness of regulations. Again, officers leaving 
the Service with a retiring allowance were required to 
repay the sum if they re-entered government employment.
This regulation was broken on several occasions, partly 
because no one had been appointed specifically to enforce
1
See,e.g., the complaint of the Superintendent of 
Cemeteries, 'Adelaide Cemetery Regulations', S.A.P.P. 79 
of 1862.
2
Government Gazette, No. 50 (21 November I86l), p.971> see 
also 'Civil Service Regulations', S .A ,P .P . l40 of 1864.
3
CSO In, 860/1868, 2 July I878.
4
CSO Circular, [lO? ] June I876.
5
Cf. Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in 
Administrative History, 1 8 2 9 - 1 8 6 1 (New Y o r k : M a c m i l l a n ,
1954), p.5^ 0.
6
CSO In, 2212/1884, enclosure dated 8 October 1884.
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Lack of Security
Because conditions, however reasonable, resulted from 
informal rather than objective regulation, civil servants 
had little sense of security. Differences between fixed 
list and temporary staff in respect of retiring allowances 
were very important here and caused temporary officers to 
emphasize the added security that the allowance gave. l^ ut 
fixed staff had no guarantee that they would be retained 
throughout times of economic stress; their dismissal was 
less likely, but it did occur. Because the 1860s was a 
period of comparative economic tranquillity, fears of 
arbitrary dismissal were not often realized, but the 
future was never predictable. Several years of continuous 
employment revealed nothing of next year. The promotional 
structure of the Service allowed few to gain positions 
that were senior enough to render dismissal improbable, 
and continued employment in middle- and lower-rank 
positions made less likely the possibility of finding 
comparable outside employment if dismissal were to come.
Investigations rare
Nor could an independent inquiry into the 
justification for a dismissal be expected. Finniss 
claimed in 1862 that
the old rule that public officers previous to 
dismissal should have specific charges brought 
against them and that these should be 
investigated by the Executive Council, had since 
the introduction of Responsible Government been 
virtually set aside.^
S.A.P.D., 15 May 1862, col. 72.1
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The rule to which Finniss referred was an unwritten one 
and had never been consistently applied, but it had only a 
weak counterpart after I856. A regulation of 1857 
provided that
any Subordinate Officer feeling aggrieved by the 
conduct, or by any order, of the Head of his 
Department, is at liberty to appeal to the 
Responsible Minister under whose control the 
Department is placed; and any Head of a 
Department feeling aggrieved...is at liberty to 
appeal to the Governor-in-Chief in Executive 
Council; but...such an appeal must be 
transmitted (in the former case) through the 
Head of the Department or (in the latter case) 
through the Responsible Minister....Any officer 
or person in the pay of the Government acting in 
any other manner...will render himself liable to 
removal from the Public Service.^
It is not clear whether these provisions applied to 
summarily dismissed officers, who would have had no head 
of department to appeal to; but the regulation was soon 
forgotten. Custom established, however, that no inquiry 
should be permitted following the abolition of an office 
for reasons of economy. This was a matter of absolute 
discretion for the Executive. The situation was less 
clear in the case of an officer dismissed for negligence, 
incompetence, corruption or similar reasons. Executives 
rejected, as far as they were able, requests for such 
inquiries as a reflection on their judgment, and inquiries 
into cases of this type occurred only after considerable
1
Waterworks Contract No. 52', S .A .P .P . 36 of I86l , p.13*
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Parliamentary and public interest had been aroused.
Whilst the number of dismissals that would have warranted 
an inquiry under later regulations cannot be known, it is 
clear that a civil servant who felt himself unjustly 
dismissed had to depend largely on political influence to 
gain redress. Few could depend on this. Regulations
2prohibiting political activity were re-issued in 1861,
3and were generally observed by subordinate officers.
Arthur Blyth, Premier and Chief Secretary on several 
occasions through the 1860s, summed up Ministerial opinion 
thus:
The removal, in the interests of the public, of 
any officer of the Civil Service, unless 
protected by special legislation, must come 
within the duty of the Cabinet. It is a very 
high trust, and at times it is a very anxious 
trust; but, with our form of government, it 
always must exist,^
1
The government thus rejected the request of one Committee 
of Inquiry that a room should be set aside permanently for 
such work; see 'Report of Board of Inquiry appointed to 
investigate a Charge of tampering with Emigration 
Certificates', S ,A .P .P . 143 of 1863-66, p.3*
2
Government Gazette, No. 34 (3 December I86l), p.1024.
But phrases like 'adverse to the policy of the Government', 
contained in the directive of 1834 (see above, pp.93-^), 
were dropped, thus supporting the idea of neutrality, 
rather than merely forbidding public dissent from 
government policy.
3
The heads of departments were in a somewhat different 
position; see below, pp.220-3.
4
'Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative 
Council on the Police Force', S .A .P .P . 120 of 1867,
Minutes of Evidence, q. 39*
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Concessions in the Act
A valuable provision of the Act of 1874, therefore, 
was one which permitted officers reported as 'unfit to 
remain in the Civil Service' to demand a written copy of 
the charges against them and a Board of Inquiry into their 
offence. On the recommendation of the Board, the 
government might restore the officer to his office, 
dismiss him, 'or inflict such other penalty...as [it
-j
might ] deem desirable' . The government naturally 
retained discretionary powers over punishment, which were 
better defined in cases of less grave misbehaviour. The 
government could then dismiss such an officer from the 
Service or
reduce him to a lower rank...or to a lower 
salary..., or deprive him of such future annual 
increase as he would otherwise have been 
entitled to receive, or of any part thereof, or 
of his leave of absence.^
Officers could thus demand an inquiry only in cases of 
grave offence, when suspended; and, important as this 
right was, it did not apply to unclassified officers, who 
constituted the bulk of the Service.
Summary: Unguaranteed Conditions
Comfortable working conditions, low promotional 
prospects and uncertain tenure were important factors in
1
S. 24.
S. 25-
2
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determining the type of man attracted to government 
employment. Here it is noted only that conditions in the 
1860s were not such as to arouse marked discontent among 
employees. Restrictions on political activity and the 
extension of office hours in 1869, for example, drew no 
letters of protest in the newspapers. There were always 
more applications for jobs than vacant positions. At the 
same time, officials knew that employment conditions could 
quickly change and would remaip satisfactory only so long 
as economic conditions were good and the departmental 
heads managed the Service to the satisfaction of 
themselves and Ministers. The apparently good employment 
conditions of the 1860s accordingly had no inherent 
permanence.
Fixed list officers provided the whole Service with a 
goal, either of gaining security or improving upon it. 
Whilst the Act of 187^+ formalized some of the conditions 
that had grown up, its most important innovations - 
concerning Boards of Inquiry and automatic annual 
increments - applied only to classified officers. 
Unclassified officers were immediately affected only by 
the retiring allowance provisions of the A c t , and the 
appointments, promotions and remuneration of these 
officers depended on the will of the government.
The Act guaranteed the bulk of the Service very
little, as in the case of promotion, for example. Some
1officers believed Clause 22 of the Act to be unjust, 
in so far as it seemed to imply that, in departments which
See above, p.156.
1
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had no officers in certain classes, promotion to positions 
above those classes would necessarily have to be offered 
to officers in other departments. It was felt that such 
officers might not be as competent as those of a lower 
class already in the department. Officers would have 
little incentive to faithful service if passed over in this 
way. But subsequent events showed that the weakness of the 
Act here lay in almost the opposite direction. Rather was 
it important that the Act stipulated, but made no 
guarantee, that applications for promotion would be 
considered from the whole Service. In 1874 the Adelaide 
Observer had drawn on Victorian experience in suggesting 
that a full time authority, such as a Civil Service 
Inspector, might be appointed to carry out such a task.^
The Act, however, set up no separate selection machinery. 
The evaluation of subordinate officers, few of whom had 
the opportunity of distinguishing themselves, thus 
remained with Ministers and the heads of departments; and 
this method did not necessarily ensure that the best men 
were promoted.
Moreover, the government could reduce any of the
salary scales, stop salary increments, and 'diminish the
total number and alter the distribution of officers' as
2exigency demanded, this last provision in addition to the 
causes mentioned above as sufficient for dismissal. Blyth
1
30 May 1874, p .13; cited hereafter as the Observer. The 
idea was endorsed by several civil servants; see 'Report 
of Select Committee on Civil Service Bill', S .A .P .P . 73 of 
1874, Minutes of Evidence, q q . 836, 9^ -2.
2
S.l4.
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directed that the Act was to be implemented strictly, but 
he admitted, in regard to salaries, that 'there is not 
anything to prevent the Government from making
1recommendations to Parliament in special cases'. TJie Act 
of 1874 raised working conditions after they had begun to 
decline from the generally acceptable level of the 1860s, 
but it contained few guarantees for the future.
1
CSO Out, 15 May 1874, p.703* The Register later observed
that 'the very terms of the Civil Service Act imply that 
changes in the salaries may be made without an alteration 
in the Act being necessary in every case and the salaries 
are voted by Parliament, which could, if it was deemed 
expedient, refuse to vote any or all of the amounts....It 
is most desirable that [salaries ] should be independent of 
the caprices of legislators and the exigencies of 
politics' (23 July 1886); cf. Schedlich v Commonwealth, 38 
Commonwealth Law Reports (1926-27), p p .518-22.
CHAPTER V
POLITICS AND PROBLEMS
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A handful of Ministers dominated Parliament after 
1857* They were men of restricted imagination who were 
content to see the colony progress slowly. They had 
little interest in Civil Service reform, although they 
required the Service to be honest, and they relied heavily 
on their senior officials. The Service was honest, and 
the colony did prosper, but Ministers made scant provision 
for future administrative change. That task was left to 
the senior officials.
First Problems
Three questions, apart from the perennial one of 
cost, concerned the Service after I856: retiring
allowances, the status of Boards and the management of the 
public accounts. Action on these issues was not quickly 
taken. The experienced members of the first Ministry wepe 
unprepared to censure their previous administration, as 
their acceptance of the existing structure of the Service 
showed, and the two succeeding Ministries were short-lived 
(eleven and twenty-nine days respectively) and had no 
opportunity to remodel the Service. The Ministry of 
R.D. Hanson (September 1857-May i860) had time and 
opportunity but little inclination for such a task. 
Hanson's was a coalition Ministry, in that it contained 
individuals of differing backgrounds and policies, and 
survived only by being reconstructed on several occasions. 
Some of its members had political experience before I856, 
and two had been closely linked with the Governor's party. 
The Ministry was forced to deal with the question of
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retiring allowances, but experienced members professed no
inclination to tamper with a Service of which they had
some knowledge. For Hanson himself, probably the most
intellectually able political leader of his generation in
South Australia, this was especially true. Little
concerned with the details of administration, he
concentrated on broader schemes, and, although some of
these demanded unusually efficient administration, his
2concern was chiefly with immediate effectiveness. Hanson 
dominated his Cabinet, the more so because its personnel 
changed often, and his predilection against Service 3reform - which may have contained some personal elements 
infected most of his colleagues.
Ministerial control of Boards?
But his Cabinet also contained, at various times, 
several men new to Ministerial activity, and at least one 
of these, Thomas Reynolds, found Hanson's doctrine of the 
status quo galling. In his capacity as Commissioner of 
Public Works, Reynolds controlled directly three 
departments and was placed at the head of the Boards 
managing the Railways, Roads and Waterworks, but over the 
Boards he had no legal jurisdiction:
1
See above, pp.l6l-3*
2
H. Brown, 'Sir R.D. Hanson' (unpub. MS for Fred Johns 
Prize, University of Adelaide, 1938), pp.102-14.
3
His brother was Chairman of the Railways Commissioners, a 
position which some wanted to abolish, and he himself 
acted as legal adviser to the Commissioners.
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There was nothing in the Constitution Act either 
to define his position or to limit the operation 
of those Acts under which the Central Road Board 
and the Railways and Waterworks Boards had been 
created. They could act without his consent, 
and even against his expressed wishes, as long 
as they were in the possession of funds. The 
District Councils, which depended on him for the 
payment of the grants in aid...did not invariably 
regard compliance with his requirements, in the 
shape of information and returns, as being 
obligatory upon them.1 2
To an ambitious Minister, new to office, 'the question
amounted to this - are we living under Responsible
2Government or are we not?' Reynolds directed his main 
energies at the Railways Commissioners, who spent the most 
money, employed the most men and were least anjenable to 
suggestions of cooperation. In May 1858 he established 
the nominal issue that the Commissioners would not agree 
that the Minister's sanction was necessary for certain 
financial transactions and recommended that the 
Commissioners should be requested, or forced, to resign.
The remainder of the Cabinet rejected this suggestion and 
Reynold's proffered resignation was accepted. However, 
the affair stirred up sufficient controversy for Reynolds 
successfully to introduce a motion for a Select Committee 
on railway management. The Committee condemned the 
existing system, finding that
1
'Public Works Report', S .A ,P .P . 29A of 1880, p.4.
2
S »A .P .D . , 15 September I858, col. 136. Other 
Commissioners of Public Works had asked similar questions; 
see, e.g. , Register, 18 November I856 and 3 December I856; 
'Report on Public Works', S . A.. P . P . 102 of 1857-58, pp.6-7.
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the duties of the Commissioners are principally 
confined to the meetings of the Board...the 
ostensible [actual?] management is under the 
charge of the various Superintendents of 
Departments, who are left very much to their 
own independent action, without that efficient 
and energetic supervision so necessary in an 
undertaking of so much importance...your 
Committee think it would be very desirable, in 
order to secure greater economy and more 
efficient control, that the management should 
be placed, without delay, under the charge of 
one manager, whose time and attention should be 
exclusively devoted to it, and be held directly 
responsible to the Government, instead of the 
present system by a Board of Commissioners.^
Hanson deflected the force of these findings by enacting
that the Governor-in-Council should approve appointments
and promotions made by the Board, after a Bill that gave
greater power to the Commissioner of Public Works had been
defeated by the supporters of the government in the
Council, and by making some organizational changes in 
21859* But as long as Hanson remained Premier, the 
position of the Boards was, in effect, unchanged.
The reforms of i860
By i860 Reynolds had extended his notions of reform 
to include the electorally more popular cry of 
retrenchment and economy, and his eleven-point election 
manifesto emphasized Service reform to an unusual extent:
1
'Report of the Select Committee on Railway Management', 
S.A.P.P. 59 of 1858, p.l.
2
See above, pp.l^-^.
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1. Retrenchment, the principal part of the 
policy...
2. Repeal of the ad valorem duties;
3. Abolition of harbour and light dues and 
remodelling of the pilot service;
4. Amalgamation of Harbour Trust, Trinity Board 
and Local Marine Board into one body, to be 
called the Marine Board;
5. Establishment of circuit courts;
6. Opening up of Northern Country...
7. ...alterations in the mode of disposing of 
the Crown Lands...
8. Placing the salaries of all members of 
Boards on the estimates, so as to bring all 
official expenditure under the control of 
the Assembly;
9* Reform of the Civil List for purposes of 
retrenchment;
10. Reform of the Constitution Act by 
substituting some lay officer in the Cabinet 
for the professional one of Attorney-General;
11. Amendment of the Real Property Act..."*
The growth of the Service did not in itself justify this 
concern, for by i860 numbers and establishment costs had 
risen only slowly from the levels of the first budget 
passed under responsible government. The rate of growth, 
in terms of numbers employed, was rather faster than for 
the whole period 1857-74, but was slower in terms of 
expenditure, and slower on both counts than for the period 
1851-56.
Hodder, History of South Australia, Vol. I, pp.328-9*
1
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Table 15
Numbers and Expenditure; Growth Rates, Selected Periods a
Period
Average Annual Increase ($)
1
Number Employed Expenditure
I851-56b 8.3
1857-1859/60° 3.7 1.4
1856-74 2.2 5.3
a
See A p p . 1 for the source of these figures, and for a
monitory note on their reliability (especially for 
1851-56). 
b
Public Works departments excluded; see App. 1. 
c
The fiscal year was changed from January-December to 
July-June in July 1859» and back qgain in January 1866; 
and to July-June again in July 1874.
But any increase appeared unjustified when set against the 
declining economic condition of the colony in 1859 and 
i860. This was a short-lived recession only, since 
conditions improved greatly in the second half of 186l, 
but it was sufficient to arouse demands for economy, 
especially since the first four Ministries had taken no 
conspicuous steps to curb expenditure. After the electoral 
success of Reynolds and his followers in i860, the press
thus looked forward to ?the inauguration of a new era of
1official administration' in which 'the question "what
Advertiser, 25 May i860.
1
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next?" will be anxiously asked by every salaried idler and 
in every sinecure office in the Public Service'.^
Reynolds carried out his programme with varying
degrees of success. He dismissed some thirty-five
officers and reduced establishment costs by approximately
10 per cent, though financial savings were obscured by the
inclusion of some new items, such as the salaries of
2officers of Boards, on the Estimates. He settled one of
his points of disagreement with Hanson in making this
expenditure public, and he settled another when he altered
the structure of the Boards to bring them directly under
3the control of the Commissioner of Public Works.
Reynolds also made some important changes in personnel. 
Within two months of taking office, four senior officers 
were removed from their positions. The Under Treasurer 
and the Manager of the Railways were transferred to 
Magistracies and the Secretary to the Central Road Board 
and the Colonial Architect retired, a change doubtless 
made easier by the institution of a retiring allowance. 
Later (March l86l), the Manager of the Waterworks was also 
replaced following charges of maladministration. The only 
characteristic common to these five officers was that they 
were appointed before 1856, and their removal within such 
a short time suggests that they may have suffered from 
being identified with the old regime.
1
Register, 4 May i860.
2
Register, 13 June i860, and Advertiser, 13 June i860. 
3
Above, pp.1^3-4.
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Reynold's greatest success was the repeal of the
Superannuation Act of 185^.^ An incentive was given to
officers to remain in the Service for an increased
allowance, and accurate calculations on the condition of
the fund could be made because only a defined portion of
the Service had access to it. Whilst the restriction of
the scheme to fixed list officers made it more likely that
temporary officers would be appointed in later years to
avoid paying the allowance, Reynolds claimed that he had
banished confusion and uncertainty, acted successfully to
prevent further financial loss after four years of
quibbling, and done justice to the civil servants. Some
thought the scheme extravagant, but the newspapers, most
legislators and the fixed list officers greeted it with
relief. It was, said the Governor, 'just and even 
2generous'. In a year of wide retrenchment, Reynold's 
measure was well planned to conciliate an important 
section of the Service, but he did not act on expediency 
alone.
Importance of Reynolds
The two Ministries headed by Reynolds in 1860-61 and 
1861-62 were the first that were not dominated by 
individuals associated previously with the Governor, and 
the retrenchments and reforms of i860 reflected an attempt
1
Above, p .162.
2
Despatch of Governor MacDonnell to the Secretary of State, 
22 November i860, contained in 'Despatch on Superannuation 
and Civil Service Act', S.A.P.P . 22 of 1861, p.l.
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to make good some of the confident words on Service 
reorganization uttered before I856. But Reynolds by no 
means made good all the vague claims of previous years, 
arid perhaps he could not have done, for legislators yet 
believed that they ought not to 'break covenants' and that 
governments therefore owed the Service some alternative to 
the Act of 1854. The reorganization of the Service in 
I858-6O was attended with more restraint than would have 
seemed likely four years earlier, which was partly a 
result of the passage of time itself; interest waned as a 
realization of the complexities of the government machine 
grew.^ Criticism of the Service before 1857 arose from 
particular irritations, such as the pensions provided for 
Executive Councillors, and from a general feeling of 
political impotence. Self government removed the latter 
and partly removed the former, and at the same time 
brought other matters connected with the administration of 
the Service to the attention of legislators. A 
consideration of these matters depends on an analysis of 
political activity during the period.
Politics
Faction government
Some division between 'new' and 'old' 
Parliamentarians - between those who had been identified
1
Cf. Kenneth K. 0'Donoghue, 'The Constitutional and 
Administrative Development of South Australia from 
Responsible Government to Strangways' Act of 1868' (unpub. 
Master's dissertation, Dept, of History, University of 
Adelaide, 1950), pp.386-87.
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with the Governor and those who had not - could be
observed until about i860, but this distinction then
became difficult to make. Not until the late 1880s could
politicians be clearly grouped by one touchstone (free-
trade and protection) and until then differences of
policy were usually slight. Even when violent
disagreement surrounded an issue, it was possible for
legislators to change their minds overnight, and some
spectacular conversions were seen.^ The early hope that
’government by party must and will obtain' was not quickly 
2realized. Ministers contributed to the idea that 
Parliament was simply a gathering of place-hunters. One 
Premier wrote that the opposition would try to dislodge 
his Cabinet,
not because we have not managed well but because 
they want our berths....The lives of Ministries 
in this country are...most uncertain.3
A visitor described a Ministerial crisis thus:
The outsiders formed themselves into a party on 
the principle 'share and share alike', and 
getting Mr Strangways to lead them, being in a
1
See, e.g., Register, 15 March 1875» and 0'Donoghue, p.3*
2
Register, 27 April 1857» cf. later comments, Register,
12 June 1880.
3
Letters of Henry Ayers to J.B. Graham, 25 April 1864 and 
23 July 1864 (National Library, Canberra).
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majority, at once carried a vote of want of 
confidence and made their leader Chief 
Secretary.^
After nearly forty years of evanescent Ministries, 
the Austrajasian (Melbourne) expostulated that the South 
Australian Parliamentary benches were
crowded with Ministers of the Crown in all 
tenses - past, present and to come....Efficient 
administration, even, becomes impossible. A 
Government that was born yesterday and expects 
to die tomorrow has no time to remedy abuses or 
even grasp the details of official work.^
The charge that brief Ministries had a deleterious effect
on administration is examined below; here it is noted that
the charge that the South Australian Parliament contained
a high proportion of members involved at some time in a
Ministry has been reflected in later writings. Coghlan,
for example, thought that ’every pettifogging politician
3had his chance of a little, if brief authority'. But, as
1
Stanley Leighton, Extracts from a Journal (National 
Library, Canberra), p.44.Leighton w a s a  young Englishman 
who visited Australia briefly in 1867-68; he later became 
a member of the House of Commons. He recorded the 
political gossip of the day with vivacity, but his accounts 
must be taken with reserve. Strangways, for example, was 
at no time Chief Secretary, although the outlines of the 
incident were doubtless as Leighton recorded them.
2
Quoted in Hodder, History of South Australia, Vol. II,
App. C, p.376.
3
T.A. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia from the 
First Settlement in 1788 to the Establishment of the 
Commonwealth in 1901 (Londpn: Oxford University Press,
1918), Vol. Ill, p .1913 5 cf. Todd, pp.60-1, and William 
Pember Reeves, State Experiments in Australia and New 
Zealand (London! Richards, 1902), Vol. T! p .64.
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L o v e d a y  and M a r t i n  have shown of N e w  South Wales, 
p o l i t i c a l  'struggle was in fact c a r ried on b e t w e e n  small 
groups of m e n . . . [and] f a c t i o n  c o r e s . . .normally lasted for 
a decade or m o r e '.^
A M i n i s t e r i a l  'elite'
D i s tinct and opposed factions were m u c h  less easily
d e l i n e a t e d  in South A u s t r a l i a  than in N ew South Wales.
2Some exigu o u s  groupings could be made, but faction 
m e m b e r s h i p  o v e r lapped to such an extent that it is more 
correct to see South A u s t r a l i a n  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  a c t i v i t y  in 
the 1860s in terms of one small, d o m inant group. It was 
p e r h a p s  i nevitable that this should be so, for the 
m e m b e r s h i p  of Parliament was small ( thir t y - s i x  in the 
House, t w enty in the Council) and l e a d e r s h i p  easily 
g r a v i t a t e d  to the able m e n  in a small pool. Despite what 
c o n t e m p o r a r y  accounts said, a M i n i s t e r i a l  seat was not the 
aim of e v e r y  member. Most ha d  b u s i n e s s e s  of some sort to 
a t t e n d  to, for w h i c h  the M i n i s t e r i a l  sala r y  could not 
a l w a y s  compensate, a M i n i s t e r i a l  seat did not itself 
g u a r a n t e e  ele c t o r a l  victory, and committee w ork p r o vided 
some members w ith a less d e m a n d i n g  outlet for their 
p a t r i o t i c  energies. D ifferences of p r i nciple and ideology 
r u l e d  out few m e m b e r s  of P a r l i a m e n t  as p o t e ntial Ministers 
but c o m p a r a t i v e l y  few in practice b e came Ministers, though
1
P. L o v e d a y  and A.W. Martin, Parliament, Factions and 
Parties? The F i rst T h i r t y  Years of R e s p o n s i b l e  Government 
in N e w  S o u t h  W a l e s , I856-I889 (M e l b o u r n e : M e l b ourne
U n i v e r s i t y  Press , 1 96 6 ) , p . 1-49 .
2
E. g. , 0 ' D o n o g h u e , p.3*
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contemporary commentators, including parliamentarians 
themselves, liked to think otherwise.
The dominance of a small group of men is illustrated 
by figures relating to the length of Ministries and the 
tenure of Ministers. In the eighteen and a half years 
between October I856 (responsible government) and June 1875 
(fall of the third Blyth Ministry), twenty-six Ministries 
held office, for periods ranging from nine days to two 
years seven months. Their average life was a little under 
nine months, a short period that did not accurately reflect
the position of some Ministers. Of the 145 members of
1Parliament of the period, fifty-two, or just over 35 per 
cent, held Ministerial office at one time or another, and 
their total Ministerial tenure was distributed thus:
Table 16
Total Ministerial Tenure of Ministers 
Holding Office, October 1856-June l875a
Length of Tenure Number of Ministers
Less than 6 months 18
6 months - less than 1 year 5
1 year - less than 2 years 11
2 years - less than 3 years 9
3 years - less than 4 years 2
4 years - less than 5 years 1
More than 5 years 6
Total 52
a
Calculated from 'Statistical Record of the Legislature, 
1836-1965', S.A.P.P. 97 of 1965.
1
Members of the House of Assembly only are considered.
The Legislative Council provided only one Minister for 
each Ministry and the elective period for Councillors was 
not comparable to that of the House. Two non-political 
Attorneys General are also excluded.
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The total Ministerial tenure of the six longest serving 
Ministers (A. Blyth, Glyde, Reynolds, Milne, Strangways 
and Ayers) equalled the total tenure of the fourteen next 
longest serving Ministers and the total tenure of the 
forty shortest serving Ministers; expressed differently, 
nine Ministers, or less than one-fifth of the total number, 
held Ministerial positions for half of the available time. 
The prominence of these men was reflected in their 
contribution to debate and to Parliamentary activity 
generally. Since Ministries were short-lived, long 
serving Ministers naturally occupied positions in a number 
of Ministries; eleven men, for example, served in five or 
more Ministries, and five served in eight or more. Most 
Cabinets contained at least one of these prominent 
Ministers - some contained several - and there were no 
consistent lines of alliance between them.
The Relation of Politicians to the Service
Limited knowledge of the Service
Inevitably, long serving Ministers were better 
acquainted with the Service than were their shorter lived 
colleagues, or non-Ministerial members generally. The 
eight longest serving Ministers held the Premiership 
eighteen times between them during the period, and this 
gave them knowledge of most areas of Service activity, 
although one still claimed that 'as a rule I know nothing 
of what takes place in other departments'. ^ Some
1
’Report of the Select Committee on Offices of Profit', 
S .A .P .P . 29 of 1865-66, Minutes of Evidence, q. 51»
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Ministers preferred a particular portfolio: Henry Ayers, 
for example, was Chief Secretary on nine occasions during 
the period (total Ministerial tenure, five years), and 
occupied no other post. Others, however, widened their 
acquaintanceship with the Service by holding a number of 
portfolios at different times: Arthur Blyth, for example, 
was Chief Secretary twice (total tenure 35 months), 
Treasurer four times (20 months), Commissioner of Crown 
Lands twice (25 months) and Commissioner of Public Works 
twice (23 months), and William Milne was Chief Secretary 
twice (19 months), Commissioner of Crown Lands four times 
(2k months) and Commissioner of Public Works twice (25 
months).
The political longevity of certain Ministers was 
aided by flexible interpretations of the doctrines of 
individual and collective Ministerial responsibility. The 
idea of Ministerial responsibility is considered below. 
Here it is noted that the idea that each Minister was 
personally responsible to Parliament for the official 
actions of his departmental officials was never observed, 
and as late as 1880 the Advertiser argued, after a 
spectacular and near-fatal railway accident, that it 
'would be absurd to hold the Commissioner of Public Works
responsible for individual instances of negligence or bad
1judgment on the part of his officials'. It was conceded 
that 'he may fairly be called to account for general 
mismanagement', but the point was not stressed and seems 
never to have been mentioned before then. And, despite 
the fact that criticisms of official behaviour occupied a
15 April 1880; cf. Register 15 April 1880.
1
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large part of Parliamentary time, no Minister ever did 
resign for such a reason. This situation followed partly 
from the rapidity of Ministerial change, which made the 
fixing of Ministerial responsibility difficult, but also 
from considerations of political strength and exigency, as 
Finer has shown for a more recent period in Great 
Britain. The collective responsibility of Ministers for 
government policy was more widely appreciated, and was 
stated for the first time in I858 by Hanson, when he 
wrote that:
when a question arises [concerning] a 
Responsible Minister and one of the departments 
under his supervision affecting the policy of 
the government, or which may be made the subject 
of attack in the legislature, the Minister 
should, before deciding, consult with the Chief 
Secretary...if the Chief Secretary differs in 
[principle?] from the Minister who consults him, 
or if he considers the matter one which should 
not be decided without the concurrence of the 
other Ministers, then the matter should be 
brought before the Cabinet. Unless this rule be 
adopted the Government is constantly exposed to 
the risk of being compromised by action of which 
the majority...are ignorant, until perhaps the 
moment of attack.^
A number of Ministerial resignations, of which 
Reynolds' in .I.858 was one of the first, adhered to this 
rule. At the same time, Ministers possessed and used their 
freedom of choice when matters of policy were not at issue. 
Between 1857 and June 1875> the proportion of divisions in
1
S.E. Finer, 'The Individual Responsibility of Ministers', 
Public Administration (London), Vol. XXXIV (Winter, 1958), 
pp.393-4.
2
CSO In, 4134-/1858, 24 March I858.
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which Ministers were found on both sides of the House to 
the total number of divisions for the session sometimes 
reached over 15 per cent,1 2*4 and not until the session of 
1880 did Ministers vote as a body at every division. On 
several occasions, the splitting of the Ministerial vote 
led to the defeat of the nominal government side. What 
constituted a defeat for the government was, indeed, 
uncertain. It was not unusual for a Ministry to be 
defeated in a division (excluding no-confidence motions, 
this happened on thirty-seven occasions, 1856-75) but this 
seldom led to the resignation of the government, which 
justified its continued existence by the argument that 
defeat was over a minor issue. No-confidence motions, 
which could not be ignored, were therefore employed to 
remove Ministries.
How able were Ministers?
To dominate the South Australian Parliament was not a
sign of marked ability. In 1870, Governor Fergusson, for
example, thought that 'the best class of men in the
2Country are indifferent to politics altogether'. Whilst 
Fergusson - a junior Minister in the British Parliament 
only two years before - could scarcely be entirely 
objective, there was much to support his view. To some 
extent, Ministers did not have sufficient time to develop 
their talents, as their occupations suggest:
1
A figure that would be increased if Ministerial 
abstentions from voting could be determined and included.
2
Letter of Sir James Fergusson to the Duke of Buckingham,
4 December 1870 (S.A.A.).
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Table 17
Occupations of Ministers, l857-7^a
Occupation N umb e r
Agriculture
Pastoralist 1
Smallholder 1
Professions
Law 7
Journalism 2
Other*3 5
Business
Entrepreneur" 13
Small 1
Total 30
Compiled from Biographies. Excludes two non-political 
Attorneys General and two lawyers who were Attorneys- 
General only, and the six Executive Councillors of I856. 
Of the forty-two Ministers remaining, information is 
available for only thirty, 
b
Includes accountant, architect, botanist, physician and 
stock-dealer (one each), 
c
Founders or directors of large commercial enterprises.
The preponderance of commercial men was reflected in the 
dominant Parliamentary groups the six longest serving 
Ministers were all founders or managers of large commercial 
undertakings. This testified to certain personal 
abilities, it is true, and indeed few had started life 
with any other assets. They became men of substance 
through ability, hard work and persistence, and their
19^
businesses were very much their own creations; but, for
that reason, they had only limited time to spare for
1Parliamentary business. Even so, few Ministers displayed
marked political ability or imagination, and they compared
poorly tyith the Executive Councillors of 1851-56. Hanson,
especially, revealed their mediocrity, and the outstanding
legislative achievement of the period, the Real Property
Act of 1858, was initiated and administered by R.R.
2Torrens, another erstwhile Councillor. But Hanson became 
Chief Justice of South Australia in I86l and Torrens 
returned to Britain in 1864, and some of the most able 
debaters in the House (such as F.E.H.W. Krichauff and
oP.B. Coglin) were Ministers only briefly or not at all.
The other legislative landmark, Strangways' Act of 1868, 
was more the creation of the Surveyor General than of the
1
In nineteenth century South Australia, the convention was 
slow to grow up that Ministers should receive a higher 
salary than heads of departments (in 1875> for example, 
the Surveyor General received £1,000 p.a . , and his 
Minister £800 p.a.). This may be traced partly to the 
presence of part-time and wealthy Ministers. A Minister's 
salary was often only a supplement to his income, which in 
total might greatly surpass that of his best paid head; in 
any case, few qnjoyed Ministerial salaries for long enough 
at a time to make comparisons with official salaries 
inevitable. Non-ministerial members were not paid until 
1887, and so a further point of comparison was lacking,
2
The Act simplified the transfer of property, and made it 
less costly; see D.H. Pike, 'Introduction of the Real 
Property Act in South Australia', University of Adelaide 
Law Review, Vol. I, No. 2 (1961), pp.181-2.
On Krichauff, see below, pp.323-^*
3
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politician whose name it bore. The boldest political 
initiative of the period was the settlement of the 
Northern Territory in 1864, but that ended in costly
2failure and further disposed Ministers towards caution.
In a young colony, politicians had much to do - they 
could not, for example, avoid the need for public works, 
immigration and the raising of loans in London. Each 
session produced many Acts, but those that were not soon 
forgotten were greatly amended in later years. Many of 
the political aims of the settlers of South Australia were 
realities by 1857* The colonists by then had their own 
Parliament, elected triennially by secret ballot and 
universal manhood suffrage, they controlled their own 
finances and they had guaranteed religious freedom.
Payment of members and votes for women were not issues 
until the 1880s. The rapid expansion of government during 
1851-56 left Ministers with few ideas for new governmental 
activity, and those areas which demanded revision, such as 
education, received little attention. For the most part, 
Ministers were content to balance the budget as nearly as 
they could, to push ahead with reproductive works, and to
1
The Act altered the system of selling and leasing land in 
order to protect the smaller agriculturalists, but was 
subsequently greatly modified; see Bowes, pp.24l-5 and 
0 1 2Donoghue, pp.423-8.
2
On the Northern Territory, see Ross Duncan, 'South 
Australia's Contribution to the Development of the 
Northern Territory Cattle Industry, 1863-1910' > Historical 
Studies Australia and New Zealand, Vol. 11, No. 43 
(0ctober, 1964) , p p .336-40, and A . Grenfell Price, The
History and Problems of the Northern Territory, Australia 
( Adelaide : Printed by A.E. Aco11, 1930 ) , pp . 11-28 ; and s"ee 
also below, pp.251-3*
maintain their own position as political leaders of 
society.
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Areas of Activity Affecting the Service
Financial reform
No Ministry, however, could escape financial problems, 
and accounting methods were thus frequently questioned. 
Reynolds' pruning of departmental expenses was widely 
approved but emphasized again that the 'system of keeping 
[the] public accounts [was] inconvenient and cumbrous,
affording only a very minimum of information at the cost
1of a maximum of labour'. The legal and constitutional
framework of public finance was outmoded by I860 and had
been for some years. The Treasurer, for example, was
still considered an accountant to the Crown, to which he
was in principle personally responsible for deficits, and
whilst this liability was never enforced it was doubtful
whether the position was 'compatible with that of a
Responsible Minister, liable to removal at any time from
2political causes'. Methods of keeping the accounts were
1
H.K. Hughes (Treasurer, November 1868-May I87O and 
January-March 1872), 'Correspondence relative to Keeping 
of Public Accounts', S .A .P .P . 55 of 1872, p.l.
2
J.E. Fitzgerald (Auditor General of New Zealand, c. 1880), 
'A Report on the Management, Accounts, and Audit of the 
Public Revenues in the Several Colonies of New South 
Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and 
New Zealand', Parliamentary Papers of New Zealand, 1881,
V o l . A - 4 , p .8.
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obscure, sometimes contradictory and often misunderstood, 
and the marked lack of consistency that developed in the 
accounting methods of departments was explained away by 
reference to patchwork regulations. In 1862 the Chief 
Secretary said:
What regulations were in force[?]; he confessed 
he did not know; he had himself sometimes asked 
the question; he believed the Imperial 
regulations were the groundwork, but somewhat 
modified and altered. At the present time 
there was no complete record of the regulations.
The task of keeping the accounts was not made easier 
by the spending habits of the Legislature. As the New 
Zealand Auditor General observed of South Australia, it 
was usual for the revenue to be at least partly expended 
before it was voted, and temporary Supply Bills were often 
adopted, in a 'less satisfactory' form than in the other
Australian colonies, before the Appropriation Act was
2passed. The provision that unexpended balances could be 
used for the following year, and a certain laxity, at 
least until 1869, in the use of Governor's Warrants,3further obscured the situation. Much confusion also 
arose from the ill-defined status of the Auditor General.
1
S . A.. P , D . , 17 June 1862, col, 283.
2
Fitzgerald, p.17 and p p .15-17 generally.
3Ibid., p.26. The Ordinary and Loan Revenue funds, also, 
seem never to have been separated in South Australia, thus 
adding to confusion, then and now; see N.G. Butlin and 
H. de Meel, Public Capital Formation in Australia : 
Estimates, 186O-190Ö~TAustralian National University : 
Social Science Monographs, Vol. II; Canberra : Department
of Economics, Australian National University, 195^),
PP.58, 93.
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The Auditor General
Although the position of Auditor General could be 
abolished only by constitutional amendment, the official 
status of the incumbent of the office was identical to 
that of other senior officers. He was appointed by the 
Governor, could be removed at pleasure and was responsible 
to a Minister (the Chief Secretary) and not to Parliament. 
He had only limited power to examine the accounting work 
of departments, submitted no detailed annual report until 
1877, and not until 1887 was he given tenure that could be 
broken only by Parliamentary address, permitted certain 
discretionary powers over the financial actions of 
departments, and generally directed 'to observe whether 
the law governing the finances has been upheld and to 
report to Parliament accordingly',  ^ although these 
guarantees had been made in most other colonies some years 
before. To some politicians, an independent Auditor 
General seemed to herald a return to 'the early days of 
the colony [when] the Auditor General exercised a certain 
amount of inflüence over the policy of the Government 
[which ]...should not now be the case' and others feared 
that he would be entitled to an unwarranted pension. 
Moreover, W.L. O'Halloran, Auditor General from I85I to 
1868, knew far more about government accounting 
intricacies than anyone else and it was implied that there 
was no cause to alter a workable system. The confusion
1
W.J. Campbell, Australian State Public Finance (Sydney : 
Law Book Company of A u s t ralasia,1 9 5 4 ) ] p .22.
2
S.A.P.D., 17 June 1862, col. 285.
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emphasized by the reforms of i860 made such a 
consideration absurd, and the feeling that change was 
unnecessary was revealed as a fear that change might be 
inconvenient. A loud watch-dog of the public purse could 
be embarrassing when harvest failures demanded the 
transfer of loan revenue to general revenue purposes, for 
example. It was rumoured that O'Halloran was forced to 
resign in 1868 following his 'disinclination' to falsify 
the accounts.^
Nevertheless, the Waterhouse Ministry in 1862 
introduced a Bill to clarify the system of keeping the 
public accounts which provided that balance sheets drawn 
up in accordance with certain regulations should be 
presented to Parliament by the Auditor General at a 
stated time each year. No substantive change in the 
position of the Auditor General was proposed, and although 
a minority argued, what was twenty years later to be the 
important question, that the Auditor General should be 
responsible to Parliament as a whole and subject to 
dismissal only by its address, the Ministry was adamant 
that the Auditor General would remain 'in precisely the
2same position as any other officer of the Civil Service'. 
The Ministry's failure vigorously to support the Bill, 
which did not pass the second reading, left the Auditor
1
Leighton, p.136. But whether or not this rumour was true, 
it did not provide the sole reason for O'Halloran's 
resignation, which he had planned some time before 1868 
(see CSO In, 1728-J/1866, 18 October 1866).
2
S.A.P.D., 21 May 1862, col. 127.
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General poorly equipped to supervise the accounting and 
auditing business of the departments.^
The mechanical handling of the accounts seemed more
amenable to reform than the position of the Auditor
General, partly because the form of accounting could be
regarded as a legacy of gubernatorial inefficiency, which
could be remedied by a willingness to investigate possible
solutions. Legislators had found a wrong to be righted
and a series of inquiries into the forms and methods of
keeping the public accounts were made in the 1860s. The
reports of the I856 Select Committee on the Public Accounts
2were largely ignored when presented, but the Audit Act of
1862 drew on some of the Committee’s recommendations and
others were embodied in the relatively comprehensive Rules
and Regulations for the Preparation and Auditing of Public4Accounts that followed the Act in I867. In the interval
1
As he himself complained; see below, pp.249-50* Cf. the 
position in New South Wales, where the Audit Act of I87O 
resulted from a Parliamentary desire to restrict the 
Executive (P.N. Lamb, 'The Financing of Government 
Expenditure in New South Wales, I856-I9OO' [unpub. Ph.D, 
dissertation, Dept, of Economic History, Australian 
National University, 1963]» pp.78-9)»
2
See above, pp.82-3*
3
I862, No. 11, 'An Act for the Better Examination and 
Audit of the Public Accounts'.
4
Adelaide : Government Printer, 1867; see also W.C.M. 
Finniss, 'Papers re Public Accounts' (S.A.A.). Finniss (a 
Treasury clerk, 1859-70; son of B.T. Finniss) was involved 
in most of the accounting reforms of this period.
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another Select Committee (December 1866) expressed dismay 
at the arrears of departmental accounts, called attention 
to the Auditor General’s dangerous lack of independence, 
and suggested that the Auditor General should summarize 
generally the Accounts in his annual report. Further 
criticisms led to the appointment of a third Committee 
which reported in July 1869 , at which time the Regulations 
were also amended. The work done by the Committees, and 
embodied in the Act and Regulations, was substantial and 
went some way to standardize the methods of departmental 
book-keeping. However, much remained to be done, 
especially in taking advantage of innovations made in 
other colonies, and further reforms were made in the 1880s.
Personnel reform
Accounts and accountability were important matters in 
a colony that seemed often to verge on financial disaster, 
but in retrospect they were not as important as questions 
concerning the quality of officers and their methods of 
selection and promotion. These issues received much less 
attention than the public accounts because the accounts were 
obviously confused, the control of finance appeared to have 
a more direct connection with the welfare of the colony,and 
financial matters appeared susceptible to watchfulness and 
action. The evaluation of personnel in the Service 
depended on factors that were less tangible and urgent. 
Certainly, no politicians denied the desirability of 
regulating remuneration, entrance and promotional 
procedures by some fixed principles.  ^ On several
1
See, e.g., Advertiser, 21 February I867 and 30 October 
1867; and Register, 1 February I869.
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occasions some argued specifically for a Civil Service Act 
covering such matters. Civil Service Bills were indeed 
introduced, in 1867, 1868 and 1872, but none reached the
second reading stage.
Failure to act on an agreed need resulted from 
several factors, chief of which was a lack of urgency: as
long as the Service functioned with reasonable efficiency, 
legislators felt no compulsion to remodel it. Scandals 
within particular departments aroused demands that the 
department should be investigated rather than that the 
whole Service should be examined. The example of other 
colonies did not prompt South Australian governments to 
legislate for the Civil Service, since only Victoria and 
Queensland had passed Civil Service Acts in this period 
and neither was very successful. Financial caution 
rendered Treasurers doubtful about the merits of 
guaranteeing salaries on a permanent basis and Reynold's 
actions in 1860-61 appeared to show that the Executive 
could deal efficiently with the Service in periods of 
recession. At the same time, an unregulated salary system 
gave opposition members an opportunity to criticize the 
Ministry by questioning items on the annual Estimates 
since the Ministry, and not some accepted system, was 
responsible for making changes in salary levels.  ^ As was
1
Members agreed, as early as I858, that time would be 
saved by considering departmental votes rather than 
separate lines, and a motion was passed favouring the 
principle. It was never adhered to, although the matter 
was intermittently mentioned in subsequent years. See 
S ,A .P .D ., 30 November I858 , cols. 710-15; Register, 9 June 
1859; 0 1Donoghue, p.135*
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the case before 1856, the regulation of personnel 
practices often assumed importance in so far as it could 
be related to the general political performance of the 
Ministry; few legislators could sustain an interest in the 
abstract principles of promotion by merit, for example, or 
the fixing of travelling allowances and similar matters.
If back-bench members were usually prepared to leave 
the administration of the Servipe to the Ministry, 
Ministers themselves were content to refrain from 
interfering with the Service for as long as they could, 
since they were soon impressed with the complexities of 
government and less inclined to question a Service that 
had often to guide them through its intricacies. And in 
the 1860s there were few urgent goals to direct the 
Service towards. The issue of agricultural settlement and 
expansion was important, but the Surveyor General 
(G.W. Goyder), aided by favourable geographic conditions, 
handled the matter ably and organized his department 
efficiently to meet demands made upon it.^ Elsewhere 
there were few overriding political aims, and officers 
were not selected with particular and urgent ends in view. 
This was not a one way process, since the calibre of 
officials to some extent determined the nature of 
political goals. That these were with few exceptions 
neither visionary or vigorous suggests that the Service 
was staffed with men imbued with the idea of steady rather 
than spectacular progress. As the Register observed,
See Bowes, Chaps k ,  5» 6, passim.
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the Government take it for granted that the 
heads of departments have looked carefully into 
the machinery of their offices, and the House 
...that the Government are intimately acquainted 
with the working of each of the subordinate 
departments.1
In a small society, such lack of concern was natural
enough. The population of the colony grew from 86,000 in
1855 to 213>000 in 1873> but Adelaide grew less quickly,
from about 35>000 to about 70,000 in the same period.
Between 1857 and 1875> the permanent government workforce
rose from about 1,000 to more than 1,800,and the number of
2civil servants from 500 to 1,000. The Service was not 
corrupt and, whilst few legislators were acquainted with 
it, fewer feared that it was beyond control. The growth 
of the Service seemed at worst unwarranted and 
extravagant, rather than ominous and unchecked. Honest 
administration was the one quality that politicians and 
public consistently demanded of the Service.
Patronage and Anonymity
The stability of the Ministerial strata did much to 
reduce Parliamentary conflict. To visitors, South 
Australian politics had a striking air of being closed and 
quiet, and some considered the Parliament to be the best
10 June 1859*
See App. 1.
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conducted in Australia. The experience of certain 
Ministers directly aided the growth of confidence in the 
Service, and less directly influenced the application of 
two factors important in Service management - patronage 
and anonymity.
Definition of patronage
S flE. Finer has pointed out that
by patronage we mean the recruitment of public 
servants by private recommendation. (There is 
no reason why a patronage system should 
necessarily be the same as a 'spoils’ system.)
Now a period of inefficiency and extravagance 
in [the British] public service, viz. during 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
coincides with recruitment by personal 
recommendation; and so, the two phenomena are 
commonly regarded as necessarily linked.^
In New South Wales, Loveday has shown, a 'spoils' system
operated:
Patronage was only one means. . . [of ] welding. . .a 
faction into a Parliamentary unit;...a leader 
could appeal to ambition, political conviction 
or to personal friendship...but when he did so 
it often had to be supplemented by patronage.3
1See, e.g., Trollope, p.22; Gilbert Parker, Round the 
Compass in Australia (Melbourne : Cole, 1 8 9 2 ) , p p .165-6;
R.E.N. Twopeny, Town Life in Australia (London: Stock, I883)» 
pp„l6l-6; R.W. Dale, Impressions of Australia (London : 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1889) p p .34-6, 184-5•
2S.E, Finer, 'Patronage and the Public Service : 
Jeffersonian Bureaucracy and the British Tradition', Public 
Administration (London), Vol. XXX (Winter, 1952)» p.329*
3P. Loveday, 'Patronage and Politics in New South Wales, 
I856-I.87O' , Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. XVIII,
No. 4 (December, 1959)» p .342.
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The discretion of Ministers in deciding appointments and
promotions was firmly defended in South Australia and
attempts to restrict it were defeated. In exercising
their discretion, Ministers were allegedly guided by
considerations of what was best for the colony; they
appointed and promoted the 'best man'. This, it was
claimed, was a difficult task, but one that Ministers
endeavoured to carry out.^ On the other hand, men were
appointed and promoted in the eastern colonies for
blatantly political reasons. 'We may' said the Advertiser,
'fairly plume ourselves on the fact that patronage in the
Civil Service has not been so notoriously abused [in South
2Australia] as it has been in Victoria'.
Existing terminology, therefore, does not fit the 
situation as South Australians saw (or professed to see) 
it. South Australians recognized a link between private 
recommendation and inefficiency and extravagance in other 
colonies, because private recommendations were made for 
political purposes, and political appointees were costly 
and inefficient. They did not see any necessary link in 
their own colony. But that was because they held private 
recommendation to be subordinate to the simple and honest 
judgement of Ministers. Private recommendation need not 
have been confined to political considerations; as in 
Britain, the practice might have been an accepted method 
of placing the members of certain classes in suitable 
employment. But this reflected a particular social
1
See, e.g., S .A .P .D ., 18 November 1868, cols. 833-^3*
8 August 1885; cf. Register 26 January 1883.
2
207
structure, in which politicians and administrators shared 
a common background, and it is argued below that social 
bias played only a marginal role in the selection of 
personnel in South Australia. The equation of private 
recommendation with the ordering of political groups, 
which Loveday emphasizes, is the proper perspective in 
which to locate South Australia. Thus, it is convenient 
to adopt the term 'patronage' to refer to cases of 
Ministerial discretion, unaffected by political
considerations; and 'nepotism' to refer to cases that were
1so affected. Whether or not South Australian Ministers 
in fact appointed and promoted the 'best man' is not at 
issue here. Rather must it be decided whether Ministers 
were influenced by private recommendation and political 
considerations to a significant degree; or whether their 
patronage was individually and honestly used to secure 
what they believed was greater efficiency.
Politicians in the Service
Providing ex-politicians with government employment 
was only one possible use of nepotism, but it is
1
These are not the customary meanings of the terms, 
although nepotism was, in fact, a term used on occasion in 
South Australia to refer to 'unfair' patronage. An 
inherent difficulty in the distincion is the tendency to 
undervalue the importance of political motives, because of 
their unpublicized nature: South Australia had no
equivalent to the Parkes Papers. This in itself was 
significant, though perhaps more because it testified to 
the South Australian sense of propriety than because of 
what it revealed about the frequency of political 
considerations. Nevertheless, the distinction is of 
practical use.
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convenient to consider this matter separately. For some
years after 1857? political and administrative offices
were not clearly distinct. In 1858-59? for example,
several civil servants attempted to win election to
2political office. Their attempts aroused a hostile press.
Both city newspapers condemned the practice on grounds of
established convention, arguing that it was accepted
nowhere else in the British Empire; on grounds of economy,
arguing that civil servants who had time to sit in
Parliament must occupy sinecures; and on grounds of
justice, arguing that civil servants, if properly occupied,
3must leave their constituents unrepresented. With the 
press, public and most politicians united on the issue, 
the offenders made their choice between political and 
administrative office and by i860 it was widely accepted
4that dual positions were not to exist. Several 
politicians, however, were paid members of Boards and 
Commissions during the 1860s. This practice aroused
1
See App. 4 for a list of politicians employed at some 
time in government positions.
2
The Constitution Act did not specifically prohibit this. 
Section 17 provided that members of Parliament should lose 
their seats if they accepted offices of profit (see above, 
p.105), but nothing was said of newly-elected members who 
already held offices of profit.
3
See the Advertiser, 25 August 1859? 21 March i860 and 22 
March i860, and the Register, 21 March I860, 22 March I860 
and 24 March I860.
4
Cf. E.R. Chaseling, 'The Constitutional History of South 
Australia, 1830-1930’ (unpub. Master's dissertation, Dept, 
of History, University of Queensland, 193l)? P*90.
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hostility also, one by-product of which was to debar
2government contractors from Parliament, but a number of
members continued quietly to supplement their incomes from3their membership of Boards. Though not widespread, the 
practice was a useful substitute for the more obvious 
procedure of appointing politicians to the Service direct.
Prohibiting dual appointments had no necessary 
relation to the matter of politicians resigning their 
seats to accept offices of profit, although the finality 
with which the one practice was rejected fostered caution 
with the other. Between 1857 and 1874, eighteen 
politicians were appointed to the Service, but these 
appointments were of several types. The first concerned 
two offices which were considered acceptable for ex- 
politicians to occupy; this provided a respectable outlet 
for some defeated, superannuated or tired members.
The sudden death of the Crown Solicitor in 1867 left 
no successor prepared for the position, and the member of 
Parliament who then filled it was one of the few lawyers in
1
A Select Committee criticized the practice ( 'Report of the 
Select Committee of the Legislative Council on Acceptance 
of Offices of Profit' , S .A .P « P . 29 of 1865-66). See also 
Edwin Gordon Blackmore, Manual of the Practice, Procedure 
and Usage of the House of Assembly in the Province of 
South Australia (Adelaide : Government Printer, 1885), 
pp.5-6.
2
18 6 9-7 0 , No. 19, 'An Act to prevent Public Contractors 
being returned to or sitting or voting in Parliament'.
3
See, e.g., 'Payments to Members of Central Road Board',
S,A .P .P . 209 of 1864, and 'Payments to Members of Central 
Road Board', S.A.P.P. 62 of I868-69.
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the colony clearly competent enough to do so. The 
position of Crown Solicitor was not controversial, and no 
one complained when another eminent lawyer and politician 
succeeded in turn to the position in 1870; indeed, 
Parliament contained a large part of the legal talent of 
the colony. The position was analogous to that of a 
Justice of the Supreme Court - few were willing to believe 
that political considerations could influence the 
occupants of such high judicial office - and the practice 
of politicians becoming Crown Solicitors was readily 
accepted. Between I.867 and 1916 the position only once 
went to a non-politician.
Criticism was strong, however, when F.S. Dutton 
(Member of the House of Assembly, 1857-6.5; Commissioner of 
Crown Lands, 1857-59 and 1863» and Commissioner of Public 
Works, I865) resigned from Parliament in I865 to become 
Agent General for South Australia, a position formerly 
occupied by G.S. Walters, a business man and erstwhile 
colonist. The press inclined hopefully to the view that 
Dutton was the best man for the job, a view endorsed, 
though perhaps not vindicated, by the passage of time.
Old suspicions were spent by the time Dutton retired from 
the position in 1877? and the appointment of another 
ex-politician aroused no comment.^
1
Cf. Barbara R. Atkins, 'The Problem of the Representation 
of Australia in England: The Origins and Development of 
the Australian Agencies General during the Nineteenth 
Century' (unpub. Master's dissertation, Dept, of History, 
University of Melbourne, 1959)? pp.43, 109-11, 171*
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Aiding such acceptance was the obvious reluctance of 
governments to appoint politicians to other positions 
during the period.^ The appointments that were made were 
of two types. On the one hand were those appointments 
concerning four individuals who were not politically 
active after 1857; they were elderly men who merely 
retained positions to which the Governor had appointed 
them in earlier years, or who were transferred to 
comparable positions. Freeling, a member of the first
2Ministry under self-government, was in a similar position. 
So also were two individuals who accepted positions of 
which they had some experience before 1857* On the other 
hand were seven individuals, politically active after 1857 > 
who occupied positions in the Service allegedly on the 
basis of merit. The other four members of the first 
Ministry were in this category, and the merit of Torrens 
and Hanson, at least, was not open to doubt. Three 
individuals remained. One occupied a temporary position 
in the Northern Territory force in order to collect 
material for a book on the Territory. The other two 
became Stipendiary Magistrates, positions to which 
influential ex-politicians in need of employment might be 
expected to find their way: Magistrates were well paid,
1
See, e.g., S .A .P .D ., 1 October 1873> cols. 611-26.
2
Freeling's dual appointment as Surveyor General and 
member of the Legislative Council (see above, p.109) 
interestingly aroused no comment. This was due partly to 
his early retirement from the first Ministry and partly to 
the unexciting Council, in which he did not play a 
prominent part. His stated desire to return to his 
regiment in England (which he did in I86l) doubtless 
helped also.
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but most were located away from Adelaide, the catchment 
area for criticism.
T h u s , the Civil Service was rarely used as a source 
of employment for ex-politicians. In few cases was it 
clear that ability did not justify an appointment. 
Following a heated debate in which a member of Parliament 
had been accused of engaging in political dealings to 
secure a Magistracy for himself,^ the Regis ter indeed felt 
it necessary to remark that 'there are precedents...for 
the transfer...from the legislature to the judiciary....It 
is not necessary that Members of Parliament should be 
permanently tabooed in the Civil Service'
Other cases
Nor does it seem that personnel changes concerning 
civil servants without Parliamentary experience were 
significantly affected by political considerations. 
Certainly, it is seldom possible to discover all the 
processes surrounding an appointment or promotion, and it 
is not to be expected that Ministers made all personnel 
changes by evaluating the merit of alternatives. No 
Minister could possess sufficient information or (for 
lower positions) interest. The senior officers of the 
Service, their grounds for personnel recommendations and 
the Minister's attitude to those recommendations are 
important factors here, and are considered below. 
Apparently few appointments and promotions, however, were
1
S .A .P .D ., 18 November 1868, cols. 833-^3*
18 November 1868; cf. Advertiser, 19 November 1868.
2
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inspired by political considerations in South Australia
during the nineteenth century, and fewest of all in the
1860s . Those clear cases that did exist caused widespread
1and prolonged criticism. In other cases where it might
have appeared that political considerations were important,
care was taken to show that such was not the case. Those
sons of heads of departments who entered the Service
generally had unrewarding careers. G. Goyder (son of the
Surveyor General), for example, remained near the bottom
of the Service for many years. Three sons of Justice
Boothby (judge of the Supreme Court, 1833-1867) attained
high positions in the Service (Under Secretary, Sheriff,
Manager of the Waterworks), which might be seen as some
2compensation for the amoval of their father; but each
reached the top of a department through seniority, and two
3of the three were dismissed in later years.
Although a number of officers undoubtedly benefited 
from the favourable opinions of Ministers while others
1
See, e.g. , Regis ter, 6 October 1868, and Letter from H.E.
Bright, 7 October 1868; and 'Select Committee on Offices 
of Profit', 1863-66, passim. The transfer of senior 
officers which Reynolds carried out in i860 (see above, 
p.182) was an exception, but a unique one.
2
On Justice Boothby, see R.M. Hague, 'History of Law in 
South Australia' (unpub. MS., S.A.A., n.d.), Ch. 3; Todd, 
pp.846-36; A.J. Hannan, 'Mr Justice Boothby', Proceedings 
of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia (South 
Australian Branch), Vol. 38 (1956-37 ) > p p .72-96.
See below, pp.255-6, 329-31.
3
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suffered from unfavourable opinions, interdepartmental 
transfers revealed no tendency for Ministers to single out 
particular officers for unusually rapid promotion. 
Ministers accepted the personnel of departments as they 
found it. No Minister heading a department for the first 
time, for example, had transferred to that department a 
senior officer from another department of which the 
Minister had previous experience.
Why patronage was seldom abused
Whilst it cannot be suggested that nepotism was 
absent in South Australia, it is clear that it was 
infrequently used and for the most part the proud claims 
of politicians and newspapers were justified. This arose 
partly from the condition of the Service itself. There
were few vacancies in the senior ranks before 1875> as has
2been shown, and the 'plums' of the Service were in any 
case less rich than those in New South Wales and Victoria, 
as the following representative cases show.
1
See, e.g., Register, 21 July 1871 (Finniss and Hitchin); 
Holroyd, pp. 3 8 - 9 (Finniss and Holroyd); Tolmer, Vol. I, 
pp.115-6 (Hanson and Tolmer); South Australian Mail, 30 
August 1913» p.8 (Richardson andWr i g h t ).
2
See above, p.152.
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Table 18
Some Top Service Positions, with Salaries, 
187^: South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales
Salary (£ p . c t.)
South
Australia Victoria
New
South Wales
Under Treasurer 7 0 0 1,000 800
Secretary, 
Crown Lands 600 1,000 800
Surveyor General 950 1,200 1,000
Secretary, 
Attorney General 550 750 650
Collector of Customs 750 1,000 9 0 0
Crown Solicitor 800 1,000 1,000
a
Compiled from the Civil Service Lists of the colonies 
named for the relevant years. The nomenclature of offices 
in some cases differed slightly from colony to colony; 
South Australian usage is given.
Important also was the nature of Parliamentary life. 
The absence of clearly defined factions reduced the need 
to garner support through the use of the less orthodox 
weapons of political activity; rationality, calmness and 
the 'gentleman's agreement' were characteristics of 
Parliamentary activity. Remembrance of the criticisms 
that had been directed at the Governor's use of his 
patronage powers reinforced this. Cockburn's suggestion 
should be noted:
No Cabinet is so strong that it can afford not 
to patronise public men, and a favourite method 
of this Ministerial patronage is to appoint a 
new member of Parliament a justice of the peace,
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and to write his name inside of* a freshly 
defined hundred. The result is that the map is 
over-run with the cognomens of political 'has- 
beens' and almost equally obscure legislators of 
the present day.^
In a relatively poor colony with a small Civil Service, 
where politicians seldom disagreed violently and where
'respectability [was] the chief qualification for a seat
2in the House', status and position were more rewarding 
than the uncertain fruits of 'jobbery' and nepotism.
Other, more general, abuses of political power were 
not frequent. Much political activity, to be sure, 
centred on the pork barrel: politicians represented their
constituencies, and were expected to win roads, bridges 
and railways for them. But graft, corruption, bribery and 
other of the more spectacular evils of government were
seldom discovered. Official incompetence was present, it
3will be seen, and no corruption could have cost as much 
as did some of the early blunders in water works
4construction. Because South Australian politicians were 
reluctant to reveal corruption, it is probable that more 
existed than was admitted. It seems clear, however, that
1
Rodney Cockburn, Nomenclature of South Australia 
(Adelaide: Thomas, 1908), p.3•
2
Twopeny, p.l66.
3
See below, pp.3^1-3, 251-3, 26l.4
See the series of editorials in the Register, 1, 9> 21
and 23 April 1869*
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honest deeds customarily matched professions of good 
intent.
Propriety and moral rectitude did not always favour
the growth of an efficient Civil Service. K.W. Knight has 
2pointed out that many of the most able officials in New
South Wales were appointed and promoted by methods which
South Australians disclaimed, and it is argued below that
a too-rigid adherence to the appearance of justice and
equality could retard the promotion of capable officers
and discourage others from entering the Service. Moreover,
3the sentiment of 'South Australia for South Australians', 
emphasized by colonial politicians in 1835-56, continued 
to define those who might properly be appointed to the 
Service. Governments risked strong censure if they
4imported civil servants from other colonies.
1
The almost total absence of corruption of any kind in the 
Survey Department is one of the few 'accepted•facts' that 
historians have drawn from the history of the South 
Australian Service; see, e.g., G.W. Rusden, History of 
Australia (London: Chapman Hall, 1884), Vol. I, pp.617-8;
Manning Clark, A Short History of Australia (New York: 
Mentor, 1963)» pp.136-7; and cf. D.W.A. Baker, 'The Origin 
of the Robertson Land Acts' (unpub. M.A. dissertation,
Dept, of History, University of Melbourne, 1957), pp.61-73* 
2
Kenneth W. Knight, 'Patronage and the 189^+ Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into the New South Wales Public 
Service', Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 
VII, No. 2 (November, 1961), pp.181-5*
3
Register, 20 April I858, Letter from 'An Old Colonist'.
4
See, e.g., S .A .P .D ., 17 September 1873> cols. 442-62; 
Register, 1.8 September 1.873*
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Anonymity slow to develop
As G. Kitson Clark has said,1 2 a Civil Service may be 
involved in politics not only because politicians use the 
Service as a field in which to place needy dependents, but 
because the Service itself plays with the issues of party 
politics through its 'closet statesmen'; and there is no 
necessary connection between the two. It has been argued 
that in South Australia the first possibility was largely 
discarded, but a modified, almost inverted, form of the 
second was evident throughout the 1860s.
In England the idea of anonymity was generally
accepted by 1830, but in South Australia the circumstances
of colonial government made any thorough-going application
difficult before I836, for not only did nominee members
combine administrative and political duties, but both
Governor and officials were at times not loth to attack
each other by referring to episodes of administrative
incompetence. The Governor had the right to take advice
from any officer in the Service, and to do so publicly.
Nevertheless, there were excellent reasons why the
doctrine of anonymity should have been eagerly grasped,
for colonial politicians before I836 were quick to claim
authority over the Service and to emphasize that they were
fit to be captains of their own legislative fate. But
after 1837» the convention was accepted only fitfully,
2despite the regulations of 1861.
1
G. Kitson Clark, '"Statesmen in Disguise": Reflexions on
the History of the Neutrality of the Civil Service', The 
Historical Journal, Vol. II, No. 1 (1939), pp.20-1.
2
See above, p.170.
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Senior officials sometimes professed to recognize a 
convention that prevented them from publicly entering 
political disputes. In 1866, for example, P.E. Warburton 
(Commissioner of Police, 1853-67) requested the government 
to reply to charges of incompetence and maladministration
made against him, because, 'as a government officer, he
1was unable to speak in his own defence*. But Warburton 
at that time was attempting to avoid further involvement 
in a prolonged controversy that threatened to ruin his 
career; anonymity was then a convenient doctrine for him.
The related convention of neutrality was later put in
an unusual form by H.P.G. Sparks (Accountant to the
Waterworks, 1867-70), who was reprimanded for insulting
the Mayor of Adelaide in the street. Sparks protested
that the Mayor had provoked him by his discourtesy in the
Waterworks office some days previously when Sparks 'being
in a Government office...was powerless to resent it, but
stood speechless before him'. But, Sparks added, he
'respectfully object[ed] to be[ing ] brought to account for
2what may pass out of office hours'.
The press did not firmly support the conventions. 
Under Colonial Office regulations of 1864, civil servants 
in certain colonies were directed to use a nom de plume
1
'Police Inquiry Correspondence', S .A ,P .P . 105 of 1867•
The publication of Warburton's request in a Parliamentary 
Paper was itself a sign that the request would not be met.
2
CPWO In, 20/1869, enclosure dated 9 January 1869.
for all public correspondence, a directive which, though
it did not apply to South Australia, the Register found
superfluous, for 'where there is responsible government...
information on all public questions is obtainable without
the aid of official journalism'. ^ The Register thus did
not give direct approval to the practice, but neither it
nor the Advertiser banned 'official journalism'. Despite
Warburton's statement, government officials did, in fact,
write to the newspapers over their own names, though the
practice decreased in frequency over the period. Moreover
civil servants did not confine themselves to non-political
matters. Most frequently, officials defended their
official actions, but on other occasions discussed
government policy before it had been finalized, and
sometimes gave support to candidates for political office.
Ministers disregarded the convention in another, and more
important, way: it was common for them to refer to
particular officers by name as having supplied certain
information, made decisions and at least helped to
3formulate policy.
Anonymity not a credible policy
The acceptance by Ministers and senior officials of 
an overt link between the recommendation and
1
1 February 1864.
2
See, e.g., Register, 19 January 1861, Letter from the 
Collector of Customs; 19 April 1861; 9 May 1861; 10 
February 1865; and Advertiser, 5 July 1859; 1 August 1859; 
27 February 1875- 
3
Some examples are given below, pp.232-4.
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implementation of policy was of importance in regard to 
the status and prerogatives of certain officials, and this 
matter is discussed below; here it is noted that the 
practice was, in part, no more than an acknowledgement of 
what many colonists took for granted. In a small 
community, it was common knowledge, or common gossip, 
where some of the important decisions were made - Goyder 
and Todd were better known than many members of 
Parliament - and to maintain the myths and verbal forms of 
an anonymous Service would have been no more than a 
frivolous ploy. Also, some former Executive Councillors 
retained Service positions after I856, and it would have 
been impossible, for example, to dissociate Torrens from 
the administration of the Real Property Act when he had 
resigned from Parliament to put it into effect. In 1859 
the Register argued that members could keep a watchful eye 
on government only by 'searching inquiry out of the House' 
and implied that contact with civil servants would be 
useful.^
However, not all civil servants were involved in 
public debate, and when Ministers named civil servants or 
referred to their official actions, they were concerned 
almost exclusively with senior officials. This was so 
because the name of an experienced and respected official 
could give support to a government's decisions. Ministers 
seldom possessed technical or economic expertise, and 
neither were they always on top of their subjects, as the 
House well knew. This tactic applied equally to those 
Ministers, already mentioned, who were well acquainted
10 June 1859*
1
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with the Service. Though possibly better equipped to 
evaluate official recommendations, these Ministers, too, 
possessed only limited technical knowledge and the 
reputation of a respected official was no less important 
to them. The stability of the Ministerial strata 
increased the tendency to bring officers into public view, 
for the senior level of the Service was also stable in 
these years, and Ministers and officials were inevitably 
linked when each group was closely associated with the 
other over a lengthened period of time. The absence of 
bold legislative initiatives during the period, moreover, 
heightened the impression that Ministers and officials 
were content to work comfortably together and maintain the 
status quo in an unadventurous era. The growth of the 
idea of Ministerial responsibility for departmental 
actions was also weakened when such actions were obviously 
influenced by a well known official.
Lack of anonymity presented few difficulties as long 
as the heads of departments and the current Ministry 
shared a common viewpoint, as was usually the case in this 
period. The meaning of the term 'political activity' was 
blurred and referred in effect to the political views of 
the subordinate members of the Service who might disagree, 
as the heads seldom did, with the policies of the 
government. This did not mean that ex-civil servants of 
the lower ranks were debarred from entering Parliament, 
and four such officers made the change during the period.1 
However, they did not come directly from the Service to 
Parliament (intervals ranged from six to seventeen years),
See App. 1.
1
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and their employment in the Service had been only brief. 
They were not identified with a 'Service* point of view.
Summary: The Calmness of Politics
Because the South Australian community, Parliament 
and Civil Service were numerically small and the senior 
officials well known, it might be expected that 
politicians and civil servants knew each other well, and 
at all levels of the political and administrative 
hierarchy, but this was not the case. The lower and, to a 
lesser extent, the middle ranks of the Service were 
largely unknown to most members of Parliament, including 
some Ministers who held office only briefly. Senior 
officials were widely recognized in the community and 
legislators frequently attempted to probe the workings of 
allegedly corrupt or maladministered departments, but it 
was not therefore true that the administration of the 
Service was well.understood or that senior officials were 
under consistent and effective scrutiny as they performed 
their official duties. Bland said of New South Wales that
the retention of [political ] office had a direct 
relation to the extent of the concessions made 
as a price of support, [and so] political 
turnover was always high...the system...
1
One erstwhile senior officer (E.A. Hamilton, Government 
Architect, I856-60) also entered Parliament. His 
appointment as Architect was made laterally, and was only 
temporary, and he did not enter Parliament until I87O. He 
remained there for only fourteen months, and was not 
considered a spokesman for the Service.
2 2 4
encouraged direct political intervention in 
administrative matters.^
In South Australia neither the malady nor the precondition 
existed so strongly. It has already been argued that the 
political supervision of the Service was in relatively few 
hands, that interest in the Service was spasmodic and only 
infrequently aroused by cases of nepotism or corruption, 
and that a handful of men influenced the structure of the 
Service and determined working conditions in it. General 
agreement about the functions of government and a 
willingness to advance slowly meant that Ministers were 
content to postpone any large scale reorganization of the 
Service and retain the s tatus quo. In this situation, the 
powers of the departmental heads were inevitably large.
Bland, p.xi.
1
CHAPTER V I
CONTROL FROM THE TOP
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The heads shared many characteristics. They 
dominated their subordinates and, to a lesser extent, 
their Ministers. Their social backgrounds were similar, 
they had wide powers over personnel and finance, and they 
were accorded high status in the community. But few were 
of marked ability, and they spent much time bickering 
amongst themselves. Their work inevitably suffered and 
the poor quality of their subordinates was in part a 
reflection of this. They maintained a dominant position 
because South Australian society was generally calm and 
untroubled throughout the period, and they were not 
prepared, and they did not prepare the Service, for 
anything else.
Characteristics of the Heads
Social background
The social background of the heads suggested certain 
similarities in values and outlooks. For eight of the 
thirty-nine heads appointed during the period no 
information is available concerning birthplace, birthdate, 
religion, father’s occupation, education, occupation prior 
to entering the Service or date of arrival in South 
Australia, and information is complete for only seven.
But some observations arise from the collected data.
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Table 19
Social Background of Heads of Departments, I857^7^a
Born
Britain - England 25 (7)
Scotland 1 (• • )Ireland 2 (1)
Total 28 (8)
Australia - South Australia 1
Other • •
Total 1 (..)
Other Empire • •
Other 2 (1)
Age to South Australia
Under 20 3 (..)
20-34 20 O )
35 and over 4 (• •)
Religion
Anglican 24 (9)
Other Protestant -
Congregationalist • .
Methodist . .
Lutheran 1
Unitarian 1
Baptist . .
Total 2 (••)
Roman Catholic 2 (2)
Education
Elementary . .
Public School 2 (••)University 3 ••Professional'3 7 (. • )
Military 5 O )
228
Father's Occupation
Government
Clergy-
Other Professional
Merchant . .
Military 4 (4)
Pastoralist . .
a
Derived from Biographies. The figures in parentheses 
indicate the number of heads appointed before 1857 
included in the sub-totals. The vacant categories are 
used in a similar table for the period 1875-92 (see below, 
pp . Jk0-1) . 
b
I.e. articles, or training in a technical college.
The majority of this limited sample was born in 
England, as would be expected, and migrated to South 
Australia as young men after completing what was, for 
colonial society, a relatively advanced education, in 
which respect they emulated their fathers. This tentative 
picture is not a surprising one, although the large 
representation of Anglicans - almost a majority for the 
group as a whole, despite the small sample - is 
unexplained. But this characteristic was in accord with 
the others, in so far as none was typical of South 
Australian society as a whole; and, it is likely, not 
typical of the Service as a whole.
Social bias in the Service?
It thus appears that the heads disprove the assertion 
made above, that no social bias was apparent in the
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selection of personnel. Some social and religious 
groups - such as Germans, Jews and Roman Catholics - 
almost certainly did not gain representation at the top 
levels of the Service in this period, which suggests a 
rather vigorous process of cooptation to those positions. 
But such a process was inevitable and warranted in South 
Australia at the time. Most heads of this period received 
their early Service training under gubernatorial rule in 
the early and middle 1850s, at which time they were 
probably more typical of the Service as a whole. Their 
social backgrounds naturally reflected the preferences of 
the Governors. By the time of self government they had 
already received considerable promotion, which placed them 
in a favourable position for eventual promotion to the top. 
Such promotion was, moreover, justified simply because 
middle-class Englishmen were doubtless more likely to 
possess the educational and language skills required for 
high office. It is noted below that the later years of 
the nineteenth century saw a diversification of social 
representation at the top, and this is consistent with the 
view that the restricted representation of these early 
years was a product of particular social circumstances, 
which rested qpon necessity rather than any considered 
prejudice. The heads of this period did not succeed - 
even if they tried - in perpetuating their own positions; 
as has been noted above, their sons, for example, did not 
receive unusual preferment.
Furthermore, no one complained that subordinate 
positions were barred to certain social groups, and many 
Germans, Jews and Roman Catholics, for example, were 
found in the Service. Whether or not these groups were
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representative of South Australian society as a whole is
not at issue - it is important that none, apparently, was
1denied admittance. German members of Parliament, such as 
F.E.H.W. Krichauff, were successful in bringing their 
German constituents to the notice of Ministers when 
vacancies occurred. It should be noted, however, that 
such constituents did not get government employment as a 
right, but rather when they appeared to be most suitable
1
Cf. "Civil Service", Parliamentary Papers of VictQria, 
Vol.II, 1858-59» No. 3^» which showed the religion of 
every permanent officer in the Service, listed 
departmentally. Such a return was never requested in 
South Australia. Certain heads, such as Todd, appear to 
have harboured some anti-German prejudice, but this made 
no obvious difference to employment within their 
departments. The Post Office, indeed, contained q large 
number of Germans, probably proportionately more than any 
other department (cf. the Public Buildings Department 
later in the century, below, p.3^+3)* South Australians, 
in their 'paradise of dissent', believed themselves to be 
unprejudiced in religious matters. The question of 
clerical precedency (see below, p.244), which aroused much 
controversy in the early 1860s, revolved around the 
position of the Catholic Archbishop, and was exacerbated 
by the fact that Governor Daly (1862-68) was a Roman 
Catholic. Politicians trod carefully; and all were 
pleased to hear themselves paying sincere praise to Daly 
after he had died in office ('Among the finest traits of 
an admirable character should be placed the tact and 
prudence whereby he averted the threatened calamity of 
religious discord... .No other person ever took office 
under such a serious disadvantage. None gained so 
steadily in public favour when he came to be known as he 
really was....Remembering, as we ought, the peculiar 
difficulties of his position, we cannot be too grateful 
for the peace and prosperity which have attended his rule ' 
[Register, quoted in Hpdder, History of South Australia, 
Vol. I, p.391 ]).
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applicants available.1 2 The quality of subordinate officers 
was poor, it is argued below, and Ministers were ready to 
employ suitable men, whatever their background. Members 
of Parliament who represented sectional interests were 
thus in the same position as other Ministerial supplicants; 
in general, their most successful applications were those 
based on merit.
The Authority of the Heads
The heads' social background did not contribute
directly to their control of subordinates, but it did make
the heads a distinct social group within the Service, and
this contributed to the status aspirations of their
subordinates. Of more direct importance was the marked
difference between the heads and their political chiefs,
whose commercial backgrounds perhaps influenced them to
leave the Service in the hands of its experienced and
expert managers. The relationship of a head to his
Minister naturally varied from case to case, but a group
possessing something of a common identity made it easier
2for Ministers to rely consistently on its members. The
1
See, e.g., Schedlich, p p .39-40.
2
Ministers could respect the heads, but they felt rather 
the opposite about the subordinate officers of government, 
who were so clearly the heads’ social inferiors. Henry 
Ayers, for example, spoke of a clerk in his own employment 
who had 'disappointed us. He has been too long a 
Government Officer, to make much in a private concern'. 
That was in 1848, when gubernatorial rule was a factor 
governing Ayers' attitude, but he thought similarly in
(continued p.232)
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authority of the heads, however, rested also on certain 
more specific powers, and the professional heads enjoyed 
these to a greater extent than did clerical heads.
Importance of expertise
Although South Australian legislators optimistically 
demanded the best talent available, there were not so many 
competent professional men in the colony, and nor were 
salaries so good, that Ministries had a wide range of 
choices open to them. Available men, willing to work for 
the government, stood out clearly and to a large extent 
picked themselves for the top positions. Because the work 
carried out by professional officers was expensive and 
important - especially public works - it was necessary to 
engage men capable of carrying out their duties aß 
efficiently as possible, and they were given considerable
1 (continued from p.23l)
1856 of a protege who became a government clerk: 'I am not
sure whether he will be [in the Service] permanently or 
not. It is not of much consequence, he will soon find 
another berth when he leaves that' (Letters of Henry Ayers 
to J.B. Graham, [October?] 1848, and 26 September I856 
[National Library, Canberra]). Self-made men readily 
adopted Ayers' attitude of indifference - even 
condescension - to the lower order of clerks, as many 
Parliamentary debates after 1856 showed. Ministerial 
indifference naturally enhanced the heads’ control of 
their subordinates.
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freedom in their work. Politicians could seldom discuss
professional matters authoritatively and there was less
inclination to do so when the general outlines of
2governmental activity were agreed upon. More than one
Ministry was thus known as the 'Goyder Government’, in
reference to the Surveyor General, who did not hesitate to
3act without Ministerial direction. And it was natural 
for the Treasurer to state in 1872 that the Post Office 
and Telegraph departments were
extending in such a way, and are in such an 
uncertain and transitional state, that it is 
almost impossible for the House to do other than 
take the assurance of the heads of the 
departments [about their finances ].^
Newspaper editorials noted with alarm that senior 
professional officers possessed large discretionary powers.
1
They were also able, on occasion, to demand increased 
salaries as an inducement to remain in the Service (see, 
e.g., 'Withdrawal of Surveyor-General's Resignation'
S .A .P .P . 105 of 1873)» In the case of one Deputy-Surveyor 
General the Government agreed to pay specified salary 
increments over a period of some years (Estimates, I865 
[Second Half], p.25)» Such practices were of little 
immediate comfort to subordinate officers, but may have 
indirectly speeded the regulation of other salaries by 
setting subordinates a goal, which they appeared to rpach 
with the Act of 1874.
2
Cf. V. Subramaniam, 'Specialists in British and 
Australian Government Services: A Study in Contrast',
Public Administration (London), Vol,4l (Winter, 1963), 
p.358.
3
See, e.g., Register, 17 March i860, and cf. Goyder's 
obituary notice (Advertiser, 4 November I898 ) .4
S.A.P.D., 11 April 1872, col.470 .
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The* Register thus wryly commented, on some regulations 
relating to earthworks construction, that the Engineer in 
Chief
must be a veritable Count Bismarck. There is 
almost no power in heaven...or...earth...which he 
has omitted to confer on [himself], [He] may 
order the works to be hastened or he may order 
them to be suspended...[and so forth]. In the 
midst of representative misgovernment [sic] and 
headcounting, it is pleasant to observe that 
there is room left for a little wholesale 
de spo tism.^
A Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry observed that
the conditions of contracts establish the 
supreme authority of the Engineer-in-Chief, 
whose decisions, in cases of dispute, are made 
binding upon the Commissioner of Public Works on 
the one hand, and upon the contractor on the 
other....The Engineer-in-Chief does not always 
consider it necessary to seek the approval of 
the Minister for alterations, nor ask his 
consent to extensions of time
A later Royal Commission noted that 'the technical
knowledge of [the heads of departments] rendered them, to3a considerable extent, masters of the situation'.
1
9 March 1868.
2
'Report upon the Public Accounts, 1869', S.A.P.P. 28 of
1869-70, p.5•
3
'Report of Commission on Government Stores', S.A.P.P. 27 
of 1887, p.x. For similar comments, see also Register,
24 March I869, 18 November 1875» and 'Progress Report of 
Commission appointed to report on Public Finance', 
S .A.P.P. 26 of 1880, p .x i .
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Influence on personnel matters
The relative absence of nepotism in South Australia 
helped to maintain the position of all departmental heads 
in matters relating to personnel control. They seldom had 
to accept politically inspired appointments and promotions 
against their wishes, because there were few such 
appointments and promotions, and for the same reason 
Ministers were likely to accept their recommendations on 
such matters. But essentially the heads’ powers arose 
from the absence of rules governing the Service. Salaries, 
increments, promotions, leaves of absence, the 
distribution of work-loads and committees of inquiry 
depended largely upon the recommendations of the 
departmental heads. They were not supreme arbiters in 
these matters, since Ministers sometimes disagreed with 
their recommendations and financial necessity overruled 
all other considerations, but their dominance over 
subordinate officers was little affected by this. Few 
subordinate officers were able, or willing, to agitate 
politically on their own behalf and the low rate of inter­
departmental transfer meant that they were subject to the 
decisions of one senior official for long periods. Only 
the foolhardy were ready to antagonize a departmental 
head, who might control their official careers for a 
decade or more, for the sake of a present advantage or an 
immediate grievance.
Influence on financial matters
The authority of the heads was enhanced by the 
confused methods of government book-keeping. Ministers 
depended on the senior officials to draw up the Estimates,
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and were sometimes ignorant of what certain items
represented. Back-bench members were naturally in an even
worse position. The large sums of money put down to
'contingencies’, the vagueness of some headings, the
mixing of the Ordinary and Loan Revenue funds and the fact
that the Estimates were passed when a good deal of the
money had already been spent, further lessened
Parliamentary control of expenditure. In I867, the
Auditor General thus noted that 'in some cases Ministers
exercise a proper control by causing regulations to be
adhered to; in other cases, Secretaries exercise an
injurious influence in the opposite direction'. In I869
the imprest system was introduced for the payment of
2public accounts, and in 1882 the Audit Commissioners 
expressed surprise that the introduction of the system was
not accompanied by an efficient system of check 
[for] a great many matters upon which the 
several Ministers ought to [have exercised] 
their judgement were placed before them in such 
a way that it was almost impossible for them to 
do s o , and in many cases even the formality of 
obtaining their consent was omitted.3
The heads further demonstrated their influence in 
financial matters in 18735 when they drew up salary scales 
to be incorporated in the Civil Service Bill then being
1
'Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative 
Council on Preparation of Accounts and Papers', S .A ,P .P . 
151 of I866-67, Minutes of Evidence, q.129»
2
Under which, payment was made before audit by the Audit 
Office; see Audit Report, 1884, pp.9-10, and Butlin and de 
M e e l , p .57•
Audit Report, 1882/83, pp.vii-viii.
3
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canvassed. Their recommendations were substantially 
adopted.^
Public recognition of their authority
The heads of departments had large powers within the 
Civil Service and affected diverse groups in the community 
without; they directed the land schemes of the 1860s that 
played such an important part in later South Australian 
history; they drew up the annual colonial budget and 
decided what taxes should be changed and what amounts 
should be spent in what areas; and they were responsible 
for the terms of employment of a large number of men. As 
has been suggested, their importance was appreciated in 
the community at large, though many looked askance at the 
ubiquitous machine they directed;
A man can scarcely do anything...without coming 
in direct contact with a government official.
If he be a squatter he must make his terms with 
the government landlord, if he desire to buy 
land he must apply to the same quarter, if he 
desire to fell timber in the mountain ranges he 
must get a government lipence....These I know 
are but some of the necessities of a new land, 
but the result is to make everyone feel the 
heavy hand of government
The annual reports of at least the larger departments 
seldom went unreviewed in the editorial columns of the 
newspapers, and were evaluated as the work of senior
1
’Report of the Civil Service Commission', S .A .P ,P . 39 of 
1873.
2
Leighton, pp.118-9.
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officials rather than of departments as a whole. Some 
government publications, most notably Bootjiby's 
Statistical Register, were hardly regarded as government
products at all, even though they were officially produced
2in government time. It appears that the heads normally 
did write the reports of their departments themselves, no 
doubt spurred on by the thought that the public watched 
the results. Public interest extended to their roles as 
private individuals: their holidays and inter-colonial
travels, for example, were usually reported in some 
detail.
How Able were the Heads?
Even so, few heads possessed marked native ability 
and in more trying times, and with more able Ministers, 
their influence would not have been so great. The best of 
the heads were the professionals, and of these G.W. Goyder
O(Surveyor General, 1861-94) was outstanding. Son of a 
Scots physician and Swedenborgian preacher, he served 
articles as an engineer in Liverpool before emigrating to 
the eastern colonies of Australia in 1848. He entered the 
South Australian Civil Service in 1851, and ten years 
later became Surveyor General. A martinet in office hours, 
he yet received a respect and affection from his
1
See, e.g., Advertiser, 23 March 1859, 20 March 1875, 30 
March 1875; Register, 21 July I869.
2
Advertiser, 2 April 1875* Josiah Boothby (on whom, see 
below, pp.329-31) was Under Secretary from 1868 to 1880.
On Goyder, see Bowes, pp,133~40.
3
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subordinates that other heads had to demand. He
overshadowed all the Commissioners of Crown Lands with
whom he was associated, and none doubted the efficiency
with which he ran his department. Some, indeed, found him
too efficient. Charles Todd (Superintendent of
Telegraphs, 1856-69, Postmaster General and Superintendent
2of Telegraphs, 1869-1901 )> was almost as prominent as
Goyder, and was distinguished by his experience in the
Greenwhich Observatory, but the eulogies paid to him
started only with the completion of the overland telegraph3in 1872. Postal employees found him domineering but
distant, and his reputation for kindliness and generosity
was a product of later years. A robbery in the Post
Office in 1873 revealed many faults in his management of
4the department. Todd was undoubtedly overworked, but he 
gained mastery of his department only over a long period 
of time, and his long service itself contributed much to 
his mystique. H.C. Mais (Engineer-in-Chief, 1867-88) came 
to South Australia from the eastern colonies after a 
series of public works blunders had convinced governments
1
See, e.g., the comments of the satirical and reactionary 
journal, Pasquin; The Pastoral, Mineral, and Agricultural 
Advocate (published in Adelaide, January 1867-November 
1869; reissued in one volume; London: Judd, 1882), pp.l7>
175» 211, and passim.
2
Todd was Postmaster General under the Commonwealth 
Government from 1901 until he retired in December 1906.
3
For an argument that the overland telegraph was Governor 
MacDonnell's idea, not Todd’s, see W.L. Manser, 'The 
Overland Telegraph: Whose Idea?' (unpub. MS., S.A.A.,
n . d . ) .
4
'Commission on the Post Office', 1875*
of the need for expert supervision, though he himself had
an equivocal professional reputation.^ He proved himself
a competent engineer, though an aggressive personality,
2who tended to overvalue his own achievements.
The clerical heads included some, like O.K.
Richardson, whose experience at the top of the Service 
extended back well before 1857* Richardson (Chief Clerk 
in the Colonial Secretary's Office, l84l-57j Under 
Secretary, 1857-68) barely kept pace with the work of his 
department, much of which was performed by his chief 
assistant, Josiah Boothby, and Richardson was glad to 
retire to a Stipendiary Magistracy at the age of sixty- 
eight. E.W. Hitchin (Under Treasurer, 1860-68 and 1880-83; 
Auditor General, 1868-80) qualified in London as an 
architect, but came to South Australia in the late l840s 
because of feeble health, which continued to plague him 
for the rest of his life. He rapidly achieved prominence 
in the Service, where he was known as one of 1 singularly 
genial and kindly temperament', eager for the betterment 
of the Service and solicitous of his junior officers. He 
was, however, a confused thinker, given to rolling Latin 
periods in his prose, and was acutely aware of the dignity 
of his position. He tended to live beyond his means and 
displayed no marked grasp of financial matters. His near 
contemporary on the promotional ladder, W.T. Sheppard 
(Under Treasurer, 1875-80; Auditor General, 1880-82), was 
devout and hard working, and esteemed throughout the
1
See S ,A .P .D ., 13 August 1868, cols. 135-38.
See below, pp.328, 3^2.
2
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Service; his death aroused eulogies on his character 
unusual even for the time. But he resembled Hitchin in 
many ways, and in later years his competence was 
questioned, as was that of several other heads.^
Some reservations
To the abilities of the heads can be traced some of 
the hesitant progress of the colony. Economic policy­
making, especially, showed little foresight or long range 
planning. Loans were raised from time to time, as 
circumstances demanded and permitted, and no fundamental 
revisions of the taxing powers of the government were 
mooted. The Treasury played an accountant's role, 
although its limited activities to some extent arose from 
a rapid turnover of Under Treasurers: no single and
forceful personality established an economic paramountcy,
2as Eagar did in New South Wales twenty years later.
Hitchin was Under Treasurer for eight years before his 
promotion to Auditor General, and he left some mark upon 
the office, but this was chiefly a rather narrow emphasis 
on its accounting functions. The next three Under 
Treasurers died in office before they could fully 
establish themselves. J.L. Haining died, aged thirty- 
eight, after eighteen months in the position; W,S.M. 
Hutton, aged forty-one, after twenty-one months and 
several attempts at suicide; and J.N. Blackmore, aged 
thirty-nine, after four and a half years.
7 "
See below, p p .327-9*
2See P.N. Lamb, 'Geoffrey Eagar and the Colonial Treasury 
of New South Wales', Australian Economic Papers (Adelaide: 
September, 1962).
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The deaths of three successive Under Treasurers, 
while still young men, at the peak of their careers, 
naturally impeded the development of bold and consistent 
economic policies. And the reservoir of talent became 
more shallow. Even so, these Under Treasurers were 
colourless men; they had no marked policies of their own. 
They were young enough to have regarded the Treasury as 
but a rung in their ascent through the Service, for 
Hitchin established the promotional route from Under 
Treasurer to Auditor General (which was later used by 
several others). In the climate of the times, work quiet 
and diligent, not vigorous, best assured future promotion.
Nor did the Audit Office give a clear lead in 
economic matters. There were only two Auditors General in 
this period (W.L. 0 'Halloran, 1851-68, and Hitchin), but 
both found sufficient to do in enforcing their powers of 
audit over recalcitrant departments.1 To the crotchety 
and would-be-dignified O'Halloran, this became almost an 
obsession. Hitchin, more urbane, was also frequently 
exasperated at departmental independence, but was too well 
aware of the deficiencies of his position to do more than 
suggest reforms in his annual reports. He doubtless 
learned much from the frustrations of his predecessor.
Some heads thus limited their own authority by their 
lack of ability and ambition. Few were empire builders, 
and none spectacular, and they exercised their powers in a 
context that was restricted by later standards. Their 
powers were important to them, but not more so than the
See below, pp.249-50,
1
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acknowledgment of those powers. Again, they were willing 
to maintain the status quo, and they did not doubt that 
their position was assured, which helps to explain an 
apparent paradox in their public position.
Though the heads were important in politics and well 
known in the community, they confined themselves to their 
official duties and were little involved in activity 
outside government circles. The registers of educational, 
religious and philanthropic bodies in these years revealed 
the names of very few seniot officials and in local 
government affairs they had disappeared entirely. Because 
of the decline of the Board system, also, they had less 
official contact with outside bodies. The heads were an 
isolated group of men to an extent greater than their 
importance and prominence would suggest. Partly this was 
made necessary by the nature of their duties. In the face 
of an often incompetent staff, they needed to work long 
hours and draw upon their experience of government 
business for their departments to function efficiently.
In comparison with the leading men of the banking, legal 
and medical professions, they were not well paid: they
were 'gentlemen' but financially they could not lead a 
'gentleman's life'. Nor could they always meet the 
members of other professions on technically equal ground. 
They drew their prominence from their work and outside of 
it most discarded their privileged position.
Emphasis on status and prestige
It was partly because senior officers were not active 
in the non-official circles of colonial life that they 
spent, conversely, much time defining and extending their
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official positions. Rivalry was first made explicit in
May 1859? over the question of which officers had the
right to wear uniforms. Under Colonial Regulations, only
the Solicitor General, Surveyor General and Collector of
Customs were accorded this privilege, but the Postmaster
General, Registrar General and Crown Solicitor also
requested it and the matter was referred to the Colonial 
1Office. The rather vague answer that the privilege 
should be construed as liberally as possible satisfied no 
one because of its very liberality, and the question of 
official precedence, raised at almost the same time, kept 
the issue of status alive, although precedence had
originally been a question involving the clergy of the
2colony. Official status, and especially the desire to be 
recognised as a ’first class officer', remained important 
issues in the Service for many years. W.C. Cox 
(Government Printer, 1849-1879) perhaps protested too 
much during the following exchange in 1873:
Chief Secretary: I suppose you are aware that
...the principal heads of departments...have the 
privilege of the private entree to Government 
House, and are expected to wear uniforms. Is 
that one of [your] objects?
1
Governor MacDonnel.1 to the Secretary of State, 30 May 
1859? and 18 July 1859; and Secretary of State to 
MacDonnell, 15 October 1859»
2
'Correspondence relative to Precedency', S .A .P .P . 115 of 
1871; 'Despatch on Precedency Act, 1872', S .A .P .P . 6l of 
1872; 'Correspondence on Precedency Bill', S ,A .P .P . 68 of
1872; 1872, No. l4 'An Act to repeal "The Parliamentary
Privilege Act", and to make Other Provisions in lieu 
thereof'.
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Cox: Oh no; not at all. I have never wished, to
visit Government House and have very rarely done 
so, although I have been invited. I dislike 
anything of the kind. I like, amongst my 
friends, to be considered a first-class 
professional man; but I am placed in...the 
second class.
Chief Secretary: ...class is the great thing to
be aimed at?
Cox: There is something in it.
As another officer said, 'one likes to look at the dignity,
2as well as the £.S.D.'. Concern with status was further
evidenced by the formation of a Civil Service Club in 1868.
Little can be discovered about the Club, which appears to
have been disbanded by 1872, but it is noteworthy that its3executive consisted entirely of the most senior officers.
It may have had some connection with the then recently
4formed Adelaide Club.
The heads achieved success through virtues that might 
be summed up in the concept of 'service', which implied
1
'Select Committee on Civil Service Bill', 1874, Minutes 
of Evidence, qq.61-62.
2
Ibid., q.857.
3
See the register of clubs and associations in the South 
Australian Almanacks for 1868-71 (the Almanacks were 
issued annually by various publishers, from 1839 onwards).
4
Cf. E.J.R. Morgan, et al. , The Adelaide Club (Adelaide:
By the Club, 1963), pp.l6-8. Tasmania was described as a 
favoured place for civil servants to retire to, but the 
description might have been applied to South Australia: 
'Life is cheap and agreeable, society is good, cultured, 
and refined, without extravagance or ostentation' (G.C. 
Levey, 'Tasmania', Aus tralasia, ed. J.A. Cockburn [London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, I900], p.227).
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devotion to duty, a willingness to work long hours when 
necessary and a high degree of immersion in government 
work to the exclusion of other activities. It was a 
concept tied largely to their official roles. Their 
wearing of uniforms, for example, conferred status on them 
in the Service but was not applauded in the community at 
large. Their importance was inextricably connected with 
the structure of the Service and their continued pre­
eminence depended on the maintenance of a static system. 
Their virtues were diligence and consistency, their reward 
was deference, and they were, in Bagehot1s words, 'used to 
red tape, placidity, and the respect of subordinates'.^
Limitations to the Authority of the Heads
But the official position of departmental heads was
circumscribed in several ways. Though important in the
economic affairs of government, they could not control the
crops and in times of recession were forced to make
retrenchments in their departments which they did not
always think were beneficial. Some resented the
discussion of their salaries and abilities which
accompanied the annual budget debate. One thought this
'particularly obnoxious to any gentleman' and considered
that the 'Public Service of the Colony [was] framed upon a
most unsatisfactory basis...[and not] in accordance with
2the feelings of gentlemen'. More important, the idea
T~~™Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution ('The World's 
Classics', No. 330; London: Oxford University Press, 1963),p.164.
2 'Resignation of Medical Officer, Lunatic Asylum', S.A ,P.P.
67 of I867.
2 4 7
that the Service should be open to public inspection was 
reiterated several times in this period. The Register 
made plain the necessity for officialdom to be open to the 
public gaze when, in 1869, it approved of a grazier's 
action in laying complaints against a Sheep Inspector 
before the Commissioner of Crown Lands. When this 
particular affair was taken to Court, the presiding Judge 
maintained that 'everyone who holds a public position, 
whether it be a General...a Minister...or a Judge, they 
are all open - and it is well that they are so - to fair 
legitimate criticism'.
The Register agreed:
[The grazier] only exercised a privilege which 
every citizen under a responsible Government is 
supposed to enjoy. The efficiency of the public 
service and the vitality of public opinion 
necessitates the existence of such a right...
[just as] constituents pass votes of censure on 
their representatives in ParliamentJ
The competence of officials was thus discussed in the 
correspondence columns of the newspapers and, as has been 
seen, the officials themselves sometimes joined in.
Parliamentary criticisms
Back-bench members were always ready to criticize the 
administration of the government departments. They were 
prone to call for departmental papers, and Cabinet minutes 
were sometimes made public, though Executives grudged
10 July I869.
1
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this. Hints of corruption, inefficiency or extravagance
led to demands for investigations into the section of the
Service concerned, although most inquiries were aroused by,
and directed at, specific abuses, such as an allegedly
unjust appointment or departmental disagreement.2 At the
same time, most sections of the Service received less
criticism than their condition warranted. This was due
partly to continued failings in police and hospital
administration, which the public noted more quickly.
Politicians turned their attention to those areas, into
3which they initiated several inquiries, and the time 
which they might have devoted to other areas of the 
Service was thereby diminished. Abuses in the police 
force, in particular, were more extravagant than in other 
departments and reinforced the tendency of politicians to 
ignore the Service so long as it appeared to be running 
smoo thly.
1
Cf. Loveday and Martin, p.lll. The practice was later 
decried in South Australia (e.g., S ,A .P .D ., 21 July 1891 , 
col.434).
2
But the case of E.T. Wildman (Secretary to the 
Commissioner of Crown Lands, 1859-66), who absconded with 
some £1,300 in 1866, illustrates how politicians treated 
the heads with care (with some exceptions). Wildman's 
case aroused few questions in Parliament, and the 
newspapers, which referred to Wildman's ill health, 
expressed regret and perplexity rather than indignation 
(see C. Davies, 'Miscellaneous Newspaper Cuttings',
[S.A.A. ] pp.36-4l); cf. below, pp.329-31? for reaction to 
a comparable case fifteen years later.
3
'Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly 
on Management of Adelaide Hospital', S .A .P .P . 150 of 
1866-67; 'Committee of Inquiry into Management of Police 
Force', S ,A .P .P . I56 of 1866-67; 'Dismissal of Police 
Constable Condon', S.A.P.P. 159 of 1871.
2^9
Politicians thus required stimulus to arouse their 
latent, critical disposition towards the Service. Such 
stimulus seldom came from fellow-politicians, or even from 
the press. In most cases, civil servants themselves 
aroused curiosity by bringing Service disputes into the 
open. Senior officials would have agreed with the later 
statement of E.W0 Hitchin, that such disclosures were ’sojdamaging in [sic] a general Service point of view’. 
Nevertheless, the quiet and even tenor of Service life, 
which depended on conciliation and compromise within the 
informal structure of the Service, was unable to contain 
major tensions and disagreements between officials and 
departments.
Dissension within the Service
Most intra-Service disputes that became public 
involved heads of departments in conflict with one another. 
The heads strongly opposed attempts to reduce their 
control over their own departments - the infrequent 
creation of new departments during the period may be 
traced in part to this - and the Audit Office was regarded 
with particular suspicion. The Auditor General claimed, 
for example, that he, ’and not the Head of a Department,
is the responsible party to see that a sufficient Check is
2devised’ over the public accounts, but lamented also that 
’when he endeavours to keep matters straight by attempting 
to crush irregularities in the bud, his interference is
1
CSO In, 2123/1880, enclosure dated 30 September 1880.
CSO In, 124/1857? enclosure dated l6 January 1857*
2
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resented as an indignity, and he is thwarted in all his 
1attempts’. Disputes between the Audit Office and other 
departments were common throughout the l860s, and 
undoubtedly delayed financial reform. But particular 
issues were frequently obscured by clashes of personality, 
which led the Auditor General in 1867 to say that
the Servants of the Government may, naturally, 
look to the Government as a watchful guardian of 
their official character, conduct, and authority. 
Should inadvertency or irritation at any time 
unfortunately betray them into objectionable 
phraseology or excess of authority, the calm and 
unbiased judgment of Government corrects the 
error before it can lead to ill-effects or bad 
feelings. Indeed, this is the real object of 
forbidding direct correspondence between most 
departments - a government is interposed as a 
correcting and repressive medium to allay the 
heats which the direct friction of departmental 
zeal or of Departmental Indiscretion might 
create.^
This was often wishful thinking, for few Ministers 
willingly involved themselves in disputes between their
senior officers. 'What a complicated and tangled web it
3is’,' said one Minister of a dispute, concerning the Audit 
Office, that he allowed to drag on for over eighteen 
months. Of another lengthy dispute, the Minister 
concerned explained that 'a great deal of personal feeling 
was mixed up in the matter, with which the Government had
1
CSO In, 1990/1867, enclosure dated 5 September I867.
2
CSO In,1820/1867, 13 November I867. Original emphasis.
3
'Correspondence with Manager of Waterworks', S.A ,P .P . 216
of 1866-67, p.15.
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nothing to d o ’,1 The heads were a small, powerful and 
identifiable group of men, a situation which itself 
heightened jealousies between them.
An illustration; settlement of the Northern Territory
Attempts to settle the Northern Territory after 1864
reflected, in heightened form, some of the deficiencies at
the top level of the South Australian Service. Any
attempt to settle the Territory would have been hampered
by distance, geographic and climatic conditions, and the
limited extent of previous exploration and survey, but
these difficulties were exacerbated by administrative
blunders which, said the Sydney Morning Herald, 'lowered
2the whole prestige of colonial administration'. B.T.
Finniss was chosen as first Government Resident, but he
was a poor choice. A later Commission of Inquiry found
that he 'did not...meet the difficulties of his situation
with tact in the management of his men, [or] with skill in3organizing their labour'. He displayed little capacity 
for leadership and aroused dissent amongst his 
subordinates by overemphasizing the distinction between 
officers and men, but his own position was made difficult 
by obscure and sometimes contradictory regulations, poor
1
S .A.P,D., 28 August 1868, col. 315-
2
Quoted in Price, History and Problems of the Northern 
Territory, p .14.
3
'Report of Commission appointed by the Governor-in-Chief 
to inquire into the Management of the Northern Territory 
Expedition', S , A.. P . P . 17 of 1866-67, p.3*
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buildings and amenities, the unwillingness of governments 
to reorganize the administrative structure, and by unclear 
demarcations of authority between senior officials. In 
1873 the Commissioner of Crown Lands emphasized
the propriety of investing the entire control of 
the Territory under one experienced responsible 
head. Everything should pass through his office, 
directed by him, receive his sanction, and he 
should be held directly responsible for all 
proceedings in the Territory,^
but not until that year was an Administrator appointed who
was familiar with tropical conditions and the needs of the
settlement. In the interval, Finniss' successor
(Bloomfield Douglas, previously Collector of Customs)
perpetuated many of the original errors: he 'quarrelled
with his subordinates, failed to support the officers of
the Overland Telegraph, and gained sweeping condemnation
2for his financial irregularities'.
Though the faults of the early settlement of the 
Territory directly concerned only the individuals involved, 
they implied certain conclusions about South Australian 
government administration in general. Finniss was chosen 
on the basis of his earlier career as an administrator and 
little thought was given to the particular requirements of
1
'Report on Northern Territory', S .A .P .P . 55 of 1873> 
pp.9-10.
2
Price, History and Problems of the Northern Territory,
p p .15-6.
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the position of Resident. Able men were to be found, as 
the surveying work of Goyder in the late 1860s and the 
appointment of G.B. Scott as Government Resident in 1873 
demonstrated, but it took governments some years to 
recognize the importance of specialized experience. 
Regulations and definitions of authority were amended only 
slowly and governments were reluctant publicly to admit 
that errors had been made. The staff of the Territory 
depot was drawn from the South Australian Service. Whilst 
the peculiar conditions of settlement brought 
administrative dissension to a head, the faults that 
Finniss and others displayed - unwillingness to delegate 
authority, emphasis on seniority, a concern with status, a 
penchant for disputation - were present in the South 
Australian Service. But one clear area of dispute, that 
was not a product of the obscurities of temperament and 
circumstance alone, arose from the growing importance of 
professionally qualified heads.
1
Finniss' abilities declined between I856 and 1864. He 
was disappointed at the coming of self-government, since 
he thought himself 'rising rapidly in the estimation of 
Downing S t ’ (George Cummins Morphett, When Adelaide was 
Very Young; Trials and Hardships of the Pioneers 
[Adelaide: Pioneers' Association of South Australia, n . d . ],
p.l4). Despite repeated solicitations, he did not after 
1857 gain the positions of eminence in the Civil Service 
that he thought he deserved (see, e.g., his letter to 
Henry Ayers, 13 December I867 [S.A.A. ]; and Despatch from 
Governor Daly to the Secretary of State, 19 March I867).
His inflexibility, always a trait, was especially marked 
during his Residency, and perhaps betrayed an over­
eagerness to be a success in the position.
Professional officers and others
Civil servants were eager to claim that they were 
educated men. Printing, for example, 'required a certain 
amount of education. . „many [printers ] are educated men' .^
The men at the top numbered some who won literary
2prominence, and nearly all could claim to be relatively 
well educated. Few could match W.R. Boothby (Sheriff, 
1856-1903), who had taken his M.A. at Cambridge, but all 
maintained that they supplemented their formal education3by wide and intelligent reading later in life. However, 
the growth of railways and waterworks, and the increasing 
importance of engineering and architecture in general, 
made it decreasingly true that the heads were all well 
educated men in equal degree. Some were professionally 
qualified and others were not. The division was marked
1
'Select Committee on Civil Service Bill', 1874, Minutes 
of Evidence, q.l464.
2
On George Hamilton (Commissioner of Police, 1867-82), 
e.g., see H.M. Green, A History of Australian Literature, 
Pure and Applied (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, I96I), Vol.
T~, p p . 271 , 314; see also W.R. Boothby's small but well 
produced book, The Olive: Its Culture and Products in the
South of France and Italy (Adelaide: Government Printer,
1878), arid Todd's preface to a volume of essays and poems 
by Edward R. Stephenson, Essays and Miscellaneous Pieces 
(Adelaide: Andrews, T h o m a s a n d  C l a r k , 1865)4 
3
William Hanson (Railways Engineer, 1860-67), e.g., kept 
up his reading on engineering 'at a good deal of cost'
( 'Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly 
on Public Works Department', S .A .P .P . 176 of I866-67,
Minutes of Evidence, q . 4 4 6 ) .
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outside the Service where lawyers and physicians were 
joining associations that regulated the professional 
conduct of members, and the movement gained impetus from 
the eastern colonies where professional and technical 
training centres were beginning to produce men with 
specific qualifications. South Australia did not match 
intercolonial development for some years, but the presence 
in the colony of men who had gained professional 
qualifications elsewhere helped underline the change. The 
appointment of Mais, B.E., M.I.C.E., A.C.E., as 
Engineer-in-Chief in 1867 most significantly marked the 
development in the Service. When Mais appointed a number 
of Victorian engineers to his staff in following years, 
provincial jealousies were added to the jealousies of 
status and remuneration.
Tensions could become public, as when Benjamin 
Boothby (Manager of the Waterworks), who was not 
professionally qualified, attacked plans for a new 
reservoir submitted by Thomas England (Engineer of the 
Waterworks), who was. The dispute widened in scope to 
involve charges of corruption from both sides, was argued 
before Select Committees, the press and members of 
Parliament, and eventually involved the Engineer-in-Chief, 
who started as an arbitrator and ended a disputant. The 
affair, which resulted in the dismissal of both Boothby 
and England, was exacerbated by differences of personality
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but the frequent allegations of professional incompetence 
revealed something of the tensions within the Service.^
The Service - How Efficient?
Ambiguity of 1 efficiency1
In the absence of such incidents, criticisms of the
Service were ill-defined. Some members 'regretted tp see
that the Government officers adopted a style of living,
2involving kid gloves, and consequent expenses'. The
newspapers frequently emphasized that reorganization of
3the Service was 'pressing', but that change should be 
preceded by a thorough examination of the existing 
situation. But most common was the question of efficiency. 
When politicians charged the Service with inefficiency, 
most meant that it cost too much in relation to the tasks 
it performed. South Australia, said one, 'was one of the
4most expensively-governed countries under the sun'.
1
Three separate inquiries were initiated ('Select Committee 
on Public Works Department', 1866-67; 'Report of Commission 
appointed by the Governor-in-Chief to inquire into Charges 
against the Waterworks Engineer', S .A .P ,P . 15 of 1867; and 
'Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council 
on Waterworks Management' , S ,A ,P .P . 188 of 1867 ) . But 
doubts remained, and Boothby continued to seek redress of 
his alleged grievances for years (see, e.g., CPWO In, 
385/I869, 12 May 1869, and CSO In, 204/1881, 30 January 
1881, and 847/1881, 10 May 1881).
2
S , A . P , D . , 18 September 1857 j col. 5^*
3
Register, 29 July 1871.
4
S .A .P ,D ., 4 August 1868, col.27*
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Without agreed standards of what the cost of government 
should b e , such charges could refer only to relative 
change, but thorough comparisons of the cost of the 
Service in previous years, and of the cost of other 
colonial Services, were never made. The annual cost of 
government establishments (excluding railways) per head of 
population rose from £1.5 in 1857 to £1.7 in 1873» but 
this increase was at least partly offset by longer hours 
and heavier work-loads. Expenditure on salaries and 
wages as a proportion of total government expenditure 
declined from 35 pen cent to 26 per cent in the same 
period, which was not consistent with a Service increasing 
disproportionately in cost. Nor did the South Australian 
Service obviously suffer in comparison with the Services 
of New South Wales and Victoria, which grew in size at a 
proportionately greater rate. These crude measures 
ignore such important factors as the quality and range of 
service, but critics of the Service made comparisons no 
more substantial, and charges of greatly increased cost 
therefore appear to have had no clear factual basis.
To some, however, inefficiency meant not only 
financial extravagance but also the employment of men of 
mediocre capacity, who could perform the ordinary duties 
of their offices with bare adequacy but who were unable to 
meet any greater challenge. ’There was little chance', 
said one critic, 'for anyone with more than ordinary s^iare 
of brains obtaining a situation under Government'. ^
1
George E. Loyau, The Personal Adventures of George E . 
Loyau, written by himself, being an Account of the Author's 
Experiences, and Remarkable Adventures in Australia, 
during the Past Thirty Years' (Adelaide: Henn, 1883) > p.79*
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M i n i s t e r s  countered this charge w ith the a s s e r t i o n  that 
the Service con t a i n e d  m a n y  able men, but they n e v e r  
e x a m i n e d  the p r o p o s i t i o n  closely. It was a d m i t t e d  that 
the Service c o n t a i n e d  'drones', and that therefore m o n e y  
m i ght be wasted, but to confess to the emp l o y m e n t  of 
i n c o m p e t e n t  m e n  was a different matter. The l a z y  could be 
w e e d e d  out th r o u g h  r e t r e n c h m e n t  and were thus o n l y  a 
t e m p o r a r y  problem, but the i n c o m petent r e f l e c t e d  d i r e c t l y  
on the abilities of M i n i s t e r s  themselves.
L o w  q u a l i t y  of s u b o rdinate staff
Like w o r k i n g  conditions, the q u a l i t y  of staff vari e d 
fro m  department to department. The Su r v e y o r  G e n e r a l ' s  
D e p a r t m e n t  was r e n o w n e d  for its zeal and efficiency, but 
the u n d e r s t a f f e d  A u d i t  Office, on the other hand, was 
u s u a l l y  b e hind in its audits and late w ith its r e p o r t s , 
and the morale of its officers was low. If the q u a l i t y  of 
d e p a r t m e n t s  v a r i e d  considerably, the qu a l i t y  of i n d i vidual 
off i c e r s  n a t u r a l l y  varied even more, and to co n s i d e r  
c o n t r a r y  cases of capable and incapable officers is of 
l i m i t e d  help in a s s e s s i n g  the q u a l i t y  of the S e r v i c e  as a 
whole when f e w  suc h  cases can be k n o w n  in detail.
E s p e c i a l l y  is this true of the l o w e r  levels of the 
Service. However, a n u m b e r  of general considerations, 
some a l r e a d y  noted, suggest that the q u a lity of 
s u b o r d i n a t e  staff was g e n e r a l l y  poor.
In 1855-56 the press had h o p e d  that, when the Service 
b e c a m e  d i s s o c i a t e d  from the odium of g u b e r n a t o r i a l  control, 
it w o u l d  be p o s s i b l e  'to make the p u blic service 
r e a s o n a b l y  a t t r a c t i v e  to that class of m e n  whom it is
259
desirable for the public interests to secure'. If this 
hope was partly realized in regard to the higher positions, 
there is little to suggest that it was realized in regard 
to the lower. Many recruits remained in the Service for a 
short time only and esprit de corps grew, at best, only 
slowly. There is no way of telling how much talent was 
unused in these years, but poor promotional prospects 
undoubtedly deterred many able men from entering the 
Service. Within the Service, departmental autonomy and 
the absence of any but the most fragmentary system of 
keeping records on employees meant that most officers were 
as likely to gain advancement because of seniority and 
propinquity to Ministers as because of ability. The 
relatively favourable position of the heads underlined the 
poor prospects of their subordinates, and one aggrieved 
letter-writer, perhaps an official, argued that
each responsible officer [should] be duly 
recognized and rewarded according to merit, thus 
having his zeal for the service stimulated by 
public recognition of services performed, and... 
we [should] abolish the pernicious system by 
which some in authority arrogate to themselves 
the duties performed by their subordinates, thus 
excluding from public recognition...many 
deserving officers
The subsequent history of the Service also suggested 
that the quality of subordinate officers in this period 
was poor. In the period 1875-91> for example, forty-nine 
men were appointed to their first departmental headships;
1
Register, 5 November 1855*
2
R egister, 31 December 1868, Letter from ’Pro Bono 
Publico ' .
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eighteen were drawn from without the Service and another 
eight entered the Service after January 1874 and rose 
rapidly to the top. Less than half of the new heads had 
been in the Service before that date, which indicated 
little confidence in those officers entitled, by length of 
service, to promotion to senior positions. Conditions 
before 1874 were comfortable and the number seeking 
government employment was always high, but turnover 
figures were also high and opportunities for advancement 
and recognition were limited, which would suggest that the 
capable remained in the Service for a short period only. 
Those who remained longer tended to be of limited ambition, 
and probably of limited capacity. One departmental head 
thus complained that the Service attracted ’all that is
mediocre, commonplace, vapid and repels all that is
1superior, intellectual and energetic'. Another gloomily 
observed that
the Government service here is embraced by 
persons of all ages, from fourteen to sixty, in 
various states of health. By few it is adopted 
(as a general rule) for a permanent livelihood, 
by many after failure elsewhere; but by men of 
capability or promise, merely as a temporary 
convenience or stepping-stone, until something 
better shall offer. Frequent shifting occurs, 
whenever convenient to the parties themselves, 
without regret or sense of obligation.^
And the more sober judgment of a Select Committee in New 
South Wales could have been applied to South Australia:
1
Letter of Torrens to Cushkin, 3 September 1862. 
Punctuation added.
2
'Government Officers' Compensation, Pensions, etc.', 
S „A.P.P. 174 of 1861, p.l.
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Admission to the Civil Service is no doubt 
eagerly sought after, but as the remuneration is 
not high, the duties monotonous, and promotions 
slow, it is doubtful, more particularly in times 
of prosperity, if the candidates as a class are 
equal to the requirements of the Country.^
Responsibility of the heads
The very mediocrity of subordinates threw doubt on 
the heads' use of their personnel powers. The heads were 
relatively young men whose interests centred on their 
official positions, which they expected to occupy for many 
years, and whilst their attention to duty was unquestioned, 
these tendencies led to a restricted vision and an 
unwillingness to experiment. They were thought to be an 
important group of men but it may be questioned whether 
other men in their position would have acted very 
differently, for the heads were closely bound by political 
and social norms of a peculiarly South Australian variety. 
Quarrels between senior officials involved matters of 
status and authority rather than any wider view of the 
good of the community, and it was significant that the 
heads appointed during this period coped only poorly with 
a number of new problems that arose after 1875* Though 
the departmental heads formed a group, in terms of 
remuneration, authority and social reputation, 
interdepartmental jealousies obscured much of their sense 
of common purpose and contributed to the piecemeal 
development of the Service.
1
'Report from the Select Committee on the Civil Service', 
Parliamentary Papers of New South Wales, Vol. I, 1872-73»p.667.
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Summary: A Complacent Civil Service
In 1873 the heads agreed that 'the regulation of the
Civil Service by legal enactment, is absolutely necessary
for the public interests ' , ^ but the Act of 187^- which they
framed secured little for the public or for the Service.
One historian thought that the Act 'marked a new era in
2the history of the civil service in South Australia' , but 
its regulatory provisions were permissive rather than 
mandatory, and the economy, efficiency and morale of the 
Service continued to depend on scrupulous and interested 
Ministers, informal coordination of administration 
following agreed aims, and a solvent Treasury. In making 
little provision for the future, the Act restated the 
system of administration that had existed before 1 8 7 ^.
The essence of that system was that Ministers and heads of 
departments were not answerable to any legally-constituted 
independent authority in their administration of the 
Service. After 187^-, the Act was thus a continuing 
testimony to the untroubled period when such a system was 
possible. It reminded civil servants of a bygone era, 
when working conditions had been reasonable, their 
superiors esteemed, and their functions little changing 
from year to year. It presented them with a goal - in the 
past - and mediocre staff and internal disputes were 
forgotten.
1
'Civil Service Commission', 1873 5 p.2.
Hodder, History of South Australia, Vol. II, p.5 8 .
2
PART THREE: READJUSTMENT, 1875-1891
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New Influences on the Civil Service
Agreement on the role of government, long serving and
conservative leaders in politics and administration, a
small community and freedom from deep economic distress
were some of the important factors that produced the Civil
Service of the 1860s and the Act of 1874. But by 1874 the
administrative and political ethos that had prevailed
since self-government was under attack. Of all Ministries,
the Blyth Ministry of 1873-75 was, said the Register, 'by
1far the feeblest we ever had', and the Advertiser thought
it 'weak, vacillating, and profitless. [it] missed golden
2opportunities'.
Political change
In Parliament, a number of members gathered around
J.P. Boucaut in opposition to what he termed 'the old
3lot', and urged the Government to more positive action,
4especially in public works and immigration. Advocacy of 
an extended programme in these matters led to convincing
1
15 January 1875*
2
14 January 1875* Blyth observed, with resignation, that 
his Ministry was 'taunted...with an inability to act 
liberally'. (S.A.P.D., 19 May 1874, col. 222).
3
Letter of James Boucaut to Henry Parkes, 10 February 1872, 
in Parkes Papers (Mitchell Library, Sydney), A919, p.924.
4
See K.W.A. Bray, 'Government Sponsored Immigration into 
South Australia 1872-86' (unpub. Master's dissertation, 
Dept, of History, University of Adelaide, 1958), pp.15-32, 
60-3, and passim.
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electoral success in 1875 lor Boucaut and his followers, 
who were aided in implementing their plans by changes in 
the personnel of Parliament. In that year, an increase in 
the number of seats in the House of Assembly, from thirty- 
six to forty-six, brought twenty-one new members to the 
House, by far the largest single intake to that date. At 
the same time, the importance of the older leaders had 
declined. Ayers, for example, who had been Premier on 
seven occasions before 1875, did not afterwards regain 
that position and served in only one more Ministry, whilst 
Blyth and Stow retired from politics before the next 
election. Other formerly prominent members resigned 
themselves to the back benches and some were translated to 
the Legislative Council. The middle 1870s marked a break 
in political leadership, as the lowered age of Ministers 
indicated. Of the eight Ministers who served in Blyth’s 
Ministry, five were aged fifty or more in 1875 and their 
average age was almost forty-eight. The seven Ministers 
of Boucaut’s Ministry (1875-6) included only one aged more
-jthan fifty and their average age was forty-two.
It was fitting that the issue on which Boucaut and 
his followers hastened to attack the weakened Blyth 
Ministry was connected with the Civil Service Act. Blyth 
promoted a relatively junior civil servant, John Mann, to 
the position of Secretary to the Commissioner of Public 
Works, and countered Boucaut’s assertion that other worthy 
officers had been overlooked by referring to the supposed 
discretionary powers conferred on the Executive by Clause
From Biographies.
1
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22 of the Act.^ Boucaut's hostile majority sought an 
issue, however, and the Blyth Government fell. Mann's 
promotion was chiefly important as a means of installing a 
government intent on an invigorated public works programme, 
but the affair linked the Act with a discredited regime. 
Some still regarded the act with optimism, however. The 
Auditor General, for example, proposed to submit 'a digest 
of such discrepancies of working as have expressly come
under notice; in the hope of securing the establishment of
2a defined code'. But one politician was 'not quite sure 
that [the Act would] be the success that some members
O
[thought] it [would] be'. From its inception, the Act 
was flawed.
Boucaut's policies marked an end to the caution which4characterized the l860s. Other changes, also, were 
taking place in the middle 1870s that symbolized the
1
See above, p.156. John Mann was a brother of the then 
Attorney General, Charles Mann, but politicians and press 
carefully stated that they did not believe nepotism was 
involved; see S . A . P . D . , 20 May 1875 » cols.’ 63-7^ and 27 
May 1875» cols'] 96-111, and the Advertiser, 17 and 20 
April 1875.
2
Audit Report, 1876/77» clause 74. This promise was 
apparently not kept.
3S.A.P.D., 3 August 1875, col. 575.
4
Boucaut's policies paralleled the extended public works 
programmes begun in other Australian colonies and New 
Zealand at about this time, and later unfavourable 
reaction to his policies had its counterpart in other 
colonies also; see, e.g., J.A. Dowie, 'Business 
Politicians in Action: The New Zealand Railway Boom of the 
1870s', Business Archives and History, Vol.V, No.1 
(February™] 1965)» PP.3^-'9.
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beginning of a new period in the history of the colony.
By 1875, exploration of the colony was virtually complete 
and the first phase of colonization was thereby ended.
The completion of the overland telegraph in 1872 reduced 
that feeling of isolation to which South Australians were 
so prone, and the opening of the University in April I876 
gave some tangible support to their claims to maturity. 
Boucaut's profession, that 'the time [had] arrived when 
the colony should be governed more as a nation and less as 
a municipality'^ was electoral rhetoric, but it found 
ready acceptance in Adelaide in 1875* And it 4iff'©3red 
from the tone of Blyth, who shortly before had hoped that 
Parkes might visit 'this little village' of Adelaide.^
Economic depression
Substantial increases in government expenditure
affected the development of the Service in many ways. So
also did the economic setbacks of the 1880s, which
3restricted the policies initiated by Boucaut. The South 
Australian economy generally prospered in the decade after 
1875) but warnings of recession in the middle 1880s were 
followed by 'an acute financial crisis' in 1886, from
4which recovery was slow. A fall of almost one-third in
1
Advertiser, 28 January 1875*
2
Blyth to Parkes, 17 July 187^, Parkes Papers, A919 , p.824. 
Original emphasis.
3This and the following paragraph are based largely on 
information drawn from the Statistical Registers for the 
period.
4
Eric C. Fry, 'Urban Wage Earners in Australia in the 
Nineteenth Century' (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of 
History, Australian National University, 1956), p.29» See 
also Coghlan, pp.386-9«
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the value of exports between 1884 and 1886 was influenced
by the wheat harvest of 1886, the worst in the history of
the colony to that date, and by the declining value of
wool exports, which did not regain the record level of
1877 for another thirty years. Manufacturing and revenue
declined, and the Commercial Bank of South Australia
collapsed in 1886. A net loss of population from 1885 to
1890 meant a rate of population growth smaller, both
proportionately and absolutely, than in any previous
decade and smaller also than that of any other Australian
1colony during the period. The uncertain position of the 
colony was underlined by Queensland, which, between 1885 
and 1887, passed South Australia in population and value 
of exports, and challenged the right of South Australians 
to think of their colony as the third in Australia.
By 1885/8 6 , total government expenditure had passed 
£2 ,000,000 per annum and the public debt had grown to £56 
per head of population (cf. £15 per head in 1874). In the 
following years politicians made strenuous efforts to 
reduce these levels, and the Service inevitably suffered. 
As one said, ’while the colony was struggling and all 
classes had to be contented with less profits and less 
income... the Civil servants should be placed on the same 
footing as their fellow colonists’. 'The year 1886-87 
was an exceptionally bad one’, said the Commissioners of 
Audit, for
1
James Dominick Woods, The Province of South Australia 
(Adelaide: Government Printer, 1894) , p .212.
2
S . A., P « D . , 26 November 1885 > col. 1664.
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the extraordinary falling-off in Customs duties 
extended from April 1886 to June I887.•..This 
period follow[ed ] close upon the date from 
which the special retrenchments in the Civil 
Service came into force; and the distress which 
then prevailed increased the depression to a 
degree that almost amounted to panicJ
Retrenchment in the Service was the more forceful when it 
came so soon after the rapid expansion of the mid 1870s. 
New government organs continued to be established after 
1885» but the Service increased in size and cost less 
quickly than before and all officers felt the effects of 
depression.
Renewed demands for reform
Dissatisfaction with the level of economies achieved 
by governments led many politicians to support a Civil 
Service Board as a weapon of retrenchment. Covert 
opposition to the idea from governments and influential 
officials resulted instead in the appointment of a Civil
Service Commission, which was meant to be little more than
2a delaying device. However, the Commissioners 
unexpectedly became interested in the problems confronting
1
Audit Report, I888/89, p.vii.
2
The Commission, which sat from January 1888 to 1891» 
provides the most important single source of information 
on the Service in this period, and its work is examined 
below (Chapter X, pp .37^-92). The Commission issued nine 
Progress Reports and two Special Reports (see the 
Bibliography for their location). It was known as the 
Public Service Commission from the Sixth Progress Report 
onwards, but only the term Civil Service Commission is 
used below. The Progress Reports are cited hereafter as, 
e.g., First Progress Report.
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the Service, and they attempted to devise a system of 
organization and control to operate through a Board. By 
1892, arguments over the control of the Service reflected 
the new political, social and economic forces that 
influenced the development of the Service during the 
period.
CHAPTER VII
GROWTH AND RETRENCHMENT
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Growth and retrenchment go uneasily together. But 
this period, unlike the earlier, cannot be characterized 
in consistent terms. On the one hand, ill-considered 
reorganizations and declining conditions of employment 
were the more disappointing when they followed the Act of 
1874 and the buoyant conditions of the 1870s. Dismissals, 
reductions in salary and other measure^ of economy were 
commonplace, and by the end of the period not only had the 
expectations of 1874 vanished, but conditions in the 
Service were probably worse than ever before. On the 
other hand, civil servants continued to hope for better 
things, and, indeed, took action themselves to improve 
their lot. The functions of government expanded greatly, 
and expanded even when depression was deepest. This was a 
period of flux, of readjustment to the new demands of 
expansion and contraction. An increasingly active 
bureaucracy aroused new suspicions, which were matched 
inside the Service by the emergence of new men with new 
ideas on the role of civil servants.
Growth of the Service
Size and cost
Although government functions expanded greatly in 
this period, increases in expenditure were uneven.
Between 1874/75 and 1880/81, expenditure on the railways 
establishment rose from £1 6 5 »000 to £266,000 (an average 
annual increase of 12 per cent), and expenditure on the 
other government establishments from £422,000 to £739,000 
(l5 per cent). Expenditure on railways continued to rise
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even faster throughout the 1880s, and by I8 9 O/9 I had
reached £ 6 2 0 ,0 0 0 , representing an average annual increase
of 17 per cent over the period as a whole. Such
expenditure was regarded as essential for the progress of
the colony, and the severe depression of the middle 1880s
was felt by other departments to a much greater degree.
Expenditure on establishments other than the railways rose
to only £ 7 7 9 5 0 0 0  in I8 9 O/9 I, which was an average annual
increase of less than 1 per cent for the decade. The
average annual increase for the whole period (5-3per cent)
was less than for the period 1856-187^-/75 (9*7 per cent).
Railways expenditure, as a proportion of total
establishment expenditure, naturally increased, from 28 per
cent in 187^/75 to ^3 per cent in I8 9 O/9 I; this increase
was one measure of the continuing importance of Boucaut1 2s
1public works policy.
Expenditure in functional areas"' otherwise appeared 
little changed in proportion at the beginning and end of 
the period.
1
Railways and other public works, such as tramways and 
water-works, also consumed a growing loan expenditure.
For figures relating generally to the expansion of public 
works in the first few years after I8 7 6 , see 'Amount 
expended on Railways, Public Works etc. , 1879' > S .A .P .P . 
204 of 1879; and 'Public Works Report', 1880, Appendix A.
2
To which the following departments were added during the 
period: Revenue - Taxation; Welfare, Health - State
Children; Law and Order, Registry - Patents, Trustee, 
Succession Duties; Other Development - Engineer of 
Harbours and Jetties, Woods and Forests, Geology, Water 
Conservation, Mines and Goldfields. On the more important 
of these new departments, see below, pp.278-82.
Table 20
Expenditure on Establishments by 
Functional Area, "1874/73 and l890/9ia
Area
Year
1874/75 1890/91
Internal Administration 7.4 11.6
Revenue 2.6 3.7
Education, Recreation 10.5 14.8
Welfare, Health 12.0 10.6
Law and Order, Registry 21.7 17.6
Communications 25.3 24.2
Other Development 20.3 17.3
100.0 100.0
a
For sources for this and the following table see Table 10,
P.139.
The clearest change was the increased roles of 
educational and administrative services,  ^ which 
approximately matched the decreased roles of development 
and law and order. But the growth of expenditure in each 
area was less constant than these figures would suggest, 
and as the following table makes plain (expenditure for 
each area is calculated from the base year 1874/73 
[ = 100]):
1
Administrative services cost proportionately as much in 
I89O/9I as they had in 1857* The increase reflected the 
growing complexity of government organization; cf. the 
position in 1837-74 (above, p.l40, note l).
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Railways and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  fell in the e a r l y  years 
before r i s i n g  r a p i d l y  n ear the end of the period; the cost 
of ed u c a t i o n  showed a great e a r l y  increase, but t h e r eafter 
fluctuated and b e g a n  to decline; communications, l aw and 
order and h e a l t h  g r e w  less q u i c k l y  as the p e r i o d  
progressed, t h ough their rate of growth varied 
c o n s i d e r a b l y  from y e a r  to year. In short, the trends of 
government s p e n d i n g  were less consistent after 1875: this
was testimony b o t h  to sudden retre n c h m e n t s  and to the 
exp a n d i n g  functions of government.
The n u m b e r  of railways employees showed a s t e a d y  and 
considerable increase throughout the whole period, whilst 
the n u m b e r  of other gov e r n m e n t  employees rose s h a r p l y  in 
the early, pro s p e r o u s  years of the period and more slowly 
thereafter:
Table 22
Size of the Government W o r k f o r c e , 
S e l e c t e d  Years, l 8 7 5 - 9 0 a
1 8 7 6 1879 1885 1888 1 8 9 0
Civil Service 
Classified 
U n c l a s s i f i e d
590
570
7 6 0
8 5 0
9 0 0
1 2 7 0
6 7 0
1 1 0 0
6 9 O
1 2 0 0
Total 1160 1 6 1 0 2 1 7 0 1 7 7 0 1890
Other G o v e rnment 
Railways 
Other
• • 1740
I 6 6 O
2 3 0 0
2 5 1 0
3 1 5 0
2000
3480
Total • • 3400 4810 5150 • •
Grand Total • • 5 0 1 0 6 9 8 O 6 9 2 0 • •
a
F o r  sources, see A p p . 1. Most figures are a p p r o x i m a t e
only, and are r o u nded to the n e a rest '10.
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Over the period, railways employees thus grew from 
about one-third to almost one-half of the government 
workforce. The number of civil servants increased less 
quickly, both proportionately and absolutely, although 
their over-all increase for the period (approximately 65 
per cent) was about the same as that for the period 
1860-75* However, most of this growth was in the 
unclassified ranks. The number of classified officials 
rose only slowly, from 579 in 1875 to a peak of $06 in 
1884, whence their numbers declined to 686 in I89O. This 
represented an increase of less than 16 per cent for the 
period, which was considerably smaller than for the years 
1857-74 (90 per cent). Classified officers accordingly 
declined as a proportion of the Service, from a little 
over one-half in 1875 to about one-third in I89O.
Such a decline followed inevitably from an extension 
of government functions, since an increase of labouring 
staff did not require an equivalent increase of clerical 
and supervisory staff, especially in public works. At the 
same time, the number of classified officers did not 
adequately reflect the number of employees engaged in 
clerical and supervisory work, as the number of temporary 
civil servants suggested. As a result, the employment of 
a clerical workforce that was temporary in name only was 
debated with even more heat after 1875 than before.  ^ But, 
as before, financial considerations dictated that the 
number of classified employees should never be very large.
1
See, e.g., S .A .P .D . 1 November 1893» pp.2522-4.
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New departments
Twenty new departments and boards (cf. six, 1857-7^0
1accompanied numerical and functional growth. By 1890 
there were fifty-seven departments. The creation of new 
departments was more frequent after 187^ but, as in the 
earlier period, most new departments represented 
extensions to, rather than innovations in, governmental 
activity. To some the term 'department' could only 
loosely be applied, and only the most important are 
mentioned here.
Several new departments were created to deal with the 
expanding role of government in conservation and 
development, in which the department of the Engineer-in- 
Chief played a central part. In 1875 the railways was 
constituted as a separate department, which it had been in 
practice for some years, and in I876 a Railways Manager 
was appointed, distinct from the position of Engineer-in 
Chief. In the same year, supervision of harbours and 
jetties construction was transferred from the Engineer-in- 
Chief to the newly created office of Engineer of Harbours 
and Jetties, and a department of that name was established. 
This innovation resulted directly from Boucaut's public 
works programme, but the jurisdictions of the two 
Engineers were not well defined and the younger department 
was absorbed by its parent in 1880. In I878 another 
reduction in the powers of the Engineer-in-Chief occurred 
when the position and department of the Hydraulic Engineer 
were created to assume his responsibilities for waterworks
1
See A p p . 2 for a graphic representation of departmental
expansion.
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construction. In 1888 this department, also, was absorbed 
by its parent. Shortly afterwards, the Engineer-in-Chief 
took over the construction activities of the Marine 
Board. A department of Water Conservation was established 
in 1883, under the direction of a former Deputy-Surveyor 
General, to discover and drill for artesian water, a 
function which had previously been the intermittent 
responsibility of the Surveyor General's Department. In 
1888 the new department was amalgamated with the Hydraulic 
Engineer's Department. All staff but the head were 
dismissed, but a year later a sub-department of the 
Engineer-in-Chief's Department ('Development of the 
Interior') was created under the same officer and with 
substantially the same responsibilities. The staff of the 
sub-department slowly increased until, in 18955 it was 
re-constituted as a separate department under its original 
name of Water Conservation.
In 1887 the railways were placed under an independent 
Board of three Commissioners, whose powers and 
responsibilities resembled those of the Railways 
Commissioners in Victoria and New South Wales. Changes in 
senior personnel were made to bring the sub-departments of 
the railways directly under the superintendence of the 
Board. The Railways Act also created a Supply and Tender 
Board which assumed control over tenders for the Engineer- 
in-Chief, Railways, and Post Office and Telegraph
1
The Collector of Customs then became ex officio President 
of the Marine Board, and the Secretary to the Marine Board 
became also Secretary to the Customs Department, as the 
Civil Service Commission had recommended (Third Progress 
Report, p.ix).
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departments. The Commissioners were ex officio members of
this Board which, in I89O , assumed control over tenders
for all other departments after the Government Store had
been abolished on the recommendation of the Civil Service 
1Commission. The creation of the Railways Board, the most 
important change in structure and management in the period,
largely separated the railways administration from the
2rest of the Service. The railways in general, and the 
Board in particular, will be mentioned hereafter only to 
explain developments in other government departments.
In 187^ a Royal Commission into various aspects of
agriculture fixed the responsibility for agricultural
education on the government and the Sixth Minister of
Boucaut's Ministry of 1875-76 adopted the style ’Minister
of Agriculture and Education’. No further action was
* *taken until 1.881 , when the Roseworthy College of 
Agriculture was established; the officers of the College 
were civil servants, and the College remained under the 
control of the Commissioner of Crown Lands until 1892, 
when it passed to the Minister of Education. In 1888 the 
role of government in agricultural education increased 
with the creation of the Central Agricultural Bureau, 
responsible for establishing regional bureaux of private 
citizens to promote an informed interest in agriculture. 
Governments also undertook the preservation and extension
1
Fifth Progress Report, App. K, p.l62.
2
The Commissioners, for example, did not consider 
themselves civil servants; see their comments on salary 
reductions in the Service, which the government proposed 
to extend to them (CSO In, 759/189^» enclosure dated 13 
September 189*4).
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of forest and other natural resources. A Forest Board was 
created in 1877> with the Surveyor General as Chairman.
In 1882 it was re-constituted as the Woods and Forests 
Department, under the direction of a Conservator, with 
wider powers than the Board had possessed. In 1882, also, 
the Geological Department was created with the appointment 
of a Government Geologist. An Assistant Geologist and a 
small clerical staff were subsequently appointed but by 
I889 only the Geologist remained. He commanded high 
status and salary but significant expansion in his 
department did not occur until the 1890s.
In 1875 the Board of Education was abolished and 
replaced with a Council of Education of five to seven 
members which had greatly increased powers over 
expenditure, the inspection of schools, the establishment 
and building of new schools, the appointment and removal 
of teachers, and the granting of scholarships.  ^ The 
President and other officers of the Council were salaried 
officials but friction developed between them and 
governments, and the Council was abolished in 1878. Its 
powers were transferred to the Minister of Education and 
the former President became Inspector General of Schools 
and head of the new Education Department. An Inspector of 
State Children was appointed in I883 to supervise the 
expanding activities of the Destitute Board in regard to 
neglected children, and his sub-department was constituted 
as a separate department ('State Children') in 1886. The 
Secretary to the department, and other staff, were drawn
See Saunders, pp.130-42.
1
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directly from the Destitute Board and the change was 
essentially one of nomeclature arising from an increasing 
volume of work.
A Stamp Duty was instituted in I876 and a Probate tax
in I878, but the administration of tax legislation was not
separated from the Treasury until 1884, when the Land and
Income Tax Department was created following extensions of
taxation in that year. J.G. Russell was appointed
Commissioner of Taxation but remained Master of the
Supreme Court. His subordinates, however, were full-time
employees of the department, which grew rapidly. By I89O
it included twenty-four officers, which made it thp
1largest of the central government offices.
The Characteristics of Departmental Growth
Organizational changes were thus more frequent after 
1875 than before. Earlier changes displayed few common 
characteristics, but this would appear to be less true of 
the changes made after 1875* A number involved a re- 
introduction of the Board as an administrative device, and 
the later years of the period witnessed several important 
departmental amalgamations. However, it is doubtful 
whether these similarities were the result of consciously 
related policies.
1
The hope that the taxation Act would be a temporary 
expedient only, and that 'the officers services would 
cease' after its abolition was thus not realized (S .A.P.D ., 
2 October 1884, col. Il8l). In 1886 the nominally 
separate Stamp Duty Department was created to administer a 
tax of growing importance, but its senior officers were 
seconded from other departments.
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Reappearance of Boards
Of the five Boards existing at the beginning of 1875 
(Destitute Poor, Marine, Botanic Gardens, Main Roads, and 
Health), all but the Central Board of Health had been 
created by i860, and only that Board and the Central Board 
of Main Roads had effective control over a substantial 
expenditure and workforce. The creation of a further 
seven Boards (Education, Forest, State Children, Railways, 
Supply and Tender, Agricultural Bureau, and Pastoral) and 
the abolition of two (Education and Forest) raised the 
number of Boards to ten in 1890. Apart from the Board of 
the Railways Commissioners, the Boards created after 1875 
resembled those previously established in so far as they 
were not direct precursors to the latter-day corporate 
bodies and statutory authorities. They were not, for 
example, separate from the Civil Service proper in terms 
of personnel, accounting practices, methods of business 
or 'style', and it was not possible to say of them that
they were 'neither a department of the central government
1nor a municipal corporation'.
The Boards acted essentially as organs of advice to 
government departments, and usually numbered several civil 
servants among their members. The administrative head of 
each so-called Board was a salaried official who 
controlled a staff of subordinate officials, and the power 
of the Boards over salaries, appointments and finance was 
strictly limited. The amount of independence enjoyed by
1
G. Sawer, 'The Legal Status of Statutory Corporations', 
Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. XVI, No. 1 (March,
1957), p.93.
23k
the Boards varied from the Local Road Boards, which 
strongly represented local interests and disbursed funds 
at the local level, to the Forest Board, which consisted 
entirely of civil servants who exercised only marginal 
control over the Inspector (later Conservator) of Woods 
and Forests. But none was independent of the government, 
and it was only the limited representation of non­
government personnel on them that gave any political 
meaning to the term 'Board'. The Council of Education, it 
was true, was 'a body politic and corporate', possessed a
common seal and perpetual succession, and could sue and be
1sued and purchase property. But it was also provided 
that:
the Council shall in all matters whatsoever be 
subject to...control by the Governor as any 
other department of the Public Service, and,..no 
regulations made and prescribed by the [Council ] 
shall have any force until approved by the 
Governor.^
In 1873 Blyth assured the House that the Central Board of
3Health 'would be under a Responsible Minister', and the 
same was true of the other Boards.
The 'Board' tradition
But, as such a comment might have implied, this form 
of mixed representation could cause problems of
1
1873» No. 11, 'An Act to amend the Law relating to Public 
Education', S.3.
2
Ibid., S.6.
S.A.P.D., 11 November 1873, col. 1028.
3
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responsibility and control. With the Council of 
Education, for example, it was found that 'authority was
too divided for that method of administration to be more
1than a tentative expedient'. There was no single reason 
impelling the institution of such ill-defined 
administrative organs. In some cases, such as the Central 
Board of Health, a need was felt for expert opinion not 
available in the Service; in others, such as State 
Children, governments were influenced by the traditional 
activity of private groups; and in others, such as the 
Woods and Forests Board, the affiliates of a particular 
legislator were conceded representation. Caution, economy 
and tradition were important. Also evident was a generally 
lessened confidence in the ability of the Service to 
manage itself.
Accordingly, the creation of Boards after 1874 
signalled a change in methods of administrative 
organization only in so far as their use showed that the 
earlier fears of 'irresponsible Boards' had been overcome. 
Previously mentioned aspects of management and control - 
convenience, lassitude and unwillingness to experiment, 
for example - again operated. The creation of Boards in 
this period therefore did not represent a significant 
departure in the organization of the Service, but rather a 
return to methods used previously.
1
'Final Report of the Commission on the Working of the 
Education Acts ', S .A.P.P. 27A of 1883-84, p.v.
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Amalgamations
Need for economy impelled the amalgamation of three
departments with the Engineer-in-Chief's Department, but
in no case was adequate consideration given to the
functional role of the departments concerned. The poorly
defined functions of the Department of the Engineer of
Harbours and Jetties made its re-absorption inevitable
when the public works boom subsided. The amalgamations of
the Hydraulic Engineer and the Conservator of Water, and
of the combined department with the Engineer-in-Chief,
were hastily made, and were shortlived.^ Both departments
were reconstituted as separate bodies in 1895* These
amalgamations were immediately successful, in so far as a
number of officers were retrenched, but they soon made
necessary a further review of the functions of the over-
2worked Engineer-in-Chief's Department.
1
The Premier (Thomas Playford) called for a report from 
the heads of departments concerned only after indicating 
his confidence that the changes could be made; though the 
heads protested, the amalgamations were carried out and 
the Hydraulic Engineer dismissed with only six weeks 
notice. (CPWO In, 219/1888, enclosures dated 6 March 1888, 
17 April 1888, and 4 May 1888).
2
A vague delineation of responsibility with the Railways 
Board contributed to the confused structure of the 
Engineer-in-Chief's department. Thus, the Engineer-in- 
Chief kept the accounts for railways construction but the 
Commissioners paid them, and some officers of the 
Engineer's Department, who were engaged exclusively on 
railways work, were not covered by railways regulations 
which guaranteed certain rights relating to overtime 
payments and leave of absence. The Engineer-in-Chief took 
his orders for railways construction from the 
Commissioners, for public works construction from the
(continued, p.287)
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Several amalgamations concerned particular offices 
rather than departments. Such combinations had a long
history and continued to be warranted, especially in
1country districts. However, the practice was extended to 
heads of departments more widely than before. The 
Chairman of the Central Board of Health, for example, 
acted as Vaccination Officer (from 1874), the Surveyor 
General as Chairman of the Forest Board (1878), tjae 
Secretary to the Attorney General as Commissioner of 
Patents (1879)? the Under Secretary as Government Statist 
(l88l), and the Secretary to the Commissioner of Crown 
Lands as Secretary and Inspector General of Credit Lands 
(1884). Some heads may have been over-burdened by such 
combinations. J.G. Russell, for example, in 1896 held the 
posts of Commissioner of Taxes, Commissioner of Stamps, 
Commissioner of Insolvency, Stipendiary Magistrate in the 
Adelaide Local Court and President of the Board of 
Conciliation. Coordination of the work of some 
departments doubtless benefited from this, but the 
increased number of small departments (such as Stamp Duty 
and Quarantine) countered some of the effect of
2 (continued from p.286)
Commissioner of Public Works and for marine construction 
from the Treasurer. Within his department, also, the 
functions of the Conservator of Water and Sanitary 
Engineer were loosely separated. See Fifth Progress 
Report, p.viii, and Minutes of Evidence, q q .1146-47, 
1422-25? 3573; 'Report of the Select Committee of the 
Legislative Council on Waterworks', S ,A ,P ,P . 23 of 1902,
Minutes of Evidence, qq.3-4.
1
See, e.g., H. Cobb, Official History with Reminiscences 
(a paper read at a meeting of the Postmasters' Association; 
Adelaide: By the Association, 1935)? pp.2-3? for an 
account of one who 'became a general official Pooh Bah'.
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amalgamation and combination, as the total number of 
departments showed no reduction. Unlike Tasmania, the 
number of departments in South Australia in this period
could not be represented, in Wettenhall's terms, as the
1beginning of the ’waist' of an hour-glass. The creation 
of Boards and the amalgamation of departments revealed no 
general principles guiding organizational change. Nor did 
several other changes made within departments.
A Confused Pattern of Growth
An illustration: the Audit Office
2In 1883, two Commissioners of Audit were appointed, 
because the work of the office had allegedly become too 
great for one man to supervise (though in subsequent years 
it was found that two Commissioners were unnecessary).
The first Commissioner of Audit (Ebenezer Cooke) was 
appointed in February 1883 but six months elapsed before 
his fellow Commissioner (Edward Heath) was appointed, and 
then only after prolonged Parliamentary pressure from 
opposition groups. The cause of Parliamentary interest in 
the second appointment and of the different speeds with 
which the government made the appointments, was the same: 
Cooke was a government supporter and his appointment was
1
Cf. Wettenhall, 'Organization in Tasmania', pp.27-9*
2
Under an Act of 1882 , No. 241, 'An Act to provide for the 
Audit of the Public Accounts'.
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in the nature of a political reward. The second
appointment was intended to divert some attention from the
appointment of a non-civil servant, for there could then
be no claims that the rights of long serving officers were
being ignored. Heath was selected to allow Cooke as much
freedom as possible in the administration of the Audit
Office. Heath was a long-serving officer who had shown
patience and conscientiousness rather than unusual
ability; he was extremely deaf and often unwell. The able
and active Cooke, who overshadowed him,signed the great
bulk of departmental correspondence, wrote the annual
departmental reports alone, exercised a general
superintendence over the whole department and was better
2known to Parliament and public.
1
But Cooke was better qualified than perhaps anyone else 
for the post. A man of 'wide information and culture, a 
lover of the fine arts’, he came to South Australia from 
London in 1862 at the age of thirty, as Chief Accountant 
to the English and Australian Copper Company. He became 
manager of the company in 1870, and was a member of the 
House of Assembly from 1875 to 1882. Xn 1880-82 he was 
Chairman, and the dominating influence,of a Royal 
Commission which preceded the Audit Act of 1882 ( 'Royal 
Commission on Public Finance’, S .A .P .P . 82 of 1881 and 83 
of 1882). One measure of his ability was his success in 
advocating security of tenure for the Commissioners of 
Audit; under the Act, governments could suspend a 
Commissioner, but Parliament had to confirm dismissal (cf. 
the position in N.S.W., where the onus was on the 
Legislature to veto dismissal). Cooke had a knack of 
extracting the essentials of complex financial problems, 
which he stated plainly, and he was one of the three or 
four most able officials of his generation in South 
Australia.
2
See Eighth Progress Report, Minutes of Evidence, q q . 
2899-2929* An Act of 1895 reduced the number of 
Commissioners to one (l895> N o . 6l7, 'An Act to amend "The
(continued p.290)
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Claims that the conditions of the Audit Office 
required a review of methods of control from the top were 
therefore not met by the appointment of two Commissioners, 
since the bulk of the work devolved on one only. The 
chief complaint of senior audit officials in previous 
years had been that departmental audits were in arrears, 
and that therefore more investigating officers in the 
field were required. The appointment of an able man like 
Cooke may have had a marginal effect on improving this 
situation (though he himself constantly called for more 
field staff), but the changes of 1883 did not in effect 
greatly alter the organization of the Office. Political 
rather than organizational considerations were dominant.
Cooke's appointment nevertheless had some wider 
results. The Commissioners were given extended powers to 
comment on the financial work of departments, and on 
government finance in general, although their position had 
certain weaknesses. Some departments, such as Customs, 
remained exempt from the Commissioners' supervision in 
matters of audit. And in 1891, one senior official of the 
Office contended that the Commissioners had made no
important modifications in the system of audit since their
1appointment, eight years before. Cooke conceded that one 
cause of this was that the Commissioners had no power to 
enforce changes in the mode of departmental book-keeping,
2 (continued from p.289)
Audit Act 1882"'). Heath was accordingly retired,without 
warning (CSO In, 999/1895» 23 August 1895)* In fact, his 
salary was struck from the Estimates before the Act was 
assented to.
1
Eighth Progress Report, Minutes of Evidence, q.3063.
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but argued that 'no department would care to resist 
instructions which we gave in such matters'. ^
Certainly, Cooke made maximum use of the powers he
did possess. Under him, the Audit Office assumed much of
the role of the Chief Secretary's Office in regulating the
Service. Cooke did not hesitate to give advice to
departments and governments on a wide range of matters
apart from book-keeping and auditing procedures, and his
annual reports included special reports on retiring
allowances, the condition of the Police Superannuation
Fund, the growth of the Service and possible amalgamate ions
in certain departments, for example. On several occasions
2he pleaded for a more rational scheme of retrenchment.
These reports were the most able commentaries on Service
deficiencies produced in the period, but they did not
inform contemporary discussion of the Service to the
extent which they might have done. Cooke's suggestions
had no binding power on governments and his work was often
ignored. Departments continued to resent the claims of
the Audit Office to exercise supervision over them, and in
1892 Cooke complained that 'since our appointment, ten
years ago, the Audit Office has never been allowed a fair
3chance of doing its work properly'. Nevertheless, Cooke 
rationalised some inconsistencies, such as the regulations 
concerning retiring allowances. He offset the growing 
fragmentation of the Service in some areas and thus gave
1
Ibid., q .2 8 8 0A .
2
See below, e.g., pp.325-6.
Audit Report 1891/92» p.xxiv.
3
29 2
support to the idea that c o o r d i n a t i o n  of the Service from 
one d e p a r t m e n t  was possible. But C o o ke's a c h i e v e m e n t s  
s t emmed from his own initiative and ability, and his w i der  
a c t i v i t i e s  were not a n t i c i p a t e d  at the time of his 
a p p o i n t m e n t .
N e g l e c t  of c oordination
Certainly, the nee d  for c o o r d i n a t i o n  inc r e a s e d  in 
this period. The g r o w t h  of the d e p a r t m e n t s  c o n c e r n e d  with 
public w o rks led to the c r e ation of a 'Public Works 
R e f e r e n c e  Board' in I883 , c o n s i s t i n g  of the A u d i t  
C o m m i s s i o n e r  (Chairman), Traffic M a n a g e r  of the Railways, 
L o c o m o t i v e  E n g i n e e r  of the Railways, E n g i n e e r - i n - C h i e f ,  
and S e c r e t a r y  to the C o m m i s s i o n e r  of Public Works 
(Secretary). This b o d y  had no formal existence but met 
i r r e g u l a r l y  for some years 'to cope w i t h  the slight 
d i f f e r e n c e s  of opinion that o c c a s i o n a l l y  [arose] b e t w e e n  
the d i f f e r e n t  d e p a r t m e n t s '.  ^ It a n s w e r e d  a nee d  that the 
e x i s t i n g  fra m e w o r k  of the Service could not provide, but 
s i m ilar b o dies have not been d i s c o v e r e d  in other areas of 
the S e r v i c e .
One other organ of c o o r d i n a t i o n  indeed disappeared. 
For some years after 1874 a B o a r d  of M i n i s t e r i a l  
S e c r e t a r i e s  and other heads of departments, w i t h  the 
A u d i t o r  Ge n e r a l  as chairman, met at i r r e gular intervals to 
d r a w  up the annual c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  lists and h e a r  appeals
1
'Report of the Royal C o m m i s s i o n  on R a i l w a y s ' , S . A . P . P . 27 
of 1883-84, M i n u t e s  of E v i d e n c e , q.32; on the B o a r d  
generally, q q . 32-55-
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1against its determinations. By 1.883, however, the Chief
2Clerk of the Audit Office was doing the work. Whilst the 
small number of officers classified during the period made 
it possible for one man to do this, the disappearance of 
the Board deprived the heads of some insight into the work 
of departments other than their own.
Effect of economy
Although the structure and organization of the 
Service underwent important changes in this period as an 
inevitable response to the increased size of departments 
and the Service generally, these changes were of a 
piecemeal nature, were made with few long-term goals in 
view and seldom involved the Service as a unit. As was 
the case before 1875, changes arose more from expediency 
and financial stringency than from an evaluation of 
functional distribution and existing departmentalization. 
The abilities and reputations of particular officers were 
again important.
By 1892, the organization of the Service had, however, 
evolved from the position in 187^ in certain obvious ways: 
there were more departments, more Boards, one more 
Minister, and more heads holding a multiplicity of 
positions. Relatively few departmental reorganizations 
were made before 1875, and this was in part a product of 
the dominant position of the heads. The increased number 
of reorganizations in this period did not, on the surface,
Audit Report, 1878/79, p.XIV.
CSO In, I798/I883, 21 August 1883.
2
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accompany a change in their formal position. Neither did 
the formal position of their subordinates (in salary 
structure, for example) appear to change greatly. The 
formal structure of the Service, indeed, imperfectly 
reflected the demands and changes made by recession and 
growth.
The Formal Position of Officers
Separation of heads from subordinates maintained
Salary differentials between heads of departments and 
their subordinates remained large, and had narrowed only 
slightly by I89O:
Table 23
Salary Differentials: Heads of Departments
and Senior Subordinates, 1880 and I890a
Number of Officers
1880 I89O
Difference as $
- 49 7 13
50 - 59 15 7
60 - 69 1 5
70 - 79 8 7
80 - 89 2 2
90 - - 1
Difference in £ p.a.
1 - 9 9 1 2
100 - 99 7 10
200 - 99 9 9
300 - 99 6 4
400 - 99 4 4
500 - 6 6
Total 33 35
a
From the Civil Service Lists, 1880 and I89O.
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However, the marginally improved position of subordinates 
occurred mainly in departments under clerical heads, whose 
own salaries declined, relatively to those of professional 
heads. This was especially so in the case of the Under 
Secretary. The salary of the position was unchanged 
throughout the period (£800 p,a.), while the salaries of 
the Engineer-in-Chief and Surveyor General, for example, 
were increased from £950 to £1100 and from £950 to £1250 
p.a, respectively. The new positions of Government 
Geologist and Conservator of Woods and Forests were placed 
among the most highly paid in the Service and several 
deputy-heads of professional departments, such as the 
Deputy Surveyor General, Deputy Engineer-in-Chief, and 
Sanitary Engineer, were placed, in terms of remuneration, 
above the clerical heads.
Salary structure
The salary structure of classified officers as a 
whole altered only slowly over the period; the structure 
of I89O, for example, was little different from that of 
1875.
Table 24
Classified Officers; Salary Structure, 1875 and l89Qa
Salary 
(£ p.a,)
Percentage of Officers
1875 I89O
£450- 12.5 10.2
350-425 5.5 5 A28O-33O 8.4 8.1
220-270 13.2 12.2
160-210 30.2 27.6
IOO-150 30.2 36.5
Total 100.0 100.0
a
From the Classification Lists for 1875 and 1890.
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But these figures included only a small proportion of the 
Service, and they concealed, it will be shown, a tendency 
for officers to cluster, unpromoted, at thp top of their 
class.
Professional and clerical heads
Heads of departments could pot be described as 
clerical or professional by criteria once useful. Long 
experience within one department, formerly the mark of a 
professional head, increasingly characterized the heads 
formerly termed clerical. Ministerial Secretaries,it was 
true, could still be separated from other heads on the 
basis of their experience in different departments and 
length of service within departments, as the following 
table shows .
Table 25
Clerical and Professional Heads, 
1875-91» Summary of Careers^
Type of Head
Clerical Professional
Number appointed during 
period 10 39
Average number of top 
positions occupied 1.4 1.3
Average number of 
departments in 3.4 1.5
Average time in each 
department (years) 12.5 16.5
a
From the Civil Service Lists.
Cf. 1857-7-4 (above, p.120).
1
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The difference, however, was less marked than hitherto. 
Moreover, the promotional patterns of Ministerial 
Secretaries were more diverse. Of the ten clerical heads 
appointed during the period, for example, five had not 
worked in a department with any of the others before 
becoming a head (cf. three of seventeen clerical heads, 
1857-1874). Such a change, which the growth of the 
Service made possible, tended to lower their community of 
feeling and made less easy their control of personnel 
matters through informal consultation.
The designation of officers as professional and 
clerical under the Act of 1874 was not closely related to 
objective criteria, and complaints that the terms were 
arbitrarily applied intensified because of the large 
number of professionally qualified officers (such as 
surveyors, architects and engineers) who entered the 
Service during the period. Classification did not reflect 
this change: by I89O, so-called professional officers
formed a little over 8 per cent of the total number of 
classified officers, as they had done in 1875. Formal 
structure did not accommodate changing occupational 
divisions, though the increased importance of professional 
officers was apparent to all.
Promotion
Restricted opportunities
The growth of the Service, and especially the 
creation of new departments, promised increased 
opportunities for promotion to senior positions. Thus,
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seventy-one departmental headships fell vacant in this 
period (cf. fifty-four, 1857-7^) > of which two-fifths were 
filled by promotion from within the Service (cf. one-third,
1857-74).
Table 26
Appointees to Head of Department, l875-9ia
Appointed from subordinate position 31
Not from subordinate position -
Previously Head of Department 22
Not previously in Service 18 40
Total 71
a
Compiled from the Civil Service Lists.
However, the practice of combining jurisdiction over 
several departments in one man, noted above, reduced the 
possible number of senior vacancies, and recruitment from 
without the Service remained substantial. Indeed, the 
most highly paid positions often went to those who had no 
previous Service experience. The eighteen heads of this 
type included a Commissioner of Insolvency (£1300 p.a.), 
Commissioner of Audit (£1000 p.a.), Manager of the 
Railways (£1000 p.a.), Engineer of Harbours and Jetties 
(£950 p.a.), Architect (£900 p.a.), two Masters of the 
Supreme Court (£850 p.a.), and Geologist (£800 p.a.).
But most civil servants were never likely to reach 
the top positions and promotion to the second rank was 
their main expectation. Here also, opportunities were
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limited. Those officers who entered the Service duripg or 
shortly before the depression of the 1880s had little 
chance to display their merits and gain promotion, since 
they felt the effect of drives for economy almost 
immediately. Of the twenty-seven entrants to the Sixth 
Class in 1880-81, for example, only five had been promoted 
to the Fifth Class by I89O. A more complete estimate of 
lower- and middle-range promotion (that is, in the Second, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Classes) is obtained by 
examining the promotional patterns of classified officers 
who had, by I89O , been in the Service for fifteen or more 
years continuously, for such officers had time in which to 
establish their claims to promotion. Under the Act of 
187^ it was, ideally, possible for an officer to receive 
fifteen salary increments in fifteen years and advance two 
classes upwards, from £100 p.a. in the Sixth Class, for 
example, to £250 in the Fourth. In practice, promotion 
fell far short of this ideal. Of 192 officers in classes 
other than the First in I89O, almost one-third had 
received no advancement to a superior class since 1875, 
and a further 40 per cent had advanced only one class 
higher. Whilst substantial promotion could involve only a 
select few, it is clear that promotional prospects were 
dull for the great majority of officers, as a comparison 
of the salary structure of the 192 officers in 1875 and 
I89O illustrates:
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Table 27
Salaries of Selected Officers, 1875 and l89Qa
Clas s Salary
Number of Officers
( £  p .  a. ) 1875 1890
Second 425 1 20
4l0 1 -
395 - -38O - 3
365 1 3
350 - 1
Third 330 24
320 - 3310 3 3300 1 -
290 4 2
Fourth 280 4 4
270 1 28
260 2 -
250 6 3240 6 2
230 5 3
Fifth 220 3210 23 66200 1 1
190 10 -
180 1 -
170 23 4
Sixth 160 12
150 l4 19
i4o 2 —
130 l4 1
120 2 -
110 30 -
100 22 2
Total 192 192
a
Compiled from the Classification Lists for 1875 and I89O.
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Officers tended to cluster at the top of their class, and 
promotion into the next could be slow; thirteen of the 
twenty-four officers at the top of the Third Class in I89O, 
for example, had been there for five or more years.^
Infrequency of transfers
Transfer between departments remained marginal, and 
tended to decline even further as time passed.
Table 28
Positional Changes, 1880 and l89Qa
Type of Change
Number
1880 1890
New entrants 53 28
Promoted within Department 155 i4o
Offices amalgamated 17 2
Transferred 15 7
Total 240 177
a
Compiled from the Civil Service Lists, 1880 and I89O.
1
It should be noted, however, that a .handful of officers 
gained very rapid promotion. Ten men advanced eighteen or 
more rungs up the salary ladder (equivalent to three 
classes), and five of these advanced twenty-two rungs 
upwards, in the fifteen years. These promotees were 
generally of unusual ability, but their good fortune 
emphasized the position of other officers and led to 
complaints of favouritism.
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Officers referred to years gone by, when inter-departmental
1mobility had supposedly been high; this had never been 
true, but by I89O the position was certainly worse than 
ever before. The anticipation that a classification list 
would facilitate transfer was thus not realized, though 
neither was the fear that experienced officers would be 
overlooked in favour of senior, but less experienced, 
officers from other departments.
Unfavourable age structure
Less obvious changes took place in the age-structure 
of the Service. The average age of the senior officers 
increased over the period, as is suggested by the 
following table which shows the distribution by age of 
some heads of departments at 1 July 1875 and 1 July I89I •
Table 29
ciHeads of Departments: Ages at July 1875 and July I89I
Age
(years)
N umb e r of Heads
1875 1891
-29 — -
30-34 2 1
35-39 1 -
40-44 6 5
45-49 7 6
50-54 4 3
55-59 3 7
60-64 5 5
65-69 - 4
70- - 2
Total 28 33
Average (median) 48 56
a
Compiled from Biographies.
See, e.g., CSO In, 685/1897, 30 June I897.
1
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These incomplete figures can only be suggestive, but are 
firmer than corresponding figures for subordinate officers, 
whose ages were revealed too seldom to permit an analysis 
by age of the Service as a whole. However, the length of 
service of officers gives some indication of this, and the 
following table classifies officers in this way for the 
years 1875 and I89O:
Table 30
Length of Service of Classified Officers,
1875 and l890a
Period of Service
1875 1890
N umb e r * Number *
Under 6 months l4 2 .4 6 0.9
Over 6 months-less than 
1 year 25 4.3 7 1.0
Over 1 year-less than 
2 years 74 12.8 9 1,3Over 2 years-less than 
5 years 104 18.0 29 4.3
Over 5 years-less than 
10 years 132 22.8 157 23.4
Over 10 years-less than 
15 years 87 15.0 187 27-9
Over 15 years-less than 
20 years 67 11.6 119 17.8
Over 20 years-less than 
25 years 57 9.8 67 10.0
Over 25 years 19 3.3 90 13.4
Total 577 100.0 671 100.0
a
Calculated from the Classification Lists for 1875 and
1890.
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Since officers entered the Service at different ages, it 
is not possible to infer age from length of service, but 
these figures are compatible with a contention that the 
average age of officers as a whole increased over the 
period. In I89I , also, forty-eight officials were aged
sixty-five or more, which would appear to be the highest
1absolute figure attained to that date.
The ranks of the Service were not regularly
replenished each year by a constant stream of entrants,
since the economic uncertainties of the 1880s led to a
lowering of the number of entrants in years of depression
and a rapid filling of vacancies when conditions improved;
in I878, for example, there were 127 entrants, but in 1887
only eleven. For the same reason, the number of officers
2leaving the Service varied considerably. Since less 
experienced officers usually suffered first in times of 
retrenchment, and since the majority of entrants were 
doubtless young men, it is probable that the number of 
young men filling middle-grade positions decreased over 
the period, as the analysis of length of service suggests. 
Slow promotion in the middle ranks of the Service 
furthered the tendency. Relatively stable classification 
figures, the absence of a retiring age and the continued 
dominance of departmental heads masked this trend, which 
contained important implications for the development of 
the Service.
1
Census, I89I (see Bibliography for location); cf. CSO In, 
318/1894, 19 March 1894, which showed fifty-eight officers 
aged sixty-five or more in 1894.
2
See below, pp.307-8, for an examination of dismissals 
during the period.
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Positions of cadets
Unsure promotional prospects in the classified ranks 
partly accounted for the declining number of cadet 
entrants, a situation aggravated by appointments made to 
more senior ranks over the heads of cadets. Many such 
appointments were supposedly temporary in nature, and the 
economic climate of the 1880s often rendered them 
temporary in fact, but others became virtually permanent, 
as the ever-increasing number of unclassified officers 
showed. Cadet salaries, moreover, were unattractive in a 
period when few families could afford to have a son 
earning only a pittance. Charles Todd thus thought that
few attractions are held out...for the best of 
our youths to enter the service...1 rarely 
come across anyone who thinks of putting his 
son into the Public Service, except as a last 
resource.^
Cadet numbers increased even more slowly than 
classified numbers. At the first examination in 1875 > 
eighteen candidates were successful, but numbers declined 
steadily to five in 1885 and to none in 1890. Nor did all 
successful candidates enter the Service; of the 108 
eligible over the period, only 51 became cadets, and only 
42 of these reached the adult ranks. As a group, cadets 
never formed more than 5 per cent of the ranks which they 
were supposed to replenish. Nevertheless, they were a 
significant group. The process of examination, the option 
of entering the Service, and the probationary period 
combined to cull out many youths who had little real
Eighth Progress Report, Minutes of Evidence, q. 2628.
1
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desire to enter the Service. Those who did enter the 
senior ranks tended to remain in the Service, as is 
suggested by the following table, which compares the 
length of service of cadets with a randomly selected group 
of youths who entered the Service without passing the 
cadet examination:
Table 31
Cadets and Non-Cadets: Length of Service5
Cadets Non-cadets
Number entering senior ranks 42 80
Number remaining after 10 years 28 25
Number remaining after 20 years 17 13
a
From the Civil Service Lists, 1875-1910.
These figures to some extent justified the claims 
advanced in favour of a cadet scheme before 1874, although 
they revealed nothing of the quality of cadets. Blyth, 
however, required only that
any civil servant should be able to write a 
plain hand, read and spell correctly, and add 
up figures correctly, and possess ordinary 
intelligence. He asked that and he asked no 
more for cadets.^
Few could have expected cadets of high quality, given the
2unattractiveness of employment in the Service. At the
1
S.A.P.D., 19 May 1874, col. 221.
2
On the later careers of some cadets appointed in this 
period see below, pp.423-4.
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same time, the relatively extended service of cadets 
emphasized the need to increase their numbers if they were 
to be of long-term importance as a recruitment source.
Uncertainty of Tenure
Throughout the 1880s, promotion was of less immediate
importance to the majority of officers than the simple
retention of their positions. Dismissals in the middle
1880s surpassed all previous levels since the time of
Governor Grey, and affected both classified and
unclassified employees. It is not possible to state
accurately how many officers were dismissed because
official returns showed incompatible figures. One return,
for example, showed that sixty-five adult officers were
dismissed in the period July 1885-June 1889 (the years of
heaviest dismissals). This would appear to be a
considerable understatement. For the same period, the
Audit Commissioners named ll4 officers who claimed a
2retiring allowance on being dismissed; they thus excluded 
from consideration all unclassified officers of le;ss than 
five years service, or, in other words, the bulk of the 
Service. However, even the figure of ll4 officers was 
probably not a true reflection of the number of dismissals 
in the classified and non-classified ranks. The 
Commissioners listed a further seventy officers who retired 
during the period, and it is likely that at least some of
1
'List of Retrenched Officers', S .A .P .P . 17^ of 1889*
2
Audit Reports for the years 1885/86, 1886/87, 1888/89, 
App. 11 for each year.
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these resigned rather than suffer the opprobrium of 
dismissal. If it is assumed that half the number of 
officers who resigned would otherwise have been dismissed, 
it would then appear, from the Audit Commissioner's 
figures, that some fifty-five classified officers 
compulsorily left the Service in the period July 1885-June 
1889; and that a further ninety-five non-classified 
officers were ejected also. Such figures meant a 
reduction of about 7 per cent in the numbers of the 
classified and non-classified establishments. The number 
of dismissals of labouring and other unclassified 
employees cannot be estimated, but reductions made in 
total salaries and wages expenditure suggest that the 
level was somewhat higher for these employees.
Such reductions were later overshadowed by the extent 
of dismissals in other colonies, but at the time were
unprecedented in South Australia, particularly for
1classified officers. Length of service did not guarantee 
security: of the sixty-five officers mentioned above,
twenty had been in the Service for more than twenty years 
at the time of their dismissal. And uncertainties of 
promotion and tenure were not rendered acceptable by 
adequate financial reward, as had generally been the case 
in the I860s.
1
Cf. Knight, 'Development of the Public Service of New 
South Wales', pp.110, 159* And South Australia never 
matched the Victorian 'Black Wednesday' of 1878 (Alfred 
Deakin, The Crisis in Victorian Politics, 1879-1881: A 
Personal Retrospect, ed. J.A. La Nauze and R.M. Crawford 
[Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1957]» p.17); 
though 'Black Wednesday' was more a product of political 
than of financial difficulties (see below, p.447).
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Uncertainty of Financial Reward
Loss of retiring allowances
The most severe financial loss suffered by civil 
servants in this period came in 1881, when retiring 
allowances were abolished.^ Repeal of the allowance did 
not result solely from a need to balance the colonial 
budget, but also from a belief that civil servants were 
enjoying more than their fair share of the prosperity of 
the colony. As one legislator said in 1880:
If the Civil Service Act went on much longer 
the whole colony would be a playground for the 
Civil Service, who [sic] would pocket all the 
money of the State, and go on the Continent or 
where else they liked to spend it.^
In introducing the amending Bill, the Chief Secretary claimed
that 'the Act has become a great burden upon the country,
3and will ultimately break down of its own weight', and 
the cost of maintaining the allowance (£13*000 in l880/8l/* 
undoubtedly influenced many members in supporting its 
repeal. The legislators of 1874 had not foreseen the rapid 
expansion of the Service in the years I876-I88O and the 
consequent increase in the number of officers who claimed
1
1881, No. 231* ’An Act to amend the "Civil Service Act of 
1874"'.
2
S .A.P.D., 25 August 1880, col. 798.
3
S.A.P.D., 28 June 1881, col. l4l.
4“ — "
Audit Report 1880/81, A p p . H; cf. £6,000 in 1874-5 (Audit 
Report, 1874/75, App. D).
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an allowance. The words of the Auditor General in 1861
applied with increased force in the 1880s: 'the past may
be given, but financial calculations embracing the next
twenty years cannot but be capricious, and certain to 
2mislead'. At the same time, support for repeal was 
greatly strengthened by a decline in public and
3Parliamentary confidence in the Service and its officers.
In providing for a retiring allowance, the Act of 1874 
showed that legislators recognized a continuing obligation 
to the Service. That feeling had its roots in the early 
years of responsible government; by 1881 it had largely 
disappeared.
The Act of 1881 provided that officers should be 
credited with the value of their retiring allowances as at 
the end of December 1881, on which amount interest, at the 
rate of 4 per cent per annum, was to be paid during the 
remainder of their careers. It also provided that officers 
not previously entitled to an allowance might claim one at 
the old rate (of one month's salary for every year of 
service), so long as they retired from the Service within 
six months of the passing of the Act. That 'many availed 
themselves' of the latter provision indicated that 
officers had regarded the retiring allowance as an
1
Moreover, the police superannuation fund (see above, 
p.136, note 2) was a sobering warning. In the early 1880s 
this fund was clearly in difficulties, and by I89O was 
virtually insolvent (see the Audit Reports 1889/90? p.xxv, 
and 1899/1900, p p .LIV-LVII). It was not, however, 
stabilized for many years (see below, p.434).
2
'Government Officers' Compensation', l86l , p.2.
See below, pp.326-39? passim.
3
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important condition of their employment. In the two 
years preceding the passing of the Act, sixty-four 
officers had drawn retiring allowances; in the following 
two years, 191 did so. They numbered some of the most 
able officers in the Service, including the Clerk of 
Works, the Registrar of the Land Office and the Hydraulic 
Engineer.^
Attitude of the heads
Protests made by the heads of departments were a 
further indication of the dismay with which officers 
regarded the Act. A promise to repeal retiring allowances 
was made in the Governor's Speech at the opening of the 
Parliamentary session of 1881 (2nd June), but the 
government fell three weeks later, without having prepared 
a Bill. Meanwhile, a number of heads of departments had 
formed an ad hoc body (9 th June) to discuss the matter and3to draw up a modified scheme of retiring allowances. The 
succeeding Premier (Bray) submitted his plans for repeal 
to this group, but did not modify the Bill, which rapidly
1
Audit Report, 1888/89, p.lx.
2
Some politicians deplored such resignations, which they 
thought unreasonable; see, e.g., Letter of Arthur Blyth to 
H.E. Bright, 30 June 1882 (S.A.A.).
3The heads recorded their meetings in a minute-book which 
is now (August, 1967) in the possession of the Public 
Service Association of South Australia. The book was 
later used by the Civil Service Association (on which, see 
below, pp.319-21, 348-58) and is the only record of much 
early employee activity within the Service; it is cited 
hereafter as Minute Book.
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became the Act, in accordance with its suggestions. The 
Government claimed that 'the older members of the Civil 
Service were perfectly satisfied, and admitted that the 
Bill did not work an injustice to them', but this was far 
from the truth. The heads protested bitterly at the Bill. 
They considered it a ’very serious injustice....The tone
2of the service will be sensibly and permanently lowered*,
and argued that 'the officers of the fixed list...have
always regarded the retiring allowance...as forming part
of the conditions under which their services have been 
3retained'.
This was a significant protest in itself, since it 
was the first time that the heads had ever complained to a 
government in writing on matters affecting them 
collectively, and was made more remarkable by the fact 
that three messages of complaint in all were sent. But it 
was of wider significance that the heads had banded 
together as a group, for it seems that their meeting 
together on June 9th was on their own initiative. Failure 
to alter the provisions of the Act revealed the
1
S ,A .P ,D ., 17 November 1881, col. 1553*
2
CSO In, 2145/1881, 11 October 1881.
3
CSO In, 2169/1881, 29 September 1881. See also, CSO In, 
II27/I88I, 15 June 1881, and 'Suggestions from Heads of 
Departments re Civil Service Amendment Bill' , S ,A .P .P . l44 
of 1881. The dismay caused by the abolition of retiring 
allowances was greatly increased in later years when 
ambiguities in the Act of 1881 led to conflicting 
interpretations of the claims of many officers; see Audit 
Report I888/89, Special Report No. 1 (’On Retiring 
Allowances'), pp.liv-lvii. Fifty years later, the Act was 
still remembered; see A.W. Pettit and A.F. Cornish, 'The 
Old Superannuation Act* (unpub. MS., S.A.A., 1931), p.l.
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limitations of their authority, but their collective 
action set a precedent for later activity within the 
Servi ce .
Pro rata reductions
Attempts to reduce salaries in the years 1885-87 
increased officers' feelings of financial injustice, 
though complaints were roused more by fears of what might 
happen than by reference to what did happen. Legislators 
had little success in reducing the total cost of 
classified and non-classified salaries, and indeed the 
average salary of clerical officers rose slightly between 
1884 and 1888, approximately from £160 per annum to £180 
per annum.  ^ Several attempts to institute schemes of 
salaries reduction operating on a pro rata basis were 
unsuccessful, for two reasons. First, most legislators 
argued that economy was better achieved by dismissing
inefficient officers than by penalizing the efficient, and
2the newspapers agreed. This was a practical argument.
In 1885 , for example, one member led an attack on the 
Estimates, which he claimed to reduce by £111,000, and 
then proposed a pro rata reduction of 10 per cent on 
salaries; this would have saved only £4,000. A majority 
of members were reluctant to legislate for such a trifling 
sum, especially when the plan would have affected only
1
'Officers and Salaries', S „A .P .P . 131 of 1885; and Audit 
Report, 1887/88, Apps. 4, 5» 6.
2
E.g., Advertiser, 21 July 1886.
S .A ,P .D ., 26 November 1885, cols. 1664-71.
3
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those officers whose salaries were voted on the Estimates.
However, most were prepared to support a pro rata
reduction of it included everyone paid by the government,
that is, if it included the Governor, Justices of the
Supreme Court, and officers on the Civil List as well. In
such a plan, economy and justice again combined. But this
raised the second barrier to pro rata reductions. The
Legislative Council firmly resisted any such extended
scheme, which involved tampering with the Constitution Act.
In 1886, the Council thus rejected a Bill which provided
for reductions in the salaries of the Judges and Civil
List officials, as the government had anticipated that it
would.^ A scheme providing for reductions in other
salaries, which had been forced through the Council as a
rider to a quarterly Supply Bill, was accordingly dropped
when it became clear that the Council would not permit the
2Government to extend the plan.
1
Advertiser, 22 July 1886; Register, 24 August 1886;
S .A .P .D ., 17 August 1886, cols.725-6. Relations between
the Assembly and Council were more than usually strained 
in the 1880s, due partly to the new public works and 
taxation legislation of the period, which the Council 
opposed; for some examples of the conflict, see Edwin 
Craddock Nowell, A History of the Relations between the 
Two Houses of Parliament in Tasmania and South Australia 
in regard to Amendments to Bills containing Provisions 
relating to the Public Revenue or Expenditure (Hobart: 
Government Printer, 1 8 9 0 ) , pp.65-126 passim. Governments 
were not loth to use the matter of Civil Service salaries 
in order to test the determination of the Council and 
officials thereby suffered; on the other hand, they 
benefited from the Council’s intransigence.
2
The Supply Bill did reduce salaries, as did a Supply Bill 
in the following year, but the reductions applied for a 
brief period only; see S.A.P.D. , 20 July 1887, cols. 274-5 
and 21 July 1887, cols.277-86.
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Civil servants were, therefore, spared the extensive 
reductions that some members wanted. At the same time, 
substantial reductions were made in the salaries of 
individual officers and heads of departments were on a
number of occasions enjoined to exercise the 'strictest
1economy' in drawing up departmental budgets. Heads were
themselves often unable to gain salary increases which
2they thought they had earned, and their recommendations
for increases in their departments were seldom sure of
3success. New economies were frequently mentioned in 
Parliament, and officers could never be confident that 
their salaries would not soon be reduced. Gloomy 
anticipation was confirmed in 1885, when the 10 per cent
4salary allowance for professional officers was abolished. 
At different times, other matters increased uncertainty. 
Proposals advanced for a Civil Service Board, for example, 
seemed to herald a period of severe retrenchment; many 
supporters of the idea saw it as a means of retrenchment 
more effective than any pro rata, or series of separate, 
reductions in salary. The Civil Service Commission of 
1888-91 gave further substance to officers' fears. The 
first eight Reports of the Commission were concerned 
almost exclusively with recommending economies which, by
1
E.g . , CSO Circulars, 13 November 1880; 2 December 1884; 
25 August 1892.
2
E.g., CSO In, 1787/1882, 24 August 1882.
3
E.g., CSO In, 552/1890, enclosures dated 16 April 1890 
and 13 August I89O; S.A.P.D., 2 October 1889, col. 1084.
4
1885, No. 355, 'An Act to further amend "The Civil 
Service Act, 187^"'.
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of -|the time the final Report, totalled £35>000» However, it
is doubtful whether this 'inept and inefficient 
2 3Commission' , this 'Star Chamber' , substantially- 
increased the level of economy which existed before its 
appointment. Some recommendations were impracticable, and 
were perhaps made by the Commission to justify its 
existence, and others were not politically feasible. No 
detailed account of the accepted recommendations was made, 
or even attempted, but it is clear that no major proposals4and few minor proposals were effected. The level of 
remuneration did not decline as much as it might have done 
in the 1880s, but it often seemed, especially during the 
prolonged sitting of the Commission, that it was about to
5decline much further, 
conditions.
And this was true also of other
Decline in other conditions
The central block of government offices was completed 
by about 1880, by which time its inadequacy to house a
1
Ninth Progress Report, p.15.
2
Register, 15 November 1923» Letter from W.G. Randall 
(Accountant, Works and Buildings, I88O-I9O9 ).
3
C.E. Owen-Smyth (Superintendent of Public Buildings, 
1888-1920), 'Remarks and Recollections', Register, 28 May 
1924 .
4
The Under Treasurer, for example, thought that it was 
'not possible to state the actual savings effected by the 
suggestions of the Commission' ('Cost of Public Service 
Commission', S .A .P .P . 130 of I890); cf. S ,A .P .D ., 27 July 
1892, cols.451-6.
5
Cf. Advertiser, 7 July 1886.
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growing Service had already been pointed out. However,
no extensions were made during this period, and the
building was soon over-crowded, as was the adjacent Post
Office building. Working conditions showed some signs of
general decline. The introduction of the typewriter in
1884 foreshadowed a loss of status for copying clerks, as
the introduction of the letterpress had done, to a lesser
extent, twenty years before. Need for economy led to
circulars enjoining the use of lower quality paper for
2departmental correspondence; another directed that
officers should themselves clear leaves from roofs and
3gutters before the winter rains. These were small 
matters, but they signified a lowering of the quality of 
official life.
In 1880 office hours were extended to 9*30 a.m.-3 p.m 
4daily, a change which disturbed some press correspondents
One wondered 'that some movement [had ] not been made by
5the parties concerned', but another explained that civil 
servants were afraid .to speak
1
'Protests against Awards re Public Offices Designs',
S .A .P ,P . 237 of 1877* For a description of the block, 
which contained all the central departments, see Thomas 
Worsnop, Adelaide and its Environs (Adelaide: Williams,
1880 ), p p .3 8 , 34-6.
2
CSO Circular, 31 October 1884.
3
CSO Circular, 9 December 1884.
4
CSO Circular, 30 November 1880.
5
Register, 27 November 1880, Letter from 'Firmness'.
318
because summary dismissal would follow. I am 
pleased in one way to hear this... [because the 
Service is therefore ] subject to wholesome 
discipline, but...[it i s ] a retrograde and I 
must say harsh step....Surely we can afford, 
as in the past, to treat the Service 
generously...the Service is not such an 
Elysium as some suppose.
Hours of work were extended also for some labouring staff;
a charge that workers at the Sewage Farm were working ten
2or eleven hours a day, for example, was not denied. The 
Act of 1881 reduced leave of absence to two weeks for 
recreation (.formerly three weeks) and two months for 
illness (formerly three months). Long service leave was 
reduced to eight months on half pay and four months on 
full pay after ten years service, and to eight months on 
full pay after twenty years service (formerly twelve, six 
and twelve months respectively). In 1888 leave for
3illness was further reduced, to one month per year.
Other privileges which officers were previously able to 
claim from time to time were curtailed. Overtime was
4strictly forbidden to salaried officers in 1885 > for5example, as was any employment outside the Service.
1
Register, 29 November 1880, Letter from ’Spirit of the
Age ' .
2
S.A.P.D., 7 October 1890, cols. 1474-5.
3
CSO Circular, 17 February 1888.4 — —
CSO Circular, 27 October 1885*
5
CSO Circular, 29 August 1887•
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Officers only reluctantly observed the increasing 
number of restrictive regulations, and a circular of I89O 
complained of 'constant...infringements of Regulations, 
and...the indifference manifested by several departments 
to circulars and reminders'. ^ However, no further 
restrictions were made to the political rights of officers 
for there was no need to do this. Officers, including the 
heads of departments, were politically mute in public. 
Worsening conditions of employment underlined their 
inability to bring pressure to bear upon politicians, 
which officers resented. Their complaints came 
increasingly to be channelled through a formal association 
of civil servants established in 1884.
The Civil Service Association
The Association - its origins, aims, membership and
2function - is considered below. Here it is noted that 
the declining working conditions of the middle 1880s 
provided sufficient impetus for civil servants to group 
together in an effort to retain their remaining privileges 
It was a unique move: the Association was the first formal
body of civil servants, of more than transitory existence, 
to be established in the Australian colonies. And that it 
was established in South Australia, where the heads of 
departments had for so long dominated the Service, might 
seem to heighten this distinction. But the Association
1
CSO Circular, l4 March I89O.
See p p .348-58.
2
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was formally established in November 1885» at the end of a 
year which had seen a prolonged attack on the Estimates, a 
proposal to reduce salaries by ten per cent, and the 
repeal of the allowance to professional officers. These 
matters seemed preludes to further restrictions and 
provided an incentive to immediate action that over-rode 
tradition, scepticism and diffidence.
In protesting against proposed salary reductions in
the following year, the Association, through a petition
from 700 officers, summarized many of the matters that
contributed to the declining position of civil servants
1during the period. The Association deplored 
retrenchments already made, the abolition of the 
professional allowance and retiring allowance, the 
curtailment of over-time payments, and the reduction of 
holidays and leaves of absence. It pointed out that 
officers remaining in the Service bore increased 
responsibilities and that Ministers relied on the ability 
of the permanent officers, who were naturally unhappy 
about the unfavourable comparison of their salaries with 
those paid in other colonies. Income tax had reduced 
salaries further, which was a poor reward for those 
officers who had 'enabled great savings to be made'. The 
Civil Service suffered from special disabilities; officers 
did not receive increases in times of prosperity, and it 
was unfair to single them out for a 'special tax' in times 
of depression. Many professional officers had left good 
positions outside the Service 'in faith', and were being 
unjustly treated. Officers found it difficult to make
CSO In, 637/1886, Ik April 1886.
1
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provision for the education of their children, or the
security of their family after their death.
Dissatisfaction was widespread, for 'arbitrary change'
1could lead only to insecurity.
These complaints were centred upon conditions of 
employment, and the petitioners recognized the powerful 
influence of depression upon the Service. But their 
complaints also implied a criticism of the management of 
the Services depression demanded economy, but economies 
should be fa,irly made. What constituted fair economies 
was not stated, but the petition made it clear that 
officers had begun to question those who controlled the 
Service, and this included the heads of departments.
1
Similar protests were published in the official journal 
of the Association, which was first issued in November 
1888 as The Public Service Journal, South Australia. Its 
name was changed to The Public Service Journal and Railway 
Re view., South Australia in August 1889, but volumes were 
numbered consecutively until July 1.892 (i.e. , to Vol. IV, 
No. 43; there were no issues in March and July 1888). In 
August 1892 it became The Public Service Review, South 
A.ustralia, beginning again at Volume I (at the same time 
the Association renamed itself the Public Service 
Association). The journal continues to be issued (1967). 
On some occasions issues were numbered incorrectly, but 
the month and year of issue were always correct and are 
included in references; the journal is cited hereafter as 
Journal up to and including the issue of July I892 , and 
thereafter as Review.
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Need for economy was the most obvious element 
influencing the development of the Service in this period. 
K.Wo Knight has argued that although the best known of the 
Australian Commissions of Inquiry into the Civil Service 
during the nineteenth century, the New South Wales Royal 
Commission of 189 -^ , was concerned with matters of 
management and control, it was appointed originally to 
secure economy in administration.^ In South Australia, 
the depression of the 1880s paralleled that of the 1.890s 
in New South Wales and led to demands for economy, which 
also resulted in an examination of methods of management 
and control., including the question of an independent 
personnel authority. The connection between questions of 
economy and management and control was close, but involved 
with each question was a more general, feeling of lowered 
confidence in the administration of the Service, and in 
the capacity and probity of its officers.
Economy
A Civil Service Board?
F.E.H.W. Krichauff, one of the very few members of 
Parliament in these years whose concern with the Service 
was not solely to cut its cost, was the first in South
1
Knight, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 
VII, No. 2, pp.167-9.
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Australia to suggest a Board. His model was the recently
2instituted Victorian Civil Service Board, and in 
September 1884 he moved that 'with a view to decide whether 
a board for the appointment of Civil servants is 
preferable to the present system...a commission [should be 
appointed ] to enquire and report upon the working of the
3Civil Service Act'. Krichauff's move was too early, 
however, and the motion was soundly rejected.
1
Friedrich Eduard Heinrich Wulf Krichauff (b. Schleswig, 
Prussia, 1824; father, a Supreme Court Judge; educated 
Berlin University, philosophy degree; to South Australia, 
I85O; land and commission agent, farmer; Member of House 
of Assembly, 1857-8, 1870-82, 1884-90 and of Legislative 
Council, 1890-4; Commissioner of Public Works, May I87O; 
Chairman, Agricultural Bureau, 1888-1904; Vice President 
of Homestead League, member of several Royal Commissions; 
d. September 1904). Krichauff consistently supported 
wide-based reform of the Service, and his interest in this 
and other matters, such as forest conservation, warrants a 
more detailed analysis than available information permits. 
He was acquainted with the strictly regulated Prussian 
bureaucracy, two of his sons entered the South Australian 
Service and reached senior positions, and he was concerned 
for the welfare of his German constituents in government 
employment. More than any other German legislator in 
South Australia, Krichauff carried the banner of German 
liberalism, and his espousal of Service reform was only 
one part of the programme of a man whose ability surpassed 
that of most of his political contemporaries.
2
On which, see Subramaniam, 'Promotion in the Commonwealth 
Public Service', pp.28-30*
3
S , A.. P . D . , 1 October 1884, col. II63. The Commissioners 
of Audit strongly criticized Krichauff's proposal, chiefly 
on the grounds of cost (CSO In, 2212/1884, 2 October 1884). 
This foreshadowed later Service attitudes to a Board; see 
below, pp.367-8 .
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Support for the idea grew during the Parliamentary 
sessions of 1885 and 1886, but economy was then the 
dominant motive. Many politicians believed that the 
piecemeal economies of previous years had reduced the 
overall cost of government very little. Efforts to cut 
the annual Estimates were frequently rendered nugatory by 
excess votes and expenditure under Governor's Warrants in 
the succeeding year. The claimed reduction of £111,000 on 
the Estimates for 1885-86, for example, was to a large 
extent a paper saving only, and was followed by excess 
votes totalling nearly £74,000. This might have 
suggested that the original economies were too severe, as 
the Commissioners of Audit suggested in their Report for 
1887/88. They considered that reductions in staff made 
difficult the efficient and honest conduct of business in 
some departments, and commented on haphazard dismissals 
that
death and retirement from the service have 
cleared the ranks much faster than all the 
effects of enforced retrenchments....It 
follows therefore that these causes would be 
sufficient to enable the most drastic system of 
retrenchment to be carried out without the 
sacrifice of a single capable officer. All 
that is necessary is to refrain, for the time 
being, from the appointment of any new men, to 
make rigid inquiries into the possibilities of 
retrenchment in all departments, to keep a 
complete register of these possibilities, and 
to act upon them whenever a vacancy o c c urs/
1
See above, p-313*
2
A list of excess votes for the years 1877/78-1887/88 is 
contained in the Audit Report, I887/88, A p p . 4.
P .x x i .3
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A Civil Service Board might have administered this 
plan,but most members believed that a Board, after 
investigating the Service, would find many officers who 
could be dismissed immediately. The Commissioners of 
Audit implied that this was not the case, but politicians 
were eager for quick and obvious reductions. A full-time 
Board could carry out such a task better than part-time 
members of Parliament, and would not be so greatly 
restricted by the Legislative Council.
The newspapers took a broader view of a Board, To 
them, economy was necessary but no more so than the 
rationalization of the Service, which they saw in terms of 
stricter entrance requirements, greater efficiency and 
guaranteed working conditions. The Advertiser, in a 
penetrating editorial, suggested that 'expense ... has been 
the primary cause of the recent demand for reform but... 
the public interests also demand...due recognition of the 
rights of the humblest servant of the State'.^ This view 
received only limited support in Parliament.
Criticism of the Service
Despite their defence of the Service when referring
to the proposed Board, the newspapers were generally more
critical of the Service in the 1880s than hitherto. They
more frequently mentioned the abundance of 'red tape', and
2thought the Service over-manned. Their criticisms were
1
6 January 1886.
2
See, e.g., Register, 16 April 1879; Advertiser, 29 
January 1880, 1 April 1880, 21 July 1880.
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usually reasoned, but in Parliament criticism was less 
restrained. One Minister, for example, was greeted with 
enthusiasm when he said that
the interests of the Civil Servants will not be 
prejudiced by being openly considered in this 
House (Cheers)...We want no unnecessary offices 
retained or new ones created, and those that 
can be advantageously joined should be 
amalgamated. (Cheers).^
But civil servants may have thought they detected 
prejudice when a member claimed that
the Civil Service was over-manned; we had a 
staff big enough to manage all Australasia....
There was a certain class of Civil Servant who 
simply walked into the office, read the paper, 
went out to a billiard match, and then came 
into lunch, and in the afternoon went out to a 
horse sale.-
Such a criticism was unusually frivolous, but it reflected 
the declining prestige of the Service.
Heads under attack
Resentment of highly paid public servants, inevitable
in times of financial distress, increased when some, such
as the Judges, Commissioners of Audit and Railways
Commissioners, strenuously fought against reductions of
3their salaries. Allegations of inefficiency and
1
S.A.P.D., 28 June, col. ikl-kZ.
2
S.A.P.D., 3 September 1890, p.1290«
3
See, e.g., Judge Boucaut's protests, contained in the 
Boucaut Papers, Nos. 32, 63 and 66, and cf. Audit Report, 
1893/94, p.xxiv.
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corruption increased criticisms, which were directed 
especially against the heads appointed before 1875*^ Many 
members, for example, protested strongly at a salary 
increase granted to G.W. Goyder in 1879 following his 
suggestion that he might resign, and Goyder's
2Parliamentary influence in general declined after 1875*
The competence of H.J. Andrews (Under Secretary, 1882-1890)
was questioned on a number of occasions, and governments
3did not defend him unreservedly. H.C. Mais was attacked 
for extravagance and a Royal Commission was appointed in 
1880, ostensibly to examine all aspects of railways 
management and finance, but in reality to examine Mais.
The hostile Commissioners found him unhelpful and 
unwilling to discuss the work of other departments, but 
ready to emphasize his expert knowledge of his own 
department, and were disturbed to learn that the 'periodic 
inspection of the [railways ] departments [was left ]
4entirely to the heads of those departments'. Their 
mistrust of some senior officers increased when the
1
Cf. Twopenny, p.105*
2
S .A .P .D ., 19 August 1879, cols. 759-63; and see D.W.
Meinig, On the Margins of the Good Earth: The South
Australian Wheat Frontier, 1 8 6 9 - 1 8 8 4 (London: Murray,
1963), P-55, and S.A.P.D., 1 November 1887, col. 1313-
3
E.g., First Progress Report, Minutes of Evidence, qq.26- 
31; S .A .P .D ., 12 September 1888, col. 976. The Under 
Secretary was removed from the Civil List when Andrews 
died in 1890, a change hastened by his unpopularity.
4
'Progress Report on the Royal Commission on Public Works 
and Railways', S ,A .P ,P . 25 of 1880, Minutes of Evidence, 
q. 2205.
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discredited John Mann made a spirited defence of Mais in 
the Public Works Report for 1880.^ Mais was bitterly 
attacked during Parliamentary debate on the Report of the 
Commission (upon which document Mann 'deem[ed ] it
Qunnecessary to remark’ ), and some members expressed 
doubts about whether retiring allowances were suited to
4the railways branch of the Service.
Probity of the Heads
Cases of financial maladministration also lowered the 
prestige of the older heads. In 1880, Josiah Boothby 
(Under Secretary, 1868-I88l) was discovered to have drawn 
personal expenses of £1,500 on an excess expenditure 
warrant under his own signature, after explaining to the 
Auditor General (e .W. Hitchin) that another warrant, 
bearing his Minister's signature, would later be submitted. 
This was never done. The Select Committee which belatedly 
investigated the affair condemned both officers, but did 
not suggest that Hitchin had intended to defraud the
5Treasury.' However, his hesitant explanations and 
tendency to rely on the argument that 'now almost
1
See above, pp.265-6 .
2
S . A.. P .P . 29A of 1880, p .7 .
3
Ibid., p .4.
4
S .A .P ,D ., 13 October 1880, cols. 1430-33* See also 24 
August 1880, col. 775*
5
'Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly 
on the Paris Exhibition Special Commissioner’, S .A .P .P . 
102 of 1881.
330
everything is approved by direction", only emphasized 
that his fault had been to depend too heavily on the word 
of a fellow officer. This was perhaps more damaging to 
the Service as a whole than a case of outright corruption. 
How could the management of the Service be entrusted to 
men who relied on their personal bonds, which clearly were 
not reliable? The Committee noted that 'such conduct on 
the part of officers occupying prominent positions, is
calculated to shake the confidence of the public in the
2Civil Service', and the Advertiser commented:
The question which will at once suggest itself 
to the public mind is, what would have been the 
fate of...an official of a lower rank who had 
committed such an offence as that by which 
these two gentlemen have so unfavourably 
distinguished themselves.3
A Board of Inquiry subsequently appointed to investigate 
Boothby's position did not confine itself to the matter of 
the warrant, but dealt also with charges that Boothby had 
unduly influenced the Government Printer in decisions 
about tenders, illegally received money connected with 
statistical returns, given unauthorized gratuities to some 
clerks and exercised insufficient supervision over others. 
It is unlikely that these charges arose just when the 
warrant was questioned and it thus appears that the 
Government had been dissatisfied with Boothby's official
1
I.e. by the authority of the head of the department 
without specific Ministerial sanction.
2
Ibid., p.v.
30 July 1880.
3
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conduct for some time. Boothby was dismissed and Hitchin 
demoted to Under TreasurerJ
Probity and Efficiency; Appraisal
Improved ability of senior officers
Of all the heads appointed before 1873? the
excellence of barely half a dozen was manifest. In this
period the heads were strongly criticized, but an
increased number were very able men. The outstanding
2three were Ebenezer Cooke, J.A. Hartley, whose role in
founding the Education Department has been described by
3others, and Oswald Brown, who was brought from England to 
be Hydraulic Engineer at the age of thirty. Brown 
reamined in South Australia for only four years, in which
1
Hitchin retired from the Service in June 1883? probably 
unwillingly. He applied for reappointment five months 
later, but was curtly refused (CSO In, 2718/1883? 21 
December I883). There were other cases which damaged the 
Service. Shortly after the Boothby inquiry, charges were 
brought against G.A. Fesenmeyer (Assistant Auditor General, 
1870-1880) that he had improperly used a warrant dealing 
with travelling expenses. The use of the warrant, which 
involved only a small sum, may have been due to genuine 
error and would probably have led only to a severe 
reprimand in previous years, but Fesenmeyer was dismissed 
and his office abolished. And in 1883? H.A. Wood (Public 
Trustee, 1.881-83) absconded with over £8,000 of suitors' 
funds.
2
See above, pp.288-92.
3
Saunders, pp. 1-43-30, and Thomas H. Smeaton, Education in 
South Australia from I836 to 1927 (Adelaide: Rigby, n .d .), 
pp.88-93.
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time he completed two major reservoirs, but his work was
remembered; in I89O, for example, the government tried
1unsuccessfully to induce him to return. E.G. Blackmore,
who became Clerk to the House of Assembly after an
apprenticeship of twenty years in 1886, and Clerk to the
Legislative Council in the following year, was another who
brought a level of intelligence to his positions that they
had not before enjoyed. Though little known to the
public, Blackmore won some renown as an authority on
Parliamentary procedure, and he became Clerk to the House
2of Representatives in 1901.
These four heads were all specialists in their 
positions. G.S. Wright, one of the first heads born in 
South Australia, showed that ability could take a more 
circuitous route to recognition. Wright began work at the 
age of sixteen, when his father, a small city merchant, 
died. He held miscellaneous jobs before entering the
1
’Correspondence re Proposed Engagement of Mr 0. Brown', 
S.A.P,P. 69 of 1890; cf. Review, V o l . XIII, No. 3 (March,
1906), PP.32-3.
2
See his Manual of the Practice, Procedure and Usage of 
the House of Assembly in the Province of South Australia. 
(Adelaide: Government Printer, 188.5 )V Manual of the
Practice, Procedures and Usage of the Legislative Council 
of South A u s t r a l i a (Adelaide: Government Printer, 1884), 
and Law of the Constitution of South Australia (1894). At 
the time of his death, Blackmore was engaged on a work on 
the Australian Constitution for Oxford University Press; 
civil servants noted with pride that the Speaker of the 
House of Commons once referred to him as an authority on 
constitutional matters. He was a sometime lecturer in 
history at the University of Adelaide, Governor of 
St Peter’s School, and Chairman of the Diocesan Synod.
His brother, James Newenham, was Under Treasurer, 1870-75*
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correspondence branch of the Post Office when eighteen, 
and then served in the Chief Secretary's Office, Office of 
the Commissioner of Crown Lands, Treasury, and Marine 
Board» He was Chief Clerk in the Treasury by 1873» but 
did not gain a position at the top until 1882, when he 
became Secretary to the Commissioner of Crown Lands. He 
held this position until 1 9 0 6 , however, and was the first 
Secretary of the Department whom Goyder could not 
completely dominate. As a thorough and demanding 
administrator, Wright earned the respect, and sometimes
the fear, of his subordinates. He was subsequently Chief
1Inspector of the State Bank, from which position he 
retired in 1 9 2 0 , at the age of seventy-five.
No obvious extravagance
It is easy to see that the faults of weaker heads 
overshadowed the merits of the stronger, but it is more 
difficult to determine whether or not the efficiency and 
probity of the Service generally declined during the 
period. However, it seems that many criticisms were over­
stated. Between 1874/75 and I.8 9 O/9 I, the cost of 
establishments (excluding railways) per head of population 
rose from £2.0 to £2.4, an increase comparable to that of 
1857-I8 7 4 /7 5 • Expenditure on establishments declined, as 
a proportion of total government expenditure, from 3 6 per 
cent in 1874/75 to 29 per cent in I8 9 O/9 I. Expenditure on 
salaries, as a proportion of expenditure on establishments, 
also declined throughout the period, and so the cost of
The top executive position in the Bank.
1
salaries declined relative to the total cost of 
government.
In 1885, the Audit Office claimed that the financial 
departments of the South Australian government were
administered more cheaply than those of New South Wales
2and Victoria, and this claim received support from the
reports made by the Auditor General of New Zealand in
31881. The Civil Service Association, also, published
unchallenged figures in later years that showed the cost
of government had been declining in the later years of the 
4period. These figures did not indicate whether the 
growth of the Service could have been curtailed still 
further, and they revealed nothing of the need for economy 
at any particular moment. It seems clear, however, that 
the growth in cost of the Service was not conspicuously 
great over the period, and that claims of extravagance 
were therefore not established beyond dispute.
Dishonesty
Financial peculation increased somewhat over the 
period.J In the decade 1870-1879/80 the Auditor General
1
For these figures, see App. I.
2
'Relative Cost of the Civil Service', S.A.P.P, 136 of 
I885, Pts (i) and (iii ) .
3
Fitzgerald, p.60.
4
'The Cost of Government', a supplement to the Review, Vol. 
VII, No. 12 (July, 1902)5 and cf. 'Report of the Civil 
Service Classification Board under Act No. 7^8 of I9OO', 
ScA.P.P. 2k of 1902, p.vi.
5
Cf. Blainey, p.H9e
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recorded fifteen cases of embezzlement, defalcation and
abscondence, which involved some £1,200 in sum. In the
decade 188O/8I-I89O/9I there were twenty-nine such cases,
involving some £11,000 (though Wood alone accounted for
almost £9,000 of this). A growing number of employees
made an increased number of cases likely, and improved
2auditing techniques were also important. Some of the 
increase was doubtless due to the temptations thrown up in 
times of depression, but perhaps more common was the view 
of one ex-Premier:
I do not agree... that small salaries causes 
[sic] people to take what does not belong to 
them - it is in the nature of the beasts are who 
led into it - mostly by gambling, often by 
extravagant habits, causing them to run into 
debt - to pay some pushing creditor they first 
take some-bodies elses [sic] money, hoping to 
return it before detection. They may do so for 
a time, but at last fail to manage it and are 
then found out.3
However, the increase was not so great that firm 
conclusions could be drawn about the 'nature' of the 
Service as a whole. But critics were not concerned so 
much with the sums involved as with the suspicion that 
undiscovered crimes were being committed.
1
From the Audit Reports for the years I87O-I89O/9I 
inclusive; see also 'Particulars re Guarantees of Civil 
Servants', S .A ,P .P . 133 of 1885.
2
Reporting of defalcations is perhaps as relevant as 
techniques in evaluating the number of cases. In his 
Audit Reports, Cooke stated when no instances occurred 
during the year under review. But Hitchin, in his Reports, 
sometimes omitted any reference to the subject of 
financial peculation. Whether or not this meant that no 
cases had been discovered during the year is not clear.
Playford to Gill, 8 August 1895* Punctuation added.3
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Increase in nepotism
South Australians continued to claim that their 
Service was free of nepotism. The Adve r t i s e r , commenting 
on attempts to extirpate the practice in Victoria,
'regretted that the general lesson [had] been inculcated 
at such c o s t ’ but observed that
one cannot but be glad that [the attempt]... 
serves to inculcate afresh the old fact that 
honesty, honour, justice, and straight­
forwardness are, in politics as in all other 
things, the only best policy.^
Such condescension was, however, less easy to maintain
than hitherto. The appointment of an ex-politician,
Augustine Stow, as Public Trustee in 1886 was
unexceptionable, for Stow had retired from Parliament
2fifteen years before. Less acceptable was the appointment
of Lavington Glyde to a position in the Treasury shortly
after an electoral defeat, and the appointment of another
ex-politician, J.M. Solomon, as Chairman of the Destitute
Board eighteen months after his defeat. The cases of
3Cooke and Mann aroused some doubts, as did the 4appointment of S.J. Way as Chief Justice in I876. The
1
9 March 1880.
2
See A p p . 4.
3See above, p p . 265-6, 289 .
4
Way was then Attorney General, and his right to appoint 
himself was not questioned. But he had been Attorney 
General for barely a year, and a member of Parliament only 
one month longer, and was not obviously the best man for 
the position; some therefore felt m i s g i v i n g s . See A.J. 
Hannan, The Life of Chief Justice Way (Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson, i960), pp.9^-7*”"
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appointment of ex-politicians to the Service in this 
period was not more frequent than before, but the merit of 
the appointees, excepting Cooke, was less apparent. The 
Civil Service Commission, also, was curious about
1departments which contained officers related by family. 
Even so, these isolated cases were insufficient to reveal 
any considerable decline in the level of rectitude in 
making appointments and promotions. The lower levels of 
the Service, in particular, remained apparently little 
touched by the vice.
The Position of the Heads 
Decline of authority
As the prestige of the Civil Service declined in the 
community and demands for retrenchment increased, 
dissatisfaction grew within the Service itself. Not only 
were officers disturbed by conditions of employment: the
informal structure of the Service, so closely knit before 
1875 > began to disintegrate, and the process aroused new 
jealousies and conflicts. In particular, the position of 
the heads of departments changed, since need for economy 
lessened their personnel powers. The Civil Service 
Commission thought that the heads still had too much 
control over finance, but one head typically complained 
that
Third Progress Report, pp.15-6.
1
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I have reduced the staff to the lowest possible 
limit...the revenue will suffer....1 must 
respectfully decline to accept any 
responsibility for this result unless I am 
allowed a staff sufficient to carry out the 
work efficiently.^
The Committee of 1881 marked most clearly the heads’
decline in this respect; their failure to influence the
government on that occasion was in marked contrast to
2their success in recommending salary scales in 1873-
'You are not the only one of my numerous correspondents',
wrote one head to another, 'who sighs for the decadence of
3the Civil Service. I do too m y s e l f . Only against this 
background of pessimism can the remark of another head, 
made when he was chosen to represent the colony in Europe, 
be understood: 'he hoped that his appointment to the
difficult position... would be recognized as a mark of
kconfidence in the Civil Service'.
Failure did not result entirely from economic
pressures, but also from the lessened unity of the heads
as a group. It doubtless remained true that the heads
knew each other well, and that they met socially when5working hours were over.' Their numbers were still small
1
CPWO In, 99/1888, enclosure dated 3 February 1888.
2
See above, pp.236-7*
3Letter of Samuel Deering to W.T. Sheppard, 18 March 1882, 
in Sheppard Papers (S.A.A.). Deering was then Acting 
Agent General in London, and Sheppard Under Treasurer.4
Illustrated Adelaide N e w s , V o l . Ill (February, 1878), 
p.196. Ironically, the head concerned was Josiah Boothby.
5
But fewer instances of such meetings can be found for 
this period, which would negatively suggest a changing 
situation.
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in comparison with the number of senior officers in New
South Wales or Victoria at that time, or with the number
in South Australia twenty years later. Informal
coordination between them was nevertheless of declining
effectiveness, a situation which they were neither willing
nor able to halt. The Public Works Reference Board was
one overt sign that inter-departmental consultation took
place, but it is probable that the process was hindered by
the declining area of official experience which the heads
held in common.^ Departments had been autonomous units
before 1875 inasmuch as heads guarded their authority
carefully, but after 1875 the growth of the Service itself
contributed to increasing autonomy. Even had the heads
been able to reverse this trend, few would have attempted
to do so when their control of personnel in their own
departments was in decline. The Civil Service Commission
noted, with dismay, 'the absence, on the part of some of
the heads of departments, of a detailed acquaintance with
the working of the various offices under the control of
2the Minister for whom they acted as Secretaries'.
Less socially homogenous
Vacancies at the top, arising from death, retirement 
and the dismissals noted above, resulted in the appointment 
of new men who did not share the traditions of the older 
heads. Information relating to the social background of 
the heads appointed during the period, though incomplete, 
suggests a reduced community of outlook.
1
See above, p p .296-7-
Fourth Progress Report, p.v.
2
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Table 32
Social Background of Heads 
of Departments, l875~91a
Born
Britain -
England 33 (l8) 
Scotland 4 (2 ) 
Ireland 6 (1)
Total 43 (21)
Australia -
South Australia 8 (l)
Other 1 (..)
Total
Other Empire 
0 ther
Age to South Australia
Under 20 
20-34
33 and over
Religion
Anglican 22 (ll)
Other Protestant -
Congregationalis t 4 (••)
Methodist 1 (••)
Lutheran 2 (1 )
Unitarian 1 (1 )
Baptis t 1 (..)
Total 9 (2 )
Roman Catholic 3 (2 )
10 (2 )
28 (l4) 
6 (3)
9 (1)
1 (..) 
2 (l)
34l
Education
Element ary 
Public School 
University 
Professional 
Military
Father's Occupation
Government
Clergy
Other Professional 
Merchant 
Military 
Pastoralist
6 (...)16 (i)6 (3)20 (M4 (3)
7 24 (2)
15 (7)
5 (■•)
5 (3)
1 (••)
a
See notes to Table 19 (above, p p . 2.2-7'ß). Figures 
in parentheses indicate the number of heads appointed 
before 1875 included in the sub-total.
The 'South Australianness' of the heads increased, 
even though the number born in Britain declined only 
slightly, for a larger proportion had come to South 
Australia when very young. On the other hand, a 
substantial minority of heads had no experience of South 
Australia or its Service before their appointment.  ^ Since 
they were mostly professional men (as were the South 
Australians recruited laterally to the top), the gap 
between professional and clerical heads widened still 
further. The tendency for the heads' fathers to be 
educated and professional men was less marked, and the 
heads themselves had a somewhat wider experience of the
1
At least four had experience of government administration 
outside of South Australia.
3^2
world. Anglicans were less predominant and, in general, 
the heads could less easily be typified as a group.
An illustration: lessened unity
Before 1875? many heads shared a common background, 
yet quarrelled endemically. The more varied background of 
heads after 1875? alone, made it unsurprising that they 
should have disagreed more frequently amongst themselves. 
Such disputes could be of more than emphemeral importance. 
Thus, A.G. Pendleton was appointed Manager of the 
Railways in I876 and was, almost immediately, involved in 
disputes with H.C. Mais, the Engineer-in-Chief, which were 
not ended until the Railways Board was established in 1887; 
Mais resigned in 1888, at least partly because the Board 
reduced his powers. One reason for establishing the Board 
was to resolve jurisdictional ambiguities between the 
Engineer-in-Chief and Railways departments, around which 
many of Mais' and Pendelton's disagreements revolved. 
Ambiguities were not simply a matter of poor or non­
existent regulations,1 2 but also a product of the personal 
differences of two heads. Although not important in 
themselves, these differences suggest how organizational 
change could be mixed up with personal feeling, and how
uncharted prejudices could cause interdepartmental
2cooperation to founder.
1
See above, p.286.
2
The bases of Mais' and Pendleton's personal antagonisms 
are not known, although it may be significant that both 
were senior Freemasons. Four other heads in this period 
were prominent Freemasons (cf. one, 1857-7^)? and there 
were possibly others less prominent. One politician
(continued p.3^3)
In the Service generally, social and religious bias 
continued to be marked by its absence. C.E.O. Smyth 
(Superintendent of Public Buildings, 1888-1920), it is 
true, showed the anti-German prejudices which were to 
bring him prominence during World War I ,  ^ but he 
apparently did nothing to deny a high position in his 
department to Frederick Krichauff (though doubtless his 
father, F.E.H.W. Krichauff, protected him). Germans and 
other minority social groups elsewhere in the Service were 
not obviously discriminated against. Indeed, one German 
was a head of a department and another, who later became a 
head, was achieving rapid promotion, as was a Roman 
Catholic. The employment of women in the Post Office and 
Education Departments, common by the end of the period, 
met with little resistance, although the Civil Service
2Association later expressed doubts about the practice.
Politics
Declining connexion between politicians and officials
Discontent within the Service had roots more obvious 
than social antagonisms. The turnover of political
~2 (continued from p.3^-2)
remarked cryptically that he ’did not care for Masonic 
principles' in the Service (S ,A ,P .D ., 2 November 1887, 
col. 1 3 3 ^), but no one else seemed concerned, which was 
consistent with the faith of South Australians in their 
own objectivity and fair-mindedness. With the possible 
exception of Mais and Pendleton, the apparent irrelevance 
of the other heads' freemasonary to their official work 
supported this faith.
1
See below, p.^37, note 2.
See below, pp.420-1.
2
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personnel in 1875 broke many of the bonds which had 
existed between particular Ministers and heads of 
departments, and the increase in the number of heads, 
while the number of Ministers remained unchanged, slowed 
the formation of new bonds. The nature of Parliamentary 
activity also underwent change. Parliament was still 
dominated by relatively few men - ten individuals held 
Ministerial positions for half of the period (cf. nine, 
1857-75) - but their dominance was less marked. The 
average total Ministerial tenure of all Ministers was 
twenty-three months (cf. seventeen months), and the number 
of Ministers serving for less than six months declined to 
one quarter of the total number (cf. three-eights).^
Policy differences between political groups became clearer 
and Ministers formed consistent alliances, unlike their 
predecessors in the 1860s. These factors meant that 
senior officials no longer served, and were identified 
with, a stable Ministerial group agreed on most matters of 
government, and this partly explains their decline in 
status in the community. The reports of government 
departments thus received less publicity after 1875 than 
hitherto, as did the activities of the heads of 
departments in general.
Increased anonymity
Public esteem faded also because the Service 
contained fewer men prominent in both politics and 
administration. Hanson, Freeling and Torrens left South 
Australian public life before 1875» Finniss received no
1
Calculated from 'Statistical Record of the Legislature,
I836-I965'.
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further full-time government employment after acting as
Auditor General in I876, and Bonney retired to New South
Wales in 1880. Of the members of Parliament appointed to
the Service in this period only Lavington Glyde had
achieved renown as a politician, and he remained in the
Service for only three yearsJ Even Ebenezer Cooke, the
only ex-politician to become a prominent official, had
said little as a member of Parliament. As in the earlier
period, those members of Parliament who had once worked in
the lower ranks of the Service (of whom four are known)
did not seek to represent the Service in Parliament, and
their government employment had ended some years before
2they became members. Unlike the earlier period, however, 
three erstwhile senior officials entered Parliament, and 
two did so directly from the Service. But neither did 
they become spokesmen for the Service.
The absence of men prominent in a dual capacity was 
both a cause and effect of increasing Service anonymity, 
for when fewer senior officers occupied prominent public 
positions their peers were less likely to seek prominence 
for themselves. Declining prestige acted in a cumulative 
way also. Officers were cautious of making grievances 
public through seeking Parliamentary redress because they 
were less confident of a sympathetic hearing. In I865,
Boothby and England had not hesitated to bring their
3dispute into the open, since both anticipated public and
1
On the Glyde family, see below, p.372» note 1.
2
See App. 4.
See above, pp.255-6.
3
3^ 6
Parliamentary support. There were no parallel cases after 
1875* The criticisms of the heads appointed before 1875 
showed the dangers of public prominence. The Civil 
Service Association was thus careful to remain outside the 
political arena.
Emphasis on Ministerial responsibility
More clearly defined political groups resulted in a 
hardening of Cabinet unity. The readiness of Ministers 
individually to accept responsibility for administrative 
actions appeared also to increase, although few incidents 
relevant to an illustration of the idea of individual 
responsibility occurred. Ministers naturally showed no 
eagerness to consider responsibility for the actions of, 
for example, Boothby and Fesenmeyer, and governments still 
changed too swiftly for responsibility to be easily placed, 
in many instances. However, one Select Committee did not 
hesitate to attribute considerable responsibility for 
certain transgressions of the Engineer-in-Chief to an 
ex-Commissioner of Public Works.1 2 The idea that ’of 
course a Minister would take responsibility’ for anything 
said in Parliament on official advice was readily 
accepted.^
1
In 1886 the Engineer-in-Chief accepted private 
engineering work after some ambiguous communications on 
the subject with the then Commissioner (L.L. Furner); see 
'Progress Report on the Select Committee of the House of 
Assembly on the Public Works Officers', S ,A ,P ,P , 82 of 
1887.
2
Ibid., Minutes of Evidence, q. 97*
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In 1884, for example, Thomas Playford (then 
Commissioner of Public Works) inititated an inquiry into 
the official behaviour of A. .G, Pendleton. The Select 
Committee absolved Pendleton from any fault and Playford, 
unable any longer to accept responsibility for an officer 
he distrusted, exchanged portfolios with the Commissioner 
of Crown Lands. Before 1875 > pastoral expansion was 
inseparable from the name of Goyder, and the early 
settlement of the Northern Territory from that of Finniss. 
After 1875, interest in such issues increasingly focussed 
on Parliament, and particularly on the government.
Increased anonymity in the Service aided this process, 
and so did the characters of Ministers. If merchants 
dominated the governments of 1857-74, professional men 
dominated those of 1875-91» Taken as a whole, the 
Ministers of the later period did not differ greatly from 
their predecessors:
Table 33
Occupations of Ministers, 1.875-9ia
Occupation N umbe r
Agriculture - Pastoralist 3
Small holder 1
Professions - Law 10
J ournalism 5
0 therb 6
Business - Entrepreneur 12
Small 1
Total 38
a
See notes a and d to Table 17 (above, p.193)* Two non­
political Attorneys General are again excluded. Of the 
fifty-one Ministers remaining, information is available 
for only thirty-eight, 
b
Includes an accountant, bank manager, clergyman, engineer, 
physician and soldier.
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But the difference between the most prominent Ministers of 
each period was marked: none of the six longest serving
Ministers of the later period was a businessman.1 The 
professional men of 1875-91 were, it appears, less willing 
than their predecessors to defer to the specialized 
knowledge of professional heads, or to assume that clerical 
heads were efficient managers.
The Civil Service Association
Origins
Dissatisfaction with the leadership of the Service, 
and with the condition of the Service generally, underlay 
the foundation of the Civil Service Association, which 
appeared to cut across departmental barriers. It has been 
seen that the Association was established in 1885 following 
fears of salary reductions, but such fears were an 
immediate impetus only. Moves to establish a formally- 
constituted body of civil servants had been made before 
then. In February 1884, Peter Whitington (Chief Clerk, 
Audit Office) sought the opinion of heads of departments 
on the advisability of founding an association devoted to 
'discussing questions relating to the welfare of the
Service, and of necessity making representations thereon
2to the Government of the day', and received a favourable 
response. Several meetings of heads and other senior
1
Cf. 1857-74, above, pp.193-^.
2
'Draft of Letter, to accompany Petition", Minute Book.
3^9
officers followed, and in April a petition from 452 
classified officers was submitted to the Bray Government, 
seeking its approval for the formation of such an 
association.^ The Government raised no objection, but no 
further action was taken until August, when it was 
resolved to call a meeting of civil servants, at an 
unspecified date. At this stage, the proposed association
was no more than a group of senior officers meeting ad
2 3h o c . They felt a connection with the Committee of 1881,
as their continued use of its minute-book showed, but they
had no clear views on the future of the association. In
August, suggestions were made that the association might
become a society - co-operative, benefit, life assurance,
building or loan and discount - or that it might administer
a superannuation fund or officers' guarantees, or simply
1
CSO In, 940/1884, 2 April 1884.
2
But they claimed to represent all ranks of the Service. 
An index to the petition of 1884 classified the 
signatories according to their Class:
Class Number %
First 46 10.2
Second 22 4.8
Third 31 11.3
Fourth 64 14.2
Fifth 137 30.3
Sixth 132 29.2
To tal 452 100.0
These numbers reflected the relative strength of the 
Classes very closely (cf. Table 24, above, p.295); 
senior officers continued to claim in later years that 
they spoke for all officers. However, some junior officers 
disputed this (see below, pp.4l2-3).
3See above, pp.311-3.
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that it might become a 'club'. But these vague 
proposals were not acted upon, and no further mention of 
an association was made for eleven months.
By July 1885 fears of salary reductions were 
widespread and officers who had been active in the previous 
year called a meeting of classified civil servants, under 
the terms of the resolution of August 1884, to discuss the 
situation. Another three months passed before the meeting 
took place, but office-holders were then quickly elected 
and the Civil Service Association was formally constituted 
on November 6th, 1885. The Association was to
promote the interests of the Civil Service by 
every means consistent with the Civil Service 
Acts in force from time to time and the 
Regulations thereunder, and with loyalty to 
the Government of South Australia.^
Membership was open to all classified officers. Executive 
control was vested in a twelve-member Council of wide 
powers; Rule 21, for example, stated that
questions for consideration at any general 
meeting of the Association shall...be 
submitted to the Council who shall decide 
whether they can properly be discussed by the 
Association; and such decision shall be final.
The Association came into existence because of 
dissatisfaction over conditions. No Association had been 
formed before when conditions were bad, however. But
1
Meeting of 22 August 1884, Minute Book.
2
Constitution and Rules of the Civil Service Association 
of South A u s t r a l i a (Adelaide: Civil Service Association,
1885), S .2(2).
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dissatisfaction rested upon new foundations in the 1880s. 
Civil servants were no longer confident that generally 
improved economic conditions would result in improved 
conditions in the Service, for governments were less 
sympathetic to their needs than hitherto. They were no 
longer confident that the informal representations of 
senior officials would rectify this, for the old connexion 
between politicians and administrators was broken. The 
Association was meant to be a permanent body: its
formation thus acknowledged the fact that the position of 
the Service was permanently changed.
Certainly, few civil servants spoke of these wider 
matters; conditions were bad, and they could better 
improve them as a group than as individuals. Others, more 
informed, did not admit that the Association represented a 
radical innovation in Service activity. To many civil 
servants the formation of an Association appeared a bold 
step, nevertheless. It was the first of its kind in 
Australia, closely followed the unsuccessful Committee of 
1881, and broke with most Service traditions. But the 
essence of the Association was respectability. It was 
presented as a quiet and non-revolutionary body of 
conservative souls interested in gradually bettering 
their conditions of employment. As the first President 
said ,
recognition [of the Association] by the 
Government, and the friendly feelings they have 
exhibited, are...gratifying facts that should 
not be overlooked...it is not out of place to
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suggest that every member should be specially 
careful not to imperil our privileges by 
injudicious conduct.1
The nature of the Association was further tempered by its 
orientation to the top of the Service. Seven of the 
twelve members of the first Council were heads of 
departments. Whilst the history of the Service rendered 
such heavy representation almost inevitable, the 
Association did not entirely embody a revolution from the 
t op.
Founders
The two men most important in founding the 
Association were Thomas Gill and Peter Whitington. They 
drew up the Constitution, visited officials, circulated 
memoranda and were members of the first Council. Neither 
was a head of department but both were near the top of the 
Service: in 1884 Gill was Chief Clerk in the Treasury and
Whitington Chief Clerk in the Audit Office. Their 
backgrounds were similar and, although their characters 
and careers in the Service differed, the nature of their 
official duties brought them into close contact. They 
were born in South Australia within a few years of one 
another. Gill, who entered the Service in I865, a few 
days before he turned sixteen, filled a wide variety of 
positions before entering the Treasury as Chief Clerk in 
1877» a position he returned to in 1880 after spending 
several years in England as Bonded Debt Clerk to the Agent
1
President’s Address, 30 April 1886 , [First J Report of the 
Council, 1885-86. (Adelaide: Civil Service Association,
1886), p .8.
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General. He became Under Treasurer in 1 8 9  ^ and retained 
the position until his retirement in 1920. Whitington 
entered the Service later in life, in 1873 when he was 
twenty-eight. His first post was in the Audit Office 
where he remained for the rest of his working life. He 
became Chief Clerk in 1875 and Auditor General in I9 O7 , 
from which position he retired in 1 9 1 2 .
Gill, whose activities were diverse, was the better 
known of the two to the public. He became Treasurer of 
the Royal Geographical Society in 1885, a Governor of the 
Museum in I8 9 6 , compiled bibliographies of South Australia 
and the Northern Territory which were not superseded for 
many years, and wrote a history of Glen Osmond, where he 
lived for most of his life. He received the I.S.O. in 
1 9 0 6 . Whitington confined himself much more closely to 
his work and because of his brusque manner was not popular 
in the Service, unlike Gill, whose 'courtesy and urbanity' 
recommended him to all. Both were able and ambitious rnen 
and the condition of the Service in the 1880s made it 
difficult for them to realize their ambitions. Whitington 
had most cause for discontent. He appeared likely to 
become a Commissioner of Audit in 1883 when a number of 
Parliamentarians pressed his claims as having virtually 
headed the Office for some years. An unsympathetic 
Ministry overlooked him, however, and appointed Edward 
Heath. Nor were his frequent applications for transfer to
35^
other senior positions in the Service heeded.1 Gill,
also, was aggrieved by his failure to become Deputy
2Commissioner of Taxation in 1884.
The careers of the other three junior members of the3first Council paralleled those of Gill and Whitington.
All five advanced at least two Classes upward in the 
period 1875-1885, and this promotional rate placed them 
apart from all but a very few other officers in the 
Service. All were deputy-heads, or near deputy-heads, of 
their departments well before the age of forty, and the 
future advancement of each was impeded by a head who
4seemed unlikely to move. Moreover, all were clerical
1
Whitington often headed the Office in the period 1875- 
1880 owing to the frequent illness of the then Auditor 
General (E.W. Hitchin), and was Acting Auditor General 
between Sheppard's death (April, 1882) and Cooke's 
appointment (February, 1883 )• He applied for permanent 
appointment several times 5 see CSO In, 1548/1882, 
enclosures dated 26 July 1882, and 20 February 1883; and 
I4 7 O/I8 8 3 , 12 July I8 8 3 . He then applied, unsuccessfully
again, for the position of Secretary to the Minister of 
Education (1550/1883, 20 July I8 8 3 ). In later years his 
applications for transfer from the Audit Office were also 
refused (e.g., CSO In, 6 5 I./I8 9O, 5 [May ] I8 9 O [incorrectly 
filed as 5 March I8 9 0 ]).
2
Fourth Progress Report, Minutes of Evidence, q . 170 .
3
T.F. Wicksteed (Chief Clerk, Credit Lands, in I8 8 5 ); T.W. 
Green (Chief Clerk, Chief Secretary's Office); C.R. Todd 
(Cashier, Treasury).
4
In I883 the average difference between their ages and 
their heads' was 23 years; the average difference between 
heads and deputy-heads, over the Service as a whole, was 
12 years (calculated from Biographies and the Civil 
Service Lists).
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officers. These men were acutely conscious of the 
declining- condition of the Service in the 1880s - 
especially the paucity of senior appointments - and of the 
lowered prestige of the heads in general and the worsening 
position of the clerical heads vis-a-vis the professional 
heads in particular. Whatever notions of wider reform 
they may have held, the Association represented an outlet 
for their frustrations, and a possible means of relieving 
the causes of those frustrations. While the vague policies 
of the Association revealed no definite means to achieve 
this endJ any improvement in the conditions of the 
Service represented an improvement in their own position. 
However, they could not alone have established and 
supported the Association.
Role of the heads
The sanction and support of the heads was crucial, as 
Whitington acknowledged when he sought their views about 
an association in March 1884, and as their presence on the 
Council further showed. Heads gave their sanction for 
different reasons. Some shared Gill's and Whitington's 
dissatisfaction with the condition of the Service and were 
disposed to positive action. Goyder, for example, thought 
government approval for the institution of an association 
unnecessary, for he objected 'to the morality of the 
service being questioned as of its being converted into a
1
Though they supported a retiring age, not surprisingly; 
see, e.g., Fourth Progress Report, Minutes of Evidence,
q. 173.
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Mutual Improvement Society*, and Todd said similarly. A 
few heads, such as Hartley and Cooke, made important 
reforms in their departments during this period, and the 
Association may have represented an extension of this work 
to them. Other heads, however, soon lost interest in the 
work of the Association: of the twelve heads who served on
the first three Councils, four served for one term only.
And some who remained on the Council for many years, like 
Charles Todd, were intent on ensuring that the Association 
did not interefere with the administration of their own 
departments. Others became members of Council to protect 
the privileges of their subordinate officers, which years 
of leadership had accustomed them to do.
But these men were not representative of all heads.
Any head who took an active interest in the Association
marked himself off from those others who resented what
they understood to be the claim of the Association to
advise government on matters of personnel. Some opposed
the recommendations of the Association with considerable
success, as the Association regretfully noted. The
Association indeed signified a new departure in
administrative development in so far as it claimed to
speak for the whole Service, but the innovations that it
2made should not be over-emphasized.
1 —
Letters from Goyder, 21 February 1884, and from Todd, 3 
March 1884, Minute Book.
2
The Civil Service Association was the first of several 
employee organizations that grew up within the Service, and 
its foundation doubtless aided the appearance of others. 
These organizations, the most important of which was an 
association of railways employees, are mentioned below, 
p p .4ll, 429-32,
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A cautious Association
It was not intended to lessen the authority of the 
heads of departments. Gill and Whitington, for example, 
were disturbed by the disappearance of privileges, 
especially those of the heads, which they had hoped to 
enjoy. A return to the past condition of the Service was 
more attractive to them than any foreseeable future 
developments. The formation of a permanent Association 
rested on the implicit assumption that the position of the 
Service was permanently changed; yet the very founders of 
the Association hopefully denied this. Their outlook was 
little removed in essence from that of the heads, and an 
atmosphere of retrospection surrounded most activities of 
the Association. In its first years of existence, 
therefore, the Association concentrated on regaining lost 
privileges and halting further losses, and the 'welfare of 
the Service' was taken to mean only this.
The apparent success of the petition of 1886 seemed 
to show that the Association had a useful role to play.^ 
But protests against salary reductions, arbitrary 
dismissals, amalgamation of offices, increased hours, 
heavier work-loads and other similar matters, involved 
only piecemeal change. Protests against particular 
injustices were no more than a mirror image of the 
economies demanded by politicians and public, and the 
Association was slow to develop a comprehensive plan for 
the administration of the Service. This, again, was a 
product of the long dominance of the departmental heads.
See above, pp.320-1.
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And the Association could not legitimately claim to 
represent the whole of the Service (though it tried to): 
it achieved only about 20 per cent of its potential 
membership in the 1880s.
The Decline of Parochialism
Criticism of the Service, and unrest within it, were 
in part due simply to a society that was getting physically 
bigger. Before 1875» the rate of population increase in 
the colony as a whole had outstripped that of Adelaide, a 
situation reversed in the period 1876-91. The population 
of the colony then rose from 213,000 to 317,000 (an 
increase of 48 per cent). The population of Adelaide rose 
from 70,000 to I3 3 ,000 (90 per cent), which transformed it 
from a town into what its inhabitants thought was a 
metropolis.  ^ New buildings, streets, entertainments, 
professional men, entrepreneurs and groups seeking 
political recognition accompanied the change, as did other, 
less tangible matters.
By the 1890s the colony had nearly fifty years of 
independent existence behind it and its political leaders 
had few memories of the era before self-government. The 
colonists found that they had their own history: in the
1880s, histories of the colony appeared with sharply
See A p p . lc.
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increased frequency.' The notorious parochialism of the
colonists conversely showed signs of weakening.
'Continued localism', said Boucaut in 1880, pursuing his
theme of 1875? 'is a curse and disgrace to the British 
2race'. By 1889? Boucaut, though a Justice of the Supreme
Court, was involved in furthering the cause of Federation
3in South Australia. Boucaut's changed role, from 
advocacy to activity, was one sign of the declining 
parochialism of South Australia. Admittedly, Twopeny, in 
1883? thought that
there is certainly something very provincial 
about the attitude of [Adelaide] to the rest of 
the world...the Adelaideans...are...by far the 
most narrow-minded [of Australians ]. . . .Shut up 
in their own little corner, they imagine 
themselves more select than Sydney or Melbourne 
circles, because they are necessarily smaller.^
And in 1893 the Register claimed too much when it said that 
South Australia, unlike New South Wales and Victoria,
1
Until 1871? the only South Australian works which might 
be termed substantial histories of the colony were those of 
Sinnett (1862), Forster (l866) and Conigrave (l87l). Then 
followed those of Harcus (1876), Worsnop (1878 and 1880), 
Loyau (l880, 1883 and I885)? Stow (1883)? Bull (1884), 
Finniss (1886) and Conigrave (l886), as well as several 
produced by governments and the press. (These works are 
cited in full in the Bibliography.)
2
Boucaut to Parkes, 13 December, 1880, Parkes Papers, A 919?
P.723.
3
See, e.g., Boucaut to Parkes, 29 November I889? ibid., 
pp.730-1.
4
Twopeny, pp.26, 109.
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treated Federation from a 'purely practical, patriotic, 
Australian point of view'. It was true, however, that in 
the 1880s South Australian interest in developments 
outside the colony increased.
Depression helped shake the colony from its 
comfortable isolation. Governments were more ready to 
learn from the experience of others, and Royal Commissions, 
for example, visited other colonies with increasing 
frequency. Matters other than Federation crossed the 
borders into South Australia. In 1885 the South 
Australian Free Trade League was incorporated, and the 
arrival in 1884 of the H.M.C.S. Protector, the colonists' 
own gunboat, signified an increased concern with external 
affairs. Communications were further extended in 1887, 
when the first express trains ran between Melbourne and 
Adelaide. Two years later, telephonic connections were 
opened between Adelaide and some country towns. An Art 
Gallery was added to the University in 1881 as final proof 
of colonial maturity. The increased role of government 
reflected a period of more rapid transition, as did the 
growing familiarity of South Australians with the men and 
issues of other colonies.
The growing diversity of senior officials, in terms 
of their official careers and social backgrounds, was in 
part a product of a society less turned in upon itself.
The prestige of officers declined in such a situation. 
Information and expertise were less a monopoly of 
government officials when developments in other colonies
22 August 1893.
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were more rapidly known and evaluated, and when the 
prominent officials and other public men of New South 
Wales and Victoria were recognized by South Australians. 
Former leaders shrank in size when placed on a larger 
stage.
Summary: The Civil Service - One Entity?
For twenty years after self-government, the Civil 
Service was inseparable from the senior officials who 
managed its affairs; to most South Australians, they 
indeed were the Service. During the 1880s this was 
decreasingly true. Although the Service grew functionally 
more diffuse and complex (a development partly offset by 
the separation of the Railways Department), colonists 
regarded it less as a collection of departments under 
renowned leaders and more as a single machine. It became 
natural to juxtapose the South Australian Service with 
that of Victoria, rather than the departments of North 
Terrace or Port Adelaide with those of Victoria Square.
The changing relative prestige of officials and Ministers, 
renewed attacks on the Service, and the precedents of the 
Railways Board and overall salary reductions, furthered 
the idea that the Service could be regarded as one entity. 
Sweeping Parliamentary criticisms showed that many found 
the notion easy and convenient to accept.
Such an idea scarcely mirrored developments within the 
Service, where departmental autonomy and tensions between 
officers increased. Yet it was a pre-condition to support 
for a Civil Service Board, an administrative device which 
assumed that the Service could be managed efficiently as
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and by one body. If need for economy influenced 
politicians to demand a Board, economy was not by itself 
enough to make the scheme seem viable,, And if senior 
officials contributed to cries for retrenchment by their 
financial blunders, they contributed more by their 
inability to show clearly that they deserved continued 
respect and authority. A fast-changing society created 
pressures of which financial stringency was only the most 
prominent.
CHAPTER IX  
INDEPENDENT CONTROL?
In 1857 , civil servants desired to retain and extend 
the privileges they had won in the previous twenty years 
(such as superannuation, salary increments, light work­
loads and high prestige). Politicians wanted to make 
vague but sweeping changes in the Service. Thirty years 
later, civil servants still tried to retain their 
remaining privileges, but politicians were no longer 
united about the Service. Many demanded narrow but 
specific changes, to ensure economy in administration.
The question of intent raised in 1884 ('a Civil Service 
Board?’) seemed, by 1887, to be one of time: when was the
Civil Service Board to be established? But Ministers 
desired to retain full control over the Civil Service. It 
may seem something of a paradox that, at a time when 
Ministers desired to exercise, and did in fact exercise, 
greater control over a Civil Service less unified than 
hitherto, public and Parliamentary demands centred on 
reducing Ministerial control over a Service which was held 
to be a single entity. The conflict was, however, a 
hidden one, for Ministers professed to support a Board, and 
the Service sought to conceal its own disunity on the 
matter.
The Board and Governments
The assumption that the Service could be managed by 
one body, though accepted by many, was not proved. The 
most important auditors of the scheme - the governments of
365
the day - appeared to endorse it. J.C, Bray (Treasurer,
1886-87), for example, announced his government's
intention of establishing a Board resembling that of
Victoria, but with the two Commissioners of Audit as 
2members, Playford made similar promises. But governments 
covertly believed that it would be undesirable to manage 
the Service through a Board.
If a Railways Board, why not a Civil Service Board?
If this question occurred to Ministers, they did not 
publicly say so. Neither the press nor back-bench members 
of Parliament linked the two Boards to fashion more 
general arguments concerning the management and control of 
administration. Few speeches or editorials mentioned both 
Boards; each was to be considered and achieved separately. 
Pressure for a railways Board was the stronger, and 
Ministers gave way before it. The railways department was 
as large as the rest of the Civil Service, and it had a 
unity which, as Ministers at least were aware, the Service 
did not, The other colonies gave clearer examples of 
railways control than of Service control generally, and 
business principles seemed easier to apply to the railways.
The establishment of the Railways Board itself 
prejudiced governments against a further abdication of 
power. The collapse of the Act of 187^ seemed to 
demonstrate that it was futile to sign away power, since
1
Of Colton (June 1884-June 1885), Downer (June 1885-June 
I887), and Playford (June 1887-June I889).
2
S.A.P.D., 2h August 1886, cols. 799-800.
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the Executive had eventually to recover its authority in 
times of economic crisis. There was no guarantee that a 
Board would save more than it would cost, for extra staff 
and equipment would be needed, and it might further strain 
inter-departmental relations. It was also feared that a 
Board, once instituted, would extend its operations past 
the realm of mere finance. The Committee of 1881 and the 
simple existence of the Civil Service Association probably 
heightened such suspicions.
Most important, the question raised the difficult 
problem of the relation of the House of Assembly to the 
Legislative Council. For decades the two bodies had 
wrangled over their areas of power, especially in regard 
to finance, and by the 1880s the Council was a declining 
force. It did, however, assert itself several times in 
the 1880s - by rejecting attempts by the House to alter 
the Civil List salaries, for example - and was provoked by 
seeing the House throwing away control of a large part of 
the public expenditure to a Board of 'irresponsible 
power'. ^ A Board also meant a reduction in the power over 
finance which the Council exercised through its sole 
Minister.
The Council's objections often took the form of a 
defence of responsible government. R.C. Baker, the 
influential arch-conservative of the Council, thus 
maintained that
the passing of such a measure would be
prejudical to good government... in South
Australia...the whole thing was contrary to the
1
5.A .P .D ., 3 November 1887, col. 1355-
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theory of responsible government under which we 
lived... people should govern themselves through 
their representat i ves in Parliament... to 
appoint a Board that was to over-rule and 1 
control the Ministers,..would be disastrous.
To some the matter was virtually a moral issue, and one 
member stated that ’only one reason would justify the
passing of such a Bill as this, and that would be the
2imputation of corruption to the Ministry’, A government 
pressing a Bill for a Board would thus risk antagonizing a 
Council that might retaliate by rejecting more important 
legislation.
The Board and the Association
The Association found it difficult to adopt a
consistent attitude towards the proposed Civil Service
Board. It professed a ’sincere desire’ to secure the
’economical and efficient conduct of the business of the
State’, but it also desired 'a due regard for the
3interests of all the parties concerned’. Most politicians 
who supported a Board were interested in the first aim, 
and there could be no guarantee that a Board would be 
concerned with the second. At the same time, a Board, if 
constituted similarly to the Victorian Board, would be 
responsible for securing more than economies alone, and 
might result in improved conditions. This view, however,
1
Ibid,, 25 October 1887, col. 1203.
2
Ibid., 3 November 1887, col. 1355«
CSO In, 1843/1886 , 26 October 1886.3
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was held largely by subordinate officers, who were ready
to grasp at any means to improve their lot,^ It had less
attraction for members of the Council and senior officers
generally. A Board of almost any form would reduce the
authority of the heads. It would also assume substantial
responsibility for those matters with which the Council
was involved, and the attempt of heads to retain their
powers by supporting the Association would therefore
fail. But the Council could not openly reject the idea of
a Board if its ’sincere desire’ was not to appear
insincere. Opposition was, in any case, unlikely to
influence the politicians who favoured a Board. The
Council thus sought a compromise, and suggested that any
Board should include civil servants as members, preferably
2selected by the Association, and not in a minority. In 
public, the Association supported the idea of a Board with 
wide powers; in private, Council members observed the 
debate with strong reservations.
Playford and Civil Service Reform
The institution of a Board to effect economies was 
nonetheless a prominent issue in the Parliamentary
1
See, e.g., H.D. Melville, Compensation for a Life’s 
Service (and Injury) (Adelaide: By the Author, 1888T<» p»3»
Melville almost lost his sight when Chief Warden of the 
Goldfields in the Northern Territory (1872-73)» and 
received little compensation. He hoped that a Board would 
do him justice.
2
CSO In, 1843/1886, 26 October 1886.
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elections of March I887. Most candidates declared 
themselves in favour of the idea, and none openly opposed 
it. One candidate claimed, typically, that
thirty thousand pounds could be saved in 
departmental expenditure by a Civil Service 
Board....No Ministry was strong enough, or 
remained in office long enough to effect the 
reforms which [the Board] would accomplish.^
The press continued to support the scheme, although the
city newspapers emphasized economy less than those of the
2country. When Thomas Playford formed his first 
Government in June 1887 it was thus expected that early 
legislation would provide for the institution of a Board.
Bill for a Board
Only after much delay, however, did Playford
introduce the necessary Bill, which he took care to send
first to the Council. It was a suspiciously ambitious
3Bill. It provided for the appointment of three 
Commissioners, with renewable terms of five years, who 
were 'personally to inspect each department', and who were 
given power to 'increase or diminish...to alter the
1
Port Augusta Dispatch, Newcastle and Flinders Chronicle,
18 March 1887.
2
Cf. , e.g. , Advertiser, 6 January 1886; Register, l4 March
1887; Northern Ar g u s , 25 March 1887; Port Augusta Dispatch, 
15 April 1887; South-Eastern Star, 8 July 1887; Border 
Watch, 9 July I887.
3
The Bill was drawn almost entirely from the Act under 
which the Victorian Board functioned (Victoria, 1883.. No. 
773> 'An Act to make Better Provision for the Public 
Service of Victoria'.)
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distribution...or to amalgamate any two or more offices or 
departments•. They were to begin their work by 
classifying the Service and were empowered to recommend 
salaries. Officers were to be compelled to retire at 
sixty. Ministers could vary or dispense with the 
proposals of the Board only by placing their objections in 
writing before Parliament. The Government spokesman in 
the Council said in introducing the measure that 'the 
object of this Bill was economy...there had been a general 
opinion that the Civil Service was overmanned and too 
highly paid, and that a Board should be appointed to deal 
with it'.1 But the proposed Board had power to deal with 
more than mere measures for economy, and the Council 
firmly rejected the Bill. This is almost certainly what 
Playford intended should happen, but the success of the 
rather transparent manoeuvre did not end the agitation for 
some re-modelling of the Service.
2A 1 dummy 1 Board?
Playford then introduced a Royal Commission to 
inquire into the Service as a preliminary to legislation. 
There was wide scope for an inquiry, but Playford desired 
an honest inquiry as little as he wanted a Civil Service 
Board. Even if a Commission only revised the cost of the 
Service, it might show that such revision was better 
handled by an extra-Parliamentary body. If it went further, 
a Commission would reveal much that demanded widespread
S .A .P .D ., 19 October 1887, col. Il46.
A term of doubt used by the Advertiser, l4 February 1888.
2
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change. Playford's legislative programme was in any 
concerned with more important matters. In 1887, his 
government - easily one of the most successful South 
Australia had seen - introduced a full scale tariff system 
for the first time, extended local government to outlying 
and newly settled areas, and established the Railways 
Board. In the following session, the Crown Lands Act 
consolidated previous legislation and initiated a system 
of perpetual lease. In these circumstances Civil Service 
reform was relegated to a minor place, and the Civil 
Service Commission of 1888-91 was therefore directed 
towards the end of doing as little as possible. 'It was', 
said one member subsequently, 'a little bit of a sop to 
public feeling because the Civil Service Board Bill had 
not been passed*.1
The Commission's terms of reference were wide:
to inquire into and examine the state and 
condition of the Public Service of South 
Australia, and to report thereon as to the 
expediency of legislation or other such action 
for the purpose of securing the better and more 
efficient and economic working of such service 
and on any other matters in any way affecting 
the said service,
No time limit was suggested. There were no immediate 
protests in Parliament or the newspapers at the terms, and 
the Civil Service Association began drawing up submissions 
for the Commission. All read their own wishes into the 
t e rm s .
S .A .P ,D ., 12 September 1888, col. 982.
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The Commissioners
PlayTord selected Commissioners who would keep the 
inquiry subdued. Samuel Dening Glyde, the Chairman, 
assumed the role of Government watchdog.^ Charles 
Counsel! , first Secretary to the Commission, wrote of him:
Before the Civil Service Commission made their 
[sic] first report, I suggested to [Glyde] that 
they [sic] ought to report on the question of 
the advisability or otherwise of appointing a 
Civil Service Board. Mr Glyde said he did not 
think the Commission would refer to the 
question, stating his opinion that a majority 
of the Commission were against the establishment 
of a Board....1 have never expected,..that the
1
The Glyde family played a prominent part in South 
Australian politics after 1837» but was a declining force 
by 1887. Samuel's brother, William, was a member of the 
Legislative Council 1882-87, and his cousin, Lavington 
Glyde, was a member of the House of Assembly, 1857-75 and 
1877-84, a Minister seven times, and Accountant to the 
Commissioner of Insolvency 1885-89 (see above, p-336). 
Samuel was himself a member of the Assembly 1885-87- He 
chaired a Royal Commission on Government Stores in 1886-87, 
was a Visitor to the Lunatic Asylum, a director of several 
companies, and chairman of a large life assurance company. 
But William, Lavington and William L. Glyde, the last 
another cousin and prominent businessman, were all 
declared bankrupt in I887 and never re-entered public life. 
After the final Report of the Civil Service Commission, 
Samuel also slipped into obscurity. Although he escaped 
the family fate of bankruptcy, Samuel was not the most 
able to the Glydes. The failure of the Town and Country 
Bank in 1882, with which he was connected, caused many to 
regard his character with doubt and his Parliamentary 
career was not distinguished; neither was his chairmanship 
of the Civil Service Commission. He died a few years 
afterwards, while prospecting for gold in Western 
Australia.
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Commission would be in any hurry to report on 
the question, which would probably be shelved 
until the Government did [something ].^
The two members of the House of Assembly on the Commission 
were also ’Playford's m e n * . David Bews and Robert Homburg 
became Ministers in Playford’s Ministry of August 1.890- 
June I892, and were in 1888 already largely committed to 
him. The third Parliamentary member was H.E. Bright, who 
represented the interests of the Legislative Council. As 
a man of seventy, with the attitudes of the Council 
influencing him, he was regarded as unlikely to favour 
sweeping change. The other two Commissioners were William 
Longbottom and A.L. Harrold, both wealthy businessmen, who 
represented the business community. No civil servants 
were included, and only Bright had any direct experience 
with the Service, as Commissioner of Public Works in
1873-75-1 2
1
CSO In, 1513/1889, enclosure dated 29 August I889- 
Counsell is only a dubious witness as to Glyde's 
intentions. He was replaced as Secretary to the Commission 
by Thomas Harry, a friend of Glyde's , and Counsel! found 
Glyde guilty of many sins (see ibid., enclosure dated 30 
August I889). But nothing suggests that Counsell’s 
reporting of Glyde was a fabrication, and other factors 
support it. The government ignored Counsell's complaints, 
as it did most matters connected with the Commission (see 
S .A.P,D. , 12 September 1888, cols. 975-77, 981-82).
2
The newspapers criticized the absence of Commissioners 
with long experience of the Service, and the Association 
deplored the absence of civil servants (see, e.g. ,
Register, 20 January 1888, and Journal, Vol. XII, No. 27 
[March, I891], Supplement, p.2). Members of Parliament, 
however, raised no protests.
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The Civil Service Commission
Playford was somewhat hampered in his choice of 
Commissioners because the work of the Commission was not 
expected to be popular. As he later admitted, he
did not wonder that members of both Houses had 
when he had consulted them respectfully 
declined to act as members of the Commission.
It was a case in which they got no pay and 
plenty of abuse....It was disagreeable wor k /
The Commission was thus, from the start, not quite such a 
good 'dummy board' as Playford wanted. This later had a 
considerable effect on the actions of the Commission, but 
initially it mattered little, since Playford had at least 
sufficient Commissioners to guide the Commission along the 
course he planned. That course was towards 
recommendations on finance and away from wider matters.
As the Chief Secretary (j.G. Ramsay) claimed, the 
Commission was
carefully examining and inquiring into the 
working of our Civil Service with a view of 
making such recommendations as will tend to the 
more economical working of the Service...and 
[the Government] will consider their report 
before taking further action.-^
1
An earlier account of the work of this Commission was a 
prize-winning essay in the Sir George Murray Essay 
Competition conducted by the Royal Institute of Public 
Administration (A.C.T. Branch) in 1964.
2
S .A .P .D ., 12 September 1888, col. 982. Playford secured
the services of Bright and Bews by telegram, only three 
days before the Commission was appointed (see CSO Out, 17 
January 1888, pp.26-7).
Quoted in the Advertiser, 24 April 1888.
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Early reaction
Playford's Ministry did not, however, receive 
economies suggested by the Commission with any indication 
of pleasure.  ^ Distinct animosity towards the Commission 
became evident in other quarters. The Civil Service 
Association published strong criticisms of it in the
2Review as its Reports continued to emphasize economy. A 
handful of legislators kept up a constant attack, their 
argument being that the cost of the Commission outweighed 
the economies it proposed. The newspapers were soon the 
only source of praise for the Commission. From the rest 
of the community came silence: in the newspapers were no
letters either of praise or condemnation, and in 
Parliament very few questions. This was predictable, 
since few apart from those directly concerned could 
sustain an interest in the manner in which the
1
See, e.g., S .A .P .D ., 16 October 1888, cols. 1390-9^*
2
In 1889 the Association commissioned J.D. Woods to 
produce his 75-pa-ge booklet, The Civil Service of South 
Australia: A Review, as a criticism of the work of the
Commission. The Council considered its tone too harsh and 
indiscreet, however (see, e.g., its comment on the 
management of the Survey department, about which 'the 
Commissioner of Crown La n d s , whoever he may b e , knows 
little' [p.74 ]), and disclaimed any responsibility for it. 
Woods, at that time a journalist, then published the 
booklet himself and had 'the satisfaction of knowing that 
it generally embodie[d ] the views and opinions of the 
Civil servants of South Australia' (Preface). This was 
probably an exaggerated claim. Woods was dismissed from 
his position as Manager of the Waterworks in 1861 on 
charges of improper conduct (see above, p.182) and he was 
unable to write impartially about the Service (see, e.g., 
pp.11-2). However, the booklet contains the only 
reasonably extensive history of the Service, and is useful 
if treated with caution.
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Commissioners’ of Audit petty cash book was kept, or in an 
alteration of the distribution of the police in the far 
north and other similar matters.
The inquiry pursued
Yet this only makes the enthusiasm of the 
Commissioners the more remarkable. The Commission sat for 
over three and a half years, asked over 22,000 questions, 
held over 600 sittings, travelled to New South Wales and 
Victoria twice, and extensively traversed South Australia. 
Members kept up a fairly constant average of sittings each 
month, and there was no evident tendency to slacken work 
during sittings of Parliament. The rate of remuneration 
would not have repaid the non-Parliamentary members for 
the loss of time involved, and the Parliamentary members 
were paid nothing. The charge that members lined their 
pockets with travelling expenses was raised once, but was 
vehemently denied and never raised again.1 2 There is no 
evidence that the intercolonial visits were an excuse for 
junke ting.
The question is partly unreal. Eleven men served on
2the Commission at various times, and to some extent it
1
S.A.P.D., 12 September 1888, cols. 975-78.
2
Viz. S.D. Glyde, H.E. Bright and W. Longbottom (all 
January 1888-September I891), D. Bews and R. Homburg (both 
January 1888-August I89O), A.L. Harrold (January 1888- 
December 1888), H.C.E. Muecke (merchant and shipping agent, 
M.P. 1903-10; January l889~July 1889)» L. Grayson 
(engineer, M.P. 1887-93; July 1 889-September I891),
D. Bower (timber merchant, M.P. 1865-70» 1875-87; July
1889-September I89I; additional Commissioner),
(continued p*377)
377
was thus a series of Commissions rather than a single one.
But three (Glyde, Longbottom and Bright) served throughout,
and the average length of tenure was just under twenty-
four months. Bews and Homburg may have remained for future
favours of more profit, but this is not an obvious reason
for the other Commissioners. It is significant that the
Commission went on for much longer than was expected.
When one member of Parliament stated in September 1888
that it had already taken longer than was at first
expected Ramsay expressed the belief that it would end
some time in 1889 .^  Playford, on his re-entry to office
in I89O, was surprised to find it still there, for he
admitted in 1900 that 'it would probably have been going
2yet, had the Government not stepped in'. The most 
obvious answer is correct - the Commission remained 
because members grew increasingly concerned at the 
problems confronting the Service and because they desired 
to find solutions to those problems.
At first this seems an unlikely answer. The first 
eight Reports showed concern only with financial detail 
and seemed no more than further demonstrations that the 
Commission existed to postpone Civil Service reform 
indefinitely. The Association, feigning regret, claimed 
that the Commission would not go beyond this to recommend
2 (continued from p.376)
J.L. Parsons (clergyman, M.P. 1878-84, 1890-93» 1901-03; 
August 1890-September I891), and J. Moule (merchant, M.P. 
1884-96; August 1890-September I.891).
1
S .A .P .D ., 12 September 1888, col. 982; and see also 25 
September 1888,col. 1099«
2
Ibid., 29 November 1900, col. 1011.
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a Board, a view which the calibre and reputations of the 
Commissioners seemed to support. At the time of their 
appointment, only Longbottom, Harrold, Bright and Parsons 
were widely or favourably known to the public, but 
Longbottom took a passive role during proceedings and 
Harrold served for a short period only. Glyde and Bower 
were superannuated politicians and the most able 
Commissioner, Muecke, served for only six months. No 
member had shown a marked interest in the Service before 
his appointment. Their mediocrity largely accounted for 
poorly written Reports and haphazard questioning. Yet the 
Commission was doing more than was readily apparent.
When J.A. Cockburn, who formed a radical government 
and replaced Playford as Premier in June 1889 , asked the 
Commission to submit plans for a Civil Service Board in 
July I889, the Commissioners pleaded insufficient evidence 
to comply with the request. But, they added, they were
very strongly impressed with the very wide 
discrepancies in salaries and the apparent 
absence of anything like system in regard 
thereto, and [they were ] led to the conclusion 
that radical change is necessary, such as can 
only be brought about by a detailed 
classification according to the value of the 
various positions in the service. The work 
done in connection with each office should have 
a proper value fixed upon it, and the holder of 
that office should only receive a salary 
commensurate therewith. The Commission hopes, 
if time permits, to deal with this important 
question when bringing up their final report. ■
1
Fifth Progress Report, p.xviii.
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'If time permits' was, perhaps, a phrase that referred 
obliquely to Glyde's obstructionist intentions, but the 
reply showed that at least some Commissioners were turning 
to matters wider than economy. So did other Reports.
Proposed reforms
During the sittings that led to the first Report, the
Commissioners examined the work of the clerical officers
of the Royal Adelaide Hospital, but went no further, for
the Hospital was 'under the control of a Board [and they
did not ] deem it necessary to go into detail in regard to
its management'.  ^ Two months later the Commission
suggested to the government that it might investigate the
2work of the Board. Had the Commission proceeded with 
this plan considerable publicity would have resulted, 
since charges of maladministration were at that time being 
levelled at the Board. Such an examination might also have 
set a precedent for investigations into other Boards. The 
government ignored the suggestion and the Commission did 
not pursue the matter.
The Commission feared that officers might be
restrained from freely giving evidence because of fears of
victimization, and so sought a government guarantee
3against any 'system of terrorism'. In reply, the 
government offered a Cabinet Minute that employees 'must 
avoid all consideration of the nature of their testimony
1
First Progress Report, p.xvii.
2
CSO In, 1791/1888, 12 November 1888.
CSO In, 729/1889j enclosure dated 7 May I889.
3
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and must not afford the slightest grounds for the 
suggestion that...[they] are affected by any such 
considerations'.1 This was a far weaker assurance than 
the Commission sought, and helps to explain the half­
hearted cooperation of officers in the inquiry. It should 
be noted, however, that just as this imperfect assurance 
had a restrictive effect, so the strong assurance which 
the Commissioners sought would probably have had an 
expansive effect.
In 1889 the Commission attempted to examine the work
of the Railways Department, but the Railway Commissioners
refused to testify, arguing that their duties lay beyond
the jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission
complained to the government that it was therefore 'unable
to proceed with [the] inquiry into the Public Works 
2departments'. The Railways Commissioners were, however, 
compelled to give evidence only in their capacity as 
members of the Public Supply and Tender Board; the 
administration of the Railways Department itself was not 
touched. The government was again unwilling that the 
operation of a nominally independent Board should be 
inve s tigated.
In the recommendations of the fourth Report, the 
Commission went so far as to suggest changes in the 
methods used by the Agent General to inscribe stock. The 
Agent General retorted angrily and indeed misrepresented 
the recommendations, leading the Advertiser to comment
1
Ibid., enclosure dated l4 May I889.
CSO In, 1247/1889, 24 July I889.
2
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that his 'irritation has prevented him from doing justice
to the report of the commission'.1 23 Again the government
did nothing, and the Commission had to defend itself in an
2appendix to a subsequent Report.
The Commission spent considerable time investigating
charges of corruption in the Service. The lengthiest and
most detailed examination involved Owen Smith, the
Superintendent of Public Buildings. The Commission drew
up its report in December 1888 and submitted it to the
government in that month, but it was not tabled until July
I889, and then only after repeated questioning from the
3Parliamentary members. This matter also died in the face 
of Ministerial intransigence.
These matters transcended economy. They involved 
such questions as: who ultimately controlled the Service?;
what rights did officers have to air their views?; who was 
to be held responsible for corruption?; how much autonomy 
did and should departments have?; how much was the public 
to know of the condition of the Service? On none of these 
did the government give more than equivocal support to the 
Commission, which could not have expected anything else. 
The Commission nevertheless persisted in approaching those 
questions, and in the final Report grappled directly with 
them.
1
4 August I89O.
2
Seventh Progress Report, App. H.
3
E.g., S.A.P.D., 11 June I889, cols. 17-18; 17 July I889, 
col. 240; 18 July I889 , col. 239.
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The Final (Ninth) Report
Deficiencies of styie and expression made 
interpretation of the Report difficult. It did, however, 
deal with most elements of the modern, non-political 
career Service, including standardization of conditions of 
employment, administration by an independent central 
agency, recruitment by examination, promotion by merit, 
position classification, and adherence in spirit to career 
service principles.^
The Commissioners desired 'uniformity' of conditions
2throughout the Service. They noted that
great anomalies exist, as it frequently happens 
that clerks in the same office working side by 
side, and discharging almost identical duties, 
have widely differing salaries, thus causing 
jealousy and suspicion of favouritism,3
and criticized
the absence of any fixed principle guiding 
appointments and promotions [which] has 
necessarily made such appointments and 
promotions uncertain and capricious.
They argued that unclassified officers 'should be entitled
to the same privileges... as are now enjoyed by the officers
5on the fixed list', and recommended a standardization of
1
Cf. Caiden, Career Service, pp.2-4.
2
Ninth Progress Report, p.8.
3Ibid. , p. 1.4.4
Ibid., p.8.
5
Ibid., p .10.
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procedures for payment of overtime. The ’vicious system
of working Government Departments as separate businesses’^
was of central concern. Officers who did not know what
their counterparts in other departments were paid revealed
2the disunity of the Service. The absence of
comprehensive records of employees prevented the
introduction of some privileges: no data existed, for
example, to provide an actuarial basis for a superannuation 
3scheme. Efficiency was lowered when departments were 
unable temporarily to command the staff of other 
departments. As an essential element of uniformity, the 
Commission urged the adoption of a classification scheme, 
dividing the Service into three branches, Professional,
4Clerical and Temporary. Most previously unclassified 
officers should be absorbed into the Professional and 
Clerical branches and only those actually employed on a 
temporary basis should be included in the Temporary branch. 
The Professional and Clerical branches were to be divided
1
Advertiser, 19 June 1890.
2
Cf. R.N. Spann, 'Reflections on Efficiency', Public 
Administration (Sydney), Vol. XIX, No. 4 (December, i960), 
P.313.
3
Cf. 'Second Progress Report of the Public Service 
Commission' , S .A .P .P . 20 of 1900, A p p . 0, p.429* The work 
of this Commission is considered below, p p .397-8.
4
The Commissioners in fact used only the terms 
Professional and Clerical and did not distinguish 
temporary officers by a particular term. However, they 
clearly (and indeed necessarily) implied the existence of 
a branch containing temporary officers, for which the term 
'Temporary' has been adopted from the Bill of I887.
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into two divisions, the Lower (containing cadets), and the 
Upper (containing adult officers).
A Board to classify positions in the Service, and to 
carry out other duties, was recommended. The Commission 
ambiguously stated the basis of the proposed
classification, but apparently intended it to be by office
rather than by officer: the Board was to determine ’the
amount of salary to be paid in respect of each particular
office',  ^ and officers receiving higher salaries than
their position warranted were to be shifted to offices of
greater responsibility and equivalent salary. Recruits to
the Professional and Clerical branches were to enter as
cadets, after passing an examination equivalent to the
fifth-grade school examination. To advance from the Lower
to the Upper division a further examination, 'of a
2practical character', was to be passed. Promotion in the
Lower division was to be strictly by seniority, since the
abilities of officers at that stage would not be clearly
differentiated enough to permit any other procedure, but
promotion in the Upper division 'should be by merit rather3than by seniority'. Automatic annual increments were to 
be abolished.
In a later reference to the South Australian Service, 
a President of the Industrial Court defined a career 
service as one
1
Ninth Progress Report, p.8; cf. above, p.378.
2
Ibid., p.9.
Ibid., p .9.
3
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normally involving a life-time of employment, 
which comprehends a collection of duties which 
are capable of arrangement in accordance with 
gradations of difficulty or responsibility so 
that the average employee, by dint of the 
experience and skill which he can acquire with 
growing years of service, may hope to pass from 
step to step thereof.^
Classification was involved in such a concept, as was the
Commissioners' question and answer:
Ought the rate of pay of public officers to be 
determined strictly by the laws of supply and 
demand? We have no hesitation in answering...by 
an emphatic negative. The career prescribed for 
officers of the State is in many respects 
special and peculiar, and, speaking generally, 
the training which best fits a man for the 
higher posts in the service is not favourable to 
his success, should he leave that service, in 
mercantile, commercial, or industrial pursuits.
The State should, therefore, in our opinion, 
hold out to all who, after entering its service, 
have faithfully complied with the conditions of 
their employment, the certainty of fair 
remuneration, whilst reserving the higher 
positions for those exceptionally gifted. We 
believe that our scheme secures this.^
In order to prevent the arbitrary and uncompensated
curtailment of officers' careers, the Commission
recommended that a superannuation fund be established,
3similar to the scheme then operated by teachers.
1
South Australian Industrial Register, 1933» No. 21, p.32.
2
Ninth Progress Report, p.10.
3For details of this scheme, see ibid., pp.12-13» and App. 
A, pp.17-20. The teachers' fund was not subsidized by the 
government, but three of the Commissioners, in a dissenting 
clause, argued that it would be 'right and expedient' for 
the government to subsidize a Civil Service fund.
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There were, however, some elements lacking from the 
Commissioners' vision of a career service. Examinations 
were not competitive, and no retiring age was recommended, 
though it was suggested that the establishment of a 
superannuation scheme would 'justify the State in 
requiring the retirement of officers, thereby making room 
for younger m e n ' . 1 A code of rights and duties was not 
outlined, though some matters raised, such as leave of 
absence, Boards of Inquiry and superannuation, were 
relevant to a code. Other matters, such as the political 
rights of public servants, were not mentioned. These 
omissions arose in part from the Commissioners' uncertainty 
about what they might properly recommend. Their doubts 
were illustrated most clearly in the recommendations 
concerning the central issue of the final Report: the
establishment of a Civil Service Board.
The Commissioners recommended a Board of three 
members, none being a civil servant, who were to be paid 
by fees, although their work was apparently intended to be 
full-time. The Commissioners arrived at this proposal 
after surveying the methods of organization and control 
then in use in the Services of New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland and New Zealand. The South Australian plan 
compared favourably with them a l l , except in one crucial 
respect. The Commission was in doubt whether the proposed 
Board should be permanent or not, and temporized: 'we are
of the opinion that the final settlement of the question 
as to the permanency of the Board may be deferred until 
its work is completed', but added that
Ibid., p .13.
1
387
if it were necessary now to make a final 
recommendation...the majority of the Commission 
are of the opinion that, after the work of 
classification is finished, there will be no 
necessity for the continuance of the Board.^
This did not satisfy some of the Commissioners, for a 
minority dissenting clause was appended: ’it is necessary
now to make a final decision...the necessity for a
2permanent Board has not been proved'.
The Commission thus had some members who favoured a 
permanent Board, others who firmly rejected it, and 
presumably some who were not very clear about the matter. 
Yet the significance of the question could hardly have 
escaped them: a temporary Board would be almost useless in
carrying out their proposals. A temporary Board could 
institute the reforms, but its demise would signify a 
return, to Ministers and heads of departments, of the 
power to organize and control the Service. A Board was 
necessary not only to set the proposed system in motion, 
but also to maintain it.
The Commission Ignored
Why, then, did the Commissioners make proposals that 
were self negating? Partly, it seems, because they lacked 
sufficient time to draw up a workable scheme. The
Ibid., p .8.
Ibid., pp.15-16.
2
388
Commissioners appear at no time to have known how long 
their work was to take, but they certainly did not expect 
to finish as soon as they did. The newspapers believed 
the final Report to be imminent in March I89I, but it did 
not appear until September of that year. In the first 
months of the Parliamentary recess of December 1890-June 
I89I, the Commission kept up a good average of sittings, 
but this activity ceased in May. It was doubtless then 
that Playford ordered the Commission to complete its 
labours, partly, no doubt, because he feared the 
criticisms of the Commission that might be made during the 
approaching session. Even so, it took a further three 
months for the Report to appear. Although the final 
Report appeared to take a long time to draft, the 
Commissioners had less time at their disposal than they
had hoped for, and it was not enough for them to reconcile
1their differences.
The Commissioners also lacked an important incentive
to produce a workable scheme: they could not have hoped
that their recommendations would be adopted. Playford was
Premier, and even the newspapers turned against the
Commission. The Observer, for instance, thought it
'naturally better fitted to deal with the details...than
with the weightier and more comprehensive issues discussed
2in its final recommendations'. Thomas Harry remarked that
1
The Commissioners attempted to understate their 
disagreements. The dissenting clause, for example, had 
originally read 'the necessity for a permanent Board has 
not been proved, quite the contrary' (CSO In, I296/I89I, 
23 September I89I; emphasis added); cf. above, p.387.
2
26 September 1891-
389
there was a 'danger that the width of [the
recommendations] will prevent anything being attempted*.
Both were obliquely referring to the Australia-wide
depression of the 1890s, which ensured that no expensive
innovations would be made. The Commission set a bad
example: members' fees and costs totalled more than
2£7,000. It was, in fact, the most expensive Royal 
Commission in South Australia in the nineteenth century. 
The Commissioners' lack of unity, which the hastily 
composed Report accentuated, and their lack of prestige, 
did nothing to mitigate these factors.
Attitude of the Association
The Civil Service Association accepted the
Commissions' recommendations on superannuation and, in a
petition of October I89I , urged the Government to
3implement them. But the major portion of the petition 
was concerned with criticizing the Commission's proposals
4for a Board. The Commission had never received the
1
Review, V o l . I, No. 3 (October, I892), p.23*
2
'Expenditure of Civil Service Commission', S .A ,P .P . 129
of 1891.
3
The petition was reprinted in the Journal, Vol. Ill, No. 
33 (November, 1891), pp.7-12.
4
For further criticisms, see also Vol. Ill, No. 3^ 
(October, I891), pp.3~^* The importance of superannuation 
to civil servants, even though temporarily overshadowed by 
the question of a Board, cannot be over-emphasized. 
Memories of 1881 were still fresh a decade later, and 
during the Parliamentary elections of 1893 the Review went 
so far as to advise officials to inquire whether or not
(continued p.390)
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sympathetic support of the Association, which was possibly 
one reason why it did not recommend a Board containing 
civil servants. The Association responded by arguing that
the Council might become more useful if regarded 
by the Government as an Honorary Consultative 
Body or Board of Advice on large questions 
affecting the Service generally, and which should 
be acted upon uniformly by all branches of the 
Service....There is no necessity at the present 
time for the appointment of a . ..Board.
This scheme was oriented to the senior officials, but the 
petition widened its critical base by reciting injustices 
which applied to all officers, many of which had been 
raised in the petition of 1886.^
The matter of a Board was, however, the main issue 
for the moment. The Association could scarcely have 
expected its plan to be adopted, for governments were not 
concerned to weigh alternative plans for reform: they
intended rather to drop the matter altogether. Indeed,the 
Association did not desire acceptance of its plan. A weak 
advisory authority was preferable to the potentially 
strong Board of the Commission, but no authority at all 
was preferable to either. Thus, the Association said 
nothing when the final Report was quietly shelved.
4 ( continued from p.389)
their local candidates were in favour of superannuation. 
Most wer e , but the Parliament of 1893-96 produced no 
Superannuation A c t , and the Association did not again 
enter the political arena.
1
See above, pp.320-21.
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Summary: The Importance of the Commission
For all the obloquy and neglect it received, the 
final Report had important implications. By I89I , the 
only substantive Civil Service legislation passed in South 
Australia since self-government was the Act of 187^. With 
a conservative Legislative Council resisting change on 
many matters, governments in South Australia were less 
inclined to reform than were those in New South Wales, 
where the desirability of reform had been admitted more 
often. The size of the South Australian Service militated 
against reform, since, as the dissenting clause of the 
final Report of I89I had argued, 'our service is very much 
smaller than in the neighbouring colonies, therefore much 
easier for the Government to administer*. The presumed 
absence of nepotism also aided inaction. 'It i s ’, the 
Commission had said, 'satisfactory to note the almost 
entire absence in South Australia of those allegations and 
even admissions of the abuse of political patronage which 
occur so frequently in the evidence taken by us in the 
other colonies' . 1
Despite these reservations, the Commission made 
three basic and important points. First, reform of the 
Service was needed; and this did not mean simply reducing 
the cost of government. Second, civil servants were not 
the best people to carry out reform. Third, an independent 
authority should therefore be established, to direct a new 
system of personnel administration. The Commission only 
outlined this new system, it has been seen. Furthermore,
Ninth Progress Report, p.8.
1
392
it did not delineate the second and third points with 
care. Where and how was the boundary between the 
responsibilities of the heads and of the personnel 
authority to be fixed? In 1887 disputes centred on when a 
Board to achieve economy was to be established. In I89I , 
the question was whether or not a Board of wider powers 
should be established. The Commission of 1888-91 boasted 
few immediate achievements; but the issues it raised were 
argued for the next twenty-five years.
PART FOUR: APPRAISAL, 1892-1916
The Reports of the Commission outlined most faults in 
the management and organization of the Service, which, the 
final Report showed (albeit imperfectly), an independent 
personnel authority might overcome. Though the 
Commissioners (or some of them) recommended such a remedy 
because of the confused condition of the South Australian 
Service, rather than because of the example of other 
colonies or abstract notions of good management, the idea 
of an independent authority was in keeping with 
developments elsewhere in Australia. But South Australia 
did not enact the principle until November I916, almost 
exactly twenty-five years after the final Report of the 
Commission. In the interval, the piecemeal reforms of 
previous decades continued; and the very fact that 
piecemeal changes frequently were made emphasized the need 
for comprehensive legislation. The question was not why 
the Act of 1916 was passed, but rather why it was not 
passed sooner. This question is part of a wider one, 
concerning the slowness of reform over the whole period 
(discussed in the final Chapter). The next Chapter 
examines the factors that delayed acceptance of the 
Commission's recommendations, and similar recommendations 
of later years. Since previous Chapters have described 
the structural and other flaws that made the old methods 
of management and control inadequate, and which continued 
to be prominent until 1916 , attention is directed at 
changing attitudes towards the idea of an independent 
personnel authority.
CHAPTER X
TOWARDS A STATUTE
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The Attitude of Governments
Governments gave formal support to the idea of a 
Civil Service Act and promised Bills in I8 9 6 , I8 9 8 , 1900, 
1906, 1909, 1910, 1911, 19 1 2 , 1914 and 1915, but they 
never supported the idea with enthusiasm. In the years 
immediately following the final Report of the Commission 
their attitude was distinctly hostile. Renewed depression 
in the 1890s raised doubts that a Board would save more 
than it would cost and politicians generally feared, after 
their experience of the Commission, that future inquiries 
would prove to be long-winded and expensive. To implement 
any recommendations which another committee might make 
would doubtless be even more expensive. In 1897» the 
Treasurer thus explained the principles regulating 
increases of salary:
First, what was the state of the finances and 
could they afford increases: second, who was
most deserving; third, who had been longest in 
the service without an increase; and fourth, who 
were those whose work had become more onerous or 
more responsible so as to entitle them to 
special considerationJ
These principles had been dominant for over forty years.
The approach of Federation, however, made some 
regulation of the Service more likely, since many 
politicians felt it necessary to place the South 
Australian officers to be transferred to the Commonwealth 
on a footing equal to their counterparts in other
1
S .A .P .D ., 19 August 1897» p.466; cf. the views of the 
Civil Service Commission (above, p.385)*
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colonies. A second Commission, consisting entirely of 
members of Parliament, was thus appointed in 1899* It was 
empowered to 'inquire into and report upon any legislative 
provision which is desirable to be made in relation to the 
Public Service', and, like the Commission of 1888-91» its 
work took longer than expected.
Civil Service Commission, 1899-190Q
The recommendations of the Commission, also, closely
2resembled those of the earlier Commission. A Civil 
Service Board similar to that of 1891 was proposed, though 
one member was to be a civil servant. A similar 
recruitment plan, but with a competitive entrance 
examination, was proposed for cadets. The previous 
superannuation and overtime proposals were repeated. The
1
See, e.g., S .A .P .D ., 15 December 1899» pp.l03^--5 and CSO 
In, 180/1900, enclosure dated 31 January 1900. But 
officers were subsequently dismayed when the first 
Commonwealth Public Service Commissioner recognized only 
their rights which were 'legally enforceable at transfer'. 
(Gerald E. Caiden, The A.C.P.T.A.: A Study of White Collar
Public Service Unionism in the Commonwealth of Australia, 
1885-1922 [Department of Political Science, Research 
School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 
Occasional Papers No. 2; Canberra, 1 9 6 6 ], p.92, and pp.75- 
80 generally on the rights of transferred officers). See 
also the same author's Career Service, pp.101-2, and 
V. Subramaniam, 'The Integration of the Commonwealth 
Public Service', Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. XVI, 
No. 2 (June, 1957*)"» p p . 1-46-8.
2
The Commission issued three Reports, contained in S .A .P .P . 
20 of 1899, 20 of 1900, and 20 of 1901.
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Commission went further in arguing that an examination
should be passed before advancement to a salary of £ 1 5 0
p.a. and over, but was also undecided whether the Board
should be permanent or not. Attempts were made to form a
Bill on these recommendations but the drafters were slow
and important clauses (especially those relating to a
Board) were discarded in an effort to ready the Bill for
1the Parliamentary session of 1901. No serious effort was 
made to pass the Bill.
Classification Board, 1902
As a measure of compensation, a Classification Board
2consisting of three civil servants, Peter Whitington,
D.H. Griffin and J. Gardiner (the last elected by members 
of the Association), was appointed in early 1901. The 
Board presented its Report seventeen months later, in 
which time it claimed to have 'travelled 6 , 6 3 6  miles, 
examined 2,120 and classified 8,488 public servants'.
For all that, its Report was brief and did not state the 
principles upon which its classification was based, and 
the Government did not implement the scheme. However, the 
proposals of the Board warrant a brief examination because 
of their relation to other classification plans.
1
CSO In, 1159/1900, 28 August 1900.
2
See above, p p .352-4.
3
'Report of the Civil Service Classification Board under 
Act No. 748 of 1900', S.A.P.P. 24 of 1902, p.v.
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The Board divided the Service into five Divisions - 
Professional, Clerical, General, Educational, and 
Railways. The Educational and Railways Divisions were 
considered separately, and a common classification was 
proposed for the other three Divisions:
Grade 1 2 3 4 5 6
Class 
Firs ta
Second £430 £420 £410 £400 £390 -
Third 380 370 360 350 34o -
Fourth 330 320 310 300 290 £280
Fifth 270 260 250 240 230 220
Sixth 210 200 190 180 170 160
Seventh - — — — — —
Heads of departments. Minimum £450 p.a., but range not 
set. 
b
Cadets and junior officers. From £26 p.a. at age fifteen 
years, and thence by annual stages to £39» 52, 6 5 , 80.... 
x £10 p.a. to £150 at age twenty-six years.
Automatic annual increments were to be paid to the level 
of £150 p.a., beyond which officers might be promoted only 
to vacant offices. Promotion was to be by seniority, 
defined firstly by rates of pay, secondly by length of 
service at equal rates of pay and thirdly by the date of 
first appointment to the Service.
The Board said no more than this, but the 
implications of its scheme were plain. The hierarchy of 
the Service (apart from positions up to £150 p.a. and 
beyond £430 p.a.) consisted of twenty-eight salary levels
4oo
separated by gaps of £10 p.a. For these positions, the 
terms 'class' or 'grade' had no immediate relevance: since
promotion was to be to vacant positions only, movement up 
from one grade to the next was indistinguishable from 
movement up from one class to the next. The rigidity of 
the system was increased by lack of provision for lateral 
entry. Classification was by office rather than by 
officer, and here the Board accepted the existing 
hierarchy of offices. Thus, it proposed few substantial 
changes of salary: only a handful of cases involved
changes of more than £20 p.a. and, in a total salaries and 
wages bill of more than £l,l40,000 p.a., the recommended 
increases and decreases totalled only £5,000 and £4,000 
respectively. The scheme, though inflexible, was 
virtually automaticJ
At the time of the Board's Report, the Government of 
Western Australia appointed a Royal Commission to inquire 
into the Service of that state. Whitington was appointed 
to the Commission, which in March 1903 recommended a
1
But the Board added the curious statement that 'when the 
pay fixed by the Board for any office is higher or lower 
than that drawn by the public servant occupying the 
position on the date named it is not intended, in all 
cases, to convey a recommendation that the particular 
officer named should be granted the higher or lower pay' 
(p.v.). The Board did not indicate which 'cases' it 
referred to. Whilst it was a long-established convention 
that officers should not be reduced in pay as a 
consequence of re-classification, it was widely 
anticipated that officers underpaid for the positions they 
occupied would receive salary increases. By not endorsing 
this principle, the Board appeared to contradict their 
classification by office.
4oi
classification scheme almost identical to that proposed by 
the South Australian Board nine months before. However, 
the Commission stated what the Board had not:
It is the office which is classified, not the 
officer. The scheme of classification... should 
be embodied in a Public Service Act, and a 
Public Service Commissioner or a Public Service 
Board will be required, with statutory powers to 
carry out the provisions of the necessary Act.
In every State in which a complete 
classification of the Public Service has been 
made it has been found necessary to appoint 
either a Public Service Board or a Public 
Service Commissioner to carry out the 
classification, and to prevent the service from 
drifting back into confusion. The existence of 
some authority with statutory powers appears to 
be inseparable from classification, and the 
Commonwealth and every State, except South 
Australia, now possesses such an authority. If 
our classification, or if any classification, be 
adopted, we think that a Board or a Commissioner 
will be essential to its establishment and 
continuance .
While the Government hesitated to introduce the South 
Australian plan, the passage of time rendered it 
increasingly out of date and it was quietly discarded. 
Classification under the Act of 1874 instead continued, 
but this covered only 264 officers in 1901; ten years 
later the number had dropped to ninety-six.
1
’Third Progress Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Public Service of Western Australia', Parliamentary Papers 
of Western Australia, V o l . I, No. 6 of 1903-4, p .v i .
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The Civil Service
If Federation moved governments to some action,
however limited, it also increased their indifference to
Service legislation thereafter. Federation removed 1,200
officers from the supervision of state Ministers, and a
smaller Service seemed easier to manage. And the
politicians who moved to the Federal sphere included those,
such as Kingston and Holder, who had been most ready to
1experiment with administrative problems. Service 
regulation was not an issue at the state elections of 1 9 0 2 , 
1905, 1906, 1910 and 1912.^ The passing of time
sanctioned indifference and piecemeal reforms seemed 
sufficient, as they had in the past. Public opinion did 
not force governments to think otherwise. More important, 
the members of the Service, as represented by their 
Association, seldom acted in a united fashion until late 
in the period. When the Association acted it did so with 
hesitation and extreme caution, much of which derived from 
the nature of civil servants as a group.
1
Cf. R.L. Reid, ’The Price-Peake Government and the 
Formation of Political Parties in South Australia' (unpub. 
MS., S.A.A., n.d.), p .6, on the lassitude of South 
Australian politics immediately after Federation.
2
In 1905, e.g. j 'no mention [was ] made. . .of such subjects 
as the reform of criminal law and administration....The 
aims of the government policy [were ] mainly material ones' 
(Advertiser, 20 April 1 9 0 5 ). The question of the 
Legislative Council franchise dominated the elections from 
1905 to 1912.
4 0 3
White-collar workers
In I9 H ,  the Public Service Review reflected on the 
history of the Service:
We can see how men approved, or else positively 
accepted as they found them, the conditions 
under which they had to work. The Association 
itself for many years perhaps, was not keen 
enough in looking after its own interests....A 
portion of the Service, some of the old brigade 
for the most part, having been born, bred, and 
comfortably advanced under the old system, fail 
to understand that the Service, like the world 
about them, is subject to change. 'Cannot they 
re a d ' asked one of our past Presidents,'...the 
signs of the times?^
Many officers, indeed, supported the Association only in 
so far as it could restore that 'old system'. There was 
no clear vision of what a new system might be. It was 
true that the Association had a profound effect on the 
development of the Service which its founders did not 
fully foresee. Its foundation testified to the altered 
position of the Service in the community and the earliest 
actions of the Association doubtless showed many that a 
return to the 1860s and 1870s was impossible.
Nevertheless, the Association fed on memories of the past, 
not just at the top, but at all levels of the Service,
Almost from the settlement of the colony civil 
servants had been accustomed to the respect of their 
neighbours and their sense of self-esteem had always been 
important in compensating for the disadvantages of 
government employment. Much of the rationale for this
V o l . XVII, No. 11 (November, I9 H ) ,  p.l4l.
1
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attitude derived from the position of the senior officers
who could fairly claim that their status in the community
rested upon their recognized importance. Junior officers
could feel, when blasts of parliamentary indignation were
vented upon them, that they too were essential for the
continued existence of the colony. They were 'gentlemen
of high education and refinement who really [carried] on
the work of government 1 . Their sense of importance
rested on less firm foundations after the financial crises
of the 1880s, when legislation failed to guarantee their
position, but this inevitably led only to a re-emphasis of
their importance. Awareness that it was more difficult to
assert a right to special respect was reflected in the
suspicious glances that were cast, in the pages of the
Review, at bank clerks, teachers and commercial clerks
whose conditions of employment approached or surpassed
2those of officers 1 .
For lower-grade clerks, the advent of the letter- 
press and later the typewriter and telephone helped to 
reduce the value of what skills they possessed. The 
laborious copying of documents in impeccable copperplate 
was time-wasting and the personal carriage of messages 
from one department to another unnecessary. Claims that 
short office hours were justified because time could be 
devoted to reading that increased an officer's
1
Letter of James Boucaut to Governor Robinson, [August] 
1886, in Boucaut Papers (S.A.A.), Paper No. 66, p.5*
2
See, e.g., Journal, Vol. II, No. 13 (January, 1890),
pp.7-8.
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understanding of the processes of government were made 
pointless. Rising educational standards undermined their 
claims in this area, and the growing anonymity of the 
Service and the employment of women further detracted from 
the honour of clerical labour. Nor was the contrast with 
the condition of the working-classes so clear.
Officers tried hard to maintain appearances. They 
took care to dress well, which marked them off from manual 
workers, although the expense could be a source of worry. 
Many had some pretensions to culture. By the end of the 
century the Review contained columns of literary criticism 
and an essay competition attracted wide interest; anagrams 
and similar intellectual conundrums of the day were 
popular. The Review referred to England simply as 'home', 
which was no longer literally true for the majority of 
officers, and attempted to assume that civil servants were 
social leaders of the day.
Caution
For many officers, the Association presented some 
hope of restoring substance to the shadow of their 
positions. But they were not therefore necessarily 
engaged in the Association's activities. Meetings were 
poorly attended, subscriptions in arrears, recruitment of 
new members slow and the management of the Association's 
affairs fell into the hands of a few. The number of 
members increased only gradually, and by the middle 1890s 
represented about 25 per cent of those eligible to join. 
The Association's club-rooms, which offered cheap meals, 
hovered on the edge of extinction for many years owing to 
lack of patronage. Members tended to be reserved and a
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little uneasy when gathered together on social occasions 
such as 'smokos'. On the occasion of one Glee Club night 
the Review found it necessary to remind the singers that 
they need not appear in evening dress. It was difficult 
for officers to come to terms with the idea that action 
was needed if governments were to grant them concessions. 
It was just as difficult for them to drop their official 
roles, around which so many of their hopes revolved, and 
to meet each other on unofficial and social ground to plot 
their own betterment. They had been accustomed to the 
subtle processes of communication between Executives and 
Service whereby their arguments and complaints could be 
handled with sympathy and understanding; by no means 
always with success, but always with the knowledge that 
their position was privileged. Now they had openly to 
band together, just as manual workers were doing. They 
had to give up their claims to special rights, to special 
abilities, to a special position.
Many officers, therefore, greeted the Association 
with only reluctant assent. Though eager to better 
themselves, they hoped this might be done without its aid. 
They feared to commit themselves too deeply to something 
that broke so conspicuously with tradition; it might fail, 
it could belittle their position in the eyes of the world, 
it would certainly involve them in fighting for things 
that they should not have to fight for. In 1908 the 
Review said:
The Public Service of South Australia suffers, 
especially in its middle and lower ranks, from 
the tendency to detachment from any main issue 
....Too often the clerk is squeezed between the 
upper and nether millstones. His chief, who may 
be a professional man...looks cynically upon him
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as one who by education and casual training is 
fitted only for the drudgery of copying and 
making detail calculations, while the mechanic, 
draftsman, and labourer despise him as ignorant 
of technical art, a would-be aristocrat without 
means to keep up his dignity.^
Militant civil servants
Not all officers, however, were so reluctant to 
define and assert their rights. A small but important 
minority wished to extend the claims that the Association 
made upon governments and they argued that this should be 
done in a more militant fashion. Because civil servants 
at that time disliked revealing their differences of 
opinion to the public, it is difficult accurately to 
document the activities of opposed groups within the 
Service. Arguments were couched in circumlocutory 
language and were seldom linked with the names of 
particular officers, for example, and excisions were 
frequently made in the Minutes of Council meetings 
published in the Review (and the original Minutes were 
often terse to the point of mystery). Nevertheless, 
reference to some of the factions and points of 
disagreement within the Council, Association and Service 
generally is essential to an explanation of changing 
attitudes to reform and the institution of an independent 
personnel authority.
The first public breach in the unity of the 
Association - albeit a unity based on inaction - came in 
May I89O, when a few members under the leadership of
V o l . XIV, No. 11 (November, I9O8 ), p.121.
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B. Solomon formed the Civil Service Union for ’the better 
conservation of the interests of subordinate members of 
the Service 1 2.  ^ The Union proposed, inter alia, to have a 
member of Parliament for President and to admit all 
government employees to its membership, proposals which
2the President of the Association 'strongly deprecated’. 
The Association and Union reached a compromise agreement 
that the size of the Council should be increased and that 
meetings of the Association should be less rigidly under 
the control of the Council, moves which reduced the 
control of the heads of departments.
The Union had insufficient supporters to become a
viable alternative association, but had enough to win
substantial concessions from the Council. Some of its
support came from officers who were not so much in favour
of its political bias as antipathetic to the conservatism
3of the Council. Thomas Gill, for example, resigned as 
Secretary to the Association in December 1890, after the 
Council had failed to endorse the pamphlet attacking the 
Civil Service Commission, and he gave some support to the 
Union. Gill was induced to return in January I89I , thus
1
CSO In, 124i /1890, enclosures dated 17 March I89O and 
21 April 1890.
2
Journal, V o l . II, No. 17 (May, I890), p.3* The Union 
thus urged civil servants to follow the example of 
railways workers, who had formed an association similar to 
the Civil Service Association, except that they elected a 
member of Parliament as President; civil servants and 
railways employees are compared below, pp.429-32.
See above, pp.352-4.
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restoring to the Association a semblance of unity. But 
his disaffection showed, perhaps more than the founding of 
the Union, that even the most respectable members could 
grow tired of the caution of the Council.. 1
Leadership at the top
At the same time, the move to found the Union was an 
indication that no longer did all civil servants share the 
apathetic trust in their official superiors that the 
foundation of the Association, six years before, had 
implied. It was natural that the paternal attitudes of 
the senior officials should be challenged when they were 
unable to translate that paternalism into practical good 
for the rest of the Service. The growth of the Service 
itself militated against direct and effective control from 
the top, in Association as well as official channels, 
especially when Council members were divorced from the 
concerns of most of their subordinates. Although the 
heads of departments exercised a strong influence on the 
Council for some years, they often did not appear to be 
exercising leadership. E.G. Blackmore (Clerk of the 
Legislative Council), for example, was elected to the 
Council in 1888 and was immediately elected to a Vice- 
Presidency, a position which he held until he became 
President of the Association in 1893* In the intervening 
five years he had attended only twenty-one of a possible 
sixty-four meetings and had taken an inconspicuous part in 
the twenty-one. His performance as President was
1
In later years, however, Gil l ’s attitude was very 
different; see below, p p .425-7.
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unstimulating though free from controversy. As a quiet, 
safe and respectable leader, he was perhaps acceptable to 
the indifferent bulk of the Service but he gave the more 
militant figures further cause for discontent.
The senior officers had no programme to offer the 
subordinate ranks of the Service. Their main efforts had 
been directed towards attacking the recommendations of the 
Commission of 1888-91 and towards gaining marginal rights, 
like transfer lists. Such a negative prescription was 
effective when fear of an 'economy-Board' was at its 
height, as was shown in the large response to the petition 
of I89I, but they had no clear answers for the ailments 
of the Service later in the 1890s. Indeed, the idea that 
the heads should control the Service through the Council 
was not a happy one for them. The heads depended on the 
votes of their juniors for places on the Council and they 
were, once members, divorced from their official roles and 
placed in the position of supplicants to the government.
A sense of duty towards the rest of the Service and a 
realization that their own position was declining caused 
them to serve on the Council; but few stayed for long, and 
those that did (Todd, Blackmore) attended meetings rarely. 
The heads had originally to enter the Association lest it 
should become an irresponsible political weapon in the 
hands of their subordinates, but their preference was to 
act informally and in the background.
As an increasing number of lower-grade officers 
entered the Council during the 1890s, the heads played an
See above, pp.389-90.
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apparently less active role on the Council and their
numbers on it declined proportionately when the number of
Councillors was raised to eighteen in 1893* They
exercised an influence disproportionate to their numbers,
however, and this led to the formation of another
association, the Public Service Federal Council (P.S.F.C.),
in July 1897* This body, like the Union of I89O, was led
by B. Solomon (by then a member of the Council of the
Association) but was not a breakaway association. It was
composed rather of representatives of existing employee
organizations within the Service, who retained membership
of their respective organizations. The P.S.F.C. had no
membership as such but its eighteen Councillors claimed to
represent over 3>000 government employees in their
capacity as members of the other organizations.  ^ The
P.S.F.C. would have been a radical organization in the
eyes of the senior members of the Council of the
Association had it done no more than ignore sectional
divisions within the Service. It appeared the more
radical, therefore, by espousing vigorously a Civil Service
Board. Some members, furthermore, were unrestrained in
2criticizing departmental heads. But governments treated
1
The P.S.F.C. claimed to represent six ’Departmental 
Associations' (CSO In, 84l/l897, 2h July 1897). These 
were the Civil Service Association, the Electric Telegraph 
Association, the Teachers' Union, the Railways Service 
Mutual Association, the Locomotive Engine-drivers, Firemen, 
and Cleaners' Association, and an association of printing 
employees. The last two were short-lived. On the 
Electric Telegraph Association, see Caiden, The A .C .P .T .A ., 
pp.5-12.
2
See below, pp.4l3-4.
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the P.S.F.C, with reserve and it never exercised the 
influence it laid claim to. With the transfer of postal 
employees to the Commonwealth it appears to have collapsed, 
though for four years it seemed to be a potentially 
important alternative to the Civil. Service Association.
In 1896 the heads still dominated the Council., and 
most officers accepted this. One, for example, noted that 
it was said
that the Association is largely composed of 
fixed officers, and it is said too that the 
power of the Association is in the hands of 
Heads of Departments and high-grade officers in 
receipt of fair, if not large salaries. It is 
natural this should be so.’ It is right and 
proper that the strong, the more influential, 
the wiser heads should govern, and that the rank 
and file should follow,
but warned that this was so only 'so long as the governing 
body does its duty by those it governs'.
Arguments concerning several proposed Bills in the 
last years of the century showed the heads, for the first 
time, not to be doing their duty to the governed. The 
heads argued that
no Public Service Act can ultimately prove 
satisfactory...which provides in any way for 
depriving, by means of a Board or otherwise, 
Honourable Ministers...of any of their duties or 
responsibilities in administering existing acts 
...[a] new A c t . ..must recognize a marked line of 
cleavage (l) between responsible officers in 
charge and the clerical staff...and (2) between 
skilled work-men or tradesmen and labourers... no
1
Review, Vol. IV, No. 10 (May, I896), p.74. Original 
emphasis.
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one increase [of] salary should carry with it 
the right to subsequent increases...every... 
subsequent increase should be subject to 
consideration and recommendation by the head of 
the department annually.^
They thus felt it 'outside their duty' to formulate a 
comprehensive Bill, and instead supported one which merely 
consolidated and re-enacted the provisions of the Acts ofp1874 and 1881. ~ The only new matter in the Bil.1 was a
provision for a Superannuation Fund which was, in effect,
only a life assurance policy. No provision was made for
new salary scales, effective classification or the
inclusion of professional and temporary employees. It was,
said a later Minister, 'only a glorified set of
3regulations'.
Officers throughout the Service were disappointed 
with the Bill, especially since the Council had possessed 
the opportunity to draft a better one, and some criticized 
the heads strongly:
It seemed as if they had got to the top of 
tree and said to themselves they would cut 
the props so that no-one else could follow 
The Bill read that way all through.
the 
away 
them.
1
CSO In, 896/1897, enclosure dated 31 August I898.
2
Review, Vol IV, No. 12 (July, I896), pp.89-9 0 ; see also 
CSO In, I673/I893, 12 November 1893, and 773/1896, l4 
July I896.
3
S.A.P.D., 12 October
4
Register, 3 November
10 November 1898.
1913, p.1282.
I898, p .7 ; see also Advertiser,
klk
Sweeping changes took place in the membership of the 
Council at the elections of August, I896 and August, 1897• 
By the latter date, none of the conservative heads 
remained, and the Council was clearly oriented towards the 
lower ranks of the Service. Membership of the Association 
rapidly increased and by the end of the century reached 50 
per cent of those eligible to join, a level almost double 
that of five years before. A month after the elections of 
August, 1897» the Council condemned the heads' Bill as 
'totally inadequate', and recommended that in any new Bill
the Public Service [should] consist of all 
persons employed in the service of the 
Government except Public School Teachers, 
persons employed on loan works, and persons only 
employed temporarily....A Board of control 
should be established to consist of three 
Members: one to be a member of the Public 
Service elected by the Service and two appointed 
by the Government one from the Service and one 
from outside. The duties of the Board to be as 
follows:- A. To classify the Public Service and 
keep records. B. To recommend for approval by 
the Governor all appointments, promotions, 
removals, and dismissals from office. C. To 
frame regulations...for the proper management of 
the Service.^
The Council formulated a Bill containing these 
provisions and submitted it to the government, but the 
Council was not perfectly unanimous on the matter. Some 
members wished to see greater Service representation on the 
proposed Board. The Public Service Federal Council thus 
submitted another Bill to the government, in which the 
membership of the Board was increased to six civil
CSO In, 896/1897» enclosure dated 20 October 1897*
1
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servants, three of whom were to be chosen by the Service. 
This enabled greater representation to be given to the 
lower ranks and, whilst the two Bills were in other 
respects identical, the difference reflected a continuing 
division between clerical and non-clerical employees.
The Twentieth Century
By 1901, the issue which divided the Service was 
fairly clear. Lower grade officers (and some senior) 
wanted a Civil Service Board to regulate most or all 
aspects of employment, but the higher officers did not.
At stake were matters of privilege, authority and 
responsibility, but 'the vexed question of a Board was the 
rock on which [they] s p l i t S e n i o r  officers endorsed 
the view that ’the responsible head of a department ought 
to have complete and undivided control of his officers,
and this he would not have if an independent Board were
2appointed'. Whilst economic troubles were at least as 
important as the views of heads in disposing governments 
against legislating for an independent personnel agency, 
the heads yet retained an authority superior to that of 
the Service associations. Whether or not the heads were 
the most important force influencing governments, their 
influence remained ostensibly high. The possibilities of
3extensive legislation were therefore conceded to be slight.
1
R eview, Vol. V, No. 3 (October, I898), p.17.
2
Register, 15 November I898.
3
See, e.g., Review, Vol. V, No. 4 (November, I898), 
pp.29-30.
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Proposals
The minority who hoped for rapid reform were 
disappointed for almost a decade. By I9O8 it was agreed 
that
what the Council asks, what the Association asks, 
and what the whole Civil Service wants...is a 
scheme, a system, a definite policy which will 
give to every honest officer the feeling of 
security, something that promises him a wage 
that will enable him to live at a reasonably 
high standard of comfort, and something that 
will give him the assurance that his ability and 
energy earn their due award [sic].”*
Even so, the Association still sought a 'system' that
would avoid the appointment of an independent authority.
It instead proposed a salary classification which would,
it was hoped, alleviate most grievances over salaries and 
2promotions. The Service was divided into four classes, 
with salary ranges and annual increments resembling 
previous schemes; but unlike previous schemes, promotion 
followed after three years at the top of a class (except 
the fourth). Both advancement within a class and 
promotion to a higher class were subject to efficiency and 
good conduct. It was claimed that the plan
offers annual increases to the Public servant on 
good behaviour and proper discharge of duties; 
but these increases are within classes and up to 
certain limits. It gives the head of the 
department the privilege of arranging his work 
to suit his officers irrespective of salary, so 
that the best results may be obtained. It gives 
the Government the privilege and power of 
promoting officers from class to class so that
1
CSO In, 793/1908, enclosure dated 20 May I9O9 .
Review, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (April, I9O8), pp.33-4.
2
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the dreaded top-heaviness may be avoided, and it 
places the reins of controlling the salaries in 
the ministerial hands. It is not a hide-bound 
method, but elastic, and at the same time 
regulative and systematic.^
It was clear to all that this scheme, like its 
numerous predecessors, lacked any machinery to ensure its 
continued existence. Attention gradually centred upon a 
Board, and those who had favoured one for many years 
argued strongly in its support. In I 9 H  , after more than 
a decade of considering such a move, the Council drafted a 
Bill providing for a Board, to consist of three officers, 
two selected by the Association and one by the government. 
Recruits were to enter the Service after a non-competitive 
examination or upon the recommendation of the Board, which 
was empowered to inspect departments, recommend the 
disposition of offices and officers and carry out other 
personnel functions resembling those of authorities in 
other states. The Review set the Bill in what it 
considered to be a proper prospective:
There is a mistaken idea abroad that heads of 
departments would be deprived of certain powers 
now enjoyed by them. No such deprivation, 
however, would occur, but the proposed 
Classification Scheme would relieve heads of a 
vast amount of worry....Of course, those bilious 
individuals whose delight is to increase their 
own advantages at the expense of the unfortunate 
officers under their scornful control, will 
object; but this Bill aims at the greatest good 
for the greatest number, . . . without reference to the 
particular greediness of a conservative few.^
1
Ibid., Vol. XIV, No. 3 (March, I9O8), p.22. 
emphasis.
Vol. XVII, No. 2 (February, I9II), p.17.
Original
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But four more years elapsed before an Act was passed.
Forces for Reform
Civil Service reform was equated with legislation 
rather than departmental regulation well before 1856, but 
the idea was emphasized less around I89O because of fears 
of what an Act would contain. By the late 1890s, however, 
the idea had revived, and it continued to be widely 
accepted in the twentieth century. It was not argued that 
only an Act could embody reforms (though it was argued 
that only an Act could guarantee them) and, indeed, many 
piecemeal and regulatory reforms in the early twentieth 
century foreshadowed provisions of the Act of 1916. 
Emphasis on an Act was important, not because it had any 
relation to the content of reform, but because it provided 
a focus for suggested reforms. Regulations might cover 
some important aspects of administration but not others, 
and they might overlap, possibly in a contradictory 
fashion, over a period of time. An Act required, at least 
to a greater extent than did regulations, the formulation 
of a comprehensive and consistent system. To present a 
Bill to governments also required a more concentrated and 
forceful marshalling of arguments than did the 
presentation of regulations, less important in their 
singularity, over a lengthened period. Attitudes on the 
possibility and propriety of an Act were thus a touchstone 
by which to evaluate desire for Service reform - not the 
content of that desire, but its strength. Agitation for a 
Civil Service Act was at its height in the late 1890s, 
when the more militant civil servants were most active. 
That regulations should so often have been preferred to an
419
Act in the twentieth century was a measure of temporarily 
lessened support for reform. Nevertheless, the idea of an 
Act was always present and this, as a symptom of the 
desire for reform, signified a change from the 
defensiveness of I89O.
Other states
The strongest single force for reform was the example 
of other states. The Association was less able to 
overlook the condition of other Services than hitherto; 
Commonwealth officers, in particular, worked within a few 
paces of state employees. Governments were not loth to 
adopt interstate practice when they found it suitable; a 
retiring age was introduced in 1903, for example, and 
aroused mixed feelings in the Service.  ^ Interstate 
conferences of Service associations made comparisons
easier and underlined the relatively poor position of the
2South Australian Service.
Personnel practices
Appointment and promotion procedures seemed 
especially bad, and contributed to the 'feeling of unrest
1
1903j No. 827j 'An Act to provide for the Retirement of 
Public Officers'. Retirement was made compulsory at 
seventy years of age, though the government could retain 
officers, at its discretion, beyond this limit.
2
Cf. Review, Vol. XX, No. 3 (March, 1914), Supplement, 
between pp.56-7* Officers seeking salary increases were 
more prone to refer to the superior position of their 
peers in other states; see, e.g., CSO In, 733/1908, 10 
July 1908.
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so manifest in the Service’.1 234 Officers criticized changes
in personnel more frequently than they had in the
nineteenth century, and with increasing frequency as each 
2year passed. Some discovered political influences at 
work; but most saw simply that long-serving officers were 
overlooked. In 1907, for example, a junior officer was 
appointed to head the Government Reporting Bureau which 
seemed particularly unjust, since it was considered that 
the Service already contained an unusually large number of 
senior men who might have filled the position. The number 
of such cases probably did grow absolutely as each year3passed. No more than a fraction of civil servants were 
ever classified, and the formal hierarchy guiding 
promotion was therefore never more than rudimentary; it 
was of even less use as the number of classified officers 
continued to decline. Governments were more ready to
4appoint non-South Australians to high positions, but
1
R eview, Vol. XVI, No. 12 (December, I9IO), p.319*
2
See, e.g. , Review, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (February-March, 1907),
p.l6; Vol. XVI, No. 2 (February, 1910), p.177; Vol. XVI,
No. 10 (October, 1910), p.283; Vol. XVII, No. 5 (May,
1911), p.69; Vol. XVIII, No. 11 (November, 1912), p.123; 
Vol. XIX, No. 10 (October, 1913), p.201; Vol. XXI, No. 8 
(August, 1915), p .l46; Vol. XXII, No. 4 (April, 1916),
P .39; Vol. XXII, No. 6 (June,1916), p p .60, 64.
3
Though sometimes the Association claimed to discover 
abuses which did not exist, and had later to retract its 
allegations; see, e.g., CSO In, 1185/1909, enclosures 
dated 12 November 1909 and 18 July 1910.
4
In I9H ,  one politician restated at length the old 
prejudices against this. He was perhaps the last to do so 
(S .A .P .D ., 6 December I9H , pp.659-66).
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attitudes within the Service were slower to change, and 
the Association regarded the employment of women, which 
grew steadily more common, with suspicion. Civil servants, 
moreover, were quick to note what they considered to be 
infringements of their rights. Allegations of an 
increased frequency of abuses in personnel management were 
a symptom, as well as a cause, of their dissatisfaction.
Forces against Reform 
Conservative officials
In removing the Post Office and Telegraph and Customs 
Departments from South Australian administration,
Federation also removed many of the more militant members 
of the Civil Service Association and P.S.F.C. This tended 
to increase the natural conservatism of the Association 
and several of the heads who had left the Council during 
the disputes of the 1890s returned. At the same time, the 
renewed caution of the Council made its senior members 
more ready to judge suggested reforms on their merits, 
rather than arbitrarily to resist proposals made by the 
supposedly irresponsible. Some substantial concessions 
were won in the years 1901-10, and they can be traced to 
the freshened support of the heads. In 1902, for 
example, a superannuation fund was established, though the
422
government made no contribution to it, and cadet salary
2scales were later clarified.
The growing size of the Association also helped it to
win such innovations. It lost about 30 per cent of its
membership to the Commonwealth Service, but its numbers
continued to increase as a proportion of the South
Australian Service. By I9IO, the Association contained
almost 80 per cent of those eligible to join it, though
3this level slipped to about 70 per cent in 1917.
Numerical strength, however, bore no necessary relation to 
support for comprehensive reform; and piecemeal reform 
postponed consideration of a Board.
Doubts about an independent authority derived in part 
from specific fears, especially from the knowledge that 
governments, when they considered the matter, favoured a 
Commissioner rather than a Board. A Commissioner was 
cheaper and those in other states appeared to work as 
effectively as Boards. Officers were more apprehensive. 
M.E. Jull, the Western Australian Public Service 
Commissioner (l904-17), was presented as the ’prosecuting
1
1902, No. 729» 'An Act to provide for a Fund for the 
Relief and Maintenance of Superannuated Public Servants 
and the Widows and Families of Deceased Public Servants, 
and for Other Purposes'.
2
See, e.g., CSO Circular, 23 June 1905; ’Regulations re 
Junior Clerks', S .A .P .P . 63 and 117 of 1910.
3
In 1915 the Association contained a higher proportion of 
civil servants than any other Service association in 
Australia, the Council claimed (Review, V o l . XXI, No. 4 
[April, 1915], p.53).
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attorney' of that state's Service. Few doubted that a 
Board composed of three officers would treat the Service 
more sympathetically. Caution, however, was also a 
product of more general doubts, seldom stated but always 
present.
Young men made the innovations - such as they were - 
in intra-Service activity during the 1880s. Those were 
years of flux, and of intense dissatisfaction; none 
intended revolution, and actions were often important for 
their unforeseen consequences. Yet the period marked a 
new phase in the development of the Service. No similar 
feeling of change and growth marked administration in the 
early twentieth century. Dissatisfaction was widespread, 
to be sure, and reforms were enunciated with growing 
maturity as time passed. But men who had lost their early 
enthusiasms impeded rapid development, and the steady 
growth of the Service did not stimulate strong action. 
Gradualism did not lack advocates, and many remembered the 
past with more favour than they contemplated the future.
Older men dominated the Councils of the Association.
The median age of Councillors in 1884/3 was just under 40
years, and this level was approximately maintained until
the end of the century. By 1908/9, however, the median
age had risen to 5 0 years, which doubtless reflected the
lowered intake of young men during the depression of the 
21880s. It was true that officers who had entered the 
Service as cadets were strongly represented amongst the
1
Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (January, 1912), p-7-
See above, p.304.
2
younger Councillors: eighty cadets appointed in the period
1875-1900 remained in the Service for ten or more years, 
and eight of them (lO per cent) served on Councils prior 
to 1910. As classified officers, ex-cadets felt the 
breakdown of the Act of 187^ more acutely than their more 
numerous unclassified fellows. They were, however, easily 
discouraged from activity, for only two of the eight 
served on more than one Council, and only one achieved any 
prominence. Nor did ex-cadets leave a significant mark 
elsewhere in the Service. Two became heads of departments 
before 1917 (and another subsequently became a head), and 
a handful of others reached senior positions, but the 
great majority proved to be only mediocre. The median 
maximum salary, for example, of cadets who entered the 
Service during 1875-80 (that is, those who were in the 
best position to establish themselves) was £210 p.a. In 
general, ex-cadets reinforced the retrospection of other 
officers. As erstwhile beneficiaries of the Act of 187^-, 
they indeed had some reason to do so.
The continuity of leadership, and the extent to which 
it was rooted in the past, should not be underestimated.
Of the fifty-two heads of 1915» a little over half had 
joined the Service before 1880, and more than two-thirds 
before I89O. Seven were heads before I892 , and fourteen 
before Federation. Extensions to the retiring age were 
frequently made, especially during the first world war.
In 1915> twenty heads were aged sixty or more, and eleven 
were sixty-five or more.
4 2 5
Slow growth of the Service
Senior officers controlled a Service, too, which grew 
less quickly, in functional terms, than at any time since 
the 1860s. Functional growth, rapid after 1875> almost 
ceased with Federation. In the 1890s, governments made 
important innovations in industrial regulation, such as 
the Court of Conciliation, and they extended irrigation 
works and entered the field of produce marketing. These 
matters were elaborated further in the twentieth century, 
but only three new departments were established before 
1916 (Agriculture, Tourist Bureau, Motor Vehicles). The 
most important, Agriculture, was a combination of a 
refurbished Agricultural Bureau^ with several 
Inspectorates established in the 1890s. Of more 
significance was the continued expansion of the railways, 
an attempt to found a state brickworks, and the 
establishment of the Municipal Transport Trust, several 
new utilities (Abattoirs and Fire Brigade, for example), 
and a number of Boards to regulate professional conduct. 
Civil servants further declined as a proportion of the 
government workforce, and not until the early 1920s were 
their absolute numbers as high as in the early 1880s. It 
was, again, a period of consolidation.
An illustration - conservatism at the top
Thomas Gill was one of many officers who examplified 
the process of consolidation and conservatism. Gill 
became Under Treasurer in 1894, at the age of forty-five,
See above, p.280.
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and thus, it seems, satisfied a life's ambition. Perhaps
previous disappointments biased him against aspiring to
further advancement;1 Thomas Playford thought him foolish,
in I896, not to have applied for the position of
Inspector-General of the State Bank at £800 p.a. (cf. £500
p.a. for the Under Treasurer).' But Gill remained Under
Treasurer for twenty-six years - a record time for that
position, and bettered in few others - and he was seventy-
one years old when he retired. No statutory retiring age
applied to him, though he had supported one in the 1880s.
He resigned from the Council of the Association within a
year of becoming Under Treasurer and was not again
officially connected with it, though he continued to take
a friendly interest in its work. Respected and popular
throughout the Service, Gill was yet unwilling to do more
than passively support reform. He conceived the duties of
3his office narrowly, and used the leisure thus gained to
1
He was late to reach the classified ranks, and his failure 
to become Deputy Commissioner of Taxation has been 
mentioned above (p.354). Late in life, after his 
retirement from the Service, Gill remembered how he had, 
in 1866, unsuccessfully applied to become a junior clerk 
with the Central Road Board (he was then a messenger with 
the militia). A trifling incident, but a memory clear 
after nearly sixty years showed an appreciation of early 
failure and later success.
2
Letter of Thomas Playford to Thomas Gill, 16 April I896, 
in Correspondence between Thomas Playford and Thomas Gill, 
1894-8 (S.A.A.).
3Playford thus rebuked him: 'You say that you with your
own hand filled up all the interest warrants...a great 
mistake in the position you now hold in occupying your 
time in any such detailed work....As Under Treasurer it is 
. . .your duty. . .to see that others do [the details ] 
properly, and to thoroughly master every question that
(continued p.427)
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indulge his antiquarian bent. He was known, in the 
twentieth century, as an old gentleman, cultured, 
kindhearted and paternal. Unconsciously or not, he 
modelled himself on the heads he had known in his youth.
In 1921, Gill was appointed to a Royal Commission to 
investigate the condition of the Service, which led one 
politician to say of him that
if there is any incompetency in the Public 
Service he is the father of it. He has grown up 
with it, and it is part of the scheme he and his 
predecessors have established.^
Such criticism was unfair: it ignored G i l l ’s work in the
1880s, and his devoted service thereafter. But it was 
adequate testimony to the influence of the later Gill, an 
influence directed at the maintenance of the status q u o , 
and an influence consonant with that of most heads who had 
preceded him.
3 (continued from p.426)
comes before the Treasurer so as to be able not only to 
clearly state the facts to him, but if desired to be able 
to give good sound advice....You should read up financial 
questions, think out the principles of political economy, 
and show your chief - that your knowledge of finance is 
extensive - and valuable to him not in mere detail only* 
(Letter of Playford to Gill, 21 February, I896 , ibid. 
[Punctuation added. ]).
1
S .A .P .D ., 11 August 1921, p.246.
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Political Activity
Caution a virtue
Success in gaining piecemeal reforms tempted such men 
to advance gradually. The Association thus 1 23consider[ed J 
it only [its] duty to move when an injustice [was] being 
done',  ^ for the idea continued 'that the Association
2existed merely to ask for favours at propitious seasons'. 
Even when officers had at last decided how the Service 
should be managed, they remained diffident about pressing 
their conclusions upon governments. Deputations and 
letters to Ministers were frequent but the canvassing of 
backbench members or electoral candidates, for example, 
continued to be tabooed. Nor were civil servants urged to 
act in concert in casting their vote.
In Victoria, Eggleston observed, the Service vote
'was like a wedge in every constituency, and...by it
[civil servants] frequently got the balance of power....
3The Service interest was constant'. In South Australia 
one observer noted, in 1894, that
the power of the civil service vote...is 
enormous - or, rather, it would be, if it were 
exercised; but I doubt if one in five of the 
civil servants, in or about the suburbs and city,
1
Review, Vol. XII, No. 5 (May, 1906), p.5 6 , Letter from 
A.W. Pettit (then Treasurer of the Association). Original 
emphasis.
2
Ibid., Vol. XVII, No. 11 (November, I9II), p.l43.
3
F.W. Eggleston and E.H. Sugden, George Swinburne (Sydney: 
n. p . , 1931), pp.98-100.
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ever records his vote. It would, doubtless, be 
improper lor civil servants to take any active 
and prominent part in political agitations, but 
in their case as in that of other persons, the 
exercise of the franchise is an imperative 
duty.1
One ex-civil servant seeking election to the South
Australian Parliament appealed to officers to 'rally
round, [and] help your old comrade', but he received less
than 100 votes in a district containing over 200
3government employees. Politicians believed that officers 
would vote against a government in times of recession, but 
they were not then the largest hostile group. In times 
of comparative prosperity politicians gave no signs of 
fearing the Service vote.
Railway workers - a comparison
As white-collar employees, civil servants felt 
themselves superior to, and apart from, those other 
government employees, such as most railway workers, who 
were not. Conditions of employment in the railways, 
however, improved more rapidly than in the Civil Service; 
the gap between civil servants and railway workers was, in 
material terms, much less in I916 than it had been in, say,
1
The Country, 7 July 1894, p.6.
2
Register, 15 April 1893> p.7*
3
That was the approximate number when the census was taken 
in 1881. By I89I , the number of government employees 
would doubtless have increased (no comparable figures were 
included in the census tables for I89I).
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1875* Attempts to improve the lot of the working man in 
the I89OS and beyond, which resulted in arbitration, wages 
boards, a minimum wage and the eight hour day, benefited 
railways workers more than civil servants partly because 
the latter already enjoyed some of the new concessions.
An 'established' group, they received less attention from 
reforming politicians. And civil servants were themselves 
not willing to engage in activities such as arbitration, 
which they considered inconsistent with their status. 
Railways workers were comparatively forthright in pursuing 
improved conditions for themselves.
The South Australian Railways Service Mutual 
Association was formed in 1888 and, like the Civil Service 
Association, met with many early setbacks. By I916, 
however, it could point to successes which the Civil 
Service Association could not match. As early as I89O, 
the Railways Association was 'congratulating [itself] on
the success of the recent agitation' for improved leaves
1of absence and allowances, and later legislation went
further in this direction by extending certain privileges
of classified civil servants to railways workers. They
benefited from de-restrictions on political activity
2before civil servants, and were governed by uniform 
classification and salaries procedures a decade before the 
Service. In 1917 the Civil Service Association complained 
that railways cadets were better paid than cadets in the
1
Review, Vol. II, No. 13 (January, I89O), p.ll.
S .A .P .D ., 21 November 18955 p.2286.
2
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Service. The Railways Association, it is true, had the 
easier task of the two associations, for it represented a 
relatively homogenous group of employees, who were not 
split into opposing factions to the extent that civil 
servants were. It was able to make its representations to 
a single body, the Railways Board, which had the power to 
enforce its decisions. The Civil Service Association had 
to deal with six Ministers, whose responses to suggested 
reforms could vary widely.
Another difference was the willingness of railways 
employees to use political action to secure their aims.
The first President of their Association was a member of 
Parliament, and after I89O Parliament always contained at 
least one or two members who were consistent and 
recognized champions of the railways worker and who, when 
railways workers opposed a government’s decision, did not 
hesitate to say so. A member of the first executive of 
the Association stood for Parliament, and others later 
followed him. During elections, the journal of the 
Association displayed the platform of the Australian Labor 
Party.
Political activity was not necessarily the strongest 
weapon of railways workers, and civil servants were not 
necessarily unwise in repudiating its use. The history 
and traditions of the Service disposed politicians, press 
and public, as well as civil servants themselves, against 
political activity in the Service. Had the Civil Service 
Association attempted to emulate the Railways Association
CSO In, 433/1917j enclosure dated November 1917•
1
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in this respect, the Service might have gained nothing. 
Certainly, the one instance of the Association entering 
politics, in 1893 over superannuation, brought no 
immediate results.  ^ But neither did it act to the 
detriment of the Service. Indeed, the Association’s 
refusal to undertake further political activity was not 
the result of a considered belief that such activity would 
fail or be harmful: it was rather the result of a
doctrinaire desire to take the path of least resistance on 
all matters. Civil servants did not examine the 
possibilities of political activity fully or carefully. 
Perhaps they could not have done so, given their 
assumptions and environment, but such an examination would 
have been a necessary prelude to hastening reform.
Civil servants claimed to recognize issues wider than
their sectional interests, and this was doubtless true.
They were ready publicly to discuss matters which
appeared - to them - to fall outside party politics, such
as conscription in 1916. A government official, said
C.E.O. Smyth, 'is not the servant of the Minister of the
day; he is a public servant - the servant of the people
2who pay the taxes'. Vigorous pursuit of sectional 
interests might endanger this position. Their rights as 
government employees would, in time, be recognized.
It seemed that the first world war gave some impetus 
to the claims of the Association. The prestige of the
1
See above, p p .389-90*
2
Register, 3 December 1923; cf . Review , Vol. XXII, No. 5 
(May, 1916), p.5 2 .
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Service rose following the considerable war efforts made
by officers, in terms of voluntary wage freezes,
enlistments and lives. It was widely conceded that the
Service set an excellent example to the rest of society,^
and the Association was led to claim that officers were
2'no different from other people®, that is, that their 
services deserved reward. Suggestions were raised that 
the Service would otherwise seek access to the Arbitration 
Court.
Indifference of governments
These matters did not weigh heavily with governments.
More important to them was the anticipated return of
hundreds of ex-servicemen to civilian life, many of whom
would seek Service employment, thus making some placement
machinery necessary. Yet these factors were not decisive
in leading to comprehensive Service legislation.
Ironically, the Act of 1916 resulted less from the actions
of civil servants than from the political needs of the
Peake Government (Liberal, 1912-15 )• To offset a marked
decline in popularity, Peake sought Service votes at the
elections of 1915 with the rather negative promise that
the Government, if returned, would not reduce salaries and
would introduce a Public Service Bill when finances
3permitted. The Labor opposition immediately promised to 
introduce a Bill, without reservation, and promised that
1
See, e.g., Advertiser, 20 July 1916, p.6.
2
Ibid., 12 August 1916, p.8.
Ibid., 25 February 1915? p.10.
3
For the firstretrenched employees would be re-employed, 
time, the Service was overtly an election issue.
Prominence was given to the issue when the Government 
emphasized the salary reductions made by the Labor
Government of Western Australia, and it widened to include
2the question of the insolvent police superannuation fund.
Newspapers devoted no editorial space to these issues,
although there are indications that this did not reflect
3the prevailing level of interest. The return of the 
Australian Labor Party was not attributed to the Service 
vote, but the new Government honoured its promise by 
passing a Public Service Act in I916 after an identical
4measure had lapsed through prorogation in 1 9 1 5 *
The Public Service Act of 1916
Provisions
By administering the Act through a Commissioner,
South Australia followed the majority of the Australian 
states. The Public Service Boards of Tasmania and New 
South Wales were working poorly at that time. In Tasmania 
eleven men had filled fourteen vacancies on the Board
1
Ibid., 27 February 1915, p.8.
2
See, e.g. , ibid. , 25 March 1915, P-9*
3
See, e.g., the speech of Angas Parsons (a candidate and 
Liberal M.P.), ibid., 3 March 1915-
4
1916, No. 1259, 'An Act to consolidate and amend the Law 
relating to the Public Service*.
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since its inception sixteen years before and political
influence and discontinuity in policy were marked;
Tasmania changed to a system of Commissioner control in
1919* In New South Wales the Board was meeting growing
criticism over its salaries policy which, two years later,
led to Mason Allard's recommendation that the members of
the Board be dismissed. On the other hand, the Public
Service Commissioners - in Western Australia, Victoria and
the Commonwealth - appeared to be working comparatively
smoothly. McLachlan in the Commonwealth Service was
showing what dynamic, if not universally approved,
administration might accomplish,1 23 and the Victorian and
Western Australian Commissioners were guardedly optimistic
2about the success of their work.
The provisions of the Act, which was concerned
chiefly with delineating the duties and responsibilities
of the Commissioner, paralleled the provisions of Public
3Service Acts in other states. The Commissioner had to be 
a public servant of at least ten years standing, was 
appointed for a renewable term of seven years at a salary 
of £800 p.a. for the first term, and could be removed only
1
Caiden, Career Service, Chaps. 2-4.
2
E . g . , 'Eighth Annual Report (with Appendix in lieu of 
Seventh Annual Report) of the Public Service Commissioner 
for the Twelve Months ended 30th June 1913 ’ , Parliamentary 
Papers of Western Australia, No. l6 of 1913» pp.7-8.
3
Some provisions followed the Western Australian Act (l904, 
No. 4 l ) exactly.
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through a Parliamentary address. His control over the 
Service rested on three main provisions.
First, he was to draw up and implement a system of 
classification for the permanent officers of the Service. 
Second, no senior position was to be filled from outside 
the Service unless the Commissioner certified that no one 
in the Service was as capable of filling the position.
His approval was also necessary before temporary employees 
could be placed on the permanent staff, and before cadets 
could enter the senior ranks. Third, the Commissioner was 
to
personally inspect each Department, and 
investigate the character of the work performed 
by every officer therein, and the efficiency, 
economy, and general working of each Department 
...[and could] recommend to the Governor - (a)
any particular disposition of officers and 
offices, (b) the division, class, and grade of 
any officer, and (c) any rearrangement or 
improved method of carrying out any work, which 
appears to the Commissioner necessary or 
expedient for the more economic, efficient, or 
convenient working of any Department.^
However, the head of each department was also to be 'held 
responsible for [departmental] discipline, general working 
and efficiency and [was to ] advise the Minister
3controlling such Department in matters relating thereto'. 
The Commissioner was to be pre-eminents he could examine
1
Cf. Parker, Public Service Recruitment, p.37*
2
Ss. 19(1), 20(1).
S.18.
3
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the work of the heads and only he could assume a 
coordinating- role over all departments.
Weaknesses
The Chief Secretary admitted that the Act did 'not
give all that the public servants would like*. The
Association preferred a Board to a Commissioner, and
criticized the lack of provision for appeal from the
Commissioner’s classification decisions and the lack of
set salary ranges. In promotions, seniority should be
considered, and not merit alone as the Act stipulated.
With patriotism aroused by the war, the Association
decried the provision permitting naturalized citizens to
2enter the Service.
There were other weaknesses. Employees covered by
3the Act were not closely defined. And during debate on 
the Bill, the Government had been unsure whether the
4Commissioner was to “report* or ’recommend* proposals. 
Power of recommendation was eventually agreed t o , but the 
Government’s lack of interest in the matter demonstrated 
lack of clarity about a vital principle and augured badly
1
S ,A .P .D ., 8 August 1916, p.5 7 8 .
2
Review, Vol. XXI, No. 10 (October, 1915)» pp.2-4, For 
some examples of anti-German feeling in the Service 
aroused by the war (with which C ,E .0. Smyth was most 
notably connected), see Review, Vol. XXII, No. 10 
(October, 1916), p.133*
2
CSO In, 363/1917, 15 May 1917-
3
S .A .P ,D ., 2 December 1915» pp.2673-6.
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for the work of the Commissioner. In general, the 
provisions of the Act were loosely defined, which gave the 
Commissioner scope for initiative but presented dangers 
also.1
Summary: The Influence of the Past
It is convenient to end the narrative with the passing 
of the Act of 1916, for the Act, despite its weaknesses, 
brought the South Australian Service substantially into 
line with the Services of other Australian states and the 
Commonwealth. Might the Act have been passed before I916?
A caution and apathy perhaps unique in Australia marked 
Civil Service reform in South Australia. And, as this 
Chapter has shown, caution and apathy were as much 
products of history as of contemporary events. The years 
between Federation and 1916 saw a re-appraisal and gradual 
acceptance of arguments raised before the end of the 
nineteenth century about the management of the Civil. 
Service, but new ideas were scarce. The final Chapter 
reviews the history of the South Australian Service and 
seeks to explain why reform took the course that it did.
1
For an account of the work of the Commissioner, and of 
the fate of the Act of 1916, see the author’s article, 
'South Australia’s First Public Service Commissioner', 
Public Administration (Sydney). (Forthcoming.)
CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSIONS: THE COURSE OF REFORM
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The Service in 1916
In 1916 the South Australian Civil Service was a 
modern, rational bureaucracy, clearly one of the group of 
Anglo-Saxon bureaucracies related in origins, development 
and contemporary character. Like the other Australian 
Services, which it most closely resembled, it was an 
expensive machines in I915/I6 the establishments of the 
Service cost nearly £1^- million (more than half of which 
went on salaries and wages), and this represented almost 
one-third of the government’s total annual, revenue. Its 
members were a substantial and growing portion of the 
workforce, and the Service was a repository for many of 
the skills which society possessed. These skills were 
employed in a range of functions towards which the well 
developed Service of half a century before had not 
approached; even so, the Service was only one of many 
organizations carrying out the work of government.
As an administrative machine, the Service was 
distinct, as were its members, from those other 
organizations on the one side, and from political activity 
on the other. It possessed uniform budgetary and auditing 
procedures and a separate personnel authority. The method 
of managing the Service thus differed from that of the 
parent Service in Britain, as did the characteristics of 
the personnel system. Classification, for example, was 
not complex; vertical divisions separated professional 
from other officials, but horizontal, divisions were weak, 
for the hierarchy embodied no separate administrative or 
executive class.
44i
In certain respects, the South Australian Service 
differed from its counterparts elsewhere in Australia.
Staff representations to the government were to a limited 
extent institutionalized, for the Public Service 
Association elected one member of the Classification Board 
set up under the Act of 1916, and subsequently elected a 
member to a permanent Classification and Efficiency Board 
established in 1925« * Numerous small departments gave the 
structure of the Service a more confused appearance.
In more important ways, the South Australian system 
of management and control had much further to go. 
Superannuation, civil servants’ right of access to 
industrial courts, the delineation of state and 
Commonwealth powers, the use of advisory committees on 
finance, the place of graduates in the Service, and the 
adoption of 0 and M techniques were matters raised or 
reapproached in time. Other problems arose directly from 
the Act of 1916, and some because it was not passed sooner. 
The Act could not be properly aplied until the Service was 
classified, and this delayed the acceptance by governments 
of the provisions of the Act and the division of 
responsibilities between the Commissioner and the heads of 
departments; for these were matters that had to be worked 
out in practice. Because South Australia had never had a 
Civil Service Board, South Australian officials lacked the 
experience of an independent personnel agency that 
officials in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and 
Tasmania possessed. The Act of 1916 was a somewhat
See below, p.438, note 1.
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doctrinaire application of interstate principles to South 
Australia, and it provided only the basis of later reform.
Nevertheless, the Act provided a basis that had not 
existed before.^ The institution of an independent 
personnel agency was the greatest single innovation made 
in Service management and control to that time, and civil 
servants were fully aware of the importance of the Act.
But if the South Australian Service had thus in principle 
'caught up' with other Australian Services, the slowness 
with which it had adopted the principle of control by a 
Commissioner remained an apparently striking difference.
This Chapter surveys the elements of South Australian 
society which influenced the development of the Service 
and which resulted in the adoption of such characteristics 
as an independent personnel agency. If the South 
Australian Service came to adopt the forms of other 
Australian Services, its route to adoption was often 
different. Identifying the mainsprings of development 
raises questions of comparative value, but it also reveals 
the uniqueness of the South Australian experience. The 
difficulty of relating South Australia to New South Wales 
and Victoria, especially, challenges some of the 
assumptions made about Civil Service reform in Australia.
1
Cf. H.G. Pope, ’Principles in Practice: A Survey of the
Application and Operation of the Principles of Public 
Administration under the South Australian Government', 
Public Administration (London), V o l . XI, No. 2 (April, 
1 9 3 3 7 7 1 5 -1 9 8 -9 9 .
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Why was Reform so Slow?
The narrative above has emphasized reaction to 
proposed and actual administrative changes, and has 
minimized the relative importance of other social and 
political issues (and this apart from the tendency to 
present reform as an inevitable, ongoing process). The 
outstanding characteristic of the development of the
Service was, in fact, the lack of interest it aroused, as
1others have said of Australia generally. What interest
there was revealed hasty and fuddled thinking, obscure
premises and halfhearted conclusions; South Australia had
no Hearn or Badham. Moreover, the level of interest in
the machinery of government (informed or not) appears to
have declined as the century progressed, despite the
2growing size, cost and importance of the Service.
The question thus raised - why did reform of the 
South Australian Service find few champions? - involves 
two others. First, what did South Australians want of 
their Civil Service, and were their expectations met? 
Second, what did civil servants themselves expect of Civil 
Service reform? And to what extent were these 
expectations compatible?
1
See, e.g., W.K. Hancock, Australia (Melbourne: Jacaranda,
1961), pp.53-55? and S, E n c e l , ’Cabinet Machinery in 
Australia’ Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. XV, No. 2 
(June, 1956), p,93-
2
The chronological list of Parliamentary Papers in the 
Bibliography illustrates this.
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Colonial Expectations of the Service
Slowness of reform resulted from satisfaction with the 
condition of the Service; satisfaction arose from 
ignorance, insularity and the conservatism of officials, 
although it was not entirely without justification. For 
much of the period, South Australia was a society isolated 
from its neighbours. It was a parochial society, inward 
looking and often complacent, and it enjoyed, to an even 
greater extent than did the rest of Australia, freedom 
from natural disasters and socially divisive forces. It 
experienced no revolutions, and militarism never tainted 
government. Few colonists criticized the expansion of 
government, for its role in the development of the colony 
was clear, and they were never excluded entirely from 
participation in it. Even the relatively fierce 
complaints of the 1850s were short-lived.^
Intercolonial example
Although South Australians expected their government 
to do a great deal for them, they were little concerned 
with its internal structure, organization or management, 
arid they seldom perceived that they lagged behind other 
colonies in legislating on these matters. The South 
Australian Civil Service Act of 1852^ was the first of its 
kind in Australia, and Victoria and Queensland did not 
succeed with more sophisticated measures in the 1860s.
1
See above, pp.58 , 60-2, 97-8»
See above, pp.63-72.
2
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For almost a decade, the Act of 1.874^ was the only 
operative Civil Service Act in Australia. The Victorian 
Act of I883 and the New South Wales Act of 1884 were not 
obvious successes, and South Australians did not admit 
that their Service required a stringent Act like the New 
South Wales Act of 1.895* The Queensland Civil Service 
Board was abolished in 1902, and not for some years was it 
clear that the Boards and Commissioners of New South Wales,
Victoria, Western Australia, Tasmania and the Commonwealth
2were working successfully. And South Australians did not 
entirely misjudge the situation. The work of reform 
proceeded more volubly in other colonies, but it met with 
little success for almost the entire nineteenth century.
R eform unnecessary
South Australians wanted their Service to be 
efficient, cheap and just, but these requirements were 
enunciated only when they were clearly absent, which was 
not often. The minutiae of official life are not
1
See above, pp.101-02, 129-31, 133, 171, 172-4, 262.
2
On these, see Bland, pp.l4-15, 48-53, and Parker, Public 
Service Recruitment in Australia, pp.26-31* If South
Australian politicians were poorly acquainted with the 
Civil Service legislation of other colonies, the 
politicians of those colonies probably knew little more of 
South Australia. In 1895, for example, the admittedly 
ignorant W.J. Lyne thus referred to the South Australian 
Civil Service Act of 1874: ’in South Australia they seem
to have a very good Civil Service Act, which seems to have 
worked remarkably w e l l 1 2*5 (New South Wales Parliamentary 
Debates , 10 October 1895 , "col"! 1627) , which was not the 
case. See also L y n e ’s later remarks, Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates, 26 June I9O I , p.1731*
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colourful (especially at the time they take place, when
they are secret and discrete), and colonists took little
interest in the business of administration as long as it
functioned quietly. As far as it has gone, the history of
administration in other colonies has shown that reform was
impelled by the existence of evils that unquestionably
needed extirpating - land corruption, gross nepotism or
negligence in railways supervision, for example.  ^ In
South Australia, most important officials, such as Goyder,
Cooke, Gill, Todd and Mais, were either able or trusted,
sometimes both, scandals were rare, officers seldom
complained of injustices in public, and the absence of
2nepotism was frequently emphasized. South Australia was 
not rich, and its population was small, which doubtless 
made abuses less worth while and easier to discover, but 
the earnestness, pride and insularity of the colonists 
also contributed to the sobriety of administrative 
development.
Politicians treated the Service relatively well. The 
Act of 1874 forestalled discontent within the Service, as 
did the Commission of 1888, at least for a time. The 
representation of civil servants on the classification 
boards of 1916 and 1925 was in keeping with this tradition
1
On the connection between nepotism and reform, e.g., see 
J.O.A. Burke, ’Management and Control of the Public 
Service', Public Administration in Australia, 2nd ed., ed. 
R.N. Spann (Sydney: Government Printer, 1962), pp.299~301j
cf. Caiden, Career Service, pp.40-4l.
2
See above, pp.206, 391.
See above, pp .371-82, passim.
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also. The hostility aroused by the Act of 1881^ was a 
measure of its uniqueness; civil servants could not 
reconcile themselves to such harsh treatment.
One mark of the modern bureaucracy - the separation
of the administrative and political machines - was
established early, and was seldom ignored. Before self-
government, the Executive Councillors combined
administrative and political roles in a manner not
continued thereafter. The heads of departments, it was
true, continued to take a prominent public part in policy
2formation for some years after 1857* But the personnel
of politics and administration formed two distinct groups;
the number of civil servants entering Parliament, and the
3number of politicians entering the Service, was small. 
Experience in both spheres was more common after about 
1875 > but by then the conventions of anonymity and
4neutrality were widely accepted. In Victoria, Deakin
said, the Civil Service was ranged ’behind and around’ the
5Conservative party. No such claims were made in South 
Australia and it would have been difficult to make them. 
Civil servants entered into political debate only when the 
outlines of debate were closely defined; they retired to 
their offices when debate was contentious.
1
See above, pp.309-11.
2
See above, pp.218-22, 232-4.
3
See above, pp.211-12, 222-3> 344-6.
4
See above, pp.344-7.
Deakin, p.ll; and pp.11-19 generally.
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An uncontroversial Service
By avoiding controversy, civil servants made 
criticisms of the Service less likely. Their scope for 
arousing controversy was, in any case, limited. The 
development of the colony was steady and usually sure, and 
senior civil servants handled an ever growing budget and 
workforce, but it is unlikely that they were concerned 
with as wide a range of economic and political options as 
were their counterparts in the larger and richer colonies. 
Extensive comparative work would be needed to establish 
this point firmly, but the geographical determinants of 
South Australian expansion in agriculture and public works 
the largely uncontrollable effect of the weather on an 
agricultural economy, and the infrequency of dissension 
over matters of policy within the Service itself, are 
general factors which cannot be ignored. The development 
of the colony did not obviously suffer from the activities 
of those heads who were barely competent to perform their 
duties.
To say this is not to indulge in a facile determinism 
To be sure, it is not possible to conceive of the course 
of pastoral expansion, for example, without Goyder.1 And 
it is impossible to dismiss the influence of other heads 
on the development of the colony, though it is peculiarly 
difficult to define the limits of their influence. But it 
may be doubted that the course of pastoral expansion would 
have been very different without Goyder; and it is 
possible to allow great influence to the heads whilst
See above, pp.203, 233» 238-9»
1
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asserting that other men in their position would have 
acted in a similar fashion.
Succession to an office held by one man for a long 
period, for example, did not usually prove difficult. The 
multiplicity of departments, otherwise dysfunctional,
helped: new heads frequently had long experience within
1the department, and were thus closely identified with 
their predecessor. But more important was the capacity of 
administrative leaders. Heads of departments were 
diligent, rather than brilliant, forceful or accomplished. 
Their ranks included few outstandingly able men, and they 
would appear to suffer in comparison with their 
counterparts in New South Wales. Few heads were so able 
that their successors could not match them.
Such a judgement would have been thought harsh by the 
South Australian political and social leaders of the day; 
if made by a South Australian it would have seemed less 
than patriotic. The heads were strongly criticized in the 
early 1880s, but it was more usual for politicians to 
discern ability in the South Australian Service not 
matched in the eastern colonies. This may be seen as a 
reflection of South Australian parochialism and 
defensiveness, and even as a rationalization to account 
for the widespread lack of interest in Service reform. 
South Australians could express pride in their Service, 
albeit spasmodically, because they lacked a touchstone by 
which to judge it; the Services of New South Wales and 
Victoria seemed clearly inferior. Because they could
Cf. above, p p .155- 6 , 301-02.
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regard the work of their Service with complacency, South 
Australians could see little reason to alter its internal 
organization.
The Act of 1916 can be set against this background. 
The Act was not seen as a substantial contribution towards 
improving the work of government. Few recognized a 
deficiency there. It resulted more from the demands of 
civil servants: by instituting a separate authority to
coordinate the personnel practices of departments, the Act 
gave civil servants some enforceable guarantee of their 
rights. The Act regulated the ’internal' Service, but it 
was passed so tardily because the 'external' Service 
appeared to require little adjustment. Even so, it 
required the passage of time, political exigencies and the 
retirement of old leaders for the anomalous position of 
the South Australian Service, in relation to its 
neighbours, to be acknowledged. Another matter inhibiting 
reform was involved here: civil servants themselves
regarded it with caution.
Civil Servants and Reform
Influence of the heads
The heads of departments fostered caution, and their 
influence was widespread within the Service, in part 
simply because of their longevity. Of the ll4 heads in 
the period 1857-92, sixteen were at the top of the Service 
for thirty years or more (and seven for more than forty
4 5 1
years). These men were links with the favourable social 
and financial position of the heads before 1875 and this 
was, for many years, an important factor motivating civil 
servants in their attempts at self betterment. It was 
inevitable that the Civil Service Association should look 
backwards to a Service that seemed relatively more 
comfortable as the years passed and the attractiveness of 
government employment declined. Even by I9H  the Public 
Service Review could sigh that
in those days [the 1860s ] there was a 
comparatively easy-going, old fashioned Service 
....Rarely did we hear of men breaking down under 
the strain of office work and worry; yet there 
were amongst us good men and true, gentlemen in 
the best sense of the word.^
Well into the twentieth century, the heads retained 
certain of the prerequisites associated with the old order. 
They continued to expect a subservient respect from their 
subordinates; most important, they received it. Some 
subordinates rebelled, and regarded the conservative heads 
as an obstacle to progress, but most saw in the heads 
those characteristics, albeit imperfect, that they thought 
should characterize the whole Service: social position,
recognized merit, fair remuneration and distinct 
individuality.
It is not surprising that civil servants should have 
been reluctant to accept the idea of an independent 
personnel authority, for the idea was directly opposed to 
the paternal and 'easy-going' Service which they 
remembered, or were told about, with nostalgia. Equally,
V o l . XVII, No. 1 (January, 1911), p.7*
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it is not surprising that reform should have been tardy 
when neither civil servants nor the public regarded it as 
a pressing necessity. A reliance on proved methods of 
administration, however, did not simply retard reform. It 
also stamped the Service with certain characteristics 
which can be traced throughout its development, and which 
remained long after 1916.
Characteristics of the Service
Departmentalization
The dispersal of personnel control accompanying the 
tradition of strong heads blurred the distinction, always 
tenuous, between running the staff side and more general 
matters of administration, and this uncertainty was 
reflected in the Act of 1916. Strong heads also abetted 
the creation of small departments, for this obviated large 
scale re-organizations of existing departments and 
consequent changes in the prestige structure. Autonomous 
departmental empires, moreover, promoted the exclusion of 
numerous government employees from the provisions of the 
Act. By 1916 some sections of the Service (notably the 
Police, Printing, Hospitals, Gaols and Parliamentary 
departments) had rationalized their internal structure and 
conditions and developed traditions at variance with those 
of the bulk of the Service, and they could not be 
incorporated in the one structure without great difficulty. 
The more obvious exclusion of the Boards, corporations and 
quasi-departments can also be traced partly to this.
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Classification
For related reasons, South Australia was slow to 
adopt classification by office rather than by officer.
The Act of 1852 purported to classify offices, but it
instituted, in fact, a pay plan based upon the existing
1salary structure of the Service. Classification under
the Act of 187^ resulted in some salary changes, but that
scheme was not based upon a review of the work of each
2office classified. It also largely confirmed the 
existing salary structure, which reflected the value of 
each officer rather than of each office.
There were sound general reasons for preferring
3classification by officer to classification by office, 
although the colonists were naturally aware of those that 
applied particularly to their colonial society: it was
especially necessary to have flexible salaries at the 
senior levels to attract professional men, whose price 
varied from case to case, and so no salary scales were set 
for heads of departments. By the time of the Act of 1916 , 
this practice had become a convention. Before then, 
however, other colonies had introduced classification by 
office for subordinate positions because of an emphasis on 
business methods and in order to ensure comparability of
1
See above, pp.67-70*
2
See above, pp.133-5*
3
C f . Harold H. Leich, 'Rank in Man or Job? Both!’, Public 
Administration Review, V o l . 2 (Spring, i960), p p .92-93*
The Southpositions in the Commonwealth Service.
Australian Civil Service Commission of 1888-91 endorsed
2classification by office, although in a confused manner,
but the Classification Board of 1902 avoided any discussion
of the basis of its classification, an omission made all
the more obvious by Whitington's clear references to
3classification by office soon afterwards.
The reasons which justified classification by office 
in other colonies applied to South Australia also, and 
vagueness was not attributable entirely to vague thinking, 
which certainly cannot be imputed to Whitington.
Reluctance to adopt or recommend the practice arose partly 
because a permanent body would be needed to maintain it. 
Since existing salary levels seemed generally fair, few 
could agree that an independent and permanent authority 
was urgently necessary. Setting up such an authority, 
moreover, would involve interference with the heads, one 
of whose tasks was to regulate the remuneration of their 
subordinates.
Personnel authority
Classification was only one matter which linked the 
establishment of a personnel authority to the position of
1
See V. Subramaniam, Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. 
XVI, No. 2 (June, 1957) , p p . 142-5 j c f . 'Classification of 
the Public Service prepared by the Public Service 
Commissioner', Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1904, 
Vol. Ill, No. 26, pp.iii-xiv.
2
See above, pp.378, 384.
See above, p.4oi.3
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the heads. When the need for a personnel agency was at 
length conceded, the example of other Australian states 
made it almost inevitable that a Public Service 
Commissioner or Board should be the chosen instrument.
But other reasons precluded the prior acceptance of 
alternative instruments, such as the British system of 
Treasury control. In explaining this, previous writers 
have emphasized the role of the Chief Secretary's Office 
in Australia/ but the negative roles of the Treasury,
Audit Office and the heads in general also deserve comment.
A rapid succession of Under Treasurers in the 1860s, 
and the presence of the discredited E.W. Hitchin in the 
position in the early 1880s and of the conservative 
T. Gill from the 1890s onwards, meant that the factor of 
personalities alone was sufficient to prevent the Treasury 
from aspiring to a central role in matters of staffing.
The Audit Office, in any case, attempted to assume that 
role. And whatever role the Treasury lost in potential, 
the Chief Secretary's Office lost in fact. The Chief 
Secretary's Office remained formally responsible for the 
coordination of the Service until 1916, but its activities 
were by then so slight that none considered it a potential 
repository for a new personnel system. The Audit Office 
in South Australia, however, never achieved the position 
it did in some other colonies, where Auditors General were 
important figures on the early Civil Service Boards.
1
See, e.g., G.E. Caiden, 'The Independent Central 
Personnel Agency: The Experience of the Commonwealth
Public Service of Australia', Public Administration 
(London), Vol. 42 (Summer, 1964), p p .134-5•
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Departmental autonomy restricted the activities of the 
Audit Office, as every Auditor General complained, and it 
never seemed likely that a Civil Service Board consisting 
of the audit chiefs would be more successful than the 
Audit Office itself. A Board consisting of other 
departmental heads was regarded with doubt also; the heads 
showed little inclination to work together for the 
coordination of the Service, and they supported a Board 
only with reluctance. A new authority, unencumbered with 
tradition, was therefore needed.
Was Reform Necessary?
Departmental autonomy, classification practices and a 
confused pattern of departmentalization were only some of 
the characteristics of the South Australian Service that 
had, by 1916, a long history behind them. Previous 
Chapters have indicated that such characteristics went 
unchallenged for the greater part of the period. Most 
emphasis, however, has been placed on reform, change and 
progress, which has been necessary to bring out the main 
themes of Service development. The balance can now be 
redressed.
This Chapter began by asking why reform in South 
Australia was so slow. The short answer is that it was 
not slow. Only during the twentieth century, it has been 
noted, did South Australia lag behind other States in 
making legislative provision for its Service. Even during 
the early twentieth century, it was not evident, as it may 
now seem to be evident, that the Service needed reforming.
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In South Australia, respectability was perhaps 'achieved 
too early a n d ... survived too long' .  ^ Investigation, 
however, has not demonstrated that South Australians erred 
greatly in judging the needs of their Service. The Act of 
1916 was modelled on the Public Service Acts of other 
Australian States, but this is not to say that it was 
addressed to the same problems. Thus, Bland has argued 
that the importance of the New South Wales A ct of 1895
in the evolution of public administration in 
Australia, is comparable with that of the 
Macaulay reforms forty years earlier in England.
The incorporation of its principles in the 
Commonwealth Public Service Act, 1902...invested 
the system with such authority that all 
subsequent public service legislation by the 
States was modelled upon it.2
It seems unlikely, however, that New South Wales 
legislators saw themselves as laying the foundations of a 
modern career service. They were concerned more with the 
immediate needs of minimizing financial extravagance and 
the worst abuses of patronage. But if there was any 
single theme leading to the South Australian Act of 1916, 
it was simply that civil servants themselves grew, at 
length, unwilling to accept unguaranteed conditions of 
employment. It has been one concern of this thesis to 
show that Civil Service reform reflected larger movements 
and needs within society: South Australian officials,
undistinguished for the most part, yet faithfully reflected
1
W.K. Hancock, review of Pike, Paradise of Dissent, The 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, V o l . Ill, 
No. 1 (November, 1957), p.133-
2
Bland, p.xiv.
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the ethos of a Civil Service that remained unchanged, in 
many respects, over a period of eighty years. Few 
attempted radically to alter the pattern of development, 
and they thereby supported the wishes of most sections of 
society. Interaction between community and Service 
produced a remarkably bland and even development for each, 
the marks of which still survive.
Comparisons
The pattern of that development suggests certain 
approaches and limitations to comparative work. South 
Australia existed for only sixty-five years before 
Federation. Its first settlers arrived later than in any 
other colony in Australia. For most of the period, one 
generation of officials dominated the Service, seldom 
questioned by their subordinates. The younger officers 
who challenged their authority in the 1880s, and who in 
turn dominated the Service until after the first world 
war, were mostly born in South Australia, but they did not 
reject the style of the Service which the English-born 
heads had established. They responded to other forces of 
discontent, which, greatly modified, found expression in 
the Act of 1916: the civil servants' self-image was, so to
speak, challenged in the 1880s and reformed thirty years 
later. As the narrative above has shown, this was a 
complex and often confused change. But it is evident 
that the passing of time itself was an important factor in 
the change. The development of the Service would doubtless
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have been very different if South Australia had been 
settled thirty years earlier, and if the first generation 
of heads had been challenged at the advent of self- 
government. Like the cycles of economic prosperity and 
recession, generations came and went within the Service in 
an uncontrollable way, and in a pattern unique to South 
Australia. Nevertheless, the pattern of ageing, of 
achievement and ambition, may be examined in other 
colonies.
Similarly, it is easy to discern some results of one 
of the most obvious and important differences between the 
South Australian Service on the one hand, and the New 
South Wales and Victorian Services on the other - their 
difference in size. South Australian problems of 
coordination and control were less severe, for example, 
which tended to alleviate the divisive effects of 
excessive departmentalization, and South Australian civil 
servants were more likely to know personally their 
counterparts in other departments, which may help to 
explain why it was possible for South Australia to have 
the first Civil Service Association in Australia. 
Relatively small size also contributed to the calmness, 
moderation and rationality of the development of the 
Service in South Australia. It is more difficult to 
relate these characteristics to the comparatively 
colourful and controversial Services of New South Wales 
and Victoria. But what of the other Services - in Western 
Australia, Queensland and Tasmania - which were not larger 
than the South Australian? Their development has not been 
comprehensively explained, and it is to those Services 
that the South Australian experience seems most relevant.
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Summary: The Course of Further Research
It is possible that the large administrations of the 
relatively complex colonies of New South Wales and 
Victoria would justify further and more detailed research 
into their separate histories. For the other colonies, 
such separate studies may not now represent the most 
valuable line of work. The present project, it is argued, 
has been justified by the need for a thorough examination 
of one colony which clearly lacked a number of the special 
features of New South Wales and Victoria: their size,
turbulent politics, social and economic complexity, and 
more or less constant concern about the probity, efficiency, 
and employee conditions and demands of their Civil Services. 
It is plausible to think that, on the whole, the 
administrative history of Queensland, Western Australia and 
Tasmania may have been closer to the South Australian 
pattern than to that of the two eastern colonies, 
especially in terms of relative size and organizational 
patterns. If this is to, their individual histories might 
not add greatly to the circumstantial picture of the 
detailed mechanics of a nineteenth century Australian 
Civil Service which it has been one aim of this study to 
elucidate. Further studies of the 'smaller' colonies 
might, therefore, be repetitive in a sphere which is not 
highly rewarding, intellectually or historically, once the 
task has been done for a representative case.
On the other hand, a more important aim of this study 
has been to bring out the points at which a particular 
Civil Service appears to be distinctively related to its 
social, economic and historical environment, and to suggest 
reasons, by this means, for its differences from the
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better known Services. In so far as this attempt has 
succeeded, it suggests the possibility that further 
research on the administrative history of the 'smaller' 
Australian colonies might take the form of comparative 
studies, across intercolonial boundaries, of the more 
important issues disclosed by work done on New South Wales, 
Victoria and South Australia. If such research should 
reveal further differences at the more routine levels of 
personnel administration, these can be investigated so far 
as their wider significance, in a comparative context, 
seems to justify.
APPENDICES
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APPENDIX 1
NUMBERS AND EXPENDITURE, 1836-1916
a. A Note on the Compilation of Figures
b. Expenditure
c. Number employed
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a. A Note on the Compilation of Figures
Finance
The Civil Service Commission of 1888-91 found that
there were 'no less than six different ways’ to pay civil
servants: they might be debited to separate lines on the
Estimates, to 'Miscellaneous', to 'Contingencies', to
Loans, to votes for Works, or partly to Works and partly
to Loans.^ It is therefore difficult to state how much
was spent on salaries and wages in any given year. Even
when salaries and wages were listed as a separate
component of expenditure on establishments (which was so
only at the beginning and end of the period), there is no
way of checking what employees were excluded from such 
2figures. When salaries and wages were not listed 
separately, no estimates have been made to overcome this 
deficiency, for the margin of guess-work is probably 
larger than the fluctuations which it is the purpose of 
such figures to reveal.
Expenditure on establishments was, for this and other 
reasons, an indefinite concept. Most departments included 
in establishments expenditure only those expenses 
necessary to maintain their existence as an organization 
from year to year. But in the case of departments 
concerned with public works the matter was more difficult, 
for a clear line was not always drawn between expenditure
1
Fourth Progress Report, p .vi.
Cf. Butlin and de Meel , p.58.
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on maintenance and expenditure on new capital equipment.
The statements of actual government expenditure which were 
appended to the annual Audit Reports have, however, been 
accepted as they stand. No better source is available.
For most of the period, figures relating to finance 
are used in too little detail to make these problems 
serious. Before 1857» however, the government accounts 
gave only the barest notion of the cost of government, for 
the expenses of several Boards were not stated in any 
detail; expenditure on the railways establishment, most 
importantly, was not separately stated until i860. This 
deficiency has not been overcome. Expenditure figures for 
the early years, therefore, must be treated as suggestive 
only.
Number employed
This is a more difficult problem. Government 
employees fell into two basic groups: classified (fixed
list) and unclassified (provisional and temporary list). 
Classified officers were listed separately in the annual 
Civil Service Lists, and their salaries were shown on the 
annual Estimates. Classified officers can thus be counted 
exactly (ignoring the fact that the Lists were, inevitably, 
slightly out of date).
Unclassified employees were of two types: those
listed on the Estimates, and those that were not. Those 
listed on the Estimates were sometimes listed individually, 
and were thus listed individually on the Civil Service 
Lists; others (such as police troopers) appeared as a 
group in each source. In either case, these employees can 
be counted with fair accuracy. Unclassified employees not
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listed on the Estimates are very difficult to count. 
Reliance must be placed on occasional sources, such as 
Parliamentary Papers, Ministerial statements and census 
re turns.
Unfortunately, the divisions mentioned here did not 
reflect occupational groupings: labouring staff were
generally not listed separately in the Estimates, for 
example, but neither were many clerical officers. The 
table below divides government employees into 'civil 
servants' (chiefly clerical and supervisory staff) and 
'other government' employees (chiefly labouring staff).
The number of unclassified civil servants, like the number 
of 'other government' employees, can only be an estimate, 
and the numbers of both groups are thus stated to the 
nearest ten to avoid spurious accuracy.
The chief sources used in compiling the number 
employed are as follows:
1. The annual Estimates.
2. The annual Civil Service Lists.
3. The annual Classification Lists (1873-1916).
4. Census returns of 1851 , 1835» I86l , I865, 1871> I876, 
1881, I89I, 1901 and I9H  (see Bibliography for 
location).
5. 'Report of Royal Commission on Public Works and 
Railways', S .A . P .P . 25 of 1880.
6. 'Report on the Post Office', S .A .P .P . 191 of 1884.
7. 'Government Officials and Salaries Paid', S .A .P .P .
131 of 1885.
8. 'Relative Cost of the Civil Service', S .A .P .P . 136 of
9.
1885.
'Cost of the Civil Service', S .A .P .P . 70 of I887.
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10. 'Summary of Receipts and Expenditure for Year ended 
June 30th, 1886', S.A.P.P. 109 of I8 8 7 .
11. Audit Report, 1887/88.
12. First Progress Report, App. C.
13* Public Service Review, Vol. I, No. 7 (February, 1893)» 
p . 65 .
14. 'Railway Staff’, S.A.P.P. 45 of 1894.
15. 'Report on the Post Office', S.A.P.P. 128 of I8 9 6 .
16. 'Cost of the Civil Service for Years ended June 30th, 
1892 and June 30th, 1 8 9 6 ' , S.A.P.P. 80 of 1897-
1 7 . 'Report of the Civil Service Classification Board 
under Act No. 748 of 1900', S.A.P.P. 24 of 1902.
18. 'Annual Report of the Public Service Commissioner,
1921', S.A.P.P. 5 of 1921.
19. 'Second Progress Report of the Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into the Public Service', S.A.P.P. 56 of 
1922, App. 1.
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b. Expenditure
Year
Total Government 
Revenue and 
Expenditure (£)
Total Expenditure on 
Establishments (£)
Revenue Expenditure ExcludingRailways
Including
Railways
1857 455,211 538,213 156,914 N .A.
1860/61 553,034 472,947 168,842 242,891
1862/63 580,735 549,237 183,388 269,4i6
1868 716,004 852,689 311,810 417,098
1870 657,576 736,818 298,302 402,828
1873 972,8l4 839,153 326,739 437,345
1874/75 1,143,312 1,176,413 422,484 588,186
1879/80 2,027,964 1,923,605 730,582 991,112
1880/81 2,171,988 2,054,285 772,367 1,038,979
1884/85 2,157,931 2,430,513 826,989 1,238,840
1885/86 2,279,039 2,383,290 812,440 1,191,690
1886/87 1,869,943 2,165,246 743,353 1,141,738
I89O/91 2,732,222 2,603,498 779,324 1,399,553
1915/16 4,356,967 4,741,376 1,382,618 2,971,484
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c. Number Employed
Year
Population
South Australia Adelaide
1855 83,821 34,3l5a
1857 109,917 « •
1839/60 124,112 , .
1860/61 126,830 44,000 (est)
1864/63 136,6031868 176,298 • •
1871 183,626 60,803a
1873 197,874 • •
1875 210,241 . ,
1876 213,271 69,113;*
1879 238,344 103,942 (l88l)1883 300,100 • •
1883 304,336 , ,1888 306,64i
I890 319,804 1 3 3 ,252 u (1891)
I892 329,650
1901 362,595^ 162,0941911 418,172 199,761°
1915 438,285° 2 2 6,646
1916 432,709 223,718°
a
Local government Councils in the metropolitan area, 
b
'Adelaide and Suburbs' (as stated in Census), 
c
S.A.S.R. 1916/17, p .3.
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Year
Government Employees - Civil Servants
Classified Unclassified Total
1853 122
1855 112 • • • •
1857 232 250 480
1859/60 265 370 64o
1860/61 313 350 660
1864/65 388 370 760
1868 549 420 970
1871 442 4io 850
1873 467 390 860
1875 579 480 1060
1876 594 570 1160
1879 756 850 1610
1883 864 1500 2360
1885 895 1270 2170
1888 671 1100 1770
I890 686 1200 I890
1892 693 • • . •
1894 664 1500 2160
1900 • • • • 3306
1902 256 • . • •
1911 96 1049 1145
1916 1378 253 1631
Year
Government Employees - Other 
Government Grand
TotalRailways Other Total
1859/60 180 180 360 1000
1864/65 230 290 520 1280
1868 390 350 740 1710
1871 550 230 780 1630
1879 1740 I66O 3400 5010
1885 2300 2510 4810 698O
1888 3150 2000 5150 6920
1894 3720 2130 5850 8010
1900 3292 I89O 5182 8490
APPENDIX 2
THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE 
GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, I836-I9OI
Note: For the sake of clarity, this chart
omits some minor departments and others 
that had only a transitory existence.
*
t?5>S I
Number ofl 
Depts (31 Dec.):
APPENDIX 3
THE PROVISIONS OF MAJOR CIVIL SERVICE 
BILLS AND ACTS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, I836-I916
Personnel Administration
1852: Departmental. 187^ - • Departmental. 1887 • Board; 
three members, 1 elected by Service; 5 year renewable 
term. 1898; Departmental. I.9OO? Departmental; with 
Classification Board (below). I916: Independent
Commissioner; 7 year renewable term.
Structural Divisions
1852; Three classes. 187^-: Ordinary and Professional (six
classes); Unclassified. 1887 ? First; Professional; 
Ordinary; Provisional. I898; Professional; Clerical; Non­
clerical (+ Railways, Education). 1900? As for I898.
1916: Professional; Clerical; General.
Classification
1852: Office/officer (dubious). 187^ - ? Office/officer.
1887 ? Office. I898 ? 1900? Office/officer; Board
(three members, one elected by Service); full-time. 1916: 
Office/officer; Commissioner and Board (three members, one 
elected by Service); temporary and part-time.
Recruitment
1852: 187^ : Cadets; non-competitive examination;
lateral recruitment by departments. 1887t As for 187^ -, 
but minor appointments only by departments. 1898; Up to
£150 p.a. by departments. 1900: Up to £200 p.a. by
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departments. 1916: Cadets; after examination by
Commissioner, on probation; otherwise, on recommendation 
of Commissioner.
Promotion
1852: Seniority and fitness. 1874 : As for 1852. I887:
Seniority and fitness (dubious). I898 : Seniority and 
fitness. 1900: Seniority to £150 p.a.; thereafter,
'special fitness and aptitude'. 1916: Merit.
Discipline
1852; — . 1874 : Appeals Board for dismissals. 1887 •
Appeals Board. 1898: 1900 : Appeals Board. 1916:
Appeals Board with appeal to Commissioner.
Re tirement
1852: 1874 : Retiring allowance for classified
officers; no retiring age specified. 1887 "• No allowance; 
retire at 60 years. I898: 1900 '• 1916; (70 years
under Act of 1903).
Leave of Absence
1852: 1874: 3 weeks recreation, 3 weeks sick; 6
months after 10 years service, 12 after 20 years; 9 
holidays p.a. 1887 • 2 weeks, 2 months; 4 months, 8 months
I898: 2 weeks (accumulate for 3 years), 2 months; 4 months
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8 months; 9 holidays p.a. 1900s 3 weeks
years); rest as for I898. 1916: 2 weeks,
for 1898.
(accumulate for 3 
1 month; rest as
APPENDIX 4
LIST OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT 
WHO HELD GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS
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This Appendix lists members of Parliament who held 
government positions at some time or other in their lives. 
It includes some who were members only of Boards, but 
those who held full- or nearly full-time positions in the 
departments are of chief concern. It excludes those whose 
political and administrative careers both ended before 
self-government and, no doubt, fails to include some 
individuals active after 1857* Possibly excluded are some 
members whose names were too common to be checked against 
the Civil Service Lists; but these would be few. Almost 
certainly excluded are others who held positions which did 
not appear on the Civil Service Lists, such as most 
railways positions; even when such individuals are 
identified, it is difficult accurately to state how long 
they spent in government employment. Politicians who 
became Justices of the Supreme Court only are not included.
Membership of the House of Assembly is below denoted 
by HA, and of the Legislative Council by L C .
Andrews, Richard Bullock: HA, 1857-60, 1862-70. Crown 
Solicitor, 1870-81.
Babbage, Benjamin Herschel: HA, 1857* Government 
explorer, 1857-58.
Bakewell, William: HA, 1.857-60, 1862-64. Crown Solicitor,
1867-70.
Bartlett, Harry: HA, I887-96. Railways clerk, c. 1880. 
Blyth, Arthur: L C , 1855-56; HA, 1857-68, 1870-77- Agent 
General, 1.877-91-
Bonney, Charles: HA, 1857-58; L C , 1865-66. Manager 
Railways, 1869-70; Inspector of Runs, 1871-87- 
Bray, John Cox: HA, 1871-92. Agent General, 1892-94.
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Bundey, William Henry: HA, 1871-75, 1878-81. Clerk of 
Court, I856-65.
Cockburn, James Alexander: HA, 1884-98. Agent General,
1898-1901.
Coles, Jenkin: HA, 1875-78, 1881-1902. Police trooper, 
c . i860.
Cooke, Ebenezer: HA, 1875-82. Commissioner of Audit, 
1883-1907.
Dashwood, Charles James: HA, 1887-92. Clerk of Court, 
1865-68; Government Resident, Northern Territory, 
1892-1905; Crown Solicitor, 1905-16.
Dashwood, George Frederick: L C , 1843-44, 1852-56.
Commissioner of Police, 1847-52; Collector of Customs, 
1852-58; Emigration Agent, 1858-60; Stipendiary 
Magistrate, 1860-79.
Derrington, Edwin Henry: HA, 1871-73« Stationmaster, 
railways, 1858 - c. I865.
Downer, Henry Edward: HA, 1881-96. Commissioner of
Insolvency, 1865-81.
Dutton, Francis Stacker: L C , 1851-56; HA, 1857-65- Agent 
General, 1865-77-
Finniss, Boyle Travers: L C , 1849, 1851-56; HA, 1857-62. 
Government Resident, Northern Territory, 1864;
Member, Forest Board, 1875-81; Acting Auditor General,
1876.
Freeling, Arthur Henry: L C , I856 , 1857-39* Surveyor 
General, 1849-61.
Glyde, Lavington: HA, 1857-73, 1877-84. Accountant to 
Commissioner of Insolvency, 1885-89*
Hack, Theodore: HA, 1890-93 * Clerk, railways, 1863-74.
Hamilton, Edward Angus: HA, 1870-71. Government Architect,
1856-60.
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Hanson, Richard Davies: L C , 1851-56; HA, 1857-61. Member, 
Real Property Act Commission, l86l; Chief Justice, 
1861- 76 .
Hare, Charles Simeon: L C , 1851-54; HA, 1878-81.
Commissioner for Gawler Railway, 1855; Superintendent, 
Gaol, 1857; Manager, Railways, I86O-65.
MacDermott, Marshall: L C , 1855-56; HA, 1857-59*
Stipendiary Magistrate, 1859-69.
McEllister, Edward: HA, 1858-62. Police trooper, c. 1840-
45*
Mair, William: HA, 1874-75* Clerk, Audit Office, 1855-57.
Mann, Charles (Sen.): L C , 1836-37* Master, Supreme Court, 
1844-49; Acting Judge, 1849-50; Crown Solicitor, 
1850-58; Commissioner of Insolvency, 1858-60.
Mann, Charles (jun.): HA, 1870-81. Clerk of Court, I863- 
68; Crown Solicitor, I88I-89.
Moorhouse, Mathew: HA, 1860-62. Protector of Aborigines,
I839-56; Immigration Agent, 1856-58.
Maturin, William Henry: L C , 1849; HA, 1858. Private
Secretary to Governor Young, 1848-54.
Myles, Charles Hegan: HA, 1871-75* Clerk of Court, 1879- 
82; Returning Officer, 1.882-1901.
Newland, Richard Francis: L C , 1847. Stipendiary
Magistrate, 1850-60; Secretary to Agent General,
1860-7 0 .
O'Halloran, Thomas Shuldam: L C , 1843-51, 1857-63* 
Commissioner of Police, 1.840-43*
Peake, Edward John: HA, 1857-59* Stipendiary Magistrate, 
1859-75*
Playford, Thomas: HA, 1868-71 , 1875-9 4 , 1899-1901. Agent 
General, 1894-98.
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Reynolds, Thomas: HA, 1857-62, 1864-70, 1871-73- Member, 
Northern Territory Runs Commission, 1865-66.
Ross, Robert Dalrymple: HA, 1875-87- Private Secretary to 
Governor Daly, 1862-68.
Rounsevell, John: HA, 1865-68, 1880-81. Agent for 
Commissioner of Railways, 1867- 
Solomon, Judah Moss: HA, 1858-60, 1871-75; L C , 1861-66.
Chairman, Destitute Poor Board, 1877-80.
Spence, John Brodie: L C , 1881-87- Official Assignee, 
1859-64.
Stow, Augustine: HA, 1862-65, 1866-68; L C , 1869-71-
Associate, Supreme Court, 1877-86; Public Trustee,
1886-1903.
Tinline George: L C , I86O-63. Commissioner to the
Registrar General of Deeds, 1858-60.
Torrens, Robert Richard: L C , 1851-56; HA, 1857-58.
Collector of Customs, 1851-51; Registrar General of 
Deeds, I858-63.
Ward, Ebenezer: HA, 1870-80, 1881-90; L C , 1891-1900.
Clerk and Accountant, Northern Territory, 1864.
Way, Samuel James: HA, 1875-76. Chief Justice, 1875-1916;
Commissioner of Insolvency, 1881-83- 
Wigley, Willaim Rodolph: HA, 1875-78. Commissioner of
Insolvency, 1844-56; Clerk of Court, 1856-75- 
Wood, Richard: HA, 1893-1902. Railways clerk, c.1885-90.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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This bibliography lists the works cited above, and is 
divided thus:
Parliamentary and Other Official Papers 
South Australian
Departmental Records 
Debates and Papers 
Acts and Bills 
Other
Other Official
Newspapers and Periodicals
Manuscripts
Contemporary Works
Modern Works
Dissertations
Other
Biographical Works 
Interviews
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Parliamentary and Other Official Papers
South Australia
Departmental Records
(Unless stated otherwise, all Departmental Records are 
held by the South Australian Archives).
Correspondence of the Chief Secretary's Office (Colonial 
Secretary’s Office before 1857) > Incoming and 
Outgoing, I837-I916.
Circulars of the Chief Secretary's Office, 1837-68 and 
I87O-I916. The Chief Secretary's Office holds 
(August, 1967) the Circulars for 1870-76 and I9II- ; 
the Circulars for 1869 have not been located.
Correspondence of the Office of the Commissioner of Public 
Works, Incoming, i860, 1868-77» 1880, I89O.
Correspondence of the Office of the Commissioner of Crown 
Lands, Incoming, i860, 1868, 1870-71, 1880, I89O.
Correspondence of the Treasury, Incoming, i860, 1870, 1880,
1890.
Debates and Papers
South Australian Parliamentary Debates, 1851-1925- 
Debates in the period 1851-56 appeared in the 
Register (see below).
South Australian Parliamentary Papers, 1851-1925- 
Especially;
Blue Books, 1857-1916. Parliamentary Paper No. 2 in each 
year. From 1868, the Civil Service Lists were 
contained in the Blue Books; until then, they were 
retained by the Chief Secretary's Office, and copies 
are now (August, 1967) held by the S.A.A.
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Reports of the Auditor General (Commissioners of Audit, 
1884-94), 1868-1916. Located in the following 
Parliamentary Papers; 1868-1873» No. 3 in each year; 
thereafter, No. 4 in each year.
Census Returns: 1855» No. 19 of 1855-56; 1861, No. 5 of 
1862; 1866, No. 8 of 1866; 1876, No. 73 of 1877;
1881, No. 74 of 1883-84; I89I, No. 74 of 1894; 1901, 
No. 74 of 1901.
Reports of the Civil Service Commission, 1888-91?
’First Progress Report of the Civil Service Commission', 
No. 30 °f 1888; Second Progress Report, 30 of 1889; 
Fourth, 30B of 1889; Fifth, 30 of I89O; Sixth, 30A of 
1890; Seventh, 30C of I89O; Eighth, 30 of I89I; and 
Ninth, 30B of 1891.
’Report of the Civil Service Commission re Superintendent 
of Public Buildings’, No. 30C of 1889«
'A.L. Thrupp’s Claim re Wattle Seed', No. 30B of I89O.
This was the second Special Report by the Commission.
’Reports from the Sub-Committee of the Legislative Council 
appointed to examine the Efficiency and Necessity of the 
Colonial Engineer’s Department and such other 
Departments as may be referred to it'. 1851; three 
Reports; not numbered; dated 27 October 1851 , 24 
November I85I and 27 November 1851» respectively.
'Report from the Sub-Committee of the Legislative Council 
appointed 15th October, 1851, to inquire into and 
report upon the Salaries of the Officers comprised in 
Schedule D . , Parts 1 and 2 ’. 1851; not numbered; not
dated; ordered to be printed, 25 November 1851»
'Civil Service Bill'. 1851; not numbered; dated 27 
November 1851.
'Civil List Bill', No. 44 of 1853.
'Mr A.S. Maturin', No. 93 of 1853*
'Police Force', No. 100 of 1.853»
'Petition from the Working Classes', No. 33 °f 1854.
'Letters from Trinity Board', No. 74 of 1854.
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’Memorial of Mr Hugh Quin', No. 27 of 1855-56.
'Management of Police Force', No. 145 of 1855-56.
'Civil Service Retirement Repeal Bill' , No. 147 of 1855-56.
'Reports of the Select Committee of the Legislative
Council of South Australia appointed to take into 
Consideration the Colonial Estimates', No. 158 of 
1855-56. Includes five progress reports.
'Memorandum on the Estimates Committee's First, Second, 
Third and Fourth Reports', No. 162 of 1855-56.
'Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council 
of South Australia, appointed to inquire into, and 
report upon the Conduct of the Police Force', No. 171 
of 1855-56.
'Reports & c . by Public Accounts Commission', No. 12 of
1856 .
'Report on Public Works', No. 102 of 1857-58.
'Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly, 
appointed to report on the Superannuation Question', 
No. 204 of 1857-58.
'Plurality of Appointments', No. 221 of 1857-58.
'Report of the Select Committee on Railway Management',
No. 59 of 1858.
'Petitions from Officers in Civil Service', No. 112 of
1858.
'Return of Classified Officers', No. 137 of 1859*
'Despatch on Superannuation and Civil Service Act', No. 22 
of 1861. 'Waterworks Contract No. 52', No. 36 of 
l86l. 'Bonus to Estimator of Runs', No. 117 of 1861. 
'Government Officers' Compensation, Pensions, etc',
No. 174 of 1861.
'Adelaide Cemetery Regulations', No. 79 of 1862.
'Pay for Overtime to Government Officers', No. 222 of 1862.
'Public Service Regulation', No. 27 of 1863* 
'Civil Service Regulations', No. l40 of 1864.
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'Payments to Members of Central Road Board', No. 209 of 
1864.
'Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council 
on Acceptance of Offices of Profit', No. 29 of 
1865- 66.
'Sum voted for Increase of Salaries', No. 53 of 1865-66.
'Report of Board of Inquiry appointed to investigate a 
Charge of Tampering with Emigration Certificates'.
No. 143 of 1865-66.
'Payment for Overtime to Government Officers', No. 156 of 
1865-66.
'Report of Commission appointed by the Governor-in-Chief 
to inquire into the Management of the Northern 
Territory Expedition', No. 17 of I866-67.
'Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly 
on Management of Adelaide Hospital', No. 150 of
I866-67.
'Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council 
on Preparation of Accounts and Papers', No. 151 of 1866-67.
'Committee of Inquiry into Management of Police Force',
No. 156 of 1866-67.
'Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly 
on Public Works Department', No. 176 of 1866-67*
'Correspondence with Manager of Waterworks', No. 216 of
1866-67.
'Report of Commission appointed by the Governor-in-Chief 
to inquire into Charges against the Waterworks 
Engineer', No. 15 of 1867.
'Resignation of Medical Officer, Lunatic Asylum', No. 67 
of I867.
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'Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council 
on the Police Force', No. 120 of 1867*
'Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council 
on Waterworks Management', No. 188 of I867.
'Private Practice of Officers of Central Road Board', No. 
190 of 1867.
'Payments to Members of Central Road Board', No. 62 of
1868- 69.
'Report upon the Public Accounts, I869?, No. 28 of
1869- 70.
'Pay for Overtime to Government Officers', No. 126 of
1869- 70.
'Charges against Clerk of Works, Mount Gambier', No. 174
of I869-7O.
'Conduct of Public Business', No. 36 of 1871.
'Correspondence relative to Precedency', No. 115 of 1871.
'Dismissal of Police Constable Condon', No. 159 of 1871.
'Correspondence relative to Keeping of Public Accounts', 
No. 55 of 1872.
'Despatch on Precedency Act, 1872', No. 6l of 1872.
'Correspondence on Precedency Bill', No. 68 of 1872.
'Report of the Civil Service Commission', No. 39 of 1873*
'Report on Northern Territory', No. 55 °f 1873*
'Withdrawal of Surveyor-General's Resignation', No. 105 of 
1873-
'Report of Select Committee on Civil Service Bill', No. 73 
of 1874.
'Examination of Candidates for Cadetship under Civil 
Service Act, 1874' , No. 248 of 1.874.
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'Report of the Commission into the Organization and
Working of the Post Office Department', No. 20 of
1875.
'Examinations for Cadetships under Civil Service Act,
1874' No. 24 of 1877.
'Protests against Awards re Public Offices' Designs',
No. 237 of 1877.
'Amount expended on Railways, Public Works etc., 1879'>
No. 204 of 1879.
'Progress Report of the Royal Commission on Public Works 
and Railways', No. 25 of 1880.
'Progress Report of Commission appointed to report on 
Public Finance', No. 26 of 1880.
'Public Works Report', No. 29A of 1880.
'Royal Commission on Public Finance', Nos. 82 and 83 of 
1881, and 26 of 1882.
'Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly 
on the Paris Exhibition Special Commissioner', No.
102 of 1881.
'Suggestions from Heads of Departments re Civil Service 
Amendment Bill' , No. l44 of 1881.
'Report of Royal Commission on Railways', No. 27 of 
1883-84.
'Final Report of the Commission on the Working of the 
Education Acts', No. 27A of 1883-84.
'Report on the Post Office*, No. 191 of 1884.
'Government Officials and Salaries Paid', No. 131 of 1885•
'Particulars re Guarantees of Civil Servants', No. 133 of 
1885.
'Relative Cost of the Civil Service', No. 136 of I885. 
'Cost of the Civil Service*, No. 70 of 1887»
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'Progress Report of“ the Select Committee of the House of 
Assembly on the Public Works Officers', No. 82 of 
1887 •
'Summary of Receipts and Expenditure for Year ended June 
30th 1886», No. 109 of 1887.
'List of Retrenched Officers', No. 174 of I889.
'Correspondence re Proposed Engagement of Mr 0. Brown',
No. 69 of 1890.
'Expenditure of Civil Service Commission', No. 129 of I89I .
'Railway S t a f f , No. 45 of 1894.
'Report on the Post Office', No. 128 of I896.
'Cost of the Civil Service for Years ended June 30th, I892, 
and June 30th, I896', No. 80 of I897.
'Report of the Public Service Commission', First, Second
and Third Progress Reports, Nos. 20 of 1899, I9OO and 
1901.
'Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council 
on Waterworks', No. 23 of 1902.
'Report of the Civil Service Classification Board under 
Act No. 748 of 1900', No. 24 of 1902.
'Regulations re Junior Clerks', Nos. 63, 117 of I9IO.
'Annual Report of the Public Service Commissioner, 1.921 ' , 
No. 5 of I92I.
'Progress Reports of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into 
the Public Service', Nos. 55 and 56 of 1922.
'Statistical Record of the Legislature, 1836-1965’, No. 97 
of 1965.
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Acts and Bills
1852, No. 9, 'An Act to regulate the Salaries of certain
Clerks and Subordinate Officers of the Crown in South 
Australia, and to establish Rules for a Progressive 
Increase of the same for Length of Service'.
1853 > No. l6, 'An Act to extend and make compulsory the 
Practice of Vaccination'.
1854, No. 21, 'An Act to provide for the Retirement of 
Officers in the Civil Service'.
1835-56, No. 2, 'The South Australian Constitution Act'.
i860, No. 12, 'An Act to repeal an Act, No. 21 of 1854, 
intituled "An Act to provide for the Retirement of 
Officers in the Civil Service", and to provide for 
the Settlement of all Claims arising under the said 
Act, and for Other Purposes'.
1862, No. 2, 'An Act to remove Doubts as to the
Appointments to and Dismissals from Office of 
Certain Persons'.
1862, No. 11, 'An Act for the Better Examination and Audit 
of the Public Accounts'.
1869-70, No. 19, 'An Act to prevent Public Contractors 
being returned to or sitting or voting in 
Parliament'.
1872, No. 14, 'An Act to repeal 'The Parliamentary
Privilege A c t ', and to make Other Provisions in lieu 
thereof'.
1874, No. 3, 'An Act to regulate the Civil Service'.
1875» No. 11, 'An Act to amend the Law relating to Public 
Education'.
1878, No. 122, 'An Act to amend "The Education Act, 1875” '.
1881, No. 231» 'An Act to amend "The Civil Service Act of 
1874"'.
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1882, No. 24l, 'An Act to provide for the Audit of the 
Public Accounts'.
1885 > No. 355, 'An Act to further amend "The Civil Service 
Act, 1874"'.
1887, *A Bill for an Act to provide for the Appointment of
a Civil Service Board, and to make Better Provision 
for regulating the Civil Service'. Legislative 
Council, No. 17; read first time, 18 October I887.
1895, No. 617, 'An Act to amend "The Audit Act, 1882"'.
1896, 'A Bill for an Act to amend and consolidate the Laws 
relating to the Public Service'. House of Assembly, 
No. 58; read a first time, 3 December I896.
I898, 'A Bill for an Act relating to the Public Service'. 
House of Assembly, No. 80; read a first time, 20 
December, 1898.
1900, 'A Bill for an Act relating to the Public Service'. 
House of Assembly, not numbered; read a first time,
5 October 1900.
1902, No. 7295 'An Act to provide for a Fund for the 
Relief and Maintenance of Superannuated Public 
Servants and the Widows and Families of Deceased 
Public Servants, and for Other Purposes'.
1903, No. 827, 'An Act to provide for the Retirement of 
Public Officers'.
1916, No. 1259» 'An Act to consolidate and amend the Law 
relating to the Public Service'.
Other
'Draft Report, of Board on civil Service Salaries'. 
December I838. S.A.A., A306/B4.
Finniss, W.C.M. 'Papers re Public Accounts'. S.A.A.3IO.
Governor's Despatches to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 1837-80. S.A.A.
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General List Book. S.A.A., GRG 24/18. This contains a 
list of Board members in the 1850s.
Minutes of the Executive Council, 1840-90, S.A.A.
The South Australian Government Gazette, 1840-1925-
The South Australian Industrial Register, 1933-
Other Official
Great Britain
'Report of the Select Committee on South Australia',
House of Commons Papers, Vol.IV, No. 19 of l84l.
'Copies of any Correspondence in the Colonial Department 
relative to the Establishment of the Settlement of 
South Australia since 1831, and its Present Financial 
Difficulties, ibid., Vol. XVII, No. 129 of l84l.
Commonwealth
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 1901.
'Classification of the Public Service prepared by the 
Public Service Commissioner', Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Papers, Vol. Ill, 1904.
Victoria
'Civil Servipe', Parliamentary Papers of Victoria, Vol. II, 
No. 34 of 1858-59-
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'Report of the Royal Commission appointed to enquire into 
the State of the Public Service and the Working of 
the Civil Service Act', ibid., Vol. II, No. 10 of
1873-
1883, No. 773? 'An Act to make Better Provision for the 
Public Service of Victoria'.
New South Wales
New South Wales Parliamentary Debates, 1895*
'Report from the Select Committee on the Civil Service', 
Vol. I, 1872-73-
See also under Thomson, E. Deas (below, Contemporary 
Works).
Western Australia
'Third Progress Report of the Royal Commission on the
Public Service of Western Australia', Parliamentary 
Papers of Western Australia, Vol. I, No. 6 of
1903-04.
'Eighth Annual Report (with Appendix in lieu of Seventh
Annual Report) of the Public Service Commissioner for 
the Twelve Months ended 30th June, 1913'> ibid.,
No. 16 of 1913.
Tasmania
'Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into 
the Accounts, and the Departments of the Government, 
Southern Side ' , Parliamentary Papers of Tasmania, 
Vol. 10, No. 11 of I863.
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New Zealand
See under Fitzgerald, James Edward (below, Contemporary 
Works).
Newspapers and Periodicals
Figures in parenthesis indicate the end of reading, when 
publication had not ceased.
Davies, Charles. 'Miscellaneous Newspaper Cuttings'.
S.A.A.
Pasquin: The Pastoral, Mineral, and Agricultural Advocate. 
Published in Adelaide from January 1867 to November 
1869; and reissued in one volume; London: Judd, 1882.
The Public Service Journal, South Australia, 1888-89; this 
became
The Public Service Journal and Railway Review, South 
Australia, 1889-92; this became 
The Public Service Review, South Australia, l892-(l925)*
The South Australian Advertiser, l858-(l925)*
The South Australian Gazette and Colonial Register, 
1836-39; this became
The South Australian Register, 1839-1901; this became 
The Register^ I9OI-(1925)•
The following newspapers were consulted for selected 
periods:
The Adelaide Observer.
The Border Watch.
The Country.
The Illustrated Adelaide News.
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The Northern Ar^us.
The Port Augusta Dispatch, Newcastle and Flinders 
Chronicle.
The South Australian Mail.
The South-Eastern Star.
Manuscripts .
Ayers, Henry. Letters to J.B. Graham, [October?] 1848,
26 September 1 8 5 6 , 25 April 1864, and 23 July 1864. 
National Library, Canberra, G6 1 9 .
Blyth, Arthur. Letter to Henry Parkes, 17 July 1874.
Parkes Papers, Mitchell Library, Sydney, A919 5 p.824.
Blyth, Arthur. Letter to H.E. Bright, 30 June 1882.
S.A.A., 991/SGAl.
Boucaut, James Penn. Letters to Henry Parkes, 10 February 
1872, 13 December 1880, and 29 November I8 8 9 .
Parkes Papers, A919> pp.924, 723 > and 730-31 
re spec tively.
Boucaut, James Penn. Letter to (Governor) W.C.F.
Robinson, [August] 1886. Boucaut Papers, S.A.A., 132.
Civil Service Association. Minute Books. In the
possession (August, 1 9 6 7 ) of the Public Service 
Association of South Australia, Inc.
Civil Service Association. Draft of Letter to accompany 
Petition (of April 1884). In the possession (August, 
1 9 6 7 ) of the Association.
Civil Service Association. See also below, under 
'Contemporary Works'.
Deering, Samuel. Letter to W.T. Sheppard, 18 March 1882. 
Sheppard Papers, S.A.A., P.R.G.71*
497
Fergusson (Governor) James. Letter to the Duke of 
Buckingham, 4 December 1870. S.A.A., D3725*
Finniss, Boyle Travers. Letter to Henry Ayers, 13
December I867. Finniss Papers, S.A.A., Don. 31^1*
Franklin, Lady. Diary. National Library, Canberra, MS 
114/B.
Hindmarsh, (Governor) John. Letter to Sir Pulteney
Malcolm, 22 June I838. National Library, Canberra, 
MS 1311.
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Winch, Donald. Classical Political Economy and Colonies. 
London: London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 1 9 6 5 •
White, Leonard D. The Jacksonians: A Study in
Administrative History, 1829-1861. New York:
Macmillan, 195^•
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substantial biographical information. Other sources 
of importance, chiefly for dates of birth, include:
Hodder, History of South Australia, Vols. I and II, 
passim (see above).
’Superannuation Fund’, S .A .P .P . 73 of 1855-36.
CSO In, 3I8/I8 9 4, 19 March 1894.
’Report of the Commonwealth Public Service Commissioner, 
1904’ (see above).
Interviews
During December 1964-February 1965* the following 
people were interviewed (date of entry to the South 
Australian Service is given in brackets):
G.E. Cresswell (October, I906). Member, Council of Public 
Service Association, and President, 1933-39*
Sir Fred Drew (July, I9H ) .  Under Treasurer, 1946-60.
J.W. Goulter (April, 1920). Assistant Auditor General,
i960- .
L.C. Hunkin (January, 1930)* Member of South Australian 
Parliament, 1920-27* Secretary, PSA, 1922-29*
Public Service Commissioner, 1930-49*
F.J.J. McNally (July, I9H ) .  Member, Council of PSA, 
1937-39*
J.A. Mitchell. Secretary, PSA, 1947- *
T.F. Rice (February, I.9IO) . Member, Council of PSA, 
1937-39* General Manager, Produce Department, 
1950-57*
J.H.G. Slade (September, 1915)* Member, Council of PSA, 
1933-39* Director, Public Buildings Department, 
1960-66.
A.C. Tillett (December, 1925)* Assistant Public Service 
Commissioner, 1964- .
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Bibliographical Note
In general, the bibliographical method adopted above 
is that of A Manual of Style (llth ed.; Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 19 ^ 9 ) • Op. ci t. and loc. ci t . are not 
used. Instead, second and later references to a work give 
the surname of the author, and the 'short title’ of the 
work if other works by the same author have been referred 
to. Similarly, 'short titles’ only are used for second 
and later references to Parliamentary Papers.
